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Summary		This	 thesis	analyses	 land	dispossession	and	associated	displacement	 in	Colombia	 from	a	critical,	historical,	political	economy	perspective.	It	illustrates	how	and	why	dispossession	and	related	polices	have	changed,	what	 is	distinctive	about	contemporary	processes	and	how	these	have	been	shaped	by	the	country’s	specific	trajectory	of	economic	development.	I	consider	land	grabs	effected	by	private	agents	and	coercive	State-backed	acquisitions,	as	well	as	other	forms	of	dispossession;	this	generates	new	insights	into	what	has	happened	in	Colombia,	where	different	forms	overlap.	In	general,	the	thesis	provides	for	a	different	and	richer	understanding	of	the	underlying	drivers,	varied	enabling	factors,	and	complex	mechanics	of	land	dispossession	in	21st	century	Colombia.			The	 analysis	 serves	 to	 challenge	 superficial	 accounts	 of	 dispossession	 in	 Colombia	specifically	 and	 mainstream	 explanations	 of	 the	 issue	 more	 broadly.	 The	 former	 treat	dispossession	as	an	aberration	of	the	armed	conflict	and/or	downplay	the	importance	of	other	factors.	The	latter	suggest	that	dispossession	arises	in	the	absence	of	clearly	defined	property	rights	and	a	strong	rule	of	law	or	that	it	is	imposed	by	governments	for	the	‘public	good’.	A	critical	political	economy	approach	highlights	and	attends	 to	 the	deficiencies	of	explanations	 that	minimise	 the	 importance	 of	 history,	 power	 relations,	 social	 struggles,	ideology	and	the	wider	socio-political-economic	context.			Dispossession	has	typically	been	investigated	as	an	appendage	to	other	issues,	such	as	the	development	of	capitalism	or	armed	conflict.	This	thesis,	by	contrast,	puts	dispossession	at	the	centre.	 I	 identify	and	critically	analyse	key	claims	about	dispossession	across	varied	theoretical	fields	and	thus	construct	a	broad	conceptual	framework	that	could	be	of	use	to	other	 scholars	 interested	 in	 this	 growing	 area	 of	 research.	 I	 also	 advance	 a	 number	 of	original	arguments,	including:	that	the	capitalist	land	regime	is	laden	with	contradictions	and	 that	 perpetuating	 growth	 based	 on	 capital	 accumulation	 relies	 on	 the	 imposition,	violation	 and	 restriction	 of	 private	 property	 rights	 in	 land.	 The	 importance	 of	 property	
violations	and	restrictions	in	mobilising	land	for	capitalist	development	is	overlooked	even	by	critical	scholars	who	tend	to	associate	dispossession	with	enclosures	and	privatisation.	Overall,	the	thesis	shows	how	analyses	of	land	dispossession	can	shape	the	way	we	think	about	broader	issues	and	opens	up	new	questions	for	future	investigation.		 	
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	Glossary	and	Acronyms	
	
o AUC	 –	 Autodefensas	 Unidas	 de	 Colombia	 or	 United	 Self-Defence	 Forces	 of	 Colombia,	paramilitary	umbrella	organisation.	
o Baldío	 –	 lands	 that	do	not	have	an	official	history	of	private	ownership	and	 -as	such-	technically	belong	to	the	State,	also	referred	to	as	State	lands.	
o Cabildo	–	a	‘special	public	entity’	(with	colonial	origins)	that	is	in	charge	of	representing	an	indigenous	community	and	administering	internal	norms	within	their	corresponding	territory,	which	may	or	may	not	be	formally	constituted	as	a	resguardo.	This	community-level	 entity	 is	made	 up	 of	 different	 volunteer	 delegates	 -such	 as	 governor,	 health	 or	education	 secretary,	 treasurer,	 and	 so	 forth-	who	are	 chosen	by	 the	 community	on	a	yearly	basis.	The	term	‘cabildo’	is	also	used	flexibly	in	reference	to	the	community	the	organisation	represents.		
o Campesino	–	akin	 to	peasant;	 though	the	 term	is	used	widely	 to	describe	people	with	scarce	resources	who	live	in	rural	areas	(both	smallholders	and	wage	labourers)	and	is	associated	with	a	particular	culture	and	way	of	life.	
o Colonos	–	peasant	settlers,	campesino	migrants	who	established	on	‘frontier’	lands.	
o COP	–	Colombian	peso.	
o ELN	–	Ejército	de	Liberación	Nacional	or	National	Liberation	Army,	guerrilla	group.	
o EPL	–	Ejército	Popular	de	Liberación	or	Popular	Liberation	Army,	guerrilla	group.	
o FARC	–	Fuerzas	Armadas	Revolucionarias	de	Colombia	or	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	of	Colombia,	guerrilla	group.	Since	the	2016	peace	accords	the	FARC	is	a	political	party	with	the	same	acronym,	standing	for	Fuerza	Alternativa	Revolucionaria	del	Común	or	Common	Alternative	Revolutionary	Force.	
o FDI	–	foreign	direct	investment.	
o Hacendado	–	the	owner	of	a	hacienda,	traditional	large	landowner.	
o IDP	–	internally	displaced	population	or	internally	displaced	person.	
o ISI	–	import	substitution	industrialisation.	
o INCODER	 –	 Instituto	 Colombiano	 de	 Desarrollo	 Rural	 or	 Colombian	 Institute	 of	 Rural	Development,	 which	 was	 recently	 replaced	 by	 the	 Agencia	 Nacional	 de	 Tierras	 or	National	Land	Agency	-	among	other	entities.	
o INCORA	–	Instituto	Colombiano	de	la	Reforma	Agraria	or	Colombian	Institute	of	Agrarian	Reform,	which	was	replaced	by	the	INCODER.	
o Prescription	–	acquisition	of	land	via	prescription	or	adverse	possession,	legal	concept.	
o Resguardo	–	indigenous	territory	under	collective	title,	which	is	governed	by	a	cabildo.	Institution/concept	originally	established	in	the	colonial	era.	
o SNR	 -	 Superintendencia	 de	 Notariado	 y	 Registro	 or	 Superintendent	 of	 Notaries	 and	Registries.	
o UAF	–	Unidad	Agrícola	Familiar	or	Agricultural	Family	Unit,	concept	introduced	by	Law	135	of	1961.	It	is	the	land	area	-legally	defined-	necessary	for	a	rural	family	to	earn	an	adequate	income,	but	not	so	large	that	production	consistently	requires	hired	workers.	
 vii	
The	UAF	is	different	for	each	region	and	depends	on	various	factors,	such	as	soil	quality	and	infrastructure.	It	is	associated	with	land	ceilings	and	floors,	designed	to	determine	titling	areas	and	prevent	concentration/fragmentation	of	rural	property.	The	term	‘UAF	rules’	refers	to	restrictions	on	the	accumulation	of	former	State	lands	–	no	one	person	is	allowed	to	accumulate	more	than	one	UAF	(originally	titled	as	a	baldío)	under	Law	160	of	1994.	
o USD	–	United	States	dollar.	
o ZIDRES	-	Zonas	de	Interés	de	Desarrollo	Rural	y	Económico	or	Rural	Social	and	Economic	Development	Interest	Zones,	concept	introduced	by	Law	1776	of	2016.	These	are	areas	specially	designated	by	the	government,	where	special	rules	and	(de-)regulations	apply,	intended	to	promote	large-scale	agricultural	investments,	especially	in	regions	with	poor	infrastructure.	
o ZRC/PRZ	–	Zona	de	Reserva	Campesina	or	Peasant	Reserve	Zone,	concept	introduced	by	Law	160	of	1994.		These	are	areas	specially	designated	by	the	government,	where	special	rules	 and	 regulations	 apply,	 intended	 to	 promote	 and	 support	 the	 campesino/colono	economy,	strengthen	the	organisation	of	rural	communities	and	their	participation	 in	State	planning	and	prevent	further	concentration	of	rural	land,	among	other	things.	
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Introduction	
	What	development?	I	don’t	see	this	famous	development.	[…]	The	only	thing	oil	activities	have	 left	 us	 is	misery,	 violence	 and	 terror,	 and	 that	 is	 very	 clear.	We	want	 the	 new	generation	to	be	able	to	live	here	in	peace.	[…	I	want]	clean	water	and	pure	air	for	my	grandchildren,	so	that	they	can	go	to	the	river	and	say	how	wonderful	this	territory	is	[…]	May	they	kill	us	defending	the	land,	may	they	kill	us	for	working	for	the	wellbeing	of	the	people	(Inhabitant	of	Nasa	Cxha	Cxha	-	Putumayo,	personal	interview,	2015).		They	[the	gold	mining	company]	put	10	cents	in	and	said	that	Marmato	belonged	to	them.	[…]	People	said	not	to	get	involved	because	they	would	kill	us	[…]	we	learnt	that	we	had	to	lose	our	fear,	that	if	they	were	going	to	kill	us	so	be	it,	because	it	is	the	life	of	everyone	or	 the	 life	 of	 one	 [person].	 I	 prefer	 to	 die	 than	 everyone	 having	 to	 leave	 displaced	(Inhabitant	of	Marmato	-	Caldas,	personal	interview,	2014).		War	has	many	faces;	that	of	death	with	blood,	with	displacement,	with	the	burning	of	villages	and	the	other	face	of	land	appropriation	for	the	rich,	for	the	development	of	a	few.	[…	new	page	and	new	speaker]	We	resist	to	defend	life,	to	defend	our	territory	for	our	children,	for	all	of	our	humanity.	[…]	If	I	die	defending	my	rights,	I	die	with	pleasure	(Inhabitants	of	Curvaradó	and	Jiguamiandó	-	Chocó	cited	in	CIJP,	2005,	pp.	54,	65).			These	people,	from	diverse	parts	of	Colombia,	all	expressed	a	willingness	to	die	for	their	land	or	territory	-	to	protect	it	and/or	to	defend	against	being	uprooted	from	it.	I	chose	to	start	with	these	quotes	for	three	reasons.	First,	this	thesis	is	essentially	about	real	people	and	their	struggles.	This	can	easily	be	lost	in	abstract	discussions,	so	I	decided	to	start	with	their	 words.	 Second,	 there	 is	 no	 clearer	 way	 of	 expressing	 the	 problem	 of	 value	incommensurability.	Most	institutions	work	on	the	assumption	that	land	is	a	commodity,	that	it	can	be	easily	replaced	or	that	its	loss	can	be	compensated	with	money.	But	the	fact	that	 some	 would	 risk	 death	 before	 giving	 up	 their	 lands	 shakes	 this	 assumption	 to	 its	foundations.	Finally,	these	narrative	fragments	point	to	the	destructive	throes	of	economic	‘development’	and	the	resistance	this	elicits.	All	three	are	from	communities	that	are/were	threatened	by	dispossession	and	displacement	linked	to	investment	interests	in	petroleum,	gold	and	palm	oil	respectively.	
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As	of	2016,	Colombia	was	 said	 to	have	 the	 largest	 internally	displaced	population	(IDP)	in	the	world	(UNHCR,	2017,	p.	65).	Just	under	7.2	million	people	have	fled	their	homes	since	 1985.	 The	 majority	 were	 uprooted	 since	 2000	 (RUV,	 2017)	 and	 circa	 85%	 of	displacements	occurred	 in	rural	areas	 (CNMH,	2015b,	p.	16).	The	official	and	 immediate	cause	of	this	displacement	calamity	is	the	decades-long	armed	conflict	(the	above	figures	do	not	include	those	‘legally’	displaced	to	make	way	for	State-backed	investments	nor	those	displaced	by	disasters	 such	as	 flooding	and	 landslides).	However,	displacement	has	also	been	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 land	 appropriation;	 it	 was/is	 often	 the	 purpose,	 rather	 than	 an	unintended	 consequence	 of	 violence	 (Mondragón,	 2006;	 Maher	 &	 Thomson,	 2011;	Thomson,	2011,	2014).		The	close	relationship	between	commercial	land	interests	and	violent	displacement	has	been	recognised	by	Colombia’s	Constitutional	Court:	“economic	actors	have	allied	with	irregular	 armed	 actors	 […	 who	 commit]	 acts	 of	 violence	 that	 eliminate	 or	 displace	 the	indigenous	 from	 their	 ancestral	 territories,	 clearing	 the	 way	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	productive	[agro-industrial	and	mining]	projects”.	The	Court	notes	that	in	some	areas	the	link	between	armed	groups	and	economic	interests	“is	one	of	the	principle	causes	of	forced	displacement”	(Corte	Constitucional,	2009,	p.	8,	my	emphasis).	Though	this	Writ	is	focused	on	 indigenous	 peoples	 specifically,	 the	 same	 observations	 also	 apply	 to	many	 Afro	 and	mestizo	 campesino	 communities.	 As	 Grajales	 explains	 (2011):	 “displacement	 as	 a	 land	grabbing	strategy	is	sufficiently	well-documented	to	be	considered	a	proven	fact”	(p.	783).	Paramilitaries	 and	 their	 elite	 allies	 orchestrated	 the	 displacement	 of	 countless	households	and	communities	to	take	over	land	and/or	employed	violence	to	prevent	the	displaced	from	reclaiming	their	homes,	farms	and	territories.	They	typically	legalised	these	land	occupations	by	gaining	property	or	use	rights	for	themselves	and	their	associates	using	force	and	fraud.	Often,	the	land	was	sold	on	to	other	investors	through	a	complex	chain	of	transactions	 designed	 to	 conceal	 the	 violent	 origins	 of	 the	 acquisition.	 The	 stolen	 land	was/is	used	for	tree	plantations	and	other	agribusiness	ventures	or	for	cattle-ranching,	as	well	 as	 for	 illicit	 enterprises.	 In	 some	 cases,	 paramilitary-led	 land	 clearances	 served	oil,	mining	and	infrastructural	projects	backed	by	the	State’s	eminent	domain	or	taking	powers	-	its	‘right’	to	dispossess	and	displace	people	legally	for	‘public	utility	and	social	interest’.	‘Collateral	damage’	type	displacement	and	that	motivated	by	factors	other	than	land	control	for	business	ventures	has	also	served	local,	national	and	global	investment	interests.	For	operators	and	owners	of	State-backed	projects,	the	violent	expulsion	of	large	segments	of	the	population	(whether	intentional	or	not)	from	the	targeted	investment	area	implied	
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fewer	 people	 to	 consult	 and	 negotiate	with,	 fewer	 to	 oppose	 the	 scheme,	 and	 fewer	 to	resettle	and	compensate	(Ó	Loingsigh,	2013,	p.	86).	Violence	has	also	enabled	opportunistic	and	predatory	land	accumulation	(acquisitions	that	lie	in	between	coercion	and	consent)	by	investors	 and	 businesses	 that	 purchased	 abandoned	 farms	 at	 clearance	 prices,	 thereby	profiting	from	the	country’s	displacement	crisis.	This	dispossession,	associated	with	the	armed	conflict,	is	difficult	to	quantify.	As	of	2012,	40.7%	of	registered	displaced	persons	reported	having	abandoned	land;	at	the	time,	the	register	included	circa	4	million	IDPs	(UNHCR,	2012,	p.	1).	However,	such	figures	do	not	distinguish	 between	 people	 directly	 stripped	 of	 their	 land,	 those	who	 sold	 in	 a	 state	 of	distress,	and	families	whose	abandoned	lands	are	not	claimed	by	others.	According	to	one	government	entity	(Acción	Social),	the	displaced	were	forced	to	abandon	some	6.5	million	hectares;	other	sources	suggest	the	figure	is	as	high	10	million	hectares	(UNHCR,	2012,	p.	1).	 Again,	 however,	 it	 is	 not	 known	 how	 much	 of	 this	 land	 was	 usurped	 or	 acquired	opportunistically	-taking	advantage	of	the	displacement	crisis-	at	giveaway	prices.		Some	observers	use	information	from	the	recent	land	restitution	process	(initiated	under	Law	1448	of	2011)	to	generate	quantitative	characterisations	of	dispossession.	As	of	May	2019,	 the	Land	Restitution	Unit	 (URT	–	acronym	 in	Spanish)	had	 received	121,462	restitution	 requests	 pertaining	 to	 110,623	 plots	 of	 land.	 At	 the	 time,	 71,284	 of	 these	applications	 had	 been	 processed	 and	 46,040	 (64.5%)	 had	 been	 rejected	 at	 the	administrative	stage.	By	this	same	date,	9,983	requests	had	been	resolved	through	5,045	court	 sentences,	 resulting	 in	 7,502	 restitution	 orders	 benefitting	 45,655	 people	 and	covering	341,725	hectares	of	land	(Unidad	de	Restitución	de	Tierras,	2019).	It	is	important	to	 stress,	 however,	 that	 these	 figures	 do	 not	 disaggregate	 land	 abandonment	 and	usurpation1	and	it	seems	most	restitution	cases	concern	the	former:	in	2013,	for	example,	the	 URT	 indicated	 that	 61.2%	 of	 restitution	 requests	 pertained	 to	 cases	 of	 forced	abandonment	and	32.7%	to	usurpation	or	despojo	(cited	in	CNMH,	2015a,	p.	23).		
                                                        1	Under	the	Victims	and	Land	Restitution	Law	(1448	of	2011),	victims	of	the	armed	conflict	can	apply	for	the	legal	and	material	return	of	usurped	or	forcibly	abandoned	lands.	The	Law	defines	despojo,	translated	as	dispossession	or	usurpation,	“as	an	action	by	which,	taking	advantage	of	the	violent	context,	a	person	is	arbitrarily	deprived	of	 their	property,	possession	or	occupation	-	whether	de	facto,	 through	 juridical	means,	 an	 administrative	 act	 or	 sentence,	 or	 through	 the	 commission	 of	crimes	associated	with	the	violent	situation”	(Congreso	de	la	República	de	Colombia,	2011a,	Art.	74).	This	may	be	contrasted	with	“forced	abandonment	[…]	a	situation	faced	by	someone	who	is	forcibly	displaced	and,	as	a	result	of	their	displacement,	is	unable	to	administrate,	exploit,	nor	have	direct	contact	with	their	land	[…]”	(ibid).		
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The	NGO	 Forjando	 Futuros	 has	 created	 an	 interactive	 database	 using	 information	from	the	recent	land	restitution	process.	The	database	currently	contains	information	from	4,733	sentences	pertaining	to	8,087	cases	and	more	than	7,000	plots	of	land,	2,447	(32%)	of	which	are	said	to	have	been	usurped	as	opposed	to	forcibly	abandoned.	Most	of	these	plots	 (1,806	 or	 73.8%)	were	 usurped	 between	 1996	 and	 2004,	 in	 the	wake	 of	 violence	perpetrated	by	paramilitaries	-	deemed	responsible	for	actions	enabling	land	usurpation	in	81%	of	cases2.	In	1,757	(or	72%	of)	cases	classified	as	usurpations,	at	least	one	individual	or	 entity	 legally	 opposed	 the	 restitution	 request	 (Forjando	 Futuros,	 n.d.)-	 the	 website	includes	a	list	of	companies	that	have	acted	as	legal	opponents.	A	publication	by	the	same	organisation	indicates	that	the	vast	majority	of	successful	restitution	claims	have	been	for	small	 or	 medium	 -sized	 properties:	 95%	 of	 5,213	 ‘restituted’	 plots	 were	 less	 than	 50	hectares	(Forjando	Futuros,	2018).	Such	quantitative	data,	drawn	from	the	restitution	process,	is	certainly	informative	but	it	is	not	a	precise	way	of	measuring	different	aspects	(e.g.	numbers	of	hectares	usurped	or	people	dispossessed,	where	the	majority	of	cases	took	place,	temporal	high	points,	etc.)	of	land	dispossession	in	Colombia.	Consider	that	persons	stripped	of	their	land	before	1991	are	 not	 eligible	 for	 restitution	 under	 Law	 1448	 and	 many	 -perhaps	 most-	 of	 those	dispossessed	who	are	eligible	have	not	applied	(see	e.g.	my	article	Thomson,	2017);	such	cases	(that	occurred	prior	to	1991	or	when	the	affected	have	not	requested	restitution)	are	not	covered	by	the	URT	figures.	Furthermore,	some	instances	of	dispossession	have	been	challenged	through	other	legal	routes	(rather	than	via	Law	1448)	and	thus	are	also	excluded	from	the	above	statistics;	the	paramilitary-led	usurpation	of	tens	of	thousands	of	hectares	in	the	collective	territories	of	Curvaradó	and	Jiguamiandó,	for	example,	has	been	handled	by	 the	 Constitutional	 Court.	 And,	 of	 course,	 given	 the	 scope	 and	 purpose	 of	 restitution,	coercive	land	acquisitions	(ostensibly)	unrelated	to	the	conflict-context	are	omitted	from	the	outset.	Finally,	these	restitution	statistics	tell	us	little	about	how	conflict-related	land	grabs	were	achieved	and	 for	what	purpose.	So,	 for	now,	 the	most	 insightful	 information	about	land	dispossession	in	contemporary	Colombia	is	qualitative.	This	qualitative	evidence	reveals	that	dispossession	has	defined	the	political	economy	of	land	in	Colombia	during	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	centuries.	
                                                        2	 Guerrillas	 (the	 database	 does	 not	 distinguish	 between	 insurgent	 groups)	 are	 considered	responsible	in	9%	of	usurpation	cases,	followed	by	armed	confrontations	(4%),	unidentified	actors	(4%)	and	the	State	(2%).	
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1)	Looking	beyond	armed	conflict	to	explain	dispossession	in	Colombia	Historically,	land	grabbing	has	been	a	common	characteristic	of	war	across	the	world.	In	the	16th	 and	 17th	 centuries,	 for	 example,	 “war	 [was	 seen]	 as	 a	 socially	 acceptable	 form	 of	property	acquisition”	(Korman,	1996,	p.	302).	The	so-called	‘right	of	conquest’	was	thought	to	include	a	right	to	enslave	civilians	and	take	their	property.	The	rules	of	war,	as	perceived	by	European	scholars	and	applied	to	peoples	deemed	‘civilised’,	started	to	change	with	the	decline	 of	 absolutism	 and	 the	 growing	 distinction	 between	 the	 property	 of	 the	 State	 or	sovereign	 and	 the	 private	 property	 of	 its	 citizens	 (ibid,	 pp.	 29-34).	 Plunder	 or	 pillage,	defined	as	“the	forcible	taking	of	private	property	by	an	invading	or	conquering	army”,	is	now	 considered	 a	 “war	 crime”	 (ICRC,	 2014a).	 Contemporary	 customary	 international	humanitarian	law	also	affirms	“the	rights	of	displaced	persons”	and	the	need	to	protect	their	abandoned	 “property	 and	 possessions”	 against	 “destruction	 and	 arbitrary	 and	 illegal	appropriation,	occupation	or	use”	(ICRC,	2014b).	These	rules	are	an	implicit	recognition	of	the	persistence	of	war-time	plunder.	The	 relationship	 between	 armed	 conflict	 and	 land	 issues	 specifically	 has	 gained	increasing	 attention	 from	 policy-makers	 and	 academics	 in	 recent	 years.	 This	 literature	mainly	examines	how	disputes	over	land	and	related	resources	contribute	to	the	onset	and	perpetuation	 of	 armed	 conflict	 and	 vice	 versa.	Much	 of	 this	 research	 is	 policy-oriented,	considering	how	to	address	land	issues	to	prevent	the	escalation	of	localised	disputes	into	generalised	 violence	 and	 how	 to	 incorporate	 land	 issues	 into	 peacebuilding	 programs	(Takeuchi,	2014;	Unruh	&	Williams,	2013b;	UN,	2012).	While	this	land-conflict	literature	is	contributing	to	important	discussions,	this	thesis	takes	a	different	approach	by	shifting	the	focus	away	from	armed	conflict.	I	do	not	deny	the	importance	of	the	land-conflict	nexus	in	Colombia	and	this	relationship	is	certainly	not	ignored	in	the	analysis.	However,	my	aim	is	to	explore	the	issue	of	dispossession,	rather	than	to	explain	the	Colombian	conflict	and	its	relationship	to	land	disputes.	Furthermore,	an	overemphasis	on	armed	actors	and	conflict	dynamics	can	imply	downplaying	other	factors	that	drive,	enable	and	shape	dispossession.	Indeed,	mainstream	media	and	other	sources	often	implicitly	treat	dispossession	in	Colombia	as	an	aberration	of	armed	conflict.	In	some	cases,	 it	 is	implied	that	recent	land	accumulation	 is	an	 incidental	outcome	of	 land	abandonment	caused	by	the	violence.	For	example:	“about	4	million	hectares	of	 land	has	been	abandoned	by	IDPs;	three	times	the	amount	redistributed	through	government	 land	reform	efforts	since	1961.	Displacement	
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has	thus	brought	about	massive	agrarian	counterreform”	(Deininger	&	Lavadenz,	2004,	p.	1).	Others	emphasise	how	armed	groups	(sometimes	failing	to	distinguish	between	these	groups)	wield	violence	to	enrich	themselves.		This	thesis	shows	that	dispossession	in	Colombia	doesn’t	fit	well	with	stereotypical	notions	of	wartime	plunder.	The	paramilitaries	and	their	allies	(what	I	call	the	para-elite)	have	 generally	 sought	 to	 legalise	 and	 legitimate	 land	 usurpation	 and	 have	 relied	 on	 an	extensive	 network	 of	 people	 to	 achieve	 this.	 So,	 violence	 has	 been	 a	 key	mechanism	 of	dispossession	but	is/was	insufficient	on	its	own	(see	also	Grajales,	2011).	It	is	often	argued	that	dispossession	is	particularly	prevalent	during	armed	conflict	because	of	an	associated	breakdown	 in	 institutions	 -	 in	particular	 those	upholding	and	regulating	property	rights	(Takeuchi,	Katayanagi,	&	Murotani,	2014,	p.	242;	UN,	2012,	p.	9;	Unruh	&	Williams,	2013a,	p.	9).	While	this	may	be	true	elsewhere,	in	Colombia	the	para-elite	achieved	dispossession	through	 careful	 navigation	 and	 deployment	 of	 property	 rules,	 rather	 than	 by	 taking	advantage	of	their	collapse.		I	argue	more	generally	that	armed	conflict	should	not	be	treated	as	the	ultimate	cause	of	 land	 grabbing	 in	 Colombia,	 but	 rather	 as	 one	 among	 several	 enabling	 conditions.	 As	highlighted	by	Cramer	and	Wood,	wars	do	not	uniformly	lead	to	land	concentration;	“[f]or	example,	landholdings	in	El	Salvador	were	dramatically	fragmented	by	the	state's	counter-insurgency	 agrarian	 reform,	 occupation	 of	 land	 by	 insurgent-allied	 cooperatives,	 and	market	 transactions	 driven	 by	 remittances	 from	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 inability	 of	landlords	to	work	their	land”	(Cramer	&	Wood,	2017,	p.	735,	emphasis	added;	see	also	Peña-Huertas,	Ruiz,	Parada,	Zuleta,	&	Álvarez,	2017;	J.	Vargas	&	Uribe,	2017).	In	this	sense,	the	mere	existence	of	war,	on	its	own,	explains	very	little.	A	consideration	of	the	particularities	of	the	Colombian	conflict	-including	the	“direct	participation	of	rural	elites”	and	in	particular	“big	cattle	ranchers”	in	paramilitary	groups-	is	key	to	explaining	coercive	land	accumulation	(Gutiérrez-Sanín	&	Vargas,	 2017).	 In	 fact,	 Gutiérrez	 and	Vargas	 (2016)	 determined	 that	paramilitary	units	“organically	articulated”	with	“rural	elites”	consistently	used	violence	or	threats	to	appropriate	land;	and	that	land	grabbing	was	much	less	common	among	units	lacking	this	characteristic.	However,	as	noted	by	these	authors,	other	factors,	especially	the	institutional	 setting	 in	which	 land	 accumulation	 took	place,	 are	 also	 important.	 In	 brief,	dispossession	 in	Colombia,	 including	 that	effected	by	 the	para-elite,	must	be	understood	within	 the	 wider	 social,	 political,	 legal,	 economic	 and	 historical	 context.	 Cramer’s	observation	 that	 “[w]ar	 is	 often	 an	 especially	 sharp	 reflection	 of	 tendencies	 and	characteristics	common	in	societies	not	at	war”	(2002,	p.	1846)	is	pertinent	here.	
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Accordingly,	this	thesis	surveys	dispossession	that	has	ostensibly	occurred	outside	the	conflict	setting,	in	addition	to	that	affected	by	the	paramilitaries	and	their	allies,	which	-for	good	reasons-	has	captured	most	academic	attention	(see	e.g.	Ballvé,	2013;	Grajales,	2011,	2013;	Gutiérrez	Sanín	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016).	This	comprehensive	approach	-including	land	grabs	effected	by	private	agents	and	coercive	State-backed	acquisitions-	differentiates	my	research	from	other	investigations	and	permits	further	insight	into	what	has	happened	in	Colombia,	 where	 different	 forms	 of	 land	 dispossession	 overlap.	 I	 demonstrate	 how	counterinsurgency	warfare	has	facilitated	investments	underwritten	by	the	State’s	taking	powers	 and	 how	 these	 projects	 intertwine	 with	 ‘illegal’	 land	 grabs	 and	 expulsions	 –	revealing	 the	 tenuousness	 of	 distinctions	 between	 conflict-induced	 (considered	detrimental	to	the	economy)	and	development-induced	(portrayed	as	a	necessary	sacrifice	for	growth)	displacement.	More	broadly,	this	thesis	challenges	the	assertion	that	land	dispossession	in	conflict-contexts	 is	 necessarily	 disruptive	 to	 capitalist	 development.	 For	 example:	 “When	fraudulent,	coerced	or	ambiguous	land	transfers	are	widespread,	the	competing	claims	that	arise	undermine	 tenure	 security,	 and	 thereby	 inhibit	 investment	 and	 growth”	 (Unruh	&	Williams,	2013c,	p.	538).	In	Colombia,	policies	designed	to	promote	investment	and	growth	have	inadvertently	bolstered	dispossession.	And	resulting	land	use	changes	have	often	been	compatible	with	the	government’s	economic	vision,	which	is	based	on	what	Selwyn	calls	“elite	development	 theory”3.	Put	 simply:	violent	 land	grabs	and	opportunistic/predatory	acquisitions	 have	 served	 and	 been	 served	 by	 the	 government’s	 economic	 development	agenda	(for	a	broader	discussion	of	how	‘certain	types	of	civil	war	violence	can	buttress	economic	growth’	see	Maher,	2014,	2015).	These	 arguments	 draw	 on	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	 growing	 academic	 literature	 on	dispossession	in	Colombia,	which	has	challenged	the	simplistic	representations	commonly	found	in	mainstream	discourses,	by	looking	beyond	armed	conflict	in	order	to	explain	the	phenomenon.	Grajales	(2011),	for	example,	stresses	that	“the	profitability	of	land	grabbing	requires	 the	 institutional	recognition	of	property	rights”	and	that	 the	usurpers	relied	on	“social	capital”,	and	not	just	“violent	capital”,	to	achieve	this	(p.	783;	see	also	2013,	p.	223).	
                                                        3	Selwyn	discusses	various	types	of	“elite	development	theory”.	Despite	differences,	the	“elitism	[of	such	theories]	is	manifested	in	three	ways:	through	the	identification	of	elites	[…]	as	primary	actors	in	the	development	process;	by	ignoring	and	delegitimising	the	poor’s	actions	to	uplift	themselves,	unless	 these	 actions	 complement	 elite	 conceptions	 of	 development;	 and	 by	 legitimating	 the	exploitation	 and	 repression	 [and	 dispossession]	 of	 the	 poor,	 in	 the	 name	 of	 helping	 the	 poor”	(Selwyn,	2016,	p.	795).	
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He	 also	 points	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 Colombia’s	 economic	 development	 policies	 (in	particular,	 the	 promotion	 of	 oil	 palm	 cultivations),	 noting	 that	 while	 “local	 collusive	networks	linking	paramilitary	groups,	politicians	and	civil	servants”	were	important,	“the	relation	 between	 state	 action	 and	 violent	 land	 spoiling	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 these	 local	configurations”	(2011,	p.	785;	see	also	2013,	p.	213).	He	rejects	portrayals	 that	 focus	on	“State	capture”	by	external	“criminal	actors”,	emphasising	instead	the	role	of	“violence	and	spoiling	in	the	formation	of	the	state”	(Grajales,	2011,	p.	789).	This	thesis	helps	strengthen	some	of	Grajales’	claims	by	offering	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	enabling	role	played	by	diverse	non-armed	actors	and	multiple	State	policies	not	covered	in	his	articles;	it	also	sheds	additional	light	on	these	issues	by	examining	how	the	political	economy	of	dispossession	in	Colombia	 (which	 I	 argue	 is	 intimately	 linked	 to	 the	 country’s	 trajectory	 and	 vision	 of	economic	development)	has	changed	over	time.	Moreover,	 case	 study	 research	 -focused	 on	 specific	municipalities	 or	 regions-	 has	contributed	to	the	identification	of	varied	forms	and	mechanisms	of	land	dispossession	in	Colombia	(see	e.g.	Ballvé,	2013;	Grajales,	2013;	García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014;	Uribe	Kaffure,	2014;	Quinche,	2016;	Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016).	Ballvé’s	(2013)	study	of	two	‘cases’	 in	 northwest	 Colombia,	 for	 instance,	 provides	 a	 rich	 description	 of	 the	 complex	processes	 behind	 dispossession	 and	 specifically	 “land	 laundering”,	 revealing	 how	 “the	grassroots	 development	 apparatus	 -its	 discourses,	 institutional	 forms,	 and	 practices-	became	utterly	instrumental	to	the	illegal	land	seizures”	in	this	region	(p.	62).		García	 and	 Vargas’	 (2014)	 comparison	 of	 cases	 from	 the	 municipalities	 of	 Turbo	(Antioquia)	 and	 El	 Carmen	 de	 Bolívar	 (Bolívar)	 leads	 them	 to	 distinguish	 between	“asymmetric	 transactions”	based	on	a	direct	use	of	 force	versus	 those	based	on	unequal	access	 to	 information.	They	 show	how	 the	 latter	 facilitated	mass	purchases/sales	 in	 the	aftermath	of	forced	displacement.	Similarly,	Uribe	(2014)	describes	two	different	“routes”	to	land	concentration	in	Tibú	(North	Santander):	one	defined	by	paramilitary-led	“coercion”	and	another	defined	by	“de-regulated	markets”4	or	more	precisely	“a	market	activated	by	coercive	means,	but	not	operated	by	the	coercive	actor”	(p.	278).	Like	Grajales,	Uribe	points	to	the	State’s	active	promotion	of	the	palm	oil	sector	in	facilitating	these	processes.	A	later	
                                                        4	The	author’s	use	of	the	term	“deregulated	market”	is	slightly	confusing,	as	is	the	implied	dichotomy	between	this	path	and	the	“coercive	path”.	However,	the	body	of	the	article	itself	is	clear:	on	the	one	hand,	the	relevant	officials	either	could	not	or	would	apply	relevant	regulations,	specifically	those	designed	to	protect	displaced	persons’	land	rights;	on	the	other	hand,	the	land	accumulation	achieved	through	 apparently	 ‘voluntary’	 transactions	was	 facilitated	 by	 violence	 and	 forced	 displacement,	though	the	buyers	themselves	did	not	use	threats	or	force	to	obtain	the	land.	
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publication	by	Vargas	&	Uribe	 (2017)	 re-articulates	 the	 ideas	presented	 in	 these	earlier	articles:	 they	 explain	 how	 in	 some	 areas	 “political	 and	market	mechanisms”	were	more	important	than	“coercion”	in	generating	land	accumulation5	and	stress	that	“the	Colombian	State	 selected	 the	 winners”	 of	 this	 accumulation	 through	 its	 “agrarian	 development	policies”,	in	particular	those	aimed	at	bolstering	palm	oil	production	(pp.	749	and	757).	Another	recent	publication,	by	Peña	et	al.	(2017),	also	examines	the	varied	‘types’	of	dispossession	in	Colombia.	They	focus	on	two	types:	(1)	“administrative	dispossession”	or	cases	where	government	officials	(re-)assigned	rights	over	land	usurped	or	abandoned	as	a	result	of	the	war	and	(2)	“dispossession	through	legal	transaction”	or	cases	where	the	land	was	 transferred	 through	 a	 ‘normal’	 purchase/sale	 process,	 which	 in	 turn	 includes	 the	subcategories	of	(a)	“dispossession	by	means	of	vitiated	consent”	and	(b)	“dispossession	through	laesio	enormis”	or	when	the	price	paid	for	the	land	was	much	lower	than	the	‘fair’	price	 –	 also	 indicating	 that	 a	 transaction	 was	 not	 wholly	 voluntary	 (pp.	 762-765).	 The	authors	 argue	 that	 the	 “techniques	 used	 to	 promote	 coercive	 dispossession	 […	 were]	significantly	broadened	and	escalated”	in	the	context	of	the	war	(Peña-Huertas	et	al.,	2017,	p.	759).	In	other	words,	the	armed	conflict	resulted	in	an	increased	frequency	of	coercive	acquisitions	and	the	advent	of	“new	mechanisms”	of	land	dispossession.	They	highlight	the	predominance	 of	 ‘private	 transactions’	 (what	 I	 call	 ‘forced	 transfers	 of	 ownership’	 or	‘coerced	sales’	–	see	Chpt	7)	and	note	that	during	the	war	period	“dispossession	was	not	restricted	to	the	agricultural	frontier	areas,	but	was	established	in	areas	of	the	country	with	formal	land	titles	and	greater	institutional	density”	(p.	766).	They	list	three	main	reasons	dispossession	was	‘broadened	and	escalated’	during	the	worst	years	of	the	war:	(1)	violence	led	 to	 mass	 forced	 displacement	 and	 land	 abandonment,	 which	 clearly	 facilitated	 the	phenomenon;	(2)	“there	were	new	opportunities	to	capture	state	agencies	or	align	them	along	purportedly	 anti-subversive	 (legal	 or	 illegal)	 actions”,	making	 it	 easier	 for	 certain	people	to	obtain	legal	rights	over	spurious	land	claims;	and	(3)	“there	was	a	context	that	weakened	peasant	property	rights”	(p.	760).	Unfortunately,	the	authors	do	not	explain	why	they	consider	that	the	“weakening	of	peasant	property	rights”	was	a	result	of	 the	armed	conflict	specifically;	it’s	possible	they	simply	mean	that	1	&	2	led	to	3.	
                                                        5	In	this	article,	too,	the	word	choice	could	be	misleading	since	it	suggests	the	processes	described	by	the	authors	did	not	 involve	coercion.	Both	authors	have	explained	this	more	precisely	elsewhere:	García	and	Vargas	(2014)	write	of	a	“continuum”	between	“violence	and	market”,	noting	that	“none	of	 the	 types	 observed	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 purely	market-driven	 […]	 or	 as	 purely	 a	 forceful	dispossession”	(p.	43);	while	Uribe’s	(2014)	piece	refers	to	“markets	activated	via	coercion”	(p.	278),	as	noted	above.	
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While	 I	would	certainly	agree	 that	 the	armed	conflict	enabled	an	 intensification	of	land	dispossession	in	Colombia	or	quantitative	change	and	-alongside	many	other	factors-	shaped	these	processes	in	qualitative	ways,	arguably	the	‘new	mechanisms’	identified	by	Peña	et	al.	are	more	a	reflection	of	the	expansion	of	private	property	rights	rather	than	the	specificities	of	the	conflict-context.	Put	differently:	in	the	19th	and	early	20th	centuries,	fewer	peasants	had	titles	to	their	land,	meaning	that	dispossession	via	private	legal	transactions	was	less	common.	Consider,	furthermore,	that	these	‘mechanisms’	of	dispossession	are	not	unique	 to	Colombia	nor	 to	 countries	at	war6.	Overall,	 the	article	by	Peña	et	 al	 (2017)	 is	unique	 among	 scholarly	 publications	 on	 dispossession	 in	 Colombia	 in	 that	 it	 explicitly	contemplates	 the	 fact	 that	 coercive	 land	 acquisitions	 also	 occurred	 before	 the	 armed	conflict	–	in	addition	to	considering	how	wider	institutions	have	influenced	conflict-related	land	grabs	in	Colombia	(i.e.	going	beyond	the	role	of	armed	actors	and	violence),	as	do	the	other	authors	cited.	Nevertheless,	the	article	slips	towards	(without	falling	completely	prey	to)	the	narrow	perspective	critiqued	above	in	the	sense	that	quantitative	and	qualitative	changes	to	the	phenomenon	of	land	dispossession	in	Colombia	are	attributed	exclusively	to	the	armed	conflict;	while	this	has	certainly	been	one	key	motor	of	change,	it	is	not	the	only	one,	as	shown	in	this	thesis.	Notwithstanding	some	discrepancies,	in	general,	I	see	my	research	as	complementary	to	the	literature	briefly	described	here.	This	thesis	draws	on	(at	least,	the	earlier	articles)	and	contributes	 to	 these	discussions	about	 land	dispossession	 in	Colombia.	Still,	 the	key	contributions	of	this	thesis	lie	precisely	in	its	(in	my	view,	reconcilable)	differences	from	existing	publications,	some	of	which	I	outline	in	the	paragraphs	that	follow.		First,	as	noted	above,	research	on	dispossession	in	Colombia	has	focused	on	the	para-elite	 land	 grab	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 opportunistic	 and	 predatory	 acquisitions	 in	 the	conflict	context	(what	Uribe	calls	the	“deregulated	market	route”	of	dispossession	or	what	García	and	Vargas	call	“asymmetric	transactions”	based	on	“asymmetries	in	information”);	it	 has	neglected	State-backed	dispossession	 sanctioned	by	eminent	domain	powers.	The	inclusion	 of	 this	 broad	 category	 (which	 includes	 different	 forms	 and	 mechanisms)	
                                                        6	Here	are	just	a	couple	examples.	Authorities	in	Tamil	Nadu	-	India	were	forced	to	create	special	“land	grabbing	cells”	to	tackle	hundreds	of	cases	in	which	“fake	documents,	coupled	with	muscle	or	money	power”	were	used	to	steal	privately-owned	lands	(Kumar,	2011).	In	Gujarat,	another	state	in	India,	at	 least	3	notaries	were	suspended	in	2014	“for	their	alleged	involvement	in	 land	grabbing	cases”	(Ahmedabad	Mirror,	2014).	Meanwhile,	 in	Guatemala,	prosecutors	arrested	14	people	who	are	said	to	have	“forced	poor	farmers	to	sell	their	land	at	cut-rate	prices”,	in	some	cases	obligating	them	“to	go	to	land	offices	at	gunpoint”	(Associated	Press,	2016;	see	also	Grandia,	2013).	
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significantly	enriches	the	discussion.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	8,	in	the	abstract	State-backed	dispossession	 exists	 independently	 of	 the	 armed	 conflict;	 however,	 in	 practice	 they	intertwine	 in	 complex	 ways.	 Hence,	 the	 neglect	 of	 this	 category	 not	 only	 limits	 our	understanding	 of	 struggles	 over	 land	 in	 Colombia	 more	 generally,	 it	 also	 limits	 our	understanding	 of	 paramilitary-backed	 usurpations	 and	 acquisitions	 facilitated	 by	 mass	forced	displacement	specifically	-	i.e.	the	focus	of	previous	research.	Second,	 and	 related	 to	 the	 above,	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	 land	 dispossession	 in	Colombia	 concentrates	on	coercive	acquisitions	 for	agriculture;	 it	does	not	address	 land	clearance	for	investments	in	mining,	hydrocarbons,	hydroelectric	dams,	roads	and	ports7	–	precisely	those	that	benefit	from	the	State’s	taking	powers.	In	many	areas	of	the	country,	coercive	 land	 acquisitions	 for	 such	 projects	 overlap	with	 those	 aimed	 at	 agroindustrial	expansion;	in	this	sense,	elucidating	what	has	happened	in	these	-mostly	rural-	territories	requires	considering	non-agricultural	elements	of	 the	economy	also.	Furthermore,	given	the	centrality	of	mining	and	oil	extraction	 to	 the	Colombian	economy,	an	analysis	of	 the	political	 economy	 of	 dispossession	 in	 the	 country	 -the	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis-	would	 be	incomplete	without	reference	to	these	sectors.	The	 inclusion	 of	 State-backed	 dispossession	 for	 mining,	 oil	 and	 infrastructural	projects	leads	to	different	conclusions.	Arguably,	a	de-escalation	of	armed	conflict,	ceteris	
paribus,	 is	 likely	 to	 transform,	 rather	 than	 resolve,	 dispossession	 and	 associated	displacement.	One	plausible	outcome,	for	example,	is	that	the	role	of	State	force	will	become	more	important	in	securing	land	for	certain	types	of	investments,	in	particular	those	backed	by	eminent	domain	powers.	Consider	that	the	disarmament	of	the	FARC	is	celebrated	by	many	investors	and	government	officials	precisely	because	it	‘opens	up’	additional	areas	of	the	country	to	these	types	of	large-scale	investments	(see	e.g.	Dinero,	2015),	which	typically	involve	dispossession	and	displacement.	
                                                        7	A	number	of	scholars	have	touched	on	land	appropriation	linked	to	the	mining	and	oil	sectors	in	Colombia.	Coleman’s	work	on	neoliberalism,	human	rights	discourse	and	resistance	to	dispossession,	for	example,	includes	valuable	insights	into	land	and	other	social	conflicts	related	to	the	oil	sector	in	Casanare	(Coleman,	2013,	2015a,	2015b).	Another	example	is	Maher’s	(2015)	article,	which	argues	that	armed	conflict	can	sometimes	bolster	economic	growth.	It	shows	that	“violence	has	been	high	in	municipalities	of	strategic	importance	to	oil	interests”	in	Arauca	and	that	“episodes	of	violence	[were]	followed	by	greater	oil	production,	oil	exploration,	and	the	construction	of	infrastructure”	(Maher,	2015,	p.	236).	One	of	Maher’s	conclusions	is	that	“the	data	support	critical	arguments	that	forced	displacement	has	‘cleared’	land	of	people	in	these	strategic	areas”	(ibid).	However,	his	work,	like	that	of	others	who	discuss	the	links	between	mining/oil	and	the	war	in	Colombia	(see	e.g.	Richani,	2002;	Dunning	&	Wirpsa,	2004;	Stokes,	2005),	is	not	about	land	dispossession	per	se.	To	reiterate,	then,	the	literature	on	land	dispossession	specifically	(in	Colombia)	has	neglected	non-agricultural	sectors.	
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Third,	 this	 thesis	 analyses	 contemporary	 land	 dispossession	 from	 a	 long-run	historical	perspective,	allowing	for	a	deeper	understanding	of	continuity	and	change.	For	example,	 I	 trace	 transformations	 in	 the	underlying	drivers	of	dispossession	(the	gradual	shift	from	dispossession	mostly	motivated	by	an	interest	in	acquiring	and	controlling	labour	to	that	motivated	by	an	interest	in	the	land	itself	and	related	resources),	as	well	changes	to	relevant	 policies,	 and	 examine	 how	 these	 processes	 have	 been	 shaped	 by	 the	 country’s	trajectory	and	visions	of	economic	development.	Such	factors	are	just	as	important	as	the	armed	conflict	-if	not	more-	in	explaining	recent	land	grabs.	Fourth,	 I	 frame	my	 research	within	 the	wider	 literature	 about	 land	 dispossession	across	 the	world	 (see	Chpt	2)	–other	 investigations	on	Colombia	mention	some	of	 these	texts,	but	most	do	not	systematically	engage	with	them.	This	global	framing	led	me	to	think	about	how	the	Colombian	experience	might	inform	our	understanding	of	land	dispossession	more	generally	and	to	put	forward	various	tentative	propositions	that	may	be	used	in	future	research,	as	explained	below.	This	framing	also	led	me	to	think	differently	about	what	has	happened	within	Colombia	itself.	What	became	clear	to	me,	as	I	read	about	coercive	land	acquisitions	in	other	countries,	was	that	many	factors	attributed	(in	the	Colombian	context)	to	the	armed	conflict	are	also	prevalent	in	countries	not	at	war.	For	example,	it	is	unclear	to	what	extent	“state	capture”,	in	particular	the	influence	of	elite	groups	over	the	institutions	that	govern	property	rights,	is	a	result	of	the	war.	I	do	not	wish	to	suggest	that	the	armed	conflict	had	no	impact,	but	it	is	worth	asking	the	question	the	other	way	around:	can	we	suppose	that	in	the	absence	of	war	Colombia	would	necessarily	have	had	more	progressive	land	 institutions/policies	 or	 that	 these	would	 have	 been	more	 justly	 applied?	 I	 am	 not	convinced;	this	thesis	provides	testament	as	to	why.		 Acemoglu	and	Robinson	would	probably	arrive	at	a	similar	conclusion,	albeit	from	a	very	 different	 perspective.	 They	 suggest	 that	 “the	 capture	 of	 political	 and	 economic	institutions	by	elites”	is	a	deeply-rooted	historical	problem	in	Colombia	and	other	parts	of	Latin	 America	 (Robinson	 &	 Acemoglu,	 2008,	 p.	 293).	 In	 a	 subsequent	 article,	 Robinson	(2013)	claims	that	while	the	armed	conflict	“exacerbated	the	country’s	problems”,	it	is	itself	a	“symptom”	of	“the	nation’s	style	of	governance”	in	which	“national	political	elites	residing	in	 urban	 areas,	 particularly	 Bogotá,	 have	 effectively	 delegated	 the	 running	 of	 the	countryside	and	other	peripheral	areas	to	local	elites”	(p.	44).	The	author	identifies	various	“mechanisms”	and	“interests”	 that	have	contributed	to	the	persistence	of	 this	“system	of	governance”	in	Colombia,	noting	that	“it	is	not	held	in	place	by	some	grand	Faustian	pact	or	Machiavellian	calculation,	but	has	evolved	over	a	long	period	of	time”	(Robinson,	2013,	p.	
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47).	A	 later	article	by	Robinson	advances	these	ideas	further.	Drawing	on	his	2012	book	
Why	Nations	Fail,	co-authored	with	Acemoglu,	Robinson	(2016)	concludes	that	violence	and	poverty	 (partially	 a	 result	 of	 high	 inequality)	 in	 Colombia	 are	 a	 result	 of	 the	 country’s	“extractive	economic	institutions”,	which	are	in	turn	arise	from	its	long-standing	“extractive	political	 institutions”.	 According	 to	 Robinson,	 political	 and	 economic	 institutions	 in	Colombia	 have	 become	 more	 inclusive	 in	 some	 respects,	 especially	 since	 the	 late	 20th	century	(i.e.	amidst	 the	armed	conflict!)	but	remain	exclusive	 in	others,	especially	 in	 the	“periphery”.	It	is	precisely	the	relationship	between	“centre”	and	“periphery”,	he	maintains,	that	helps	explain	the	peculiar	co-existence	of	extractive	and	inclusive	institutions	in	the	country.	Although	the	article	is	not	focused	on	land	grabs,	Robinson	uses	the	phenomenon	to	 exemplify	 how	 certain	 elite	 “interests”	 contribute	 to	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 “extractive	institutions”	(Robinson,	2016,	pp.	52–54)8.	To	reiterate	my	point:	to	truly	understand	land	dispossession	in	Colombia,	we	must	look	beyond	the	armed	conflict.	
	
2)	Analysing	land	dispossession	from	a	critical	political	economy	perspective	This	thesis	analyses	dispossession	in	Colombia	from	a	critical,	historical,	political	economy	perspective.	It	examines,	among	other	things,	the	different	forms	and	complex	mechanics	of	land	dispossession,	how	and	why	dispossession	and	related	polices	have	changed	over	time,	what	is	distinctive	about	contemporary	processes	and	how	these	have	been	shaped	by	the	country’s	specific	 trajectory	and	vision	of	economic	development.	The	analysis	serves	 to	challenge	narrow	accounts	of	dispossession	in	Colombia	and	mainstream	explanations	of	the	 phenomenon	 more	 broadly.	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	 former	 treat	 dispossession	 as	 an	abnormality	of	the	armed	conflict	and/or	downplay	the	importance	of	other	factors.	The	latter	suggest	that	dispossession	arises	in	the	absence	of	clearly	defined	property	rights	and	a	strong	rule	of	law	or	that	it	is	imposed	by	governments	under	exceptional	circumstances	for	the	wider	‘public	good’.	A	critical	political	economy	approach	highlights	and	attends	to	the	deficiencies	of	explanations	that	minimise	the	importance	of	history,	power	relations,	social	 struggles,	 ideology	 and	 the	 wider	 socio-political-economic	 context	 (see	 e.g.	Chandhoke,	1994;	Wood,	1995).	
                                                        8	Acemoglu	and	Robinson’s	thesis	(contained	in	their	2008	article,	elaborated	on	in	their	2012	book,	and	applied	 to	Colombia	by	Robinson	 in	 the	articles	mentioned	here)	has	multiple	strengths	and	weaknesses.	However,	an	evaluation	of	their	arguments	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	which	has	a	different	‘object’	of	study.	Acemoglu	and	Robinson’s	purpose	is	to	explain	differences	in	economic	development,	while	my	own	work	aims	to	explore	the	issue	of	land	dispossession.	Nevertheless,	their	research	does	offer	some	insight	into	coercive	land	acquisition,	as	indicated	above.	
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Land	dispossession	has	typically	been	investigated	as	an	appendage	to	other	issues,	such	 as	 armed	 conflict,	 neoliberalism	 and	 imperialism	 (as	 in	 Harvey’s	 analysis	 of	accumulation	by	dispossession)	or	the	historical	development	of	capitalism	(as	in	Marx’s	account	 of	 primitive	 accumulation	 and	 much	 of	 the	 ‘traditional’	 literature	 on	 agrarian	questions).	This	thesis,	by	contrast,	puts	dispossession	at	the	centre	of	analysis.	As	such,	it	draws	on,	and	contributes	to,	a	growing	area	of	research	on	land	grabs	or	“the	ways	capital	is	seizing	hold	of	land	and	natural	resources”	(Fairbairn	et	al.,	2014,	p.	656)	-	what	Fairbairn	et	al.	(2014)	call	the	“third	wave	of	dispossession	studies”,	which	they	locate	within	the	field	of	 agrarian	 political	 economy9	 (p.	 654).	My	 arguments	 are	 also	 shaped	 by	 literature	 on	issues	 often	 considered	 peripheral	 to	 agrarian	 political	 economy,	 mainly:	 (1)	 law,	 (2)	eminent	domain	(3)	and	forced	displacement.	Research	on	land	dispossession,	in	particular	that	accomplished	via	extra-economic	force,	entails	a	specific	set	of	questions	(see	also	Levien,	2011,	p.	457).	Why	is	dispossession	more	or	less	prevalent	in	certain	contexts?	What	are	the	underlying	drivers	and	enabling	conditions?	How	is	dispossession	enforced,	by	whom	and	for	what	purpose?	How	has	the	development	of	capitalism	shaped	dispossession,	generally	and	within	a	particular	context?	Did	a	given	coercive	land	acquisition	enable	capitalist	development	and	in	what	way?	This	is	not	an	exhaustive	list.	This	thesis	addresses	such	questions	in	the	Colombian	context,	but	also	puts	forward	some	more	general	tentative	propositions	about	land	dispossession.	Coercive	land	acquisitions	are	more	common	than	some	might	imagine.	Global	figures	on	dispossession	do	not	exist	(among	other	reasons,	because	the	variety	of	forms	it	takes	obstructs	 statistical	description)	but	evidence	 suggests	 it	has	affected	millions	of	people	across	the	world	over	the	last	few	decades10.	Furthermore,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	
                                                        9	As	noted	by	the	authors,	this	third	wave	arose	around	the	mid-2000s	in	the	context	of	‘the	global	land	rush’.	 It	“builds	on”	but	is	distinct	from	the	“first	generation	of	dispossession	scholarship	[in	which]	expropriation	was	largely	seen	as	a	historical	stage	in	the	development	of	capitalism”	(p.	654).	It	is	also	close	to,	but	distinguishable	from,	a	second	wave	that	emerged	in	the	1980s	and	brought	conflicts	over	land	and	resources	into	focus	(Fairbairn	et	al.,	2014,	pp.	653–656).	10	‘Development-induced	displacement’	figures	provide	an	imperfect	indication.	According	to	Cernea	(1995),	at	least	“ten	million	people	annually	enter	the	cycle	of	forced	displacement	and	relocation	in	two	‘sectors’	alone-	namely,	dam	construction,	and	urban/transportation”	(p.	249,	emphasis	added).	This	 estimate,	 he	 notes,	 was	 generated	 by	 researchers	 at	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 “emerged	 from	collecting,	verifying	and	combining	a	vast	body	of	data	[…	and	it]	is	still	conservative”	(Cernea,	1995,	p.	249).	More	recent	calculations	suggest	that	“large	development	projects	such	as	dams,	roads	and	exploitation	of	raw	materials	led	to	the	displacement	of	least	300	million	people	between	1988	and	2008”	(Terminski,	2012,	p.	2).	Suppose	that	just	10%	of	the	displaced	were	dispossessed	of	land	held	individually	or	in	common	(the	real	percentage	is	probably	higher),	we	are	still	left	with	a	figure	of	circa	30	million	dispossessed	for	‘large	development	projects’	over	20	years.	
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the	prevalence	of	dispossession	will	increase	in	the	years	to	come	(as	demand	for	land	and	land-based	 resources	 continues	 to	 rise),	 unless	 the	 global	 political	 economy	 is	 radically	transformed.	The	adverse	effects	of	forcible	land	acquisitions	(which	often	entail	regressive	redistributions	 of	 wealth)	 have	 been	 well-documented	 elsewhere,	 especially	 in	 the	literature	on	 ‘development-induced	displacement’.	For	example,	based	on	a	review	of	all	“World	Bank-financed	projects	involving	involuntary	population	displacement”	from	1986	to	 1994,	 Cernea	 identified	 eight	 “recurrent	 characteristics”	 -namely	 ‘landlessness,	joblessness,	 homelessness,	marginalization,	 increased	morbidity,	 food	 insecurity,	 loss	 of	access	 to	 common	 property	 and	 social	 dis-articulation’-	 that	 together	 constitute	 the	“economic,	social	and	cultural	impoverishment”,	which	typically	affects	those	dispossessed	and	displaced	(Cernea,	1995,	pp.	250–252).	 In	sum,	 land	dispossession	is	a	social	 justice	issue	in-and-of	itself,	as	well	as	being	relevant	to	other	(wider)	pressing	matters	such	as:	poverty,	inequality,	forced	migration,	environmental	degradation,	State	‘fragility’,	violence	and	 armed	 conflict.	 Despite	 the	 real-world	 significance	 of	 land	 dispossession,	 related	research	is	beset	by	theoretical	stagnation	that	limits	our	investigations,	discussions	and	understanding	 of	 the	 problem;	 hence,	 the	 importance	 of	 developing	 new	 concepts	 and	propositions,	with	the	ultimate	aim	of	shaping	broader	debates	outside	academia.	While	 this	 thesis	 doesn’t	 aim	 to	 provide	 a	 theory	 of	 land	 dispossession,	 it	 is	 a	‘prolegomena’	to	one.	What	would	such	a	theory	look	like?	First,	the	theory	must	articulate	what	land	dispossession	is,	so	that	we	know	how	to	recognise	it	in	dissimilar	social,	political,	economic	and	legal	settings.	This	definition	could	include	a	classification	of	varied	kinds	of	dispossession.	Second,	the	theory	would	identify	the	diverse	causal	factors	and	conditions	that	explain	how	and	why	land	dispossession	occurs	in	different	contexts.	Third,	the	theory	would	describe	the	potential	effects	of	land	dispossession	and	how	these	are	influenced	by	varying	contextual	factors.		Why	do	we	need	such	a	theory?	First,	without	it,	it	would	be	difficult	to	recognise	the	ubiquity	 of	 land	dispossession,	 given	 the	 different	 forms	 it	 can	 take.	 Second,	 the	 theory	would	 enable	 us	 to	 better	 explain	 how	 dispossession	 interacts	with	 other	 facets	 of	 our	global,	regional	and	local	political	economies.	Third,	it	would	allow	us	to	move	away	from	the	 detrimental	 tendency	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 most	 obvious	 causal	 factors	 and	 to	 develop,	instead,	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 understanding	 of	 the	 varied	 and	 contingent	 causal	mechanisms	of	dispossession	and	how	these	play	out	in	different	contexts.	Finally,	such	a	theory	could	prove	a	useful	tool	for	activists,	organisations	and	sympathetic	policy-makers	struggling	against	land	dispossession.	
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Another	rationale	 for	building	critical	 theories	of	 land	dispossession	rests	upon	its	import	 for	wider	 social	 scholarship,	 in	 particular	 critical	 political	 economy.	 Land	 is	 the	
primary	means	of	production	and	subsistence	–	it	is	the	ultimate	source	of	almost	all	the	material	goods	that	we	use	in	our	everyday	lives.	In	this	sense,	understanding	how	land	and	land-based	resources	are	acquired	and	controlled	(and	dispossession	is	a	central	element	of	 this)	 is	 vital	 to	 a	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 how	 our	 socio-economic	 systems	function.	Nevertheless,	despite	the	efforts	of	political	ecologists	and	ecological	economists,	land	 questions	 tend	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 niche	 interest	 area.	 I	 hope	 to	 help	 subvert	 this	tendency.	As	such,	this	thesis	is	not	written	primarily	for	a	specialist	audience,	but	with	the	aim	of	enriching	broader	debates	within	critical	political	economy,	as	well	as	literatures	on	dispossession	and	on	Colombia	in	particular.	As	will	become	clear,	many	of	the	propositions	contained	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	wider	 implications	 for	 how	we	 think	 about	 property,	 law,	capitalist	 market	 economies	 and	 liberal	 democracy.	 It	 is	 unlikely	 that	 I	 would	 have	developed	 these	 ideas	 had	 the	 focus	 of	 my	 investigation	 been	 the	 inverse.	 To	 really	understand	the	role	of	land	dispossession	in	our	societies/economies,	it	is	necessary	to	put	the	phenomenon	at	the	centre	of	our	analyses;	starting	from	questions	about	(e.g.)	armed	conflict,	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 capitalism	 or	 the	 nature	 of	 neoliberalism	 or	imperialism	can	only	provide	a	partial	view	of	the	issue.		
3)	Key	arguments	and	thesis	outline	Chapter	1	establishes	the	basic	conceptual	groundwork	for	the	discussions	that	follow	and	outlines	the	scope	of	my	research.	It	explains	how	the	term	‘dispossession’	and	other	related	vocabulary	are	used	in	this	thesis	and	why	I	have	chosen	to	link	the	analyses	with	forced	displacement.	 It	 also	 introduces	Marx’s	 concept	 of	 primitive	 accumulation	 and	Harvey’s	notion	of	accumulation	by	dispossession,	which	I	argue	provide	valuable	insights,	but	are	inadequate	for	analysing	land	dispossession	specifically.	Chapter	 2	 critically	 examines	 some	 key	 claims	 about	 land	 dispossession,	 divided	broadly	 into	 those	 found	 in	 research	 informed	 by	 orthodox	 economic	 and	 liberal	political/legal	paradigms	and	those	found	in	critical	scholarship.	I	focus	on	claims	about	the	relationship	 between	 dispossession	 and	 economic	 development	 or	 growth,	 capitalism,	property	rights,	land	markets	and	the	law.	Because	land	dispossession	is	a	relatively	nascent	area	of	inquiry,	the	identification	of	these	claims,	sometimes	only	implied	and	dispersed	in	varied	academic	fields,	was	a	central	part	of	the	research	process.	This	work	may	be	of	use	
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to	other	scholars	interested	in	dispossession	and	constitutes	a	contribution	to	the	literature	in	itself.	Chapter	2	is	very	much	the	outcome	of	my	research,	rather	than	its	antecedent.	It	contains	 the	main	 findings	 and	 conclusions	 of	 the	 project.	 Here,	 for	 reasons	 of	 space,	 I	highlight	only	the	more	unusual	ideas	that	are	not	addressed	in	the	rest	of	this	outline.	Mainstream	 economists	 suggest	 that	 dispossession	 is	 antithetical	 to	 capitalist	economies	 in	 which	 competitive	 markets,	 based	 on	 private	 property	 rights,	 ensure	 an	‘efficient’	use	and	allocation	of	land.	I	argue,	in	contrast,	that	the	capitalist	land	regime	is	laden	 with	 internal	 contradictions	 and	 that	 perpetuating	 growth	 based	 on	 capital	accumulation	 relies	 on	 the	 violation	 and	 restriction	 (i.e.	 the	 exclusion	 of	 areas	 from	privatisation)	of	landed	property	rights,	as	well	as	their	imposition	and	enforcement.		On	the	one	hand,	economic	growth	driven	by	capital	accumulation	requires	that	land	allocation	and	use	be	made	to	serve	to	these	objectives	-	that	it	be	treated	as	a	commodity.	And	 the	 imposition	 of	 private	 property	 and	 development/construction	 of	 land	markets	often	 comprises	 processes	 of	 dispossession.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 markets	 don’t	 always	provide	land	in	the	right	places	and	at	the	right	price	–	relative,	that	is,	to	the	demands	of	capital	accumulation	and	growth.	So,	even	once	private	property	and	markets	in	land	are	established,	 extra-economic	 force	 (dispossession	 and	 displacement)	 continues	 to	 be	integral	to	capitalist	development.	Some	governments	have	understood	that	the	property	system	 can	 encumber	 growth	 and	 have	 opted	 to	 impose	 it	 partially.	 State-owned	 lands	permit	 the	 implementation	 of	 large-scale	 projects	 that	 in	 other	 contexts	 would	 have	required	the	violation	of	property	rights,	implying	higher	compensation	costs	and	lengthier	legal	processes.	The	role	of	property	violations	and	restrictions	in	mobilising	land	for	capital	accumulation	and	growth	is	often	overlooked	even	by	critical	scholars	who	tend	to	focus	on	privatisations	and	enclosures.	Chapter	 2	 also	 addresses	 the	 question:	 why	 is	 land	 acquired	 via	 coercive	dispossession	 rather	 than	 voluntary	 market-exchange?	 Levien	 (2011),	 who	 is	 the	 only	critical	author	 I	 found	 that	 tackles	 this	question	head-on,	concludes	 that	extra-economic	force	is	used	to	facilitate	accumulation	where	“land	markets	are	not	fully	capitalist”	(p.	462-463).	I	argue	instead	that	what	he	calls	“barriers	to	accumulation”	are	inherent	to	capitalist	land	markets	 themselves.	This	does	not	mean	 land	dispossession	 is	 a	mere	 ‘function’	 of	capitalism;	 the	 character	 and	 prevalence	 of	 dispossession	 is	 contingent	 upon	 multiple	factors	and	understanding	it	requires	context-specific	political	economy	analysis	–	indeed,	this	is	the	central	theme	running	through	Chapter	2.	However,	I	also	signal	the	importance	of	considering	the	wider	capitalist	system	in	which	dispossession	takes	place.	
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Chapters	 3,	 4	 and	 5	 examine	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 land	 and	 dispossession	 in	Colombia,	during	the	colonial	era,	the	1800s	post-independence,	and	the	20th	century	up	until	the	1970s	-	respectively.	As	argued	by	Edelman,	Oya	and	Borras	(2013),	much	of	the	recent	literature	on	dispossession	“neglect[s]	the	importance	of	history”,	which	forms	“the	spaces	 in	 which	 [today’s]	 land	 grabbing	 occurs”	 (p.	 1521).	 Furthermore,	 a	 “historical	perspective	 permits	 […]	 a	 greater	 appreciation	 of	 the	 specificity	 that	 may	 characterise	contemporary	land	grabs	in	general	and	certain	land	grabs	in	particular”	(Edelman,	Oya,	&	Borras,	 2013,	 pp.	 1521–1522).	 These	 comments	 closely	 reflect	 my	 own	 reasons	 for	including	an	analysis	of	past	processes:	to	enable	a	more	profound	understanding	of	the	political	economy	of	land	in	21st	century	Colombia	and	to	identify	what	is	distinctive	about	contemporary	dispossession	and	how	this	has	been	influenced	by	the	country’s	trajectory	of	economic	development.		The	historical	narrative	in	this	thesis	is	unique	in	that	it	is	written	through	the	lens	of	dispossession	and	associated	displacement.	I	pay	particular	attention	to	the	different	forms	they	take,	the	relationship	between	the	two,	the	political/economic	drivers	and	motivations	behind	these	processes,	as	well	as	how	land	grabs	enforced	by	private	agents	interact	with	policy/law	and	the	factors	that	shape	these	interactions.	This	allows	me	to	explore	how	and	why	dispossession	and	displacement	and	related	policies	changed	over	time.	Four	themes	run	through	these	chapters,	supporting	some	broader	arguments	and	ideas.	(1)	 In	 Colombia,	 labour	 control	 was	 central	 to	 many	 policies	 and	 practices	 of	dispossession	and	displacement	from	the	16th	to	the	early	20th	centuries.	This	contrasts	with	contemporary	 land	 grabs,	 which	 are	 primarily	 aimed	 at	 controlling	 the	 land	 itself	 and	related	 resources,	 with	 little	 concern	 for	 the	 labour	 power	 of	 the	 dispossessed	 or	 the	destination	of	the	displaced.	Thus,	these	chapters	include	evidence	for	one	of	the	tentative	propositions	put	 forward	 this	 thesis:	 that	dispossession	motivated	 by	 labour	acquisition	tends	to	decline	as	capitalism	develops,	while	dispossession	driven	by	interest	in	the	land	and	 related	 resources	 tends	 to	 increase.	 This	 has	 implications	 for	 analyses	 informed	by	Marxist	concepts,	many	of	which	tend	to	overemphasise	proletarianisation	to	the	detriment	of	other	 issues,	and	some	of	which	conflate	potential	outcomes	with	drivers	by	 implying	that	dispossession	occurs	because	capitalist	production	requires	wage	labourers.		 (2)	The	historical	chapters	also	reveal	the	complexities	of	how	dispossession	interacts	with	policy	and	legislation.	Contrary	to	mainstream	liberal	views,	which	often	represent	the	legal	 realm	 as	 neutral,	 the	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 the	 contents,	 interpretation	 and	application	 of	 the	 law	 are	 shaped	 by	 specific	 trajectories	 and	 visions	 of	 economic	
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development,	 as	 well	 as	 changing	 power	 dynamics,	 social	 struggles	 and	 the	pressures/constraints	faced	by	the	government.	Here	I	provide	a	few	examples.	Both	the	colonial	and	post-independence	governments	legislated	against	private	land	grabs,	but	elite	groups	consistently	flouted	these	norms	and	the	government	eventually	legalised	unofficial	land	appropriations	ex-post	 facto.	For	 the	 colonial	 administration,	one	main	 reason	was	fiscal:	 it	 could	 charge	 wealthy	 individuals	 a	 fee	 for	 legalisation.	 The	 independent	government,	for	its	part,	buckled	under	pressure	from	the	landed	elite.	Ironically,	it	was	the	first	 agrarian	 reform	 legislation	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 that	 endorsed	 historical	 land	 theft.	Political	 will	 to	 address	 previous	 and	 ongoing	 dispossession,	 and	 resulting	 land	concentration,	had	been	particularly	strong	during	the	period	running	up	to	this	reform.	These	 processes	 threatened	 to	 undercut	 smallholder	 production,	which	was	 supporting	industrialisation.	 Nevertheless,	 multiple	 factors	 pushed	 government	 policy	 towards	 the	promotion	of	large-scale	industrial	agriculture,	gradually	weakening	the	economic	rationale	for	attempting	to	prevent/reverse	dispossession.	(3)	Another	key	proposition	is	that	private	property	in	land	can	both	empower	and	impede	 economic	 growth;	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 this	 statement	 is	 generally	 overlooked	 by	orthodox	and	heterodox	theorists	alike.	All	three	historical	chapters	provide	evidence	of	the	tension	between	property	rights	and	capitalist	and	non-capitalist	 forms	of	development.	Ever	since	the	Spanish	invasion,	elite	groups	started	amassing	property	claims	over	huge	areas	 of	 land,	which	 they	 left	 un-	 or	 under-	 used.	 Colonial	 officials	 and	politicians	 post-independence	repeatedly	commented	on,	and	devised	legislation/policies	to	address,	the	economic	 problems	 caused	 by	 property	 institutions	 that	 allow	 for	 speculative	accumulation.	 However,	 with	 a	 few	 exceptions,	 across	 the	 centuries,	 governments	 have	been	reluctant	to	use	their	taking	powers	against	elites.	As	suggested	in	Chapter	2,	because	of	 unequal	 power	 dynamics,	 dispossession	 -including	 via	 State	 sanctioned	 violations	 of	property	rights	-	is	more	likely	to	affect	‘labouring	classes’.	(4)	 Finally,	 these	 historical	 chapters	 illustrate	 the	 diverse	 underlying	 drivers	 and	outcomes	of	dispossession	and	associated	displacement.	 I	 argue	 that,	on	 the	whole,	 land	grabs	by	elite	groups	did	not	favour	economic	development	nor	the	expansion	of	capitalist	social	relations	in	Colombia	and	in	some	ways	hindered	these	processes	throughout	most	of	 the	period	under	 consideration.	 I	 also	 argue	 that	 a	 crude	application	of	 the	primitive	accumulation	concept	(to	infer	conclusions	rather	than	devise	questions)	to	these	processes	may	 obscure	 our	 understanding	 of	 Colombian	 history.	 For	 example,	 varied	 policies	 and	practices	of	dispossession	and	displacement,	from	colonial	times	up	until	circa	the	1920s,	
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were	motivated	by	elite	interest	in	appropriating	surplus	labour	from	the	direct	producers	but	 the	 dispossessed	 were	 largely	 drawn	 into	 non-capitalist	 relations	 of	 production.	Furthermore,	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 the	 smallholder	 economy	 -which	 the	 traditional	landed	elite	sought	to	undermine	via	land	grabs	and	evictions,	among	other	methods-	was	financing,	 stimulating	 and	 sustaining	 the	 country’s	 industrial	 development.	 The	political	economy	 of	 dispossession	 and	 displacement	 in	 Colombia	 started	 to	 change	 around	 the	1930s/1940s	 in	 various	ways	 and	 for	multiple	 reasons.	 For	 example,	 with	 government	assistance,	 many	 large	 landowners	 established	 mechanised	 crops	 on	 arable	 flatlands	formerly	 used	 for	 extensive	 cattle	 ranching	 –cleared	 of	 tenants	 and	 peasant	 settlers	 in	earlier	 epochs.	 In	 other	 words,	 property	 claims	 that	 had	 long	 stymied	 economic	development	now	supported	a	rapid	expansion	of	exchange	value,	at	least	in	some	regions.	Agribusiness	growth	also	stimulated	new	processes	of	dispossession	–	stirred	by	a	drive	to	expand	profits	within	a	capitalist	system	of	production,	rather	than	to	subjugate	peasants	to	the	‘semi-servile’	and	relatively	‘inefficient’	hacienda.	These	same	four	themes	also	run	through	chapters	6,	7	and	8,	which	focus	on	recent	history	(since	the	1980s)	and	the	contemporary	era.	Nevertheless,	given	the	emphasis	of	this	thesis,	the	contents	of	these	chapters	are	much	broader	and	deeper.	Chapter	6	provides	the	 context	 necessary	 for	 understanding	 and	 explaining	 dispossession	 in	 contemporary	Colombia.	 It	 pays	particular	 attention	 to	 the	 country’s	 specific	 trajectory	 and	policies	 of	economic	development	 (plus	 related	power-dynamics	and	conflicts),	which	 I	argue	have	fundamentally	shaped	these	processes.	Here	I	provide	a	skeletal	outline.	Following	 trade	 liberalisation	 and	 the	 shift	 towards	 export-oriented	 growth,	 the	economic	rationales	(e.g.	to	control	food	price	inflation,	boost	internal	demand,	or	ensure	a	domestic	 supply	 of	 raw	 materials	 for	 urban	 industries	 by	 supporting	 smallholder	production)	 for	 attempting	 to	 halt	 and	 reverse	 dispossession	 and	 associated	 property	accumulation	 disappeared	 from	 the	 policy	 agenda.	While	 the	 1994	 agrarian	 reform	 law	strengthened	 regulations	 designed	 to	 limit	 land	 concentration,	 government	 policy	 has	remained	biased	in	favour	of	large-scale	agribusiness.	Furthermore,	since	2007,	successive	administrations	 have	 attempted	 to	 quash	 the	 pro-campesino	 rules	 in	 the	 1994	 law.	Reinvigorated	interest	in	agriculture	as	an	‘engine	of	growth’	gave	impetus	to	the	ongoing	legislative	counter-reform.	This	 includes	proposals	 to	 ‘forgive	and	 forget’	historical	 legal	violations	 and	 complements	 (alongside	 subsidies	 and	 other	 policies	 aimed	 at	 boosting	agribusiness)	land	grabs	executed	by	paramilitaries	and	their	backers,	as	well	as	grey-area	land	acquisitions	in	the	conflict-context.	
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The	chapter	discusses	norms	established	through	the	1994	agrarian	reform	law	and	the	 1991	 Constitution,	 which	 are	 important	 for	 understanding	 the	 ‘mechanics’	 of	dispossession	discussed	subsequently.	Given	that	much	of	the	literature	on	dispossession	emphasises	 the	enabling	 role	of	 legislation,	Colombian	 land	 law	 is	not	what	 some	might	expect.	Contemporary	laws	have	countless	shortcomings	and	enable	dispossession	in	many	respects	 but	 compared	 to	 previous	 eras	 and	 other	 countries	 they	 are	 also	 relatively	‘progressive’.	 For	 example,	 while	 other	 governments	 were	 deregulating	 in	 ways	 that	facilitate	 large-scale	 land	 acquisitions,	 Colombia	 actually	 strengthened	 regulations	 that	
should	have	prevented	wealthy	 individuals	and	businesses	 in	particular	 from	benefitting	from	the	dispossession/displacement	of	campesinos	who	occupied	or	owned	certain	types	of	land.	These	norms	are	now	being	slowly	dismantled;	however,	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	most	recent	phase	of	dispossession	peaked	while	they	were	still	formally	in	force.	The	poor	enforcement	of	 these	and	other	rules	cannot	be	blamed	simply	on	a	weak	rule	of	 law;	 it	reflects	 unequal	 power	 dynamics	 and	 the	 State’s	 vision	 of	 development	 –	 in	 short,	 the	political	nature	of	the	legal	realm.	Meanwhile,	Colombia’s	growing	reliance	on	the	mining	and	energy	sectors	has	had	enormous	 implications	 for	 the	 State’s	 land	 use	 priorities,	 which	 in	 turn	 impacts	 on	 the	political	 economy	 of	 dispossession.	 Oil	 and	 mining	 companies	 not	 only	 benefit	 from	coercive	land	acquisition,	they	often	require	it	–	as	a	whole,	these	sectors	are	reliant	on	the	State’s	taking	powers.	I	examine	the	legal	underpinnings	of	dispossession	and	the	central	government’s	attempts	to	 inhibit	popular	consultations	and	municipal	regulatory	power,	which	have	been	used	to	block	these	investments.	Thus,	I	also	point	to	the	contradictions	and	conflicts	that	arise	from	the	State’s	role	as	facilitator	of	capital	accumulation.		Chapter	6	also	offers	an	overview	of	the	armed	conflict	since	the	1980s,	 limited	to	highlighting	 dynamics	 vital	 for	 understanding	 the	 latest	 phase	 of	 dispossession.	 This	includes	 the	 expansion	 of	 paramilitary	 groups,	 which	 worked	 in	 collaboration	 with	government	 forces,	 were	 supported	 by	 diverse	 elites	 and	 primarily	 targeted	 civilians	deemed	 ‘subversive’.	 It	 should	 be	 stressed	 that	 counterinsurgency	 has	 been	 as	much	 a	political,	economic	and	social	undertaking	as	a	military	mission.		In	 addition,	 the	 chapter	 contains	 a	 brief	 discussion	 on	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 illicit	 drug	economy	and	the	associated	‘War	on	Drugs’	and	how	this	shaped	the	armed	conflict	and	the	political	 economy	 of	 land	 in	 Colombia.	 Among	 other	 points,	 I	 argue	 for	 a	 conceptual	distinction	between	the	narco	land	rush	and	the	para-elite	land	grab.	Many	land	acquisitions	by	narcotraffickers,	especially	in	the	1980s,	involved	purchases	from	large	landowners	at	
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inflated	 prices,	 rather	 than	 the	 dispossession	 of	 smallholders.	 Also,	 while	 narco-paramilitaries	clearly	participated	in	the	para-elite	land	grab,	which	took	off	in	the	1990s,	an	overemphasis	on	their	role	runs	the	risk	of	obscuring	the	importance	of	other	elite	actors	and	thus	reproducing	oversimplified	accounts	that	reduce	land	grabbing	to	a	problem	of	the	criminal	underworld.	Chapters	7	and	8	provide	a	bird’s	eye	view	of	dispossession	and	related	displacement	in	 Colombia	 during	 the	 late	 20th	 and	 early	 21st	 centuries.	 Chapter	 7	 examines	 (a)	 the	usurpation	 imposed	by	the	para-elite,	plus	(b)	grey-area	 land	transfers	 facilitated	by	the	conflict	context;	while	Chapter	8	discusses	dispossession	for	investment	projects	backed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers,	including	those	broad	categories	mentioned	above	(a	and	b),	as	well	 as	 (c)	 coercive	 land	 acquisitions	 directly	 endorsed	 by	 the	 State	 and	 other	 types	 of	involuntary	 land	 loss.	My	main	 objective	 is	 to	 identify	 varied	 forms	 and	mechanisms	 of	dispossession,	which	helps	illustrate	how	these	processes	occur	and	provides	support	for	some	broader	claims.	First,	 by	 examining	 the	 different	 mechanisms	 of	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab,	 I	demonstrate	 the	 importance	 of	 multiple	 factors	 and	 groups	 of	 people	 in	 enabling	dispossession	 and	 hence	 why	 what	 happened	 in	 Colombia	 does	 not	 fit	 with	 simplistic	notions	 of	 war-time	 plunder.	 The	 usurpers	 depended	 on	 the	 connivance	 and/or	collaboration	 of	 politicians,	members	 of	 the	 Armed	 Forces,	 notaries	 and	 registrars,	 and	functionaries	 of	 the	 agrarian	 reform	 and	 rural	 development	 agency,	 among	 others.	Arguably,	without	this	‘social	capital’,	the	para-elite	would	have	been	unable	to	legalise	their	usurpations;	at	the	very	least,	the	scale	of	the	phenomenon	would	have	been	limited.		Second,	a	detailed	look	at	the	mechanics	of	these	processes	reveals	that,	contrary	to	accounts	that	pin	dispossession	in	conflict	contexts	to	the	break-down	of	State	institutions,	the	 para-elite	 manoeuvred	 within	 the	 legal	 system	 to	 secure	 the	 lands	 they	 usurped.	Similarly,	other	individuals	and	businesses	were	able	to	profit	from	the	forced	displacement	crisis	precisely	because	they	could	gain	titles	over	the	land	they	purchased.	In	short,	both	depended	on	the	continued	operation	of	property	institutions	rather	than	their	collapse.	Third,	the	discussion	helps	reveal	why	‘technical	fixes’	are	inadequate	for	addressing	dispossession.	For	example,	titling	and	registration	programs	are	frequently	presented	as	preventative	solutions	to	involuntary	land	loss.	While	it	is	true	people	without	legal	title	are	more	vulnerable	to	dispossession,	the	para-elite	were	adept	at	legalising	the	usurpation	of	privately-owned	 lands	 and	 even	 found	 ways	 to	 legitimate	 the	 occupation	 of	 territories	
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under	 inalienable	collective	 titles.	On	another	 level,	 the	government	passed	a	number	of	laws	to	protect	the	displaced	against	dispossession	that	in	many	instances	failed	to	achieve	their	objective;	this	has	as	much	to	do	with	power	relations	and	structural	inequalities	as	policy	design	 failures.	Other	rules	 that	 theoretically	prohibited	elites	 from	exploiting	the	usurpation	or	abandonment	of	‘reform	lands’	were	also	ineffective	for	related	reasons.	Fourth,	 the	 analysis	 of	 different	 forms	 and	mechanisms	 of	 dispossession	 provides	insights	into	the	varied	relationships	between	these	processes	and	displacement.	As	noted	earlier,	 so-called	conflict-	and	development-	 induced	displacement	are	not	always	easily	distinguishable;	 this	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 given	 that	 the	 former	 is	 usually	 deemed	inimical	 to	 economic	 growth	 and	 development,	 while	 the	 latter	 is	 represented	 as	 a	necessary	cost	of	the	same	objectives.	Fifth,	in	detailing	the	varied	legal	mechanisms	of	dispossession,	I	am	able	to	better	elucidate	the	role	of	property	rights	violations	and	restrictions	in	securing	land	for	large-scale	investments.	I	stress	that	the	suspension	of	free	markets	is	not	always	immediately	obvious	since	many	agreements	that	appear	voluntary	are	in	fact	guaranteed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers.	This	permits	companies	to	acquire	land	at	otherwise	impossibly	low	prices	–	constituting	a	socially	regressive	redistribution	of	wealth,	just	like	the	para-elite	land	grab	and	many	grey-area	transactions	in	which	buyers	profited	from	the	displacement	crisis.	Finally,	the	presentation	of	various	 ‘typologies’,	 in	addition	to	being	convenient	for	analytical	purposes	and	helping	to	uncover	the	complexity	of	the	dispossession	process	and	the	 variety	 of	 forms	 it	 can	 take,	 enhances	 understanding	 of	 how	 ‘legal’	 and	 ‘illegal’	mechanisms	of	coercive	land	acquisition	interlink.	This	is	most	obvious	in	cases	where	the	para-elite	land	grab	aided	State-backed	investments	that	in	other	circumstances	would	have	been	imposed	through	a	legal	process	and	using	government	force.	More	 broadly,	 I	 argue	 that	 counterinsurgency	 has	 been	 partially	 constitutive	 of	agrarian	 counter-reform	 and	 helped	 advance	 the	 elite-led	 development	 promoted	 by	successive	administrations.	The	government’s	agricultural	policies	 indirectly	encouraged	and	enabled	the	para-elite	land	grabs,	as	well	as	opportunistic/predatory	acquisitions	in	the	conflict-context.	And	many	of	the	land	use	changes	brought	about	via	dispossession	have	been	 consistent	 with	 the	 government’s	 economic	 goals.	 Moreover,	 armed	 conflict	 has	expedited	 land	 clearance	 in	 zones	 slated	 for	mining,	 oil	 and	 infrastructural	 investments	sanctioned	by	the	State’s	taking	powers	and	provided	a	pretext	for	violence	against	people	opposing	these	projects.	
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Social	movements,	activists,	and	some	critical	scholars	have	long	pointed	to	the	close	links	between	dispossession	in	Colombia	and	the	country’s	economic	development	model;	but	the	issue	has	not	been	systematically	analysed.	Even	in	contexts	where	the	relationship	between	 certain	 growth	 strategies	 and	 dispossession/displacement	 has	 not	 been	obfuscated	 by	 armed	 conflict,	 there	 is	 a	 reluctance	 among	 many	 policymakers	 and	academics	to	recognise	the	contradiction	between	condemning	the	harm	caused	by	these	processes	 while	 promoting	 the	 policies	 and	 underlying	 ideologies	 that	 impel	 them.	Economic	 development,	 often	 simply	 a	 euphemism	 for	 growth	 driven	 by	 capital	accumulation,	is	rarely	seen	as	part	of	the	problem	and	is	frequently	presented	as	part	of	the	 solution,	 alongside	 titling	 and	 registration	 programs	 and	 legal	 reform.	 But	 without	substantial	changes	to	conventional	views	on	how	to	foster	wellbeing,	without	challenging	structural	inequalities	and	unequal	power	relations,	the	latter	‘solutions’	are	only	likely	to	transform	the	problem.	The	same	can	be	said	of	efforts	to	end	violent	conflict,	in	particular	programs	 focused	 on	 the	 economic	 foundations	 of	 peacebuilding.	 As	 Coleman	 (2018)	forcefully	put	it:	in	Colombia	“the	model	of	development	advocated	in	the	name	of	‘peace’	is	the	very	model	for	which	people	were	massacred	in	the	first	place”	(p.	23).		
4)	Methodological	approach,	methods	and	the	research	process	This	thesis	is	based	on	qualitative	exploratory	research.	Exploratory	research	should	not	be	understood	 in	 narrow	 terms	 as	 a	 pilot	 study	 or	 the	 first	 stage	 of	 inquiry,	 but	 rather	 in	juxtaposition	 to	 “confirmatory	 research”,	 which	 aims	 to	 “test	 hypotheses”	 drawn	 from	established	 theory	 (Stebbins,	 2001,	 2008;	 Davies,	 2006;	 Reiter,	 2017;	 see	 also	 Coleman	cited	 in	Swedberg,	2018,	p.	14).	Davies	 (2006)	explains:	exploratory	research	 involves	a	“flexible	and	pragmatic”	approach	and	is	“concerned	with	the	development	of	theory	from	data	in	a	process	of	continuous	discovery”	(p.	2).	It	“aims	to	be	as	broad	and	thorough	as	possible”	 and	 is	 open-ended	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 there	 is	 no	 goal	 to	 search	 for	 something	specific	(Stebbins,	2001,	p.	3).	As	such,	exploratory	research	typically	results	 in	multiple	findings	and	propositions	(ibid),	rather	than	centring	upon	a	single	overarching	conclusion.		 Since	 “there	 is	 no	 a-theoretical	 perception	 of	 the	 world	 […]	 a	 pure	 exploration,	starting	 from	 zero,	 is	 impossible”	 (Reiter,	 2017,	 p.	 137;	 see	 also	 Sayer,	 2010).	 As	 noted	above,	I	examine	land	dispossession	from	a	critical	political	economy	perspective	and	draw	specifically	 on	Marxist	 concepts;	 this	 necessarily	 shaped	 the	 scope	 and	 emphasis	 of	 the	research	and	analyses.	However,	I	did	not	start	with	a	clear	set	of	hypotheses	nor	with	the	
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aim	 of	 evaluating	 a	 particular	 theory.	 Instead,	 I	 developed	 the	 claims	 of	 this	 thesis	 by	studying	the	phenomena	in	question	in	their	specificity.	In	keeping	with	the	‘flexible’	nature	of	exploration,	the	contents	of	this	thesis	are	quite	different	to	how	I	had	initially	imagined.		 My	decision	to	pursue	exploratory	research	was	not	an	immediate	conscious	choice.	I	knew	that	my	main	objective	was	to	better	understand	land	dispossession	in	Colombia	-especially	the	different	forms	its	takes	and	how	it	happens-	and	that	I	wanted	to	link	my	findings	to	studies	of	coercive	land	acquisitions	in	other	parts	of	the	world.	I	also	knew,	as	noted	above,	that	I	didn’t	want	to	focus	on	a	particular	theory,	partly	because	of	an	absence	of	theories	adequately	linked	to	my	research	interests.	In	many	ways,	this	was	an	anxiety-filled	exercise	because	I	believed	I	should	have	been	trying	to	refute	or	confirm	a	particular	theory.	 Indeed,	 the	 research	 design	 and	methods	 texts	 I	 read	 (and	 courses	 I	 attended)	typically	assume	the	researcher	starts	out	with	a	theory	or	hypothesis11.	It	was	only	later	I	found	authors	advocating	 the	advantages	of	open-ended	 investigations	and	giving	 this	a	name:	exploratory	research.		 Many	texts	classified	as	belonging	to	the	 ‘land	grab	literature’	are	in	fact	about	the	recent	global	land	rush,	not	coercive	dispossession	per	se.	Unfortunately,	it	took	me	a	long	time	to	accept	that	some	of	the	most	cited	scholarly	publications	(supposedly)	in	my	field	weren’t	directly	relevant	to	the	research	I	was	doing;	initially,	I	felt	they	had	to	be	relevant	because	 these	were	 the	articles	 land	scholars	were	discussing.	Additionally,	many	of	 the	publications	I	encountered	that	were	more	focused	on	dispossession	included	excellent	case	studies	 and	 analyses	 of	 local	 processes	 but	 contained	 little	 or	 no	 explicit	 discussion	 of	broader	conceptual	and	theoretical	issues12	other	than	perhaps	a	brief	reference	to	Marx’s	concept	of	primitive	accumulation	or	Harvey’s	accumulation	by	dispossession.	I	gradually	realised	that	many	of	us	(I	include	myself	here)	have	over-relied	on	these	concepts	and	that	this	has	been	generating	a	theoretical	inertia.	Eventually,	I	came	to	the	further	conclusion	that	there	are	no	explicit	theories	of	land	dispossession,	nor	structured	debates	on	the	issue	(compared	say	to	armed	conflict	or	economic	development);	I	would	have	to	unearth	mostly	
                                                        11	My	experience	echoes	Swedberg’s	 (2018)	assertion	 that	 “textbooks	on	methods	do	not	discuss	exploratory	studies;	and	students	are	not	being	taught	how	to	carry	them	out”	(p.	17).	12	Levien’s	work	on	India	is	the	clearest	exception	to	this	generalisation:	it	is	both	empirically	and	conceptually/theoretically	rich.	Unfortunately,	I	didn’t	come	across	his	writing	until	quite	late	in	the	PhD	process	(it	would	have	helped	me	enormously	had	I	read	it	sooner),	when	by	a	stroke	of	luck	someone	recommended	it	to	me.	Upon	reading	a	couple	of	Levien’s	publications,	I	immediately	felt	identified,	 not	 because	 I	 agreed	 with	 all	 his	 arguments,	 but	 because	 I	 felt	 he	 challenged	 the	conceptual/theoretical	inertia	affecting	‘dispossession	studies’.	
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implicit	 claims,	dispersed	across	varied	 fields	of	 inquiry,	 in	order	 to	 situate	my	 findings	within	a	broader	literature.	I	reached	the	latter	conclusion,	it	is	worth	noting,	towards	the	end	of	the	research	process,	after	I	had	done	most	of	the	empirical	work	for	my	project.		 The	dearth	of	theoretical	work	on	land	dispossession	posed	problems	for	my	research	design.	 As	 noted	 above,	 in	 my	 experience,	 most	 courses	 and	 texts	 are	 geared	 towards	‘confirmatory’	 research.	 For	 example,	Odell’s	 (2001)	 overview	of	 case	 study	methods	 in	international	political	economy	examines:	the	“preliminary”	illustrative	case	study,	aimed	at	 illustrating	 a	 theoretical	 idea;	 “the	 disciplined	 interpretive	 case	 study”,	 aimed	 at	systematically	 “applying	 a	 known	 theory”	 to	 a	 “new	 event”;	 “the	 least-likely	 (theory-confirming)	case	study”;	“the	most-likely	(theory-infirming)	case	study”;	and	“the	deviant	case	study”	or	“a	case	where	the	main	causes	were	present	but	the	expected	effect	did	not	occur”	(pp.	163-167).	All	of	these	case	study	designs	start	from	the	assumption	that	there	is	an	existing	 theory	 the	researcher	wishes	 to	 illustrate,	apply,	 reject	or	 refine.	The	author	mentions	 just	 two	 types	 not	 founded	 upon	 pre-established	 theory:	 “descriptive”	 and	“hypothesis-generating”	 case	 studies.	The	 former,	he	argues,	 “aims	only	 to	document	an	important	event”,	while	the	latter	is	not	explained	in	detail	–	the	reader	is	simply	referred	to	a	couple	examples	(Odell,	2001,	pp.	162–165).	As	noted	by	Gerring	(2011):			 	social	science	research	involves	a	quest	for	new	theories	as	well	as	a	testing	of	existing	 theories	 […]	 Regrettably,	 social	 science	 methodology	 has	 focused	almost	exclusively	on	 the	 latter.	The	conjectural	element	of	 social	 science	 is	usually	dismissed	as	a	matter	of	guesswork	[…]	Yet,	it	will	readily	be	granted	that	many	works	of	social	science,	including	most	of	the	acknowledged	classics,	are	 seminal	 rather	 than	 definitive.	 Their	 classic	 status	 derives	 from	 the	introduction	of	a	new	idea	or	a	new	perspective	that	is	subsequently	subjected	to	 more	 rigorous	 (and	 refutable)	 analysis	 (Gerring,	 2011,	 p.	 9;	 see	 also	Swedberg,	 2018,	 who	 discusses	 the	 historical	 importance	 of	 exploratory	studies	 in	 sociology	 specifically	 and	 the	 scarcity	 of	 publications	 on	 related	methods	and	research	design).			 The	 generation	 of	 novel	 concepts/theories	 is	 precisely	 one	 of	 the	 main	 aims	 of	exploratory	 research.	 For	 example,	 writing	 on	 exploratory	 case	 studies,	 Streb	 (2010)	explains:	these	“are	generally	distinguished	by	the	absence	of	preliminary	propositions	and	
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hypotheses.	Identifying	these	very	often	is	the	actual	purpose	of	the	study	instead	of	being	its	 origin”	 (p.	 3).	 Swedberg,	 for	 his	 part,	 identifies	 two	 main	 objectives	 of	 exploratory	studies:	“The	first	is	to	increase	the	knowledge	of	a	topic	that	is	little	known	[…]	The	second	is	 to	 generate	 new	 and	 interesting	 hypotheses	 about	 a	 topic	 that	 is	 already	 known”	(Swedberg,	2018,	pp.	12–13;	see	also	Stebbins,	2001,	2008;	Davies,	2006;	Streb,	2010).	In	practice,	 many	 “topics”	 lie	 somewhere	 in	 between	 being	 “little	 known”	 and	 “already	known”;	 arguably,	 this	 is	 the	 case	 of	 land	 dispossession	 in	 general	 and	 in	 Colombia	specifically.	 My	 own	 research	 aimed	 to	 both	 further	 understanding	 of	 coercive	 land	acquisitions	 in	Colombia	and	 to	develop	new	 tentative	propositions	about	dispossession	more	 generally,	 which	 I	 hope	 may	 inspire	 or	 inform	 future	 inquiries	 -	 including	 those	designed	to	rigorously	‘test’	these	propositions.		 An	 additional	 factor	 that	 shaped	 my	 methodological	 choices	 is	 the	 absence	 of	comprehensive	‘data	sets’	on	land	dispossession	in	Colombia.	We	simply	do	not	know	with	any	certainty	how	much	land	and	how	many	people	were	dispossessed	in	which	parts	of	the	country,	when,	by	who,	how	and	for	what	purposes.	In	terms	of	dispossession	in	the	context	of	the	armed	conflict	specifically,	I	have	already	discussed	the	problems	with	attempting	to	establish	quantitative	characterisations	of	the	phenomenon	using	existing	IDP	surveys	or	land	restitution	data.	In	chapters	6,	7	&	8	I	also	refer	to	the	difficulties	of	‘quantifying’	land	dispossession	more	broadly;	among	other	reasons,	because	of	the	variety	of	forms	it	can	take	 and	 associated	 conceptual	 ambiguities	 –	 something	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 address	 in	 this	thesis.	For	example,	I	discuss	problems	with	accessing	information	on	expropriations	(in	the	technical/legal	sense	of	the	term)	due	to	the	large	number	of	entities	invested	with	this	power,	and	also	point	out	why	such	figures	-even	if	they	were	readily	available-	would	not	be	 indicative	of	 State-backed	dispossession	 given	 that	 sales	 coerced	under	 the	 threat	 of	expropriation	 (which	 on	 paper	 appear	 as	 ‘normal’	 voluntary	 market	 transactions)	 are	evidently	more	common,	partly	because	Colombian	law	requires	that	firms	attempt	private	negotiations	before	soliciting	government	intervention.	In	sum:	the	lack	of	prior	conceptual	disentanglement	 and	 absence	 of	 relevant	 ‘data’	 precluded	 certain	 research	 designs	 and	methods,	whilst	indicating	the	expediency	of	a	broad	and	adaptable	investigation.		 A	 number	 of	 authors	 have	 commented	 on	 the	 misconceptions	 surrounding	exploratory	research	(see	e.g.	Stebbins,	2001;	Davies,	2006;	Streb,	2010),	which	partially	derive	from	attempts	to	impose	the	norms	of	confirmatory	studies	on	exploration,	which	has	very	different	aims.	The	“intuitive”,	“flexible”	and	“open-ended”	nature	of	exploratory	research	account	for	the	advantages	of	such	an	approach,	as	well	as	its	limitations;	while	
 28	
above-mentioned	 characteristics	 are	 usually	 not	 desirable	 if	 a	 study	 contends	 to	 ‘test’	 a	proposition,	they	are	precisely	what	is	needed	for	the	development	of	new	concepts	and	ideas.	The	defining	qualities	of	exploratory	research	do	not	imply	a	lack	of	rigour;	they	imply	understanding	‘rigour’	in	a	way	that	is	attuned	to	the	aims	of	exploration.			 During	the	research	for	this	thesis,	I	sought	to	‘triangulate	data	sources’13	wherever	possible.	I	searched	for	documentary	evidence	to	complement	interviewee’s	descriptions	of	processes	or	issues	and	vice	versa:	I	asked	relevant	people	about	events,	policies	and	laws	I	had	come	across	during	desk-based	research.	More	generally,	I	consulted	as	many	sources	as	 possible,	 such	 as:	 restitution	 sentences,	 Constititional	 Court	writs,	 different	 laws	 and	policies,	documents	 from	INCORA	or	 INCODER	(the	agrarian	reform	institute,	 later	rural	development	 institute)	 and	 the	 regional	 environmental	 authorities	 (‘corporaciones	
autónomas	 regionales’),	 reports	 by	 the	 Comptroller’s	 and	 Ombudsman’s	 Offices	 or	 the	Superintendent	 of	 Notaries	 and	 Registries,	 NGO	 publications,	 corporate	 press	 releases,	documentary	videos,	newspaper	articles	and	academic	papers.	This	is	not	an	exhaustive	list.	I	 frequently	 found	 inconsistencies	 not	 only	 regarding	 (e.g.)	 how	 a	 particular	 case	 of	dispossession	was	portrayed,	but	also	in	the	so-called	‘facts’.	Sometimes,	I	could	determine	that	a	particular	inconsistency	was	a	typo	or	otherwise	identify	the	error	and	its	origins;	otherwise,	I	qualified	my	claims	or	simply	excluded	the	contested	‘fact’.		 The	 exploratory	 research	 on	 which	 this	 thesis	 is	 based	 is	 best	 described	 as	 an	‘iterative	 process’	 in	 which	 issues	 and	 ideas	 arising	 from	 secondary	 readings,	 primary	documentary	investigation	and	fieldwork/interviews	shaped	-but	did	not	limit-	questions	for	the	following	round	of	inquiry.	(Note	that	the	writing	process	for	this	thesis	was	perhaps	quite	unusual	in	that	the	literature	review	and	conceptual	framework	was	one	of	the	last	chapters	I	completed.)	This	iteration	often	involved	going	back	to	the	same	source	a	number	of	times	or	re-reading	texts	with	different	concerns	in	mind.	It	also	implied	that	there	was	no	rigid	separation	between	the	so-called	‘data	collection	phase’	and	‘data	analysis	phase’.			 The	iterative	process	underlying	this	thesis	is	sometimes	identified	with	“emergent	design	[which]	involves	data	collection	and	analysis	procedures	that	can	evolve	over	the	course	of	a	research	project	 in	response	to	what	 is	 learned	 in	earlier	parts	of	 the	study”	
                                                        13	 As	 explained	 by	Rothbauer,	 there	 are	multiple	 types	 of	 “triangulation”	 in	 qualitative	 research.	“Triangulation	of	data	sources”,	specifically,	may	help	the	researcher	“increase	the	credibility	of	their	findings	 by	 drawing	 from	 evidence	 taken	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 data	 sources	 […	 such	 as]	 interviews,	participant	 observation,	 written	 documents,	 archival	 and	 historical	 documents,	 public	 records,	personal	papers,	and	photographs.	Each	type	of	source	of	data	will	yield	different	evidence	that	in	turn	provides	different	insights	regarding	the	phenomena	under	study”	(Rothbauer,	2008,	p.	4)		
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(Morgan,	2008,	p.	2).	This	is	clearly	apposite	for	exploratory	studies,	given	that	“emergent	design	 procedures	 are	 closely	 associated	 with	 the	 broad	 goal	 of	 induction	 […	 and]	generating	theories	and	hypothesis	often	depends	on	a	flexible	use	of	methods”	(ibid).		 My	decision	(albeit	not	well-articulated	until	quite	 late	 in	 the	research	process)	 to	pursue	 exploratory	 rather	 than	 confirmatory	 research	 implied	multiple	 trade-offs.	Most	obviously:	 I	 chose	 to	 favour	 the	 development	 of	 new	 ideas	 and	 a	 comprehensive	understanding	of	land	dispossession	in	Colombia	over	the	testing	of	established	ones	and	a	precise	description/explanation	pertaining	to	a	specific	aspect	of	the	same	phenomenon.	The	reasons	for	this	choice	have	already	been	articulated	in	the	preceding	paragraphs.	Here	I	focus	on	the	implications.		 The	first	implication	is	that	the	general	propositions	put	forward	in	this	thesis	must	be	treated	as	tentative14.	For	some	readers,	this	admission	may	be	off-putting;	academia,	arguably,	 has	 an	 inbuilt	 antipathy	 towards	 the	 tentative	 and	 this	 could	 influence	 the	reception	 of	my	work.	 However,	 the	 very	 same	 qualities	 of	my	 research	 that	 proscribe	unreserved	 theoretical	 generalisations	 are	precisely	 those	 that	 allowed	me	 to	develop	a	deep	and	broad	understanding	of	dispossession	in	Colombia	and	to	use	this	understanding	to	refine	concepts	and	to	play	around	with	and	articulate	original	ideas.	The	latter	simply	would	not	have	been	possible	had	I	focused	on	a	few	specific	aspects	of	the	phenomenon,	or	a	 particular	 ‘hypothesis’	 or	 ‘theory’,	 defined	 in	 advance.	 On	 this	 issue,	 I	would	 like	 to	 a	reiterate	three	points,	made	by	the	various	authors	(cited	in	this	section),	albeit	in	different	ways	and	from	different	perspectives:	(1)	many	of	the	hypotheses	‘tested’	via	strategically	designed	confirmatory	research	originate	in	exploratory	studies;	(2)	though	confirmatory	studies	can	lead	to	new	hypotheses,	the	associated	methodological	approaches	are	ill-suited	to	the	task,	just	as	exploratory	research	is	-by	definition-	ill-suited	to	‘test’;	(3)	the	repeated	‘testing’	of	the	same	hypotheses	-no	matter	how	sophisticated	the	methodological	design-	cannot	on	its	own	‘advance’	the	collective	endeavour	of	social	research.			 Second,	and	related	to	the	above,	while	exploratory	research	led	me	to	multiple	claims	about	dispossession	in	contemporary	Colombia,	it	did	not	allow	for	the	generation	of	‘killer	facts’15	to	complement	and	strengthen	these	claims	and	that	are	useful	for	advocacy	work.	
                                                        14	Arguably	most	social	knowledge	claims	are	tentative,	even	those	‘rigorously	tested’	via	research	designed	for	the	purpose.	Still,	some	claims	have	been	subjected	to	systematic	scrutiny	of	different	forms	–	others	have	not.	So,	we	might	say	some	claims	are	more	or	less	tentative	than	others.	15	The	term	‘killer	fact’	is	borrowed	from	this	article	in	the	Oxfam	Blog	From	Poverty	to	Power.		
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An	example	to	illustrate	my	point.	I	found	that	government	policies	indirectly	incentivised	and	facilitated	dispossession.	Multiple	pieces	of	evidence	-(e.g.)	various	cases	in	which	the	usurper	or	predatory	buyer	received	State	subsidies	for	agricultural	or	forestry	projects,	criminal	 proceedings	 and	 media-interviews	 in	 which	 the	 perpetrator	 or	 beneficiary	 of	dispossession/displacement	 discusses	 how	 such	 policies	 influenced	 their	 decisions,	 or	official	 documents	 discussing	 ongoing	 legislative	 changes	 aimed	 at	 fostering	 industrial	agriculture	 that	make	 it	 easier	 to	 legalise	 claims	 over	 land	 obtained	 through	 illicit	 and	violent	means	-	support	this	assertion.	However,	I	cannot	say	(e.g.)	how	much	public	money	was	 pumped	 into	 investments	 in	 ill-gotten	 land	 nor	 how	 many	 companies/individuals	involved	in	violent	land	grabs	or	opportunistic	acquisitions	received	subsidies.	When	‘killer	facts’	 are	 not	 already	 publicly	 available,	 obtaining	 or	 generating	 them	 (supposing	 its	feasible,	which	for	some	types	of	information	it	isn’t)	requires	dedicating	a	lot	of	time	and	resources	to	this	end,	a	specific	research	design	and	methods	and	-above	all-	knowing	what	one	is	looking	for	in	advance.	It	should	be	noted	that	such	‘fact-finding	missions’,	like	studies	aimed	at	 ‘testing’	 a	particular	 theory,	often	benefit	 from	 the	groundwork	established	by	exploratory	research,	such	as	that	presented	in	this	thesis.		 Third,	 as	 hinted	 at	 earlier,	 exploratory	 research	 typically	 results	 in	 multiple	 and	diverse	findings	and	ideas	rather	than	a	single	overarching	set	of	principles;	this	is	certainly	the	case	of	 this	project.	This	has	multiple	advantages	and	disadvantages;	 for	example,	 it	complicates	 ‘research	 engagement’	 in	 many	 respects	 but	 the	 diversity	 of	 contents	 also	means	the	thesis	(or	at	 least	aspects	of	 it)	 is	 likely	to	be	relevant	to	comparatively	more	readers.	 More	 generally,	 my	 research	 and	 writing	 sacrifices	 theoretical	 elegance	 and	simplicity	in	favour	of	breadth,	depth	and	complexity.	This	trade-off	is	largely	a	result	of	the	choice	 between	 confirmatory	 and	 exploratory	 research.	 However,	 it	 also	 reflects	 my	preference	 for	 a	 particular	 conception	 of	 causation	 in	 the	 social	 realm	 (see	 below)	 and	indicates	 a	 theoretical	 priority:	 the	 need	 to	 be	 right	 about	 the	 complex	 specifics	 of	 a	particular	case	before	one	can	try	to	make	generalisations.			 Stebbins	(2001)	associates	exploratory	research	with	positivism	(pp.	10-11),	but	the	approach	 is	also	compatible	with	critical	 realism	(Reiter,	2017).	Broadly,	 critical	 realists	share	the	basic	ontological	position	that	“much	of	reality	exists	and	operates	independently	of	 our	 awareness	 or	 knowledge	 of	 it”	 and	 the	 basic	 epistemological	 position	 that	 “our	knowledge	about	that	reality	is	always	historically,	socially	and	culturally	situated”	(Archer	et	 al.,	 2016;	 see	 also	 Sayer,	 2010).	 This	 is	 the	 “meta-theoretical	 position”	 (ibid)	 that	underpins	this	thesis.		
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	 Many	critical	realists	also	have	a	particular	view	of	causation	in	the	social	realm.	They	focus	on	how	and	why	a	particular	phenomenon	unfolds	or	the	‘causal	mechanisms’	behind	it	and	privilege	complexity	and	contingency	in	their	explanations	(Archer	et	al.,	2016;	Sayer,	2010).	This	implies	an	emphasis	on	process(es),	as	opposed	to	the	“regular	associations	(or	‘constant	conjunctions’)	of	causes	and	effects”	notion	of	causation	(Sayer,	2010,	p.	73).	As	argued	 by	 Sayer	 (2010),	 both	 the	 ‘activation’	 of	 a	 particular	 causal	 mechanism	 and	 its	‘effects’	are	contingent	on	the	presence	of	certain	conditions.	Furthermore,	 ‘processes	of	change’	 usually	 arise	 from	 the	 interaction	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 causal	 mechanisms.	Finally,	“depending	on	conditions,	the	operation	of	the	same	mechanism	can	produce	quite	different	results	and,	alternatively,	different	mechanisms	may	produce	the	same	empirical	result”	(p.	73).	Arguably,	this	conception	of	causation	is	necessary	for	understanding	and	explaining	land	dispossession.		 Qualitative	case	study	research	is	well-suited	to	the	study	of	processes	and	is	able	to	bring	complexity	and	contingency	into	the	analysis	(Gerring,	2011;	Odell,	2001).	The	term	‘case	study’	can	imply	a	number	of	different	things.	Broadly,	it	is	“an	empirical	inquiry	that	investigates	a	contemporary	phenomenon	 in	depth	and	within	 its	 real-life	context”	 (Yin,	2009,	p.	18).	Country-level	studies	are	especially	useful	for	examining	land	dispossession	given	 the	 importance	 of	 national	 legislation	 and	 policy	 in	 shaping	 these	 processes.	 My	reasons	 for	 choosing	 Colombia	 as	 a	 ‘country	 case’	 are	 personal	 and	 pragmatic.	 I	 do	 not	suppose	my	findings	are	 ‘generalisable’	 to	other	country-contexts.	 I	do	believe,	however,	that	by	means	of	example,	it	is	possible	to	shed	light	on	wider	issues.	The	empirical	claims	in	this	thesis	may	be	useful	for	future	research	that	compares	and	contrasts	processes	of	dispossession	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 world,	 while	 -as	 noted	 above-	 theoretical	 claims	 are	advanced	as	tentative	propositions,	requiring	further	investigation.		 Of	course,	within	Colombia	 itself	dispossession	varies	across	space	and	time.	 I	had	originally	 intended	 to	 build	 this	 thesis	 around	 three	 regional/local	 studies;	 what	 is	sometimes	called	a	“case	within	a	case”	research	design	(Gondo,	Amis,	&	Vardaman,	2010).	I	did	in	fact	investigate	three	different	‘cases’16	in	detail	(I	also	examined	dozens	of	other	
                                                        16	What	constitutes	a	 ‘case’	 is	not	always	straight-forward.	For	example,	a	single	 family’s	story	of	involuntary	land	loss	could	be	considered	a	case	of	dispossession.	However,	it	also	makes	sense	to	consider	 the	 processes	 affecting,	 for	 example,	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 Marmato	 or	 Jiguamiandó	 and	Curvaradó	as	‘cases’	of	dispossession,	given	that	one	company	or	group	of	inter-linked	companies	and	people	(respectively)	attempted	to	(or	effectively)	procure(d)	large	areas	of	land	using	extra-economic	force	for	a	single	project	or	set	of	related	purposes.	Such	local	‘cases’	are	made	up	of	dozens	of	individual	‘cases’,	which	are	nonetheless	‘bound’	by	multiple	factors,	rather	than	being	isolated	or	separate	processes.	The	‘case’	of	the	oil	industry	in	Putumayo	is	different;	I	would	not	call	this	a	‘case’	
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‘cases’	 in	 comparatively	 less	 detail):	 attempts	 to	 dispossess	 and	 displace	 thousands	 of	people	 for	 an	 open-pit	 gold	 mine	 in	 Caldas;	 on-going	 dispossession	 and	 displacement	related	to	oil	operations	in	Putumayo;	and	the	usurpation	of	collective	territories	in	Chocó	by	 paramilitary-backed	 palm	 oil	 businesses.	 However,	when	 it	 came	 to	 ‘writing	 up’,	 for	reasons	of	space,	I	faced	an	extremely	difficult	choice	between	including	these	‘cases’	or	an	extensive	historical	discussion.	I	opted	for	the	latter	because	it	allowed	for	the	inclusion	of	a	greater	number	of	theoretical	claims	that	arguably	make	the	thesis	more	unique.	Still,	a	close	examination	of	these	specific	places/processes	definitively	shaped	my	research	and	this	thesis,	as	explained	in	subsequent	pages.		 This	 decision	 to	 exclude	 detailed	 discussions	 of	 these	 three	 regional/local	experiences	 from	 the	 thesis	 was	 not	 taken	 lightly.	 I	 anguished	 at	 the	 thought	 of	 not	incorporating	the	stories	of	the	people	I	interviewed	for	the	simple	reason	that	I	felt/feel	an	ethical	duty	to	share	their	testimonies.	I	also	felt	exasperated	given	the	amount	of	work	I	put	into	understanding	(and	drafting	written	accounts	of)	what	happened	in	these	localities.	Beyond	these	more	personal	concerns,	I	am	conscious	that	leaving	these	‘case	studies’	out	weakens	the	thesis	in	various	respects.	Most	importantly,	it	implied	a	thinner	description	of	 the	 evidence	 on	 which	 many	 of	 the	 ideas	 and	 arguments	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 based.	Furthermore,	arguably,	the	eliminated	(draft)	chapters	would	have	allowed	the	reader	to	better	‘connect’	with	the	real	people,	places	and	events	that	inspired	this	thesis,	making	it	more	powerful.			 However,	removing	the	three	historical	chapters	(which,	given	various	constraints,	was	the	only	practical	alternative)	would	have	entailed	omitting	key	arguments	and	ideas,	which	 contribute	 substantially	 to	 the	 originality	 of	 the	 thesis.	 It	 is	 perhaps	 worth	mentioning	that	I	had	originally	intended	to	write	just	one	historical	chapter;	however,	as	research	for	this	element	of	the	thesis	progressed,	I	became	increasingly	convinced	that	an	in-depth	analysis	of	past	processes	offered	different	and	important	insights	into	the	political	economy	of	land	in	present-day	Colombia.	Put	differently:	the	secondary	historical	research	I	did	for	this	thesis	really	transformed	how	I	think	about	land	dispossession	(in	general	and	in	Colombia	specifically),	something	I	hope	is	transmitted	in	the	thesis	itself.	
                                                        of	land	dispossession,	since	we	cannot	speak	of	a	set	of	processes,	driven	by	one	company	or	group,	that	affect	all	 inhabitants	of	the	region.	However,	a	study	focused	on	involuntary	land	loss	within	Putumayo	could	reasonably	be	called	a	‘regional	case	study’	in	the	sense	that	diverse	processes	of	dispossession	in	the	department	are	shaped	by	shared	particularities.	In	effect,	I	learnt	about	various	‘cases’	of	dispossession	in	Putumayo,	affecting	single	families,	as	well	as	entire	villages.	
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The	three	historical	chapters	are	based	on	a	variety	of	academic	sources.	A	limited	number	of	government	documents	and	digital	newspaper	archives	were	also	consulted	for	Chapter	5,	which	covers	the	1920s-1970s.	My	understanding	of	more	recent	20th	historical	processes,	such	as	the	expansion	of	the	agrarian	frontier	to	the	south	and	the	development	of	the	armed	conflict	within	specific	regional	contexts,	has	also	been	shaped	by	interviews	and	informal	discussions	with	people	who	lived	that	‘history’	first-hand.		Clearly,	my	reliance	on	secondary	sources	for	the	historical	analysis	is	a	limitation.	However,	 conducting	 primary	 investigation	 for	 the	 history	 chapters	 would	 have	meant	sacrificing	time	spent	researching	the	contemporary	era	and,	given	the	latter	is	the	focus	of	this	 thesis,	 I	 do	 not	 believe	 this	 would	 have	 been	 a	 reasonable	 trade-off.	 In	 order	 to	strengthen	the	reliability	of	the	analysis	presented	in	chapters	3-5,	I	consulted	numerous	publications	and	especially	favoured	those	with	direct	quotations	from	archival	materials.	Furthermore,	I	sought	to	identify	disagreements	or	inconsistencies	(and	to	convey	these	in	my	own	writing)	and	to	be	transparent	about	gaps	in	historical	knowledge	and	how	these	affect	my	conclusions	(i.e.	by	qualifying	 them	as	needed).	My	analysis	of	 these	historical	sources	was	 done	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 exploration	 described	 earlier.	 Though,	 of	 course,	 this	analysis	 was	 shaped	 by	 pre-existing	 concepts,	 I	 did	 not	 set	 out	 to	 ‘test’	 a	 particular	‘hypothesis’.	 Furthermore,	 I	was	 open	 to	 evidence	 that	weighed	 against	my	 ‘conceptual	baggage’	(as	any	good	researcher	should	be).	To	give	just	one	example:	even	though	it	was	never	my	aim	to	apply	Marx’s	notion	of	‘primitive	accumulation’,	it	influenced	my	reading	and,	in	the	early	stages,	I	felt	quite	dismayed	when	I	found	out	how	ill-suited	the	concept	is	to	Colombian	history;	 I	 faithfully	reported	this	 ‘finding’	despite	being	concerned	that	my	thesis	might	be	read	as	an	attack	on	this	concept,	which	it	wasn’t	meant	to	be	-	just	as	it	wasn’t	designed	to	advocate	for	it	either.	As	discussed	earlier,	the	three	chapters	covering	the	contemporary	period	draw	on	-among	other	sources-	scholarly	publications,	NGO	reports,	newspaper	articles,	a	mixture	of	countless	government	documents	(laws,	court	rulings,	reports	from	the	Comptroller’s	and	Ombudsman’s	 offices	 and	 the	 Superintendent	 of	 Notaries	 and	 Registries,	 etcetera)	 and	interviews/fieldwork.	The	latter	deserve	special	attention	and	consideration	here.	
	 Fieldwork	allowed	 for	 access	 to	 information	 and	perspectives	not	 available	 in	 the	documents,	 thereby	 enriching	 the	 contents	 and	 analysis	 of	 this	 thesis.	 As	 argued	 by	Cawthorne	 (2001),	 interview	 research	 is	 a	 fundamental	 tool	 for	 anyone	 trying	 to	understand	social	and	economic	processes,	but	especially	those	scholars	who	identify	with	
critical	political	economy.	While	there	is	nothing	wrong	with	using	statistical	data	(e.g.	gini	
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coefficients,	GDP	growth	rates),	this	should	not	be	the	sole	basis	of	our	arguments,	according	to	Cawthorne.	Not	only	does	“unpeopled	research”	reproduce	intellectual	“alienation”,	it	is	also	 less	 likely	to	challenge	the	researcher’s	preconceptions	the	way	that	 fieldwork	does	and	is	unable	to	generate	a	nuanced	and	realistic	descriptions	(Cawthorne,	2001,	pp.	68–87).	In	what	follows,	I	use	a	more	narrative	style	to	briefly	describe	the	fieldwork	(and	desk-based	case	research)	that	underlies	this	thesis.		 Primary	research	has	vitally	defined	this	thesis	in	ways	that	may	not	be	immediately	obvious	to	the	reader.	I	only	began	to	understand	how	dispossession	happens	and	the	varied	forms	it	takes	by	engaging	with	diverse	people,	especially	those	dispossessed	or	resisting	involuntary	land	loss.	For	example,	it	was	after	listening	to	people	from	Nasa	communities	in	 Putumayo	 that	 I	 started	 to	 think	 about	 prior	 consultation	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	dispossession	and	how	armed	conflict	impacts	upon	this	process.	Similarly,	I	would	not	have	thought	of	oil	infrastructure	easements	as	a	form	of	dispossession	were	it	not	for	meeting	people	whose	 livelihoods	were	partially	destroyed	as	a	 result	of	 the	associated	 impacts.	Based	 on	 what	 people	 told	 me	 about	 their	 experiences,	 I	 started	 looking	 into	 relevant	government	policy,	legislation	and	other	documents	-	putting	the	puzzle	pieces	together.		 Given	the	exploratory	nature	of	my	research	and	difficulties	with	access,	the	selection	of	field	work	sites	and	informants/interviewees	was	relatively	open-ended.	I	knew	from	the	beginning	of	 the	project	 that	 I	wanted	 to	 examine	dissimilar	 instances	of	 dispossession,	involving	 varied	 types	 of	 investment-interests	 and	 in	 areas	 with	 different	 ‘levels’	 of	violence.	 I	 also	 knew	 that	 I	 was	 most	 interested	 in	 listening	 to	 people	 who	 had	 been	dispossessed	or	were	threatened	by	dispossession17.	However,	the	specifics	of	where	and	who	were	determined	by	my	contacts,	people’s	ability	and	willingness	to	get	involved,	and	other	factors	mostly	outside	my	control.		
                                                        17	This	has	obviously	influenced	the	perspective	and	contents	of	this	thesis.	A	project	focused	on	the	viewpoint	of	different	functionaries,	investors	or	their	employees	would	clearly	read	differently.	My	decision	to	mostly	interview	people	affected	by	dispossession	reflects	the	focus	of	the	project,	but	also	practical	 concerns.	 It	 became	 clear	 that	 being	 ‘seen	with’	 certain	 characters	 could	 affect	my	engagement	with	others	and	might	even	bar	access	outright	due	to	high	levels	of	mistrust.	Though	I	did	not	go	out	of	my	way	to	 interview	public	servants,	company	representatives,	or	other	people	involved	or	with	stakes	in	coercive	land	acquisitions,	I	didn’t	pass	up	opportunities	when	they	arose.	While	observing	the	aftermath	of	an	oil	spill,	an	engineer	working	for	one	of	the	companies	happened	to	arrive;	I	told	him	why	I	was	there	and	asked	him	as	many	questions	as	I	could	in	a	short	space	of	time.	In	this	case,	my	companions	actually	informed	me	afterwards	that	this	was	a	risky/problematic	thing	to	have	done.	On	another	occasion,	I	spent	a	couple	hours	talking	with	someone	who	worked	for	the	Ministry	of	Interior.	These	are	just	a	couple	examples.	Finally,	I	did	actively	seek	webpages,	documents	 and	 videos	 containing	 the	 perspectives	 of	 politicians,	 businesspeople,	 paramilitaries	involved	in	usurpation,	and	those	critical	of	the	land	restitution	program,	among	others.	
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	 During	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 fieldwork,	 I	 went	 to	 a	 number	 of	 places	 in	 the	 Caldas	department	-a	mostly	mountainous	region,	known	for	coffee	production,	in	central	western	Colombia-	and	spoke	informally	with	people	who	I	met	through	a	friend	from	a	regional	university.	I	decided	to	look	more	closely	into	what	had	been	happening	in	Marmato,	a	small	municipality	slated	for	an	open-pit	gold	mining	operation.	The	planned	project	would	have	required	the	displacement	of	circa	5,000	people	from	the	town	and	rural	vicinity	(Dinero,	2012a;	Gran	Colombia	Gold,	2012;	SRK	Consulting,	2012,	p.	117).	The	plans	have	since	been	discarded;	but,	at	the	time,	battles	to	block	the	open-pit	mine	were	ongoing18.	It	was	here	I	first	learned	about	State-backed	dispossession	and	displacement:	the	protractedness	of	the	process,	which	in	the	case	of	Marmato	was	not	completed;	the	various	tools	and	strategies	used	 by	 company	 and	 government	 representatives	 to	 pressure	 people	 into	 accepting	relocation	and	associated	divisions	between	inhabitants;	and	the	difficulties	faced	by	those	leading	resistance.	I	was	able	to	interview	(in	March,	May	and	October	2014)	leaders	from	the	 Civic	 Committee	 in	 Defence	 of	 Marmato,	 the	 Association	 of	 Traditional	 Miners	 of	Marmato	and	the	Cartama	Indigenous	Council,	among	others.		 I	had	a	more	difficult	time	organising	fieldwork	outside	the	Caldas	department,	my	home-base	 in	 Colombia.	 Eventually,	 I	 met	 someone	 from	 a	 human	 rights	 NGO,	 the	Interchurch	Justice	and	Peace	Commission	or	CIJP	-	Comisión	Intereclesial	de	Justicia	y	Paz,	who	was	willing	to	help	me	on	a	collaborative	basis.	I	wrote	a	report	for	the	organisation	-as	a	volunteer-	with	the	understanding	that	the	research	I	did	for	the	report	could	also	be	used	in	my	thesis.	The	report	focuses	on	the	social	and	environmental	 impacts	of	the	oil	industry	in	the	Amazon	Pearl	Peasant	Reserve	Zone	and	various	Nasa	communities	in	the	southern	department	of	Putumayo.	I	travelled	to	the	region	in	June	and	August	2015.	CIJP	team	members	 shared	 relevant	 documents,	 let	me	 shadow	 them	 during	 their	workday,	answered	 countless	 questions	 and	 organised	 meetings/interviews	 with	 community	leaders/inhabitants.	 This	 process	 really	 broadened	 and	 deepened	my	 understanding	 of	dispossession,	particularly	in	an	area	severely	affected	by	armed	conflict.	
                                                        18	In	December	2014,	just	a	couple	months	after	I	conducted	a	last	round	of	interviews	in	Marmato,	the	multinational	retracted	from	its	open-air	mining	plans,	citing	environmental	and	social	impacts	as	the	primary	obstacles,	as	well	as	the	depth	of	the	mineral	deposit	(Peña,	2014;	Quintero,	2014).	This	does	not	rule	out	the	expansion	of	the	company’s	subterranean	operations	(with	its	own	set	of	problems)	or	the	sale	of	titles	to	another	firm	that	doesn’t	uphold	its	predecessors’	promises.	Indeed,	the	social	conflict	in	Marmato	-in	particular	between	small	scale	miners	and	the	multinational-	did	not	end	there;	still,	the	announced	decision	certainly	changed	the	terms	of	struggle.		
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	 I	felt,	however,	that	my	research	would	be	incomplete	if	I	didn’t	examine	a	process	in	which	paramilitaries	played	a	more	direct	role.	I	decided	to	return	to	a	story	I	had	come	across	in	the	news	around	2007/2008:	the	violent	takeover	of	the	collective	territories	of	Jiguamiandó	and	Curvaradó	(in	Chocó	department,	northwest	Colombia)	by	paramilitary-backed	palm	oil	businesses.	Dozens	involved	in	the	usurpation	have	been	tried/convicted	and	court	sentences	are	publicly	available.	These	 texts	offer	a	rare	amount	of	detail	and	insight	into	the	strategies	used	by	the	para-elite	to	accomplish	dispossession;	without	these,	such	 information	 would	 be	 difficult	 if	 not	 impossible	 to	 access.	 The	 experiences	 and	perspectives	of	people	from	Jiguamiandó	and	Curvaradó	were	also	already	documented	by	various	organisations,	including	CIJP.	For	this	and	other	reasons	(including	time/resource	constraints),	my	research	 for	 this	 ‘case’	was	desk-based.	 I	drew	on	government	sources,	NGO	and	media	reports,	and	especially	recent	criminal	proceedings.		 In	addition	 to	 these	 three	 in-depth	 ‘case	studies’,	 this	 thesis	has	been	shaped	by	a	mixture	of	accounts	from	different	parts	of	Colombia.	I	travelled,	attended	relevant	events	and	 spoke	 with	 people	 whenever	 the	 opportunity	 arose.	 For	 example,	 I	 followed	 a	sociologist	friend	to	an	Embera	resguardo	in	Riosucio	(Caldas)	and	heard	an	elder’s	account	of	 land	 ‘recovery’	 battles	 decades	 past	 (May	 2014).	 I	 started	 to	 learn	 about	 ‘special	jurisdictions’	by	attending	an	event	organised	by	the	Public	Prosecutors’	Office	in	which	the	majority	 of	 participants	 were	 indigenous	 leaders	 from	 across	 Colombia	 (July	 2014).	 I	observed	a	‘National	Victims	Forum’,	which	brought	hundreds	of	armed	conflict	survivors	together	 to	 gather	 proposals	 for	 presentation	 at	 the	 ‘dialogue	 table’	 between	 the	government	 and	 FARC	 guerrillas	 (August	 2014).	 I	 spent	 a	 week	 in	 the	 east	 of	 Caldas	(involving	visits	to	five	different	villages	and	towns)	with	a	functionary	from	the	regional	Ombudsman’s	 Office	 and	 a	 friend/NGO	 lawyer	 (May	 2015).	 Here,	 I	 learned	 about	 the	failures	 of	 the	 government	 reparations/restitution	 program	 and	 the	 problems	 faced	 by	returnees	-	including	the	threat	of	being	displaced	yet	again	by	hydroelectric	projects.		 This	 thesis	 has	 also	been	 formed	by	 experiences	 and	 conversations	 that	were	not	officially	part	of	 fieldwork.	Colombia	has	been	my	second	adopted	home	 for	 the	 last	 ten	years,	which	I	have	spent	toing	and	froing	between	Brighton	(Sussex,	UK)	and	Manizales	in	the	Caldas	department.	 Sometimes	 the	 line	between	daily	 life	 and	 research	 is	not	 easily	drawn	(see	Stebbins,	2001,	especially	Chpt.	5).	I	am	constantly	learning	from	my	husband	(who	is	Colombian,	an	agronomist,	and	familiar	with	the	world	of	commercial	agriculture),	friends	 and	 students	 -	 from	hearing	 about	 their	 experiences	 and	 asking	 them	questions	relevant	to	this	thesis.	I	have	also	gone	on	trips	and	to	events	and	meetings	that	influenced	
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my	PhD	research	in	various	and	often	subtle	ways.	In	July	2017,	for	example,	I	spent	a	week	in	a	‘rural	transition	zone’	-the	places	where	FARC	combatants	assembled	for	disarmament	and	 reintegration-	 in	 the	 southern	 department	 of	 Guaviare,	 with	 colleagues	 from	 the	University	of	Caldas.		 A	distinct	but	related	issue	that	requires	mention	is	how	this	thesis	is	influenced	by	my	personal	values	and	views.	I	do	not	feign	to	be	a	disinterested	and	detached	researcher.	I	have	ethical	and	political	commitments	(in	the	broad	sense	–	i.e.	I	am	not	a	member	of	any	party	or	organisation)	that	are	evident	in	this	thesis.	In	keeping	with	a	critical	realist	meta-theoretical	position,	I	do	not	believe	that	neutral	research	is	possible.	This	does	not	mean	‘anything	goes’	(for	a	full	discussion	see	Sayer,	2010).	Negating	the	possibility	of	value-free	‘science’	does	not	contradict	the	basic	idea	that	academic	writing	on	social	issues	should	be	based	on	research	and	guided	by	“principles	such	as	those	concerning	honesty	of	reporting	and	refusal	of	illogical	argument”	(Sayer,	2010,	p.	11).		 Many	 single	 sentences	 or	 paragraphs	 in	 this	 thesis	 have	 weeks	 of	 reading	 and	investigation	behind	them.	As	noted	earlier,	I	would	consult	multiple	sources	on	the	same	events	or	issues.	I	encountered	innumerable	imprecisions	and	misrepresentations	in	news	articles,	reports	from	varied	organisations	and	scholarly	publications	-	from	different	ends	of	the	political	spectrum.	This	led	me	to	reject	claims	and	ideas	circulating	among	friends,	groups	and	academics	who	hold	views	with	which	I	am	broadly	sympathetic.	My	point,	to	rephrase,	is	that	while	my	political	and	ethical	views	and	values	have	obviously	influenced	this	thesis,	this	does	not	mean	they	mechanically	determined	my	conclusions,	nor	that	they	undercut	(what	I	see	as)	my	duties	as	a	researcher.	.
-	1	-	
Analysing	land	dispossession:	the	basic	conceptual	groundwork	
	This	chapter	establishes	some	of	the	basic	conceptual	groundwork	for	the	discussions	that	follow.	The	first	section	defines	dispossession	as	the	term	is	used	in	this	thesis	and	argues	for	a	particular	definition	of	land	grabbing.	Section	two	explains	why	I	have	chosen	to	link	analyses	of	land	dispossession	with	forced	displacement.	The	third	section	introduces	some	key	dispossession-related	vocabulary,	which	 I	use	 in	 specific	ways.	 It	 then	distinguishes	between	three	broad	types	of	dispossession.	The	fourth	and	final	section	presents	two	key	concepts	that	have	shaped	critical	scholarship	on	land	grabbing:	Marx’s	notion	of	primitive	accumulation	 and	 Harvey’s	 accumulation	 by	 dispossession.	 I	 argue	 that	 both	 concepts	provide	 useful	 insights	 for	 analysing	 land	 dispossession	 but	 that,	 ultimately,	 they	were	constructed	 for	 another	 purpose	 and	 hence	 are	 insufficient	 on	 their	 own	 -	 this	 point	 is	illustrated	further	in	Chapter	2.			
1)	A	focus	on	coercion:	dispossession	and	land	grabbing		Dictionary	definitions	are	usually	deficient	for	academic	purposes,	but	they	are	sometimes	a	 good	 place	 to	 start.	 The	 verb	 “dispossess”	 is	 defined	 as:	 “to	 take	 property,	 especially	buildings	or	land,	away	from	someone	or	a	group	of	people”	(‘dispossess’,	2019).	The	legal	definition	is	narrower:	“dispossession”	is	“the	wrongful,	non-consensual	ouster	or	removal	of	a	person	from	his	or	her	property	by	trick,	compulsion,	or	misuse	of	the	law,	whereby	the	violator	obtains	actual	occupation	of	the	land”	(‘dispossesssion’,	2008).	Drawing	on	these	descriptions,	 I	 propose	 that	 dispossession	 refers	 broadly	 to	 involuntary	 land	 loss.	 The	legalistic	definition	suggests	that	dispossession	is	unlawful	coercive	land	acquisition;	this	is	too	 narrow	 for	 my	 purposes,	 since	 I	 also	 examine	 involuntary	 land	 loss	 that	 is	 legally	sanctioned.	 And	 while	 it	 is	 often	 useful	 to	 distinguish	 between	 legal	 and	 illegal	dispossession,	 in	 practice	 the	 distinction	 can	 be	 ambiguous.	 Finally,	 both	 the	 above	definitions	 focus	 on	 property,	 but	 from	 my	 perspective	 dispossession	 implies	 stripping	someone	of	land	they	possess,	whether	they	formally	and	legally	own	it	or	not.	I	use	the	term	‘land	grab’	in	a	similar	way	to	dispossession	(though	the	former	is	more	specific	than	the	latter	since	not	all	forms	of	dispossession	involve	someone	grabbing	the	land).	This	is	a	point	of	contention	among	scholars	writing	about	the	recent	global	land	rush	
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(discussions	of	this	issue	in	Edelman	et	al.,	2013;	Hall,	2013).	Many	use	the	term	‘land	grab’	for	any	large-scale	land	acquisition,	including	consensual	transfers.	Others	argue	explicitly	for	a	definition	that	focuses	on	land	control,	noting	that	from	this	perspective	a	“land	grab	does	not	always	[…]	result	in	dispossession”	(Borras,	Franco,	Gómez,	Kay,	&	Spoor,	2012,	p.	850).	 But	 the	 word	 grab	 connotes	 coercion;	 arguably,	 if	 coercion	 is	 not	 involved	 then	phrases	 like	 ‘deal’	or	 ‘purchase’	(which	suggest	consent)	or	 ‘acquisition’	(which	suggests	neither	 consent	nor	 coercion)	 are	more	 appropriate.	 The	 implied	objection	 to	using	 the	term	‘land	grab’	 in	such	a	specific	way	is	that	it	narrows	the	focus	of	research	and	could	result	 in	 the	 neglect	 of	 important	 issues.	 The	 following	 paragraph	 proposes	 a	 simple	response	to	this	concern.	The	disagreement	over	definitions	can	be	 traced	 to	 the	 interchangeable	use	of	 the	phrases:	‘global	land	rush’	and	‘global	land	grab’.	I	argue	for	a	distinction	between	the	two.	‘Global	land	rush’	denotes	an	increase	in	land	acquisitions	and	investor	interest	in	land;	it	says	 nothing	 about	 how	 the	 land	 is	 obtained.	 The	 global	 land	 rush	 has	 involved	 both	
voluntary	 transactions	 and	 coercive	 land	 grabs.	 Activists,	 NGOs	 and	 some	 scholars	 are	rightly	concerned	that	the	recent	rush	for	land	has	fuelled	dispossession	and	displacement.	So,	the	proposition	is	that	the	global	land	rush	is	causing	an	increase	in	land	grabs.	This	does	not	 negate	 the	 importance	 of	 land	 use	 changes	 or	 property	 concentration	 arising	 from	voluntary	agreements	or	consensual	market	transactions.	Research	projects	on	the	global	land	rush	could	examine	cases	of	land	grabbing,	or	land	deals	where	no	coercion	is	involved,	or	a	mix	of	the	two.	This	distinction	also	helps	clarify	why	so	many	analyses	of	dispossession	or	land	grabs	cannot	be	easily	situated	in	the	land	rush	literature.	This	thesis,	for	example,	says	very	little	about	the	recent	global	land	rush,	as	this	is	not	my	‘object’	of	study.		As	noted	earlier,	research	focused	on	dispossession	entails	a	specific	set	of	questions.	For	example:	 could	a	particular	 land	use	change	 imposed	via	extra-economic	 force	have	been	achieved	through	voluntary	transactions	instead?	Or:	what	are	the	main	factors	that	drive	and	enable	dispossession	within	a	given	context?	There	may	be	some	overlap	with	analyses	 of	 a	 particular	 land	 rush.	 However,	 a	 focus	 on	 coercion	 adds	 another	 layer	 of	complexity.	And,	 as	 shown	subsequently,	 it	 can	 shape	 the	way	we	 think	about	 capitalist	development,	liberal	democracies	and	market	economies	more	broadly.		Derek	Hall	(2013)	rightly	points	out	that	it	is	not	always	easy	to	distinguish	between	“economic	and	extra-economic	means	of	accumulation	in	land	acquisition”	(p.	1593).	For	example,	 government	 policies	 impact	 how	 land	 markets	 work,	 and	 they	 may	 set	 small	farmers	 up	 for	 losing	 their	 land.	 So,	 land	 transfers	 that	 appear	 to	 be	 ordinary	 market	
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transactions	may	“from	the	point	of	view	of	the	landholders	be	shot	through	with	political,	legal	and	coercive	power”	(Hall,	2013,	p.	1594).	Thus,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	there	are	different	forms	of	dispossession	and	to	clarify	how	the	term	is	being	used	at	any	given	point.	This	thesis	is	mostly	concerned	with	dispossession	imposed	by	the	State	or	private	agents	 using	 direct	 extra-economic	 force;	 however,	 I	 also	 recognise	 what	 can	 be	 called	‘market-mechanisms	 of	 dispossession’	 and	 how	 these	 are	 set	 in	 motion	 by	 political	decisions.	 Hall	 (2013)	 suggests	 that	 “the	 economic/extra-economic	 distinction	 may	 be	better	seen	as	a	continuum	than	as	a	dichotomy”	(p.	1594);	the	same	could	be	said	of	the	relationship	between	coercion	and	consent.	The	definition	of	dispossession	supplied	above	excludes	land	transfers	at	the	consent	end	of	the	continuum	but	could	potentially	include	those	cases	somewhere	in	the	middle,	closer	to	coercion.	Nevertheless,	 in	order	to	avoid	repeating	cumbersome	caveats,	I	use	the	term	dispossession	to	refer	to	processes	involving	clear	and	direct	coercion,	unless	I	expressly	indicate	the	contrary.		
2)	Forced	displacement	and	land	dispossession	Much	 of	 the	 recent	 literature	 on	 land	 grabbing	 refers	 only	 fleetingly	 to	 the	 problem	 of	displacement	(McMichael,	2012,	p.	641;	White,	Borras	Jr.,	Hall,	Scoones,	&	Wolford,	2012,	pp.	693–695);	in	some	cases,	only	to	point	out	that	not	all	land	grabs	entail	people	being	displaced	(Borras	&	Franco,	2012,	p.	52;	Borras,	Franco,	et	al.,	2012,	pp.	854–857).	This	is	partially	due	to	differences	in	definitions	of	what	constitutes	a	land	grab,	mentioned	above.	But	even	coercive	land	acquisitions	do	not	always	result	in	displacement	and,	of	course,	not	all	 displacement	 is	 linked	 to	 dispossession.	 Still,	 the	 two	 issues	 are	 often	 closely	 tied	 in	complex	and	varied	ways;	a	closer	examination	of	this	relationship	would	be	beneficial	to	both	 displacement	 and	 land	 specialists,	 as	 well	 as	 critical	 political	 economy	 and	development	research	more	broadly.	Furthermore,	much	of	the	literature	(mainstream	and	critical)	 on	 forced	 displacement	 offers	 valuable	 insights	 into	 dispossession,	 which	 is	 of	relevance	to	research	on	land	grabbing.	Likewise,	displacement	scholars	could	gain	from	engaging	with	the	political	economy	of	land.	Land	appropriation	sometimes	underlies	displacement	attributed	to	armed	conflict	and	disaster	prevention.	Even	displacement	that	is	genuinely	an	inadvertent	consequence	of	war	or	some	other	cataclysm	may	enable	land	grabs.	Elsewhere,	I	discuss	in	detail	the	limitations	of	the	conventional	typology	of	forced	displacement,	which	includes	three	main	types,	 categorised	according	 to	 the	presumed	cause:	 conflict,	disaster	and	development-
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induced	(Thomson,	2014).	I	argue	that	this	threefold	classification	diverts	attention	away	from	the	struggles	over	resources	and	territory	that	are	often	vital	for	understanding	the	stories	behind	displacement.	Of	the	three,	only	the	development	type	points	directly	to	the	links	between	displacement	and	land	control.	Still,	much	of	the	literature	on	development-induced	displacement	treats	it	as	a	technical	policy	issue.	Furthermore,	this	is	presented	as	a	separate	category,	distinguished	from	conflict	and	disaster	-induced	displacement.	The	latter	 are	usually	deemed	 to	 impede	economic	development	 (though	 they	may	 facilitate	land	use	changes	conducive	to	capital	accumulation);	the	former,	in	contrast,	is	portrayed	as	an	 inevitable	requirement	of	progress	and	growth.	Overall,	 the	conventional	 typology	predisposes	us	to	overlook,	downplay	and/or	de-politicise	land	questions.	This	thesis	is	about	Colombia,	which	is	said	to	have	the	largest	internally	displaced	population	 in	 the	world.	As	 explained	earlier,	many	of	 the	 country’s	7	million	displaced	persons	were	forced	to	abandon	their	lands	and	homes	to	avoid	being	‘caught	in	the	cross	fire’	or	were	deliberately	displaced	for	military	and	related	political	reasons;	however,	an	unknown	number	were	violently	uprooted	so	that	others	could	take	control	of	their	land	and	its	resources.	Put	simply:	the	Colombian	context	demands	an	analysis	of	dispossession	linked	to	displacement.		As	 forced	migration	 intensifies	across	 the	world	(UNHCR,	2017),	 it	 is	 important	 to	draw	attention	 to	 how	 land	 grabs	 -often	 tied	 to	 national	 and	 international	 policies-	 can	contribute	 to	 humanitarian	 crises.	 This	 is	 not	 exclusively	 a	 Colombian	 problem.	 Many	Ethiopians	 who	 live	 in	 refugee	 camps	 in	 South	 Sudan	 and	 Kenya,	 for	 example,	 were	displaced	by	a	government	‘villagisation’	program	-	partially	aimed	at	clearing	indigenous	groups	from	their	territories	so	that	the	land	can	be	leased	to	investors	(Abbink,	2011;	HRW,	2012a,	2012b).	These	‘villagisation’	programs	have	been	funded	by	agencies	such	as	USAID	and	 DfID.	 An	 ex-employee	 of	 the	 UK	 aid	 agency	 DfID	 stated	 frankly	 that	 he/she	 was	“prepared	to	tolerate	a	certain	 level	of	human	rights	abuses	in	exchange	for	progress	on	development”	 (cited	 in	 Rawlence,	 2016).	 So,	 aid	 agencies	 are	 simultaneously	 pumping	money	into	attending	humanitarian	crises	and	into	policies	that	underwrite	them,	in	some	cases	knowingly,	in	the	name	of	development.	Of	course,	not	all	displacement	is	linked	to	land	grabs	and,	even	when	there	are	links,	causes	 are	 often	 multifaceted.	 In	 other	 words,	 we	 should	 not	 reduce	 explanations	 of	displacement	to	land	grabbing.	But	we	do	need	to	start	debunking	some	of	the	simplistic	narratives	 surrounding	 forced	migration	 crises	 and	 I	 believe	 land	 specialists,	 especially	critical	scholars,	could	help.	A	distinct	but	related	issue	-touched	upon	only	indirectly	in	this	
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thesis-	 is	 how	 armed	 conflicts	 and	 environmental	 disasters	 that	 generate	 mass	displacement	are	 themselves	 intimately	 intertwined	with	capitalist	development	 (on	 the	former,	see	e.g.	Cramer,	2006;	on	the	latter	see	e.g.	Gellert	&	Lynch,	2004).	Bringing	 together	 analyses	 of	 displacement	 and	 dispossession,	 and	 placing	 them	within	 broader	 political	 economy	 discussions,	 can	 also	 contribute	 to	 critiques	 of	mainstream	discourses	that	portray	development	(often	a	euphemism	for	growth	or	capital	accumulation)	 as	 innately	 benign.	 Critical	 scholars	maintain	 that	 capitalist	 development	produces	both	wealth	and	poverty	and	that	the	process	itself	is	inherently	conflictual	and	often	 violent	 (see	 e.g.	 Cramer,	 2006;	 Selwyn,	 2014).	 State-backed	 dispossession	 and	displacement	is	perhaps	the	clearest	example	of	the	“violence	of	development”	(McMichael,	2012;	Coleman,	2013;	Escobar,	2003)	and	of	how	the	very	process	 that	promises	 to	 ‘lift	people	out	of	poverty’	often	impoverishes	them	instead.	According	to	one	of	the	most	well-known	experts	on	development-induced	displacement,	“the	dominant,	most	important	and	universally	corroborated	finding	[of	research	within	this	field]	has	been	that	in	developing	countries	a	vast	number	of	displaced	people	have	ended	up	worse	off,	poorer	than	they	were	before	 development	 projects	 displaced	 them”	 (Cernea,	 2004,	 p.	 39).	 A	 focus	 on	displacement,	alongside	land	dispossession,	helps	emphasise	how	people	are	tossed	aside	in	the	name	of	growth	and	progress	and	how	related	policies	overturn	lives	in	ways	that	are	generally	associated	with	disasters	and	war.		
3)	Types	of	dispossession:	some	conceptual	distinctions		Dispossession	 can	 take	multiple	 forms:	 expropriation	 of	 privately-owned	 homes	 for	 an	industrial	 park;	 enclosure	 of	 common	 pasture	 land	 by	 local	 elites	 for	 an	 agribusiness	venture;	government-enforced	evictions	of	squatters	from	State-owned	lands	coveted	by	a	real	 estate	 developer;	 the	 forcible	 acquisition	 of	 use	 rights	 -like	 oil	 infrastructure	easements-	that	significantly	impair	the	owner’s	ability	to	live	on	or	use	their	land;	or	the	occupation	of	collectively-owned	indigenous	territories	by	a	mining	firm	without	a	transfer	of	title.	These	are	just	a	few	examples.			 Some	 of	 the	 above	 terms,	 such	 as	 ‘enclosure’	 and	 ‘expropriation’,	 are	 often	 used	interchangeably.	 However,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 utilise	dispossession-related	vocabulary	as	precisely	as	possible.	I	adopt	the	specific	definition	of	‘expropriation’,	found	in	most	dictionaries,	which	refers	to	the	taking	of	private	property	by	the	State.	This	can	be	contrasted	with	the	enclosure	of	common	land,	which	may	be	imposed	
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by	 private	 actors	 with	 or	 without	 State	 endorsement.	 More	 importantly,	 in	 the	contemporary	era,	land	under	private	ownership	is	usually	already	physically	and	socially	enclosed,	 so	 it	 makes	 little	 sense	 to	 call	 dispossession	 achieved	 through	 expropriation	‘enclosure’.	 Furthermore,	 while	 enclosure	 often	 involves	 the	 imposition	 of	 exclusionary	property	rights	over	common	lands	(though	there	may	be	exceptions	such	as	the	fencing	of	forests	for	their	conversion	into	State-owned	conservation	areas),	expropriation	implies	a	
violation	of	established	property	rights.			 Chapters	7	and	8	of	this	thesis	detail	dozens	of	different	forms	and	mechanisms	of	dispossession	 in	contemporary	Colombia.	For	 the	purpose	of	 the	present	discussion	and	those	of	the	chapter	that	follows,	I	focus	on	three	broad	types	of	dispossession:	that	which	is	overtly	backed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers,	that	carried	out	by	private	agents	without	explicit	government	sanction	at	 the	moment	of	 imposition,	and	 that	which	arises	due	 to	economic	 pressures	 or	 through	 market	 mechanisms.	 Later	 chapters	 show	 how	 these	different	types	overlap	in	complex	ways.	However,	these	basic	distinctions	are	useful	for	analytical	reasons.			 (i)	State-backed	dispossession	–	Legal	systems	worldwide	refer	to	the	State’s	exclusive	‘right’	to	take	land,	in	particular	private	property,	against	the	will	of	its	owner	-	often	called	‘eminent	 domain’	 or	 ‘taking	 powers’.	 The	 actual	 process	 is	 variously	 referred	 to	 as:	‘expropriation’,	 ‘appropriation’,	 ‘condemnation’,	 ‘forcible	 acquisition’	 or	 ‘compulsory	purchase’	–	to	name	a	few.	To	avoid	confusion,	I	use	the	term	‘expropriation’.	Most	country’s	taking	 clauses	 require	 (a)	 that	 expropriation	 only	 be	 used	 where	 the	 public	 interest	demands	it	or	variations	on	this	theme	(b)	that	it	 follow	a	legal	process,	and	(c)	that	the	expropriated	 receive	 ‘just’	 compensation.	 These	 conditions	 are	 said	 to	 distinguish	expropriations	under	liberal	democracy	from	arbitrary	takings	by	despotic	rulers.		Modern	‘takings	law’	-informed	by	the	liberal	notion	of	rights-	is	supposed	to	restrict	the	State’s	power;	expropriation	is	presented	as	an	exception	to	property	rules.	For	example,	the	 1789	 French	 ‘Declaration	 of	 the	 Rights	 of	 Man	 and	 the	 Citizen’	 proclaims:	 “Since	property	is	an	inviolable	and	sacred	right,	no	one	shall	be	deprived	thereof	except	where	public	necessity,	legally	determined,	shall	clearly	demand	it,	and	then	only	on	condition	that	the	 owner	 shall	 have	 been	 previously	 and	 equitably	 indemnified”	 (Article	 17,	 emphasis	added).	 Similarly,	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 states:	 “No	 one	 shall	 be	deprived	 of	 his	 possessions	 except	 in	 the	 public	 interest	 and	 subject	 to	 the	 conditions	
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provided	 for	by	 law	and	by	 the	general	principles	of	 international	 law”	 (Protocol	 to	 the	Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Fundamental	 Freedoms	 -	 Paris,	20.III.1952,	Article	1:	“Protection	of	Property”,	emphasis	added).		To	reiterate:	in	most	countries,	governments	are	-legally-	only	allowed	to	seize	land	when	 the	 expropriation	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 for	 the	 public.	 Some	 texts	 refer	 to	 ‘public	necessity’	or	‘public	interest’	(see	above	examples)	and	others	to	‘public	use’	(see	e.g.	the	US	Constitution).	The	difference	in	wording	is	noteworthy,	since	‘necessity’,	‘interest’	and	‘use’	imply	quite	distinct	 things.	But	 in	contrast	 to	most	 traditions	of	 legal	 interpretation,	 the	word	choice	seems	to	make	little	difference	in	this	case.	Many	governments	have	pushed	the	boundaries	of	what	constitutes	an	acceptable	expropriation,	beyond	projects	of	public	necessity,	use	or	even	interest.	The	specifics	of	this	shift	(timing	and	nature)	are	particular	to	different	countries.	However,	there	is	evidence	that	it	is	a	global	trend.	Wily	 (2012)	 notes,	 for	 example,	 how	 across	 the	 African	 continent	 clauses	 about	“public	purpose	[...	were]	explicitly	expanded	in	most	land	laws	during	the	1990-2010	era	to	 include	 private	 investments	 which	 support	 economic	 growth”	 (p.	 768).	 Similarly,	 in	Colombia,	private	mining	and	oil	operations	are	considered	projects	of	 ‘public	utility	and	social	interest’	because	they	are	alleged	to	be	necessary	for	economic	development.	Michael	Levien	details	how,	by	 the	1990s,	 “land	 [in	 India]	was	 increasingly	expropriated	 for	any	private	purpose	that	represented	a	higher-value	land	use	than	agriculture	-	no	matter	how	immaterial,	 consumptive	 or	 speculative”	 (p.	 384).	 Meanwhile,	 the	 US	 Supreme	 Court	defended	 an	 extremely	 malleable	 interpretation	 of	 the	 ‘public	 use’	 restriction	 in	 the	country’s	 Constitution	 and	 thus	 endorsed	 the	 already	 well-established	 practice	 of	expropriating	homeowners	and	small	businesses	for	private	investments.	In	the	words	of	one	judge,	who	opposed	the	decision	of	her	peers	in	the	infamous	2005	Kelo	v.	New	London	case:	“Under	the	banner	of	economic	development,	all	private	property	is	now	vulnerable	to	being	taken	and	transferred	to	another	private	owner”	(O’Connor,	2005,	p.	1).	So,	it	seems	that	 in	 many	 liberal	 democracies,	 with	 capitalist	 economies,	 expropriation	 is	 neither	strongly	conditioned	nor	that	exceptional.		
	 State-backed	 dispossession	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 expropriation.	 The	 State	 may	 also	confiscate	land	through	asset	forfeiture	proceedings.	Under	Colombian	law,	for	example,	the	State	 can	extinguish	property	 rights	 (via	extinción	de	dominio)	 and	 thus	 confiscate	 land,	among	other	reasons,	when	a	property	was	acquired	with	money	obtained	illicitly,	if	it	is	used	 for	 illicit	 purposes,	 if	 the	 titleholder	 breaches	 select	 environmental	 laws,	 or	 if	 the	owner	stops	exercising	possession	for	an	established	period	of	time	-	unless	this	is	due	to	
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‘force	majeure’	(Laws	793	of	2002	and	1708	of	2014	and	Articles	52-64	of	Law	160	of	1994).	In	such	cases,	the	government	does	not	have	to	pay	compensation,	unlike	when	land	is	taken	via	 expropriation.	 This	 thesis	 does	 not	 examine	 confiscation	 in	 great	 detail	 because	 in	Colombia	this	has	mainly	affected	elites	involved	in	the	illicit	drug	business	and	absentee	landowners	 who	 left	 their	 properties	 idle,	 and	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 the	 dispossession	 of	
campesinos	and	other	‘labouring	classes’.		Furthermore,	when	a	government	evicts	people	from	(or	encloses	and	thus	prevents	them	from	using)	formally	State-owned	land,	this	is	not	usually	considered	an	expropriation	in	the	technical	sense,	since	the	State	is	not	taking	private	property,	but	rather	‘recovering’	land	it	claims	as	its	own.	In	many	parts	of	the	world,	especially	where	large	areas	of	land	are	not	 covered	 by	 private	 property	 titles,	 this	 form	 of	 State-backed	 dispossession	 is	more	common	than	expropriation	(see	e.g.	Wily,	2012a).	The	rules	regulating	the	 ‘recovery’	of	State-owned	 lands	 are	different	 from	country	 to	 country	 and	may	or	may	not	 require	 a	formal	legal	procedure,	a	public	interest	justification	and/or	compensation.		Other	 forms	 of	 State-backed	 dispossession	 include	 the	 forcible	 acquisition	 of	easements	(land	use	rights)	and,	one	that	is	perhaps	specific	to	Colombia,	the	imposition	of	(e.g.)	oil	and	mining	operations	within	indigenous	and	Afro	territories	under	collective	title	–	neither	of	which	involve	a	legal	transfer	of	ownership.			 (ii)	 Dispossession	 effected	 by	 private	 agents	 –	 Here	 I	 refer	 to	 appropriations	 not	explicitly	 backed	 by	 the	 State’s	 taking	 powers	 (as	 above),	 that	 are	 achieved	 using	 force	and/or	fraud,	and	by	people	who,	at	least	at	the	beginning	of	the	process,	had	no	legal	claim	to	 the	 land	 in	 question.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 such	 appropriations	 are	 technically	 illegal	 in	many,	 if	 not	most,	 countries.	 Even	 people	without	 formal	 titles	 often	 have	 basic	 ‘rights’	under	the	 law	and	the	process	 itself	usually	 involves	some	illicit	activity	or	another	(e.g.	arson,	 murder,	 forgery).	 Nevertheless,	 I	 decided	 against	 labelling	 this	 category	 ‘illegal	dispossession’	since	these	appropriations	are	frequently	legalised	ex-post	facto.	As	argued	by	Simon	Springer	(2013):	“It	matters	not	if	the	land	is	obtained	through	force,	theft,	fraud,	violence	or	‘unlawful’	means,	so	long	as	the	courts	recognize	the	outcome,	the	act	of	legally	sanctioning	unscrupulous	activity	is	what	explicitly	makes	it	legal”	(p.	23,	italics	in	original).		 Government	 agents	 may	 assist	 with	 the	 legalisation	 of	 such	 appropriations	 (e.g.	notaries	or	 judges);	 support	 the	physical	 removal	of	 the	original	 landholders	or	prevent	their	 return	 (e.g.	 police	 or	 army	 and	 officials	 that	 sign	 eviction	 orders);	 provide	 the	
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usurpation	with	a	veneer	of	legitimacy	(e.g.	functionaries	that	approve	government	loans	and	 subsidies);	 and	 may	 even	 themselves	 partake	 in	 the	 profits	 of	 such	 dispossession.	Indeed,	these	have	been	key	characteristics	of	the	para-elite	land	grab	in	Colombia,	which	I	describe	 in	Chapter	7.	However,	 this	 is	not	 the	same	as	an	appropriation	being	 formally	sanctioned	by	the	State	or	‘performed’	using	its’	taking	powers.		 This	 thesis	 also	 shows	 that	 -in	 Colombia-	 private	 land	 grabs	 and	 State-backed	dispossession	 are	 sometimes	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	 in	 practice.	 Still,	 as	 mentioned	previously,	it	is	useful	to	establish	conceptual	distinctions	as	a	starting	point	in	the	analysis,	even	if	only	to	challenge	them	later.	Much	more	could	be	said	about	this	but	my	purpose	here	is	limited	to	preparing	the	ground	for	subsequent	discussions.		 (iii)	Market-led	dispossession	–	This	 thesis	 focuses	on	State-backed	dispossession	and	 that	 imposed	 directly	 by	 private	 agents	 -	 the	 broad	 types	 (ii	 &	 ii)	 outlined	 above.	Nevertheless,	 it	 also	 touches	 upon,	 and	demands	 an	 explanation	 of,	what	may	be	 called	market-led	dispossession.	The	most	obvious	example	is	when	a	bank	seizes	a	person’s	home	or	land	as	collateral	for	unpaid	loans:	the	foreclosure	(which	may	involve	direct	physical	coercion,	especially	when	accompanied	by	eviction)	-essentially	an	enforcement	of	a	legal	contract	concerning	property	rights-	is	the	immediate	manifestation	of	dispossession,	but	debt	and	the	factors	that	led	to	its	unsustainability	are	the	underlying	mechanisms	driving	the	process.	‘Distress	sales’	in	which	someone	is	compelled	to	sell	their	land	urgently,	often	at	 a	 loss,	 are	 probably	 even	 more	 common	 than	 foreclosure.	 Often	 these	 sales	 are	undertaken	 to	 cover	 unmanageable	 debts	 and	 thus	 the	 underlying	 mechanisms	 of	dispossession,	in	such	cases,	may	be	similar.			 Market-mechanisms	of	dispossession	are	arguably	specific	to,	or	at	least	particularly	prevalent	within,	 capitalist	 economies.	 Explaining	 this	 point	 requires	 a	 brief	 account	 of	Ellen	 Wood’s	 concepts	 of	 market-dependence	 and	 capitalist	 imperatives.	 In	 capitalist	societies,	 most	 people	 depend	 on	monetised	markets	 for	 almost	 everything	 -	 including	access	to	food,	water	and	shelter.	The	majority	are	also	dependent	on	markets	to	sell	their	labour	power,	to	obtain	money	with	which	to	purchase	these	necessities.	For	many,	salaried	work	is	not	an	opportunity	but	an	imperative;	the	alternative	can	be	as	harsh	as	hunger	and	homelessness,	 even	 death.	 Capitalist	 firms	 also	 depend	 on	 markets,	 to	 obtain	 their	production	inputs	(including	land	and	labour	power)	and	to	sell	the	final	output	for	a	profit.	They	face	systemic	pressures	of	a	different	sort.	Those	firms	that	do	not	comply	with	“the	
  
47	
imperatives	 of	 competition,	 accumulation,	 profit-maximization	 and	 increasing	 labour	productivity”	risk	bankruptcy	(Wood,	2002,	p.	2	and	7).	Wood	(2002)	explains:	“This	market	dependence	gives	the	market	an	unprecedented	role	in	capitalist	societies”	(p.	97).		 Typically,	 market	 dependence	 (of	 the	 direct	 producers)	 is	 associated	 with	 total	dispossession	 or	 loss	 of	 land.	 However,	 Wood	 (2002)	 shows	 that	 -historically-	 English	peasants	 became	 “dependent	 on	 the	 market	 for	 the	 basic	 conditions	 of	 their	 self-reproduction	 -	 without	 being	 completely	 dispossessed”	 (p.	 131).	 The	 introduction	 of	 a	competitive	 money	 rent	 system	 (which	 gradually	 replaced	 customary	 tenancy	arrangements)	circa	the	16th-17th	centuries	forced	tenant	farmers	to	prioritise	production	for	markets	and	to	improve	productivity.	Put	simply:	their	continued	possession	of	the	land	was	 made	 conditional	 upon	 the	 generation	 of	 exchange	 value.	 As	 a	 result,	 “productive	farmers	prospered	and	their	holdings	were	likely	to	grow,	while	less	competitive	producers	went	 to	 the	wall	 and	 joined	 the	 propertyless	 classes”	 (Wood,	 2002,	 p.	 103).	 So,	 for	 the	unsuccessful	 or	 unlucky,	 market-dependence	 translated	 into	 market-led	 dispossession.	Wood	doesn’t	mention	debt	in	her	exposé	of	English	history	but	in	the	contemporary	era,	in	many	parts	of	the	world,	debt	-rather	than	a	competitive	rent	system-	is	the	key	mechanism	through	 which	 people’s	 “possession	 of	 land”	 is	 made	 “dependent	 on	 competitive	production”	(Wood,	2009,	p.	43).		Mainstream	 economics	 discourse	 indicates	 that	 the	 transfer	 of	 land	 from	 less	productive	 to	more	productive	users	 is	 inherently	positive	 as	 it	 raises	overall	 economic	productivity	 and	 growth.	 Ideal	 markets	 should,	 from	 their	 perspective,	 facilitate	 such	transfers	(Deininger,	2003,	pp.	xxvi,	xxx,	85–86,	113	and	143).	Nevertheless,	when	forced	by	 market	 mechanisms,	 such	 transfers	 often	 result	 in	 impoverishment.	 A	 document	published	by	FIAN	and	La	Via	Campesina	(2004)	sums	up:	the	transfer	of	land	from	less	to	more	productive	users	“is	the	technocratic	language	that	the	[World]	Bank	uses	to	describe	the	deprivation	of	peasant	families	of	their	means	of	life”	(p.	6).	It	is	worth	noting	that	even	‘competitive’	 farmers	 -who	 use	 their	 land	 as	 loan	 collateral-	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 market-mechanisms	of	dispossession;	for	example,	they	may	go	bankrupt	after	losing	their	crops	to	drought	or	flooding	or	because	they	are	unable	to	compete	with	subsidised	goods	that	force	prices	below	the	cost	of	production.	Economists	blame	this	sort	of	problem	on	what	they	call	market	‘imperfections	and	distortions’.	Subsidies,	for	example,	would	be	considered	a	‘distortion’	 rather	 than	 a	 common	 characteristic	 of	 contemporary	 economies.	 Similarly,	distress	sales	are	blamed	on	‘imperfect’	or	under-	developed	insurance	and	credit	markets	(Deininger,	2003,	pp.	95–96,	120).		
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Market-mechanisms	of	dispossession	were/are	regularly	set	in	to	motion	following	the	 implementation	 of	 neoliberal	 reform	 packages	 (Akram-Lodhi,	 Kay,	 &	 Borras,	 2009;	Araghi,	2009;	Akram-Lodhi,	2007;	La	Via	Campesina	&	FIAN,	2004).	According	to	Akram-Lodhi	 et	 al	 (2009)	 “neoliberal	 agrarian	 restructuring	 […	 is	 aimed	 at]	 broadening	 and	deepening	 the	 sway	 of	 capitalist	 social	 property	 relations	 […]	 exposing	 an	 even	 greater	number	 of	 people	 to	 the	 market	 imperative”	 (p.	 218).	 In	 this	 sense,	 market-led	dispossession	is	also	driven	by	specific	policies.	Farshad	Araghi	(2009)	calls	these	policies	the	“visible	foot”,	as	opposed	to	the	invisible	hand,	behind	“dispossession	by	displacement”.	Akram-Lodhi	(2007)	even	suggests	that	such	policies	are	“designed	to	facilitate	a	market-led	appropriation	of	land”	(p.	1446,	emphasis	added);	regardless	of	intention,	this	has	been	a	common	result.	The	elimination	of	financial	regulations	and	the	abandonment	of	special	credit	schemes	(resulting	in	interest	rate	hikes),	the	lifting	or	reduction	of	import	barriers	(specifically	 those	 protecting	 agricultural	 sectors)	 and	 the	 repeal	 of	 other	 policies	 and	programs	(e.g.	government	marketing	systems	and	subsidies	for	transport,	fertilizers	and	other	inputs)	has	driven	countless	farmers	to	bankruptcy	all	over	the	world.	All	of	this	often	combined	with	 land	market	 deregulation	 and	 property	 formalisation	 schemes,	 ensuring	land	could	easily	be	transferred	to	more	‘efficient’	users	(Araghi,	2009;	Akram-Lodhi	et	al.,	2009;	Akram-Lodhi,	2007;	Chossudovsky,	2003;	La	Via	Campesina	&	FIAN,	2004).				 Many	studies	of	dispossession	concentrate	solely	on	one	of	 the	 three	broad	 ‘types’	delineated	 in	 this	 section.	 But	 examining	 the	 relationship	 between	 different	 types	 of	dispossession	can	enrich	the	analysis.	This	 thesis	 looks	at	 land	grabs	effected	by	private	agents	and	coercive	State-backed	acquisitions,	as	well	as	other	forms	of	dispossession	not	detailed	above.	As	emphasised	earlier,	this	comprehensive	approach	permits	clearer	insight	into	what	has	happened	in	Colombia,	where	different	forms	of	dispossession	often	overlap.		
4)	From	primitive	accumulation	to	accumulation	by	dispossession	and	beyond	Marx’s	 notion	 of	 primitive	 accumulation	 and	 Harvey’s	 notion	 of	 accumulation	 by	dispossession	are	perhaps	the	mostly	widely	used	concepts	in	critical	scholarship	on	land	grabbing	 (for	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 different	 and	 sometimes	 contradictory	 ways	 these	concepts	have	been	used	in	the	‘land	grab	literature’,	see	Hall,	2013).	In	this	section	I	provide	an	overview	of	these	concepts	and	the	potential	advantages	and	limitations	of	using	them	to	analyse	land	dispossession	(Hall,	2013;	see	also	Levien,	2011).		
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Marx’s	account	of	primitive	accumulation	In	the	most	basic	sense,	Marx’s	concept	of	primitive	accumulation	responds	to	the	question:	how	did	we	get	to	a	point	where	a	small	group	of	people	control	the	means	of	production	and	 the	masses	 own	 little	more	 than	 their	 labour	 power,	 i.e.	 a	 society	 divided	 between	propertied	and	propertyless	classes?	Marx	(1867)	uses	acidic	sarcasm	to	mock	the	notion	that	the	capitalist	class	was	born	of	hard-working	prudent	savers,	while	workers	are	the	offspring	of	 lazy	 impulsive	 spenders.	Actual	 history,	 he	 shows,	 is	 far	 removed	 from	 this	fairy-tale	 (I-26,	 pp.	 873-874).	 Primitive	 accumulation,	 Marx	 explains,	 is	 “the	 historical	process	of	divorcing	the	producer	from	the	means	of	production”	and	“the	expropriation	of	the	agricultural	producer,	of	the	peasant,	 from	the	soil	 is	the	basis	of	the	whole	process”	(1867,	I-26,	pp.	875-876).	It	“operates	two	transformations,	whereby	the	social	means	of	subsistence	and	production	are	turned	into	capital,	and	the	immediate	producers	are	turned	into	wage	 labourers”	 (ibid,	 p.	 874).	 In	 other	words:	 land	 use	 is	 subordinated	 to	 capital	accumulation,	while	the	people	who	used	to	till	the	earth	are	stripped	of	their	livelihoods	and	left	with	no	option	but	to	work	for	a	salary.	Hence,	the	dispossession	and	displacement	of	 the	 peasantry,	 according	 to	Marx,	 is	 central	 to	 the	 shift	 from	 “feudal	 exploitation”	 to	“capitalist	exploitation”	(ibid,	p.	875).		Marx’s	account	of	primitive	accumulation	focuses	on	the	centuries-long	process	that	led	 to	 the	destruction	of	 the	English	 -and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 Scottish-	 peasantry	 and	 the	associated	“revolution	in	property	relations	on	the	land”	(1867,	I-30,	p.	908).	However,	he	suggests	 the	 broader	 concept	 is	 applicable	 to	 other	 contexts:	 “The	 history	 of	 this	expropriation	assumes	different	aspects	in	different	countries	and	runs	through	its	various	phases	in	different	orders	of	succession,	and	at	different	historical	epochs”	(I-26,	p.	876).	In	 later	 chapters,	 Marx	 extends	 his	 account	 of	 primitive	 accumulation	 to	 include	additional	processes,	beyond	the	dispossession	and	displacement	of	the	peasantry.	Hence,	to	 avoid	 confusion,	 primitive	 accumulation	 may	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 many	 interlinking	processes	(rather	than	a	single	one),	all	of	which	play	a	role	in	the	transition	to	the	capitalist	mode	of	production.	While	the	formation	of	capitalist	social	property	relations	is	the	overall	theme	that	binds	these	various	processes	together,	the	outcomes	described	by	Marx	can	be	broken	down	into	at	least	five	component	parts.			
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First,	 dispossession	 was	 part	 of	 a	 process	 through	 which	 the	 primary	 means	 of	production	(i.e.	land)	was	put	at	the	service	of	capital	accumulation.	In	Marx’s	own	words:	“The	spoliation	of	the	Church’s	property,	the	fraudulent	alienation	of	the	state	domains,	the	theft	of	the	common	lands,	the	usurpation	of	feudal	and	clan	property	[…]	conquered	the	
field	for	capitalist	agriculture	[…	and]	incorporated	the	soil	into	capital”	(1867,	I-27,	p.	895,	emphasis	added).	Land	became	a	‘mere	commercial	commodity’	(ibid,	p.	885)	and	land	use	was	 subjected	 to	 the	dictates	 of	 the	market.	 In	England,	 this	 change	 in	 landed	property	relations	provided	for	an	“agricultural	revolution”	through	which	“the	soil	brought	forth	as	much	produce	as	before,	or	even	more”	(Marx,	1867,	I-30,	p.	908).		Second,	the	people	usurped	of	their	 land	are	thus	made	dependent	on	selling	their	labour	 power,	 supplying	 emerging	 capitalist	 industries	 (manufacturing	 and	 agriculture)	with	 a	 workforce	 and/or	 adding	 to	 the	 ‘industrial	 reserve	 army’	 or	 ‘relative	 surplus	population’	that	plays	a	key	part	in	suppressing	wages.	This	is,	in	short,	the	formation	of	a	‘proletariat’	class.	However,	as	noted	by	Marx,	 it	 is	not	enough	that	the	rural	masses	are	dispossessed	and	displaced;	historically,	State	 force	played	a	key	role	 in	 the	 forging	of	a	‘disciplined’	wage	labour	class	and	in	intensifying	their	exploitation	at	the	service	of	capital	accumulation.	These	processes	(i.e.	post-dispossession	and	displacement)	are	also	part	of	the	primitive	accumulation	described	by	Marx	(1867,	I-28,	pp.	899-900).	Third,	this	landless	class	of	workers	must	purchase	even	their	most	basic	necessities	(unlike	 the	 relatively	 self-sufficient	 peasants),	 creating	 a	 mass	 of	 consumers	 and	consolidating	the	‘home	market’	for	the	capitalist	production	founded	upon	the	ashes	of	the	‘rural	domestic	industries’	(Marx,	1867,	I-30,	pp.	908-915).		Fourth,	and	relating	to	the	 last	point,	raw	materials	and	essential	goods	(including	food)	 are	 converted	 into	 commodities	 controlled	 by	 capitalist	 enterprise.	 Following	 the	dispossession	of	independent	producers,	Marx	explains,	“flax	looks	exactly	as	it	did	before.	Not	a	fibre	of	it	is	changed,	but	a	new	social	soul	has	entered	into	its	body.	It	now	forms	a	part	of	the	constant	capital	of	the	master	manufacturer”	(ibid,	p.	909).	Finally,	 the	 wealth	 amassed	 through	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 processes	 -via	 the	 financial	system,	exploitation	of	slave	labour,	colonial	plunder-	becomes	the	seeds	of	the	capitalist	accumulation	 cycle	 (Marx,	 1867,	 I-31,	 pp.	 918-923)	 in	 which	 profits,	 derived	 from	 the	exploitation	 of	 wage	 labour,	 are	 reinvested	 in	 the	 production	 process	 with	 the	 aim	 of	extracting	more	profit	ad	infinitum.	However,	I	would	reiterate,	echoing	a	point	made	by	Ellen	Wood,	 that	 this	 aspect	 of	 primitive	 accumulation	 only	 serves	 the	 development	 of	
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capitalism	 in	 so	 far	as	 the	other	processes	accompany	or	precede	 it.	Wood	explains:	 for	Marx,	Adam	Smith’s	definition	of	the	original	accumulation	as	an	amassing	of	wealth	was	inadequate,	not	only	because	 it	 falsely	portrayed	 the	process	as	 idyllic,	but	also	because	such	a	perspective	represents	capitalism	as	simply	“more	of	the	same”.	Marx	understood	capital	 in	 terms	 of	 social	 relations	 and	 hence	 “while	 the	 accumulation	 of	 wealth	 was	obviously	a	necessary	condition	of	capitalism,	it	was	far	from	being	sufficient	or	decisive.	What	 transformed	wealth	 into	capital	was	a	 transformation	of	social	property	relations”	(Wood,	2002,	pp.	35–37,	5).		
Harvey’s	concept	of	accumulation	by	dispossession		In	the	21st	century,	capitalist	social	relations	are	entrenched	in	most	parts	of	the	world.	In	this	sense,	it	seems	that	primitive	accumulation,	which	Marx	labelled	a	“prehistoric	stage	of	capital”,	is	now	an	anachronism.	Indeed,	Zarembka	(2002)	argues	that	it	is	a	“mistake”	to	treat	primitive	accumulation	as	“trans-historical”	and	suggests	that	the	term	should	only	be	used	in	reference	to	“the	process	of	initial	transition	from	the	feudal	to	the	capitalist	mode	of	 production”	 (p.	 1).	 Still,	 many	 other	 authors	 argue	 that	 primitive	 accumulation	 is	“ongoing”,	or	at	least	that	the	concept	is	useful	for	understanding	contemporary	phenomena	(De	Angelis,	2001;	Perelman,	2001,	2007;	Harvey,	2003,	2004;	Cramer,	2006;	Sassen,	2010).		David	Harvey	 (who	 draws	 on	Arendt	 and	 Luxemburg)	 is	 perhaps	 the	 best-known	proponent	of	“the	continuous	role	and	persistence	of	the	predatory	practices	of	‘primitive’	or	‘original’	accumulation”	within	contemporary	capitalism	(Harvey,	2004,	p.	74).	Harvey	deems	the	prefix	“primitive”	a	misnomer	precisely	because	he	considers	these	“predatory	practices”	to	be	on-going,	and	instead	uses	the	term	“accumulation	by	dispossession”	(ibid).	Harvey	stresses	that	Marx’s	notion	of	primitive	accumulation	is	not	exclusive	to	the	“the	commodification	 and	 privatization	 of	 land	 and	 the	 forceful	 expulsion	 of	 peasant	populations”	(Harvey,	2003,	p.	145)	-	his	parallel	notion	of	accumulation	by	dispossession	covers	 a	 “wide	 range	 of	 processes”	 and	 “practices”	 (ibid).	 Indeed,	 Harvey	 (2003;	 2004;	2005)	instils	the	concept	with	meaning	by	detailing	varied	examples	from	across	the	world:	biopiracy,	 speculative	 raiding	 by	 financial	 institutions,	 the	 commodification	 of	 culture,	privatization	programs	(e.g.	water,	universities,	health,	transport,	etc.),	among	others.	The	 distinction	 between	 ‘accumulation	 through	 expanded	 reproduction’	 (i.e.	capitalist	accumulation	proper)	and	accumulation	by	dispossession	is	key	to	understanding	Harvey’s	 argument.	 The	 former	 creates	wealth	within	 the	 capitalist	 production	 process	
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through	 the	 exploitation	 of	 wage	 labour	 and	 the	 reinvestment	 of	 profits.	 The	 latter,	 in	contrast,	“redistributes”	or	“transfers”	wealth	in	a	socially	regressive	way	via	“predation,	fraud,	 and	 [or]	violence”.	According	 to	Harvey,	 these	 two	processes	of	 accumulation	are	discrete,	but	also	“dialectically	intertwined”	(Harvey,	2003,	pp.	143–176).	Despite	the	apparent	unproductive	character	of	accumulation	by	dispossession,	it	is	instrumental,	Harvey	argues,	in	overcoming	(partially	and	temporarily)	recurrent	crises	in	which	excess	capital	sits	in	redundancy	due	to	a	dearth	of	profit-making	opportunities.	In	the	author’s	own	terms:	“What	accumulation	by	dispossession	does	 is	 to	release	a	set	of	assets	 (including	 labour	 power)	 at	 very	 low	 (and	 in	 some	 instances	 zero)	 cost.	Overaccumulated	 capital	 can	 seize	 hold	 of	 such	 assets	 and	 immediately	 turn	 them	 to	profitable	use”	(Harvey,	2003,	p.	149).	According	to	Harvey,	when	accumulation	through	expanded	 reproduction	 becomes	 untenable,	 accumulation	 through	 dispossession	 takes	centre	stage.	This,	he	claims,	is	precisely	the	“shift”	that	began	to	take	place	in	the	1970s.	Thus,	 for	 Harvey,	 accumulation	 by	 dispossession	 is	 “at	 the	 heart”	 of	 contemporary	(neoliberal)	imperialism	(2003,	pp.	176–182).			
Using	the	concepts	to	analyse	land	dispossession	Marx’s	account	of	primitive	accumulation	(PA)	 in	England	and	Scotland	 includes	what	 is	perhaps	 the	 first	 critical	 political	 economy	 analysis	 of	 dispossession	 and	 associated	displacement	and	is	a	source	of	inspiration	in	this	thesis.	Nevertheless,	the	main	purpose	of	this	section	of	Capital	was	to	explain	the	transition	from	feudalism	to	capitalism	or	more	precisely	the	origins	of	capitalist	social	relations	–	not	land	dispossession	per	se.	Thus,	the	PA	concept	offers	insights	that	are	useful	for	analysing	both	historical	and	contemporary	dispossession	but	is	insufficient	on	its	own,	as	it	was	constructed	for	a	different	purpose.	A	similar	 point	 can	 be	made	 about	Harvey’s	 conception	 of	 accumulation	 by	 dispossession	(ABD),	 which	 centers	 upon	 the	 role	 of	 various	 forms	 of	 dispossession	 in	 temporarily	resolving	over-accumulation	crises.		At	 the	most	basic	 level,	 the	PA	 concept	 indicates	 the	potential	 links	between	 land	dispossession,	the	transformation	of	social	property	relations	and	capitalist	development	more	broadly.	Marx’s	narration	of	British	history,	specifically,	poses	a	direct	challenge	to	the	general	claim	that	a	high	prevalence	of	dispossession	typically	hinders	economic	growth	(see	Chapter	2),	by	suggesting	that	such	processes	played	a	vital	role	in	the	agricultural	and	industrial	revolutions	in	Britain.	Of	course,	this	observation	cannot	be	blindly	transferred	
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from	one	context	to	another.	Indeed,	in	this	thesis	I	show	how	historical	land	dispossession	in	 Colombia	 served	 to	 perpetuate	 non-capitalist	 relations	 of	 production,	 and	 arguably	encumbered	 economic	 growth,	 up	 until	 circa	 the	 late	 19th	 century.	 In	 short,	 we	 cannot	simply	assume	that	dispossession	serves	capitalist	development.	The	usefulness	of	the	PA	concept	lies	in	how	it	shapes	our	questions.	For	example:	did	X	or	Y	case	of	dispossession	help	 ‘conquer	 the	 field	 for	 capitalist	 agriculture’?	 Did	 the	 dispossessed	 become	 wage	labourers?	Was	this	part	of	a	broader	process	that	contributed	to	the	establishment	of	a	proletariat	class	or	the	expansion	of	a	domestic	market?		Marx’s	 account	 of	 primitive	 accumulation	 also	 poses	 a	 direct	 challenge	 to	 liberal	political	and	mainstream	economics	discourse	by	highlighting	the	role	of	dispossession	in	the	creation	of	modern	property	 institutions	and	the	use	of	 the	 law	as	 ‘an	 instrument	of	theft’	 –	 something	 I	 discuss	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 Furthermore,	 it	 points	 to	 the	apparent	 contradictions	 of	 the	 process;	 for	 example,	 how	 impoverishment	 and	 wealth	creation	 go	 hand-in-hand	 or	 how	 the	 new	 property	 rules	 imposed	 via	 dispossession	simultaneously	enabled	leaps	in	productivity	and	relatively	unproductive	land	uses	(e.g.	his	discussion	 of	 the	 agricultural	 revolution	 vs.	 the	 Highland	 game	 reserves)	 and	 more	generally	the	tensions	between	use	value	and	exchange	value	inherent	to	a	capitalist	land	regime.	Again,	these	insights	can	be	used	to	formulate	questions	for	analyses	of	historical	and	contemporary	land	dispossession	elsewhere.	Many	scholars	reduce	Marx’s	PA	to	an	account	of	the	historical	formation	of	a	wage	labour	 class;	 the	 importance	 of	 land	 dispossession	 specifically	 is	 limited,	 in	 these	descriptions,	 to	 its	 role	 in	 turning	 people	 into	 the	 workers	 -and	 sometimes	 also	 the	consumers-	required	by	emerging	capitalist	industry	(see	e.g.	De	Angelis,	2001;	Perelman,	2001,	 2007;	 Zarembka,	 2002).	 Hence,	 these	 authors	 overlook	 the	 first	 of	 the	 ‘two	transformations’	described	by	Marx:	the	‘conquering’	of	land	for	capitalist	industry.	This	is	no	small	oversight.	Capitalist	production	is	based	on	the	exploitation	and	impoverishment	of	labour	and	land,	which	are	together	“the	original	sources	of	all	wealth”	(Marx,	1867,	I-15,	p.	638);	both	must	be	treated	as	mere	commodities	for	the	system	to	work.	This	basic	idea	is	perhaps	the	most	important	for	understanding	and	analysing	land	dispossession	within	a	capitalist	context.	The	difficulties	and	problems	associated	with	centring	analyses	of	land	dispossession	on	 primitive	 accumulation	 are	 perhaps	 equally	 numerous	 as	 the	 advantages.	 Most	importantly,	 and	 as	 noted	 above,	 this	 wasn’t	 the	 purpose	 for	 which	 the	 concept	 was	intended.	Even	if	we	accept	that	 in	many	parts	of	the	world	transitions	to	capitalism	are	
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ongoing	or	 incomplete,	 the	 concept	 (as	 a	whole)	 cannot	be	 easily	 adapted	 to	 explaining	dispossession	in	contexts	where	capitalist	social	property	relations	are	already	established.	Furthermore,	while	Marx’s	notion	of	primitive	accumulation	draws	attention	to	how	land	dispossession	may	contribute	to	the	development	of	capitalism,	it	diverts	attention	away	from	this	relation	in	the	inverse.	In	labelling	PA	a	“prehistoric	stage	of	capital”,	Marx	not	only	concludes	that	once	capitalism	is	“fully	developed”	the	use	of	“direct	extra-economic	force”	tends	to	diminish	in	importance	(1867,	I-28,	p.	899	-	a	claim	that	has	been	rejected	by	multiple	scholars	on	different	grounds),	he	also	implies	that	the	process	itself	was/is	not	shaped	by	capitalist	dynamics.	Drawing	on	Wood	(2002),	I	would	argue	that	the	historical	processes	of	dispossession	and	displacement	studied	by	Marx,	specifically	in	England	and	Scotland,	were	in	fact	fashioned	by	the	impulses	and	ideologies	of	‘early’	capitalism.	These	issues	are	discussed	further	in	the	subsequent	chapter.	In	a	broad	sense,	Harvey	addresses	both	these	limitations	by	shifting	emphasis	from	how	 dispossession	 contributes	 to	 the	 development	 of	 capitalism	 to	 the	 role	 it	 plays	 in	subsequent	 capitalist	 development	 and	by	 examining	how	 the	 specific	 characteristics	 of	contemporary	 capitalism	 drive	 and	 define	 these	 processes	 of	 dispossession.	 In	 Levien’s	(2013)	 words:	 “Harvey	 frees	 primitive	 accumulation	 from	 its	 function	 in	 generating	capitalist	social	relations”	(p.	382).	But	Harvey	casts	his	net	widely,	examining	how	socially	regressive	 ‘redistributions’	or	 ‘transfers’	of	wealth	help	 to	 temporarily	 resolve	recurring	over-accumulation	 crises;	 in	 this	 sense,	 he	 lists	 land	 grabbing	 as	 just	 one	 form	 of	 ABD,	among	many	others.	This	wide	focus	may	match	Harvey’s	objectives,	but	it	means	that	ABD	is	an	imprecise	concept	with	which	to	examine	land	dispossession	specifically.	Also,	while	it	is	worth	considering	the	role	of	capitalist	crisis	in	triggering	dispossession,	this	should	not	be	our	sole	focus,	as	I	argue	in	Chapter	2.			
Summary	and	conclusion	This	chapter	has	established	the	basic	conceptual	groundwork	necessary	for	understanding	the	 discussion	 and	 analyses	 in	 subsequent	 chapters.	 It	 proposed	 a	 basic	 definition	 of	dispossession,	which	excludes	land	transfers	based	on	genuinely	voluntary	exchange,	and	explained	how	the	term	‘land	grab’	is	used	in	this	thesis,	which	focuses	on	coercion.	It	also	introduced	 other	 key	 definitional	 distinctions	 (e.g.	 expropriation	 vs.	 enclosure)	 and	distinguished	between	three	broad	types	of	dispossession:	State-backed,	that	effected	by	private	agents,	and	market-led.	The	chapter	also	explained	why	this	 thesis	brings	 forced	
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displacement	into	the	analysis.	Finally,	it	introduced	the	concepts	of	primitive	accumulation	and	 accumulation	 by	 dispossession,	 which	 I	 argue	 provide	 valuable	 insights	 but	 are	inadequate	on	their	own	for	analysing	land	dispossession.	With	this	conceptual	grounding	in	place,	the	next	chapter	proceeds	to	present	and	critically	evaluate	mainstream	accounts	of	land	dispossession	and	those	found	in	critical	scholarship	-	highlighting	how	my	research	on	Colombia	serves	to	challenge	and/or	reinforce	such	accounts,	while	also	putting	forward	some	of	my	own	arguments.		
-	2	-	
Analysing	dispossession:	from	the	inadequacy	of	economic	and	liberal	
paradigms	to	the	complexity	of	critical	political	economy	
	Dispossession	has	received	renewed	attention	in	the	context	of	what	is	popularly	known	as	the	‘global	land	rush’	(Fairbairn	et	al.,	2014).	Nevertheless,	much	of	the	recent	‘land	grab	literature’	 focuses	on	the	rush	for	 land	 itself,	 its	characteristics	(how	much	land	is	being	acquired,	where,	by	who	and	for	what	purpose?)	and	causes	(what	triggered	this	rush	and	what	 conditions	 have	 enabled	 it?),	 globally	 and	 within	 specific	 regional	 and	 national	contexts.	This	research	has	improved	understanding	of	the	recent	land	rush	and	established	the	necessary	groundwork	for	varied	theoretical	discussions	(see	e.g.	Borras,	Franco,	et	al.,	2012;	Borras,	Kay,	Gómez,	&	Wilkinson,	2012;	Cotula,	2012;	Visser,	Mamonova,	&	Spoor,	2012).	 However,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 it	 doesn’t	 tackle	 issues	 surrounding	 dispossession	specifically.	Just	a	select	few	scholars	focus	on	coercive	land	acquisitions	and	still	fewer	have	attempted	to	address	wider	questions	such	as	whether	and	how	dispossession	has	changed	over	time	and	its	role	in	contemporary	capitalist	economies.	This	is	not	just	a	feature	of	the	recent	literature	on	land	grabbing.	In	general,	explicit	theories	of	land	dispossession	are	lacking.	Unlike	other	broad	and	multifaceted	issues	-such	as	 civil	war,	 crime,	or	economic	development-	 land	dispossession	has	not	generated	big	cross-discipline	debates	among	scholars.	This	is	not	to	say	that	dispossession	has	not	been	investigated.	But	relevant	empirical,	conceptual	and	theoretical	claims	(sometimes	simply	implied)	are	dispersed	in	varied	fields	and	the	researchers	working	within	these	different	areas	 rarely	engage	with	one	another.	This	makes	writing	a	 literature	review	about	 this	topic	a	tricky	endeavour,	one	that	is	-nevertheless-	taken	up	in	this	chapter.		My	aim	is	four-fold:	(1)	to	identify	and	critically	analyse	the	main	claims	about	land	dispossession;	(2)	to	highlight	how	my	research	on	Colombia	either	serves	to	challenge	or	reinforce	 these	 claims;	 (3)	 to	 develop	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 this	 thesis,	 based	 on	critical	political	economy;	and	(4)	to	put	forward	some	of	my	own	arguments.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	chapter	should	be	read	as	a	‘product’	of	my	doctoral	research,	rather	than	as	its	‘precursor’	or	‘foundation’.	Borrowing	from	Marxist	terminology,	it	is	the	result	of	a	very	long	process	of	going	back	and	forth	between	the	abstract	and	the	concrete.	
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The	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 are	 organised	 around	 specific	 claims	 on	 land	dispossession,	 which	 are	 divided	 broadly	 into	 those	 found	 in	 research	 informed	 by	orthodox	economic	and	liberal	political/legal	paradigms	(part	one,	consisting	of	8	claims)	and	those	found	in	critical	scholarship	(part	two,	consisting	of	6	claims).	This	is	by	no	means	an	exhaustive	review.	I	focus	on	claims	about	the	relationship	between	dispossession	and	economic	development	or	growth,	capitalism,	property	rights,	land	markets,	and	the	law.		
PART	1:	THE	CONVENTIONAL	UNDERSTANDING	OF	DISPOSSESSION		The	first	part	of	this	chapter	provides	an	overview	of	eight	key	claims	on	land	dispossession	(both	 explicit	 and	 implied)	 found	 in	 orthodox	 economic	 and	 liberal	 political/legal	discourses.	Each	section	 is	centred	upon	a	specific	claim.	Most	sections	 include	a	critical	evaluation	of	the	claim	under	consideration;	however,	in	some	cases,	the	critique	is	deferred	to	the	second	part	of	the	chapter.	The	discussion	covers	both	State-backed	dispossession	and	that	effected	by	private	agents;	these	are	not	separated	into	different	sections,	as	some	claims	pertain	to	both	‘types’.	As	noted	in	the	previous	chapter,	this	thesis	uses	the	term	‘dispossession’	 to	 refer	 to	 processes	 involving	 direct	 extra-economic	 coercion,	 unless	explicitly	stated	otherwise.		
1.1)	 Dispossession	 is	 antithetical	 to	 capitalist	 economies	 in	 which	 competitive	
markets,	 based	 on	 clearly	 defined	 property	 rights,	 ensure	 an	 efficient	 use	 and	
allocation	of	land.	Liberal	 legal	 theorists	 and	 orthodox	 economists	 typically	 define	 private	 property	 as	 a	“bundle	of	rights”	including:	the	right	to	exclude	others	from	using	the	land	in	question;	the	right	 to	use	 the	 land	 freely	or	 as	one	 chooses	 (within	 certain	 limits),	 the	 right	over	 any	income	derived	 from	it;	and	the	right	 to	approve	or	deny	ownership	transfer	 to	another	(Hamilton	&	Bankes,	 2010,	 pp.	 24–25;	Rubin	&	Klumpp,	 2012,	 p.	 2).	 In	 general,	 private	property	rights	in	land	are	seen	as	vital	for	enabling	growth-generating	investments	(Rubin	&	Klumpp,	2012;	Miceli,	2011;	Williamson,	2009;	Deininger,	2003;	Soto,	2001).		But	economic	‘efficiency’	is	not	just	a	question	of	whether	people	invest,	but	also	how	they	invest.	Mainstream	economists	usually	assume	that	proprietors	(rational	actors)	will	make	 investment	 decisions	 based	 on	market	 price	 signals,	 thus	 ensuring	 that	 land	 use	corresponds	 to	 society’s	 wishes,	 as	 measured	 by	 effective	 demand	 (Miceli,	 2011).	 For	
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example,	 if	 market	 price	 signals	 suggest	 an	 oversupply	 of	 oranges	 and	 a	 shortage	 of	avocados,	a	landowner	would	invest	accordingly;	she	would	profit	more	from	planting	an	avocado	orchard	as	high	demand	and	relative	scarcity	pushes	avocados’	price	up.	Hence,	the	 ‘right’	to	use	the	land	as	one	chooses	is	 indispensable	to	the	property	 ‘bundle’.	 If	the	government	 dictates	 land	 use	 (e.g.	 all	 farmers	 in	 X	 area	 must	 grow	 oranges),	 then	 the	efficiency	function	of	private	property	is	undermined.		So-called	‘efficient’	land	use	also	depends	on	‘efficient’	allocation,	which	economists	claim	is	best	achieved	through	voluntary	transactions.	Resuming	the	example	from	above,	suppose	the	landowner	is	elderly	and	doesn’t	have	the	energy	to	run	an	avocado	orchard.	She	might	sell	the	land	to	a	businessman	interested	in	cashing	in	on	the	avocado	boom	and	retire	with	the	money	she	got	in	return.	Likewise,	if	the	land	could	generate	more	profit	as	a	new	housing	development	instead,	a	developer	would	be	willing	to	offer	an	even	better	price	for	the	land.	The	landowner	would	sell	to	the	developer	(the	highest	bidder);	again,	society	would	get	what	it	values	most,	as	measured	by	effective	demand.	Hence,	market-mechanisms	are	alleged	to	ensure	that	land	and	other	resources	are	allocated	‘efficiently’,	which	requires	tradability	or	the	‘right’	to	approve	or	deny	a	transfer	of	ownership	(Miceli,	2011;	Deininger,	2003;	Posner,	1981).		In	general,	 it	 is	simply	assumed	that	so-called	 ‘inefficient’	producers	would	benefit	from	transferring	their	land	to	others	and	hence	that	they	choose	to	do	so	voluntarily.	For	example:	 “Households	with	 low	 agricultural	 skills	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 able	 to	 obtain	 higher	incomes	from	off-farm	employment	than	from	farming,	and	thus	will	be	better	off	if	they	rent	out	some	or	all	of	their	land	for	others	to	cultivate.	[…	this]	will	unambiguously	increase	incomes	 for	 everybody”	 (Deininger,	 2003,	 p.	 86).	 In	 reality,	 this	 free	 market	 model	 of	‘efficiency’	involves	‘inefficient’	producers	being	pushed	off	their	land	by	economic	forces.	Put	 simply:	 the	 model	 depends	 upon	 market-mechanisms	 of	 dispossession	 as	 well	 as	
genuinely	voluntary	exchange.		In	 contrast,	 land	 (re)allocation	 achieved	 via	 direct	 extra-economic	 force	 and/or	coerced	changes	in	land	use	are	not	central	to	these	market	models.	Indeed,	these	practices	are	 associated	 with	 ‘planned’	 economies,	 widely	 considered	 anathema	 by	 market	economists.	 On	 the	 whole,	 dispossession	 is	 deemed	 unnecessary	 within	 capitalist	economies:	“As	long	as	property	rights	to	land	[…]	are	well-defined	and	a	proper	regulatory	framework	 to	 prevent	 externalities	 is	 in	 place,	 productivity-	 and	 welfare-enhancing	transactions	can	occur	without	the	need	for	active	intervention	by	the	state”	(Deininger	et	al.,	2011,	p.	34).	Nevertheless,	mainstream	economists	themselves	 introduce	 important	-
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destabilising-	exceptions	to	this	general	argument,	as	explained	below	(see	claims	7	and	8).	Part	 two	 of	 this	 chapter,	 in	 particular	 the	 final	 section,	 directly	 and	 forcefully	 calls	 into	question	the	idea	that	dispossession	is	antithetical	to	capitalist	free	market	economies.		
1.2)	Dispossession	occurs	due	to	a	lack	of	clearly	defined	formal	property	rights.		The	most	common	explanation	of	dispossession	is	that	 it	arises	 in	the	absence	of	clearly	defined	formal	property	rights	and	a	strong	rule	of	law	(versions	of	this	thesis	can	be	found	in	Deininger,	2003;	Deininger	et	al.,	2011;	FAO,	2012).	These	are	interrelated	issues	but,	for	the	 sake	 of	 clarity,	 I	 focus	 here	 on	 the	 property	 rights	 component	 of	 the	 argument.	 An	extreme	version	of	the	above	claim	is	implicit	in	“Western	foundational	narratives	that	tell	property’s	 story,	 which	 often	 begin	 from	 an	 a	 priori	 and	 usually	 violent	 world	 before	property”	 (Blomley,	2003,	p.	124).	 In	 the	 imagined	pre-property	 ‘state	of	nature’	 land	 is	allocated	through	violent	competition;	the	threat	of	dispossession	is	simply	part	of	everyday	life.	From	such	a	perspective,	land	theft	is	a	problem	prevalent	in	‘savage’	societies	(for	an	overview	and	critique	of	these	‘foundational	narratives’,	see	Blomley,	2003).	Variations	of	this	argument	acknowledge	alternative	land	tenure	systems	and	accept	that	a	lack	of	‘modern’	property	rules	doesn’t	necessarily	translate	into	a	Hobbesian	free-for-all.	However,	the	assumption	is	that	customary	structures	tend	to	break	down	over	time,	due	especially	 to	population	growth,	but	also	 technological	change	and	 the	expansion	of	trade	 (Deininger,	2003,	pp.	 xvii–xviii,	 xxiv–xxv,	7–10).	Deininger	explains:	 “demographic	changes,	especially	in	the	absence	of	economic	development,	will	increase	the	scarcity	and	value	of	land.	This	can	challenge	traditional	authorities	and	institutions	that	previously	had	unquestioned	authority	over	land	allocation”.	In	the	best-case	scenario	these	changes	will	generate	 a	 natural	 “evolution	 of	 land	 tenure	 arrangements”	 or	 a	 “virtuous	 cycle	 where	greater	 resource	values	 lead	 to	an	 increasingly	precise	definition	of	property	rights	 that	induces	higher	level	of	investment”.	In	the	worst-case	scenario,	“failure	of	the	institutions	administering	 land	rights	 to	respond	to	 these	[new]	demands	can	 lead	to	 land	grabbing,	conflict	and	resource	dissipation”	(2003,	pp.	xxiv,	8,	10,	xviii).	From	this	perspective	then,	dispossession	is	a	function	of	two	variables:	increasing	land	values	(caused	by	demographic	growth	or	market	integration)	combined	with	a	lack	of	effective	property	rights.	Both	the	above	narratives	are	problematic.	As	explained	below,	it	was/is	a	particular	ideology	 that	 proclaimed	 possession	 and	 use	 as	 insufficient	 proof	 of	 ownership	 and	customary	rights	as	violable	-	thus	making	it	legally	acceptable	to	dispossess	land	holders	
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without	 formal	property	rights	(Wily,	2011).	However,	 the	general	claim	that	people	are	dispossessed	 because	 they	 do	 not	 have	 property	 titles	 (or	 other	 forms	 of	 formally	recognised	 rights)	 over	 their	 land	 does	 not	 necessarily	 have	 to	 be	 embedded	 in	 such	narratives.	The	weakness	of	this	claim	lies	in	its	misleading	emphasis.	For	example,	who	is	responsible	for	dispossession,	their	motivations,	power	relations,	etcetera,	may	be	treated	as	minor	 details	 from	 this	 perspective.	 Also,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 economic	 development	 or	capitalist	expansion	are	rarely	part	of	the	explanation;	when	these	topics	do	appear,	it	 is	often	suggested	the	conditions	conducive	to	dispossession	arise	from	their	absence	(e.g.	see	quote	above).	In	short,	those	who	defend	this	claim	(1.2)	often	see	a	lack	of	clearly	defined	property	 rights	 as	 the	main	 problem	 and	 titling	 or	 other	 formalisation	 programs	 (plus	improvements	to	the	cadastre	and	land	registry)	as	the	main	solution	-	alongside	the	rule	of	law	issue,	discussed	below.	Notwithstanding	 these	 limitations,	 qualitative	 evidence	 does	 suggest	 that	 people	
without	 formally	 recognised	 property	 rights	 over	 their	 land	 are	 more	 vulnerable	 to	
dispossession	(effected	by	the	State	and	private	agents)	than	their	counterparts	with	legal	title.	 Note	 that	 acknowledging	 this	 does	 not	 imply	 accepting	 overall	 claim	 1.2;	 the	proposition	in	italics	allows	us	to	introduce	the	lack	of	formally	recognised	property	rights	as	 an	 enabling	 condition	 for	 coercive	 land	 dispossession,	 while	 also	 asserting	 that	 it	 is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient.		Finally,	 it	 is	 often	 assumed	 that	 people	 lack	 formally	 recognised	 property	 rights	because	of	insufficient	resources	or	poor	institutional	capacity.	This	may	be	partly	true,	but	it’s	not	the	whole	story.	Historically,	countless	people	were	systematically	denied	property	rights	over	their	lands	(see	e.g.	Wily,	2012a).	And	while	many	countries’	legal	systems	now	theoretically	permit	anyone	to	acquire	property,	the	State	may	still	exclude	certain	areas	from	titling.	In	Colombia,	for	example,	titling	is	prohibited	within	a	2.5	km	radius	of	non-renewable	 resource	exploitation	and	 the	government	can	 ‘reserve’	areas	of	State-owned	lands	 for	 certain	 projects,	 preventing	 families	 and	 communities	 from	 obtaining	 formal	rights	over	their	farms	and	territories.	Hence,	many	people	are	denied	titles	so	that	the	land	can	easily	be	mobilised	to	serve	economic	growth;	they	are	vulnerable	to	dispossession	on	purpose	(see	also	Wily,	2011)	19.	
                                                        19	Robinson	(2016)	makes	a	similar	point	(though	he	refers	only	to	coercive	land	acquisitions	effected	by	private	agents,	not	State-backed	dispossession):	he	notes	that	informal	land	rights	are	prevalent	in	Colombia’s	“periphery”	due	to	the	“weakness	and	incapacity	of	the	State”	but	also	because	“there	are	strong	interests	in	the[se]	poorly	defined	and	weak	property	rights”	(p.	34).	
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1.3)	Dispossession	occurs	due	to	a	weak	rule	of	law.	Of	 course,	 even	 people	 with	 formally	 recognised	 rights	 over	 their	 land	 have	 been	dispossessed.	This	is	typically	assumed	to	occur	because	of	a	weak	rule	of	law	(e.g.	this	view	is	implied	in	Deininger,	2003;	Deininger	et	al.,	2011;	FAO,	2012;	a	qualified	version	of	this	argument	can	be	found	in	Visser	et	al.,	2012).	In	a	basic	sense,	this	refers	to	a	situation	in	which	the	government	is	unable	to	enforce	legal	norms	or	itself	violates	them.	A	strong	rule	of	law	is	said	to	be	especially	important	for	protecting	groups	with	less	power	and	resources	against	 dispossession	 since	 “self-enforcement	will	 be	 highly	 correlated	with	 individuals’	wealth”	(Deininger,	2003,	p.	24).	For	example,	elite	landowners	are	more	likely	to	be	able	to	afford	fences	and	guards	to	defend	their	land	claims	(ibid).	Conversely,	where	the	rule	of	law	is	weak,	powerful	individuals	can	act	with	impunity	and	take	land	belonging	to	others.		This	explanation	of	dispossession	is	deceptively	compelling	in	the	case	of	Colombia.	The	Colombians	have	two	popular	sayings	that	are	relevant	here:	‘la	ley	es	para	los	de	ruana’	and	 ‘hecha	 la	 ley,	 hecha	 la	 trampa’20.	 The	 first	 implies	 that	 only	 labouring	 classes	 are	expected	to	obey	the	law	or	that	its	only	applied	punitively	to	these	groups	(although	it	has	more	specific	origins	and	connotations	since	‘ruana’	is	a	garment	typically	worn	by	Andean	
campesinos).	 The	 second	 implies	 that	 as	 soon	 as	 a	 law	 is	 approved	 a	 loophole	 is	 found	through	 which	 it	 can	 be	 bypassed.	 Both	 these	 sayings	 can	 help	 us	 understand	 why	dispossession	has	been	so	prevalent	in	Colombia,	historically	and	to	date.	Nevertheless,	this	does	not	mean	the	issue	can	be	solely	explained	as	a	rule	of	law	problem.		 The	‘rule	of	law’	is	a	contested	and	slippery	concept	(Coleman,	2018;	Waldron,	2016b;	Mattei	&	Nader,	2008).	Some	definitions	are	limited	to	“formal”	and	“procedural”	principles	that	do	not	determine	the	content	of	the	law.	For	example:	the	law	itself	should	be	general	or	impersonal,	stable	and	thus	predictable,	clear	and	disseminated	as	public	knowledge;	an	independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal	 should	 be	 in	 charge	 of	 administering	 the	 law;	 the	reasons	for	its	decisions	should	be	based	on	arguments	and	evidence	and	made	available	to	the	affected	parties;	and	the	latter	have	a	right	to	be	present	and	represented	at	a	hearing	(incomplete	list	based	on	Waldron,	2016b).	But	if	the	rule	of	law	is	limited	to	such	principles,	we	must	reject	the	proposition	that	dispossession	occurs	due	to	a	weak	rule	of	law	because	the	law	itself	may	sanction	it.	
                                                        20	‘La	ley	es	para	los	de	ruana’	roughly	translates	as	‘the	law	is	for	those	of	the	ruana’	–	a	garment	similar	to	a	poncho,	while	‘hecha	la	ley,	hecha	la	trampa’	is	akin	to	‘the	law	is	made,	the	trick	is	made’.	
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	 Many	 people	 simply	 assume	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 comprises	 the	 protection	 of	 private	property21.	Some	actually	assert	that	stable	and	impersonal	property	rules	are	“the	essence	of	 the	rule	of	 law”	(Cass	cited	 in	Waldron,	2016b).	Accepting	 that	 the	defence	of	private	property	 is	 part	 of	 the	 rule	 the	 law,	 implies	 adopting	 a	 “substantive”	 definition	 of	 the	concept	 (i.e.	 going	beyond	 formal	and	procedural	principles);	 this	 “inaugurates	a	 sort	of	competition	in	which	everyone	clamors	to	have	their	favorite	political	ideal	incorporated	[…	such	as	human	rights	or	democracy	…	the	upshot	is	that]	people	struggle	to	use	the	same	term	to	express	disparate	ideals”	(Waldron,	2016b).	An	example	to	illustrate	this	point.			 As	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 a	 number	 of	 municipalities	 in	 Colombia	 recently	 held	popular	consultations	in	which	an	overwhelming	majority	voted	against	permitting	oil	and	mining	 operations	 in	 their	 localities.	 (This,	 it	 should	 be	 noted,	 is	 the	 only	 official	 route	through	which	people	can	avoid	being	dispossessed	for	such	projects.)	Some	legal	experts	and	 government	 functionaries	 claimed	 that	 municipal	 authorities	 have	 no	 power	 to	implement	 the	will	 expressed	 in	 the	 vote.	 But	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 determined	 that	municipal	governments	can	impose	land	use	regulations,	which	effectively	block	mining	and	oil	investments,	within	their	jurisdiction.	On	the	one	hand,	representatives	of	the	extractive	industries	and	their	allies	denounced	the	‘juridical	uncertainty’	in	Colombia,	portraying	the	Court’s	decision	as	a	threat	to	the	rule	of	law.	On	the	other	hand,	opponents	of	the	extractive	industries	see	these	events	as	a	victory	not	just	for	their	communities	and	the	environment,	but	for	the	rule	of	law:	the	Court	defended	the	principles	of	the	Constitution,	despite	the	pressure	of	powerful	interest	groups.			 These	ambiguities	are	not	 resolved	by	 focusing	solely	on	 the	protection	of	private	property.	 For	 example,	 multiple	 observers	 have	 argued	 that	 expropriations	 for	 private	projects	violate	the	right	to	property	and	the	requirement	that	such	takings	only	be	used	for	the	public	benefit.	So,	should	we	conclude	that	the	USA,	for	example,	has	a	weak	rule	of	law?	To	reiterate:	definitions	of	the	rule	of	law	are	open	to	debate,	making	it	difficult	to	make	sense	of	the	claim	that	land	dispossession	is	due	to	its	weakness.		 Furthermore,	the	rule	of	law	(which	under	liberal	substantive	definitions	includes	the	protection	of	property)	is	often	treated	as	a	technical	issue.	If	dispossession	is	widespread	then	 the	 solution	 is	 to	 change	 the	 law	 and/or	 improve	 enforcement	mechanisms:	 “legal	reform	is	needed	where	[…]	certain	categories	of	users	or	owners	face	a	high	risk	of	land	
                                                        21	See,	for	example,	the	Heritage	Foundation’s	Index	of	Economic	Freedom,	which	includes	property	rights	as	the	main	“Rule	of	Law”	indicator,	alongside	“freedom	from	corruption”.	
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loss	or	expropriation”	(Deininger,	2003,	p.	75).	I	do	not	wish	to	discount	the	idea	that	certain	legal	reforms	could	help	protect	against	dispossession.	However,	the	content	of	the	law	and	how	 it	 is	 interpreted	 and	 applied	 depends	 on	 ideology,	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	different	(inter	and	intra	class)	groups,	and	the	multiple	constraints	and	pressures	faced	by	the	 government.	 Theoretically,	 the	 “Rule	 of	 Law	 is	 supposed	 to	 lift	 law	 above	 politics”	(Waldron,	 2016b),	 but	 this	 is	 a	 fantasy.	 In	 practice,	 the	 legal	 realm	 is	 a	 site	 of	 constant	struggle.	This	is	true	all	over	the	world	–	not	just	in	the	Global	South	or	in	countries	deemed	to	have	‘fragile’	governments.	For	example,	according	to	the	Institute	for	Justice,	in	the	USA,	“the	parties	who	gain	from	eminent	domain	abuse	[…]	have	disproportionate	influence	in	the	political	arena	[…	and]	have	fought	hard	against	eminent	domain	reform”	(IFJ,	2010).	In	short:	it’s	not	a	technical	problem.		 So	far,	the	discussion	has	mainly	focused	on	State-backed	dispossession.	But	what	of	appropriations	carried	out	by	private	agents?	(Here,	I	write	exclusively	from	my	knowledge	of	Colombia.)	At	first	glance,	the	rule	of	law	explanation	seems	to	have	more	utility	in	such	cases.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 historically	 and	 to-date,	 the	 Colombian	 State	 has	 been	 unable	and/or	unwilling	to	enforce	its	 land	laws	and	to	protect	 its	citizens’	property	rights.	The	problem	is	that	general	statements	like	this,	even	if	superficially	true,	obscure	more	than	they	reveal	when	taken	out	of	context.	The	more	pertinent	question	is	why	 the	State	has	been	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 enforce	 its	 land	 laws	 -	 noting,	 of	 course,	 that	 unable	 and	unwilling	are	two	different	things.		 As	a	starting	point,	the	State	is	not	unitary–	so	while	one	entity	might	be	working	to	an	enforce	a	law,	another	might	be	trying	to	repeal	it	or	prevent	its’	implementation.	Second,	dispossession	is	never	affected	by	a	single	law	or	policy,	meaning	that	certain	legal	norms	may	facilitate	the	process,	while	others	block	it.	Third,	the	central	government	itself	may	simultaneously	 promote	 (at	 least	 indirectly)	 and	 condemn	 private	 land	 grabs	 through	different	 laws,	 policies,	 actions	 and	 inactions.	 In	 general,	 changing	 social,	 political	 and	economic	 dynamics	 have	 influenced	 how	 the	 central	 government	 responds	 to	dispossession.	The	typical	rule	of	law	explanation	downplays	all	of	these	complexities.		 Finally,	which	land	laws	has	the	Colombian	government	been	unable	or	unwilling	to	enforce	 and	 whose	 property	 rights	 has	 it	 been	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 protect?	 The	unenforced	 laws	 that	would	 have	 blocked	 coercive	 dispossession	 are	 largely	 those	 that	disadvantage	 large	 investors,	 for	 example:	 land	 ceilings,	 transfer	 restrictions	 and	transaction	 freezes	 during	 periods	 of	 forced	 displacement.	 And	 it	 has	 mainly	 failed	 to	protect	 the	property	rights	of	campesinos,	Afro	and	 indigenous	groups.	 If	Colombia’s	 so-
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called	‘weak	rule	of	law’	affected	everyone	equally,	the	Heritage	Index	of	Economic	Freedom	probably	would	not	rank	the	country	as	well	as	it	does	in	terms	of	“the	degree	to	which	a	country’s	 laws	 protect	 private	 property	 rights	 and	 the	 degree	 to	which	 its	 government	enforces	those	laws”22.			 To	reiterate,	it’s	not	that	the	content	of	the	laws,	the	government’s	ability	to	enforce	them,	and	the	nature	of	the	judicial	system	don’t	matter.	They	do.	The	problem	is	when	legal	reform	 and	 other	 technical	 fixes	 are	 fetishised.	 Policy-oriented	 researchers	 who	 blame	dispossession	on	a	weak	rule	of	law	often	ignore	power	relations	and	ideology	or	treat	them	as	exogenous	factors.	Borras	and	Franco	put	forward	a	similar	argument	in	their	analysis	of	‘land	 governance’	 issues;	 they	 show	 how	 policies	 and	 programs	 that	 are	 treated	 as	“technical”	 and	 “neutral”	 are	 inherently	 political.	 Achieving	 genuinely	 “pro-poor”	 and	“democratic	 land	 governance”,	 they	 argue,	 demands	 recognising	 this	 and	 then	strengthening	“autonomous”	rural	“mobilisations”,	identifying	and	supporting	allies	in	the	government,	 and	 ensuring	 “mutually	 reinforcing	 interactions	 between”	 them	 (Borras	 &	Franco,	2010,	pp.	23–24).			
1.4)	Dispossession	 is	a	 common	 feature	of	violent	 conflict	and	war	because	of	 the	
concomitant	weakening	of	property	institutions	and	the	rule	of	law.	Land	 dispossession,	 especially	 that	 effected	 by	 private	 agents,	 seems	 to	 be	 particularly	pervasive	in	contexts	of	armed	conflict.	One	way	of	explaining	this	presumed	connection	can	be	extrapolated	from	orthodox	economic	theories	of	civil	war.	Paul	Collier	asserts,	for	example:	“Governments	reduce	expenditure	on	the	police	during	conflict	as	they	increase	spending	on	the	military.	As	a	result,	the	risks	of	punishment	for	criminal	behavior	decline”	and	activities	such	as	theft	increase	(Collier,	1999,	p.	8).	The	problem	with	using	such	an	observation	to	explain	land	usurpation	in	violent	settings	is	two-fold.		 On	the	one	hand,	it	is	not	clear	that	‘criminal	behaviour’	does	uniformly	increase	in	conflict-contexts.	 In	 Colombia,	 both	 guerrilla	 and	 paramilitary	 groups	 tended	 to	 exert	considerable	social	control	in	their	stronghold	areas.	They	essentially	imposed	their	own	laws	 on	 civilian	 populations	 and	 used	 especially	 harsh	 ‘punishments’	 to	 deter	 certain	
                                                        22	Colombia,	alongside	Chile	and	Uruguay,	were	the	only	countries	to	receive	a	mid-range	rating	in	South	America	in	2017,	in	terms	of	the	property	rights	indicator	specifically.	As	another	imperfect	indication	of	Colombia’s	reputation	as	an	‘investment	destination’,	consider	that	in	2017	it	came	in	at	59	on	the	World	Bank’s	Doing	Business	Rankings	-	above	Puerto	Rico,	Luxembourg	and	Greece.	
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‘criminal	 behaviours’	 such	 as	 petty	 theft	 (CNMH,	 2011,	 2012a;	 Molano,	 1989).	 In	 the	Colombian	context,	it	was	mostly	paramilitaries	that	effected	land	grabs,	in	alliance	with	a	varied	elite,	and	largely	against	campesinos;	arguably,	the	low	‘risk	of	punishment’	had	much	more	to	do	with	who	did	the	dispossession	and	who	was	dispossessed	than	a	homogenous	decline	in	law	enforcement.	On	the	other	hand,	the	use	of	such	observations	to	explain	land	dispossession	specifically	is	clearly	inadequate.	Among	other	reasons,	land	is	not	like	other	‘property’	or	‘possessions’;	it	is	not	an	easy	target	for	looting.		 Over	the	last	decade	or	so,	policymakers	and	scholars	have	paid	increasing	attention	to	land	issues	in	conflict-contexts.	This	growing	field	of	specialists	are	well	attuned	to	the	complexities	of	land	dispossession	in	these	settings.	Nevertheless,	the	basic	predominant	explanation	within	this	literature	is	similar:	land	dispossession	is	enabled	by	a	“weaken[ing]	or	collapse”	of	“State	and	customary	institutions”	(UN,	2012,	p.	9;	see	also	Takeuchi	et	al.,	2014,	p.	242).	Unruh	and	Williams	(2013)	explain:	“violent	civil	conflict	reduces	the	power	and	penetration	of	state	law	in	affected	regions	[…	it]	may	cripple	or	render	inoperable	the	state’s	land	and	property	administration	institutions”	(p.	9).	In	the	case	of	Colombia,	such	general	statements	can	end	up	misconstruing	what	actually	happened.	Later	chapters	show	how	paramilitaries	and	their	allies	achieved	dispossession	through	a	careful	navigation	and	deployment	 of	 property	 rules,	 rather	 than	by	 exploiting	 their	 collapse.	 In	 short,	 even	 in	conflict	contexts,	the	weak	property	institutions/rule	of	law	explanation	is	insufficient.		
1.5)	The	best	way	to	prevent	dispossession	is	through	titling/formalisation	programs	
and	improvements	to	the	rule	of	law.	Explanations	of	 this	 claim	and	 the	accompanying	critique	are	 implied	 in	 the	discussions	surrounding	points	1.2	and	1.3,	and	hence	are	only	touched	on	briefly	here.	Institutions	such	as	 the	United	Nations	Food	and	Agriculture	Organisation	(FAO)	and	the	World	Bank	are	right	to	emphasise	the	vulnerability	of	people	without	formally	recognised	land	rights	and	the	 role	 of	 underfunded,	 incompetent	 and/or	 unscrupulous	 government	 agencies	 and	agents	 in	 creating	 the	 conditions	 for	 dispossession.	However,	 overall,	 “portrayals	 of	 the	state	as	weak	or	corrupt	and	of	the	need	for	good	governance	as	a	solution	to	the	excesses	of	expropriation	are	overly	facile”	(Wolford,	Borras,	Hall,	Scoones,	&	White,	2013,	p.	206),	as	 shown	above.	To	 reiterate:	 the	 titling/formalisation	and	 rule	of	 law	solutions	 to	 land	dispossession	 tend	 to	 downplay	 the	 importance	 of	 power	 relations	 and	 de-politicise	inherently	ideological	questions.	
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Titling	and	formalisation	programs	and	improvements	to	the	rule	of	law	(imagining,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	we	agree	on	what	the	latter	means	and	that	both	these	‘solutions’	can	be	effectively	 implemented)	are	 likely	 to	 transform	rather	 than	 ‘solve’	 the	problems	surrounding	 dispossession.	 Supposing	 ‘illegal’	 dispossession	 could	 be	 eliminated	 and	everyone	had	formally	recognised	rights	to	their	land,	we	are	still	left	with	the	question	of	‘legal’	 dispossession,	 which	 includes	 the	 expropriation	 of	 private	 property.	 And	dispossession	-with	all	the	attributes	of	an	orderly,	efficient,	transparent	legal	process-	is	still	dispossession.	The	 issue	 of	 expropriation	 is	 sometimes	 reduced	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 so	 long	 as	compensation	is	paid,	it’s	acceptable.	There	are	two	main	problems	with	this.	(1)	On	the	one	hand,	 the	 systems	 used	 for	 determining	 ‘just’	 compensation	 tend	 to	 systematically	‘undercompensate’	people	-	especially	those	without	power	and	resources	(Berliner,	2003;	Cernea,	2004;	Levien,	2011;	Miceli,	2011).	It	is	possible	that	if	the	dispossessed	were	truly	‘made	whole’,	the	project	for	which	they	were	removed	would	become	financially	unviable	-	at	 least	 relative	 to	 the	profit	 prerogatives	 of	 the	beneficiary	 firm	 (this	 is	 an	 issue	 that	deserves	attention	in	future	research).	In	any	case,	profit-oriented	companies	clearly	have	motives	 for	 attempting	 to	 minimise	 compensation.	 So,	 arguably,	 systematic	 under-compensation	is	often	an	in-built	attribute	of	dispossession,	not	a	mere	oversight.	(2)	On	the	other	hand,	non-financial	and	immaterial	losses	are	ignored	or	it	is	falsely	assumed	that	they	 can	 be	 ‘compensated’	 with	 extra	 money	 or	 cancelled	 out	 with	 the	 right	 policies.	Because	many	people	value	their	homes,	farms	or	territories	for	non-monetary	reasons,	the	‘ethics’	of	dispossession	cannot	be	reduced	to	compensation.		
1.6)	A	high	prevalence	and/or	risk	of	dispossession	hinders	economic	growth.	The	FAO	(2002)	defines	“security	of	tenure	[...	as]	the	certainty	that	a	person’s	rights	to	land	will	 be	 recognized	 by	 others	 and	 protected	 in	 cases	 of	 specific	 challenges.	 People	 with	insecure	tenure	face	the	risk	that	their	rights	to	land	will	be	threatened	by	competing	claims,	and	even	lost	as	a	result	of	eviction”	(see	also	UN,	2012,	pp.	19–20).	Thus,	insecure	tenure	means	a	high	risk	of	coercive	dispossession.	And	insecure	tenure	is	characteristically	said	to	 hinder	 economic	 growth	 and	 development	 (FAO,	 2002;	 Deininger,	 2003;	 Unruh	 &	Williams,	2013c,	p.	538;	DFID,	2015).	It	is	worth	emphasising	that	this	claim	goes	with	those	above,	since	insecure	tenure	is	usually	attributed	to	a	lack	of	clearly	defined	formal	property	rights	and/or	a	weak	rule	of	law.	
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A	 high	 risk	 of	 dispossession	 is	 generally	 assumed	 to	 deter	 people	 from	 investing:	“secure	 tenure	 is	 critical	 to	 provide	 incentives	 for	 households	 and	 entrepreneurs	 to	undertake	land-related	investments.	If	their	ability	to	keep	the	benefits	from	investments	is	uncertain,	they	are	unlikely	to	invest”	(Deininger,	2003,	p.	39;	see	also	Soto,	2001,	p.	18).	Another	reason	the	threat	of	dispossession	is	said	to	hinder	economic	growth	is	the	forgone	earnings	implied	in	protecting	against	it:	“if	property	rights	are	poorly	defined	or	cannot	be	enforced	at	 low	cost,	 individuals	and	entrepreneurs	will	be	compelled	to	spend	valuable	resources	on	defending	 their	 land,	 thereby	diverting	effort	 from	other	purposes	 such	as	investment”	(Deininger,	2003,	p.	xix	and	23-24;	see	also	Rubin	&	Klumpp,	2012).		In	addition	to	limiting	the	investments	of	people	who	are	already	landholders,	a	high	risk	of	dispossession	is	also	thought	to	deter	potential	investors	from	acquiring	land;	i.e.	to	discourage	 growth-enabling	 transactions	 (Deininger,	 2003;	 Rubin	 &	 Klumpp,	 2012).	Nevertheless,	 a	 recent	World	 Bank	 publication	 suggests	 that	 “lower	 recognition	 of	 land	rights	increases	a	country’s	attractiveness	for	land	acquisition”	(Deininger	et	al.,	2011,	p.	55,	emphasis	 added)	 and	 that	 “a	 favourable	 investment	 climate	 as	 proxied	 by	 the	 Doing	Business	 rank	 for	 investor	 protection	 has	 only	 a	 weak	 effect	 on	 planned	 and	 none	 on	implemented	 investment”	 in	 farmland	(ibid,	pp.	54-55).	What	accounts	 for	 this	apparent	anomaly?	 Put	 simply:	 insecure	 tenure	 is	 not	 distributed	 equally,	 as	 indicated	 in	 the	examples	 from	 Colombia	 above.	 Arguably,	 certain	 types	 of	 tenure	 insecurity	 benefit	powerful	 investors	because	 it	 enables	 them	to	obtain	 land	cheaply	 through	mechanisms	
other	than	voluntary	market	exchange	(i.e.	via	dispossession).		Deininger	et	al.	(2011)	themselves	assert	that	the	“factors	conducive”	to	successful	business	 ventures,	 aimed	 at	 producing	 “high-value	 export	 crops”	 in	 Sub-Saharan	Africa,	“were	an	ideal	agro-economical	setting,	low	if	any	compensation	for	land,	and	cheap	labour.	[…]	These	natural	advantages	offset	a	lack	of	technology,	weak	institutions,	high	transport	costs	 and	 ill-functioning	 markets”	 (p.	 26).	 But	 cheap	 land	 and	 labour	 are	 not	 ‘natural	advantages’.	 Arguably,	 much	 of	 the	 land	 acquired	 in	 Africa	 during	 the	 recent	 global	investment	boom	was	only	cheap	because	it	was	usurped	from	local	communities,	usually	by	 the	 State	 on	 the	 investors’	 behalf.	 The	 same	 World	 Bank	 publication	 informs:	“Smallholders’	 income	is	[often]	2	times	to	10	times	[more	than]	what	they	could	obtain	from	wage	employment	only”	(ibid,	p.	35).	The	question	is	whether	these	investors	would	be	willing	to	pay	an	amount	(for	land	and/or	labour)	sufficient	to	actually	induce	people	to	sell/rent	 their	 plots	 voluntarily?	 Given	 that	 the	 success	 of	 the	 projects	 described	 above	depended	on	“cheap”	labour	and	land,	the	probable	answer	is	NO.	
	 
68	
Deininger	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 provide	 an	 illustrative	 example	 in	 which	 voluntary	transactions	 would	 generate	 the	 least	 amount	 of	 monetary	 wealth.	 They	 compare	 four	different	 “options	 for	 engaging	 small	 farmers”	 in	 “large-scale	 investment”:	 (1)	 “a	smallholder	model	tied	to	a	nuclear	estate”;	(2)	“a	joint	venture	model	in	which	local	people	with	 customary	 rights	 to	 the	 land	 receive	 an	 equity	 share	 in	 a	 plantation	 run	 as	 single	operation”;	(3)	“a	fixed	land-lease	model	based	on	an	annual	rental	payment”;	(4)	“a	purely	private	 company	 operation	 with	 government	 providing	 the	 land	 through	 a	 concession	without	 compensation”	 (Deininger	 et	 al.,	 2011,	 p.	 36).	The	 comparison	 is	 based	on	 case	studies	of	palm	oil	production	in	Sarawak,	Malaysia.	(Unfortunately,	the	authors	don’t	offer	information	 about	 smallholder	 production	 independent	 of	 a	 large-scale	 investment.)	 A	graph	 examining	 the	 “distribution	 of	 benefits”	 clearly	 shows	 that	 the	 best	 option	 for	smallholders	(no.	1)	also	results	in	the	lowest	‘yields’,	as	measured	by	net	present	value	per	
hectare	 in	 US	 dollars.	 Let’s	 play	 the	 rational	 actor/perfect	 markets	 game:	 if	 these	smallholders	had	enforceable	private	property	rights	over	their	land	and	were	negotiating	with	the	interested	investor	on	a	relatively	level	playing	field	(e.g.	with	access	to	the	relevant	information),	 they	would	reject	transactions	that	made	them	worse	off	and	hence	would	‘choose’	 option	 1.	 Here	 the	 arguments	made	 under	 claim	 1.1	 start	 to	 fall	 apart,	 leading	indirectly	to	the	next	claim.		
1.7)	Sometimes	growth	and	development	require	dispossession	and	displacement.	Some	 business	 representatives	 and	 economists	 seem	 to	 suffer	 from	 a	 sort	 of	 cognitive	dissonance	when	it	comes	to	State-backed	dispossession.	On	the	one	hand,	they	maintain	that	‘efficient’	land	allocation	and	use	is	best	assured	through	voluntary	transactions	within	a	context	of	free	markets	and	private	property.	On	the	other	hand,	they	also	acknowledge	that	many	 investments	would	 not	 proceed	without	 coercive	 land	 acquisition.	 Few	 have	attempted	to	address	this	apparent	contradiction	systematically.	Given	that	the	World	Bank	is	simultaneously	an	ardent	defender	of	un-	or	lightly-	regulated	land	markets,	and	one	of	the	 most	 important	 funders	 of	 investments	 that	 rely	 on	 coercive	 dispossession	 and	displacement,	it	is	worth	considering	what	their	policymakers	have	to	say	on	the	matter.	First,	some	basic	context.	Recent	calculations	suggest	some	3.4	million	people	were	displaced	(physically	and/or	economically)	by	projects	financed	by	the	World	Bank	Group	between	2004	and	2013.	Though,	“the	true	figure	is	likely	higher,	because	the	bank	often	fails	 to	 count	 or	 undercounts	 the	 number	 of	 people	 affected	 by	 its	 projects”	 (Chavkin,	
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Hallman,	 Hudson,	 Schilis-Gallego,	 &	 Shifflett,	 2015).	 Public	 and	 private	 entities	implementing	 projects	 funded	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 Group	 are	 expected	 to	 comply	 with	certain	 standards	 relating	 to	 involuntary	 resettlement	 and	 compensation.	On	paper,	 the	Bank’s	 standards	 are	 higher	 than	 those	 contained	 in	 many	 national	 legal	 frameworks	regulating	 expropriation.	 This	 is	 supposed	 to	 ensure	 that	 affected	 people	 are	 better	 off	following	project	implementation	or	at	minimum	that	their	‘living	standards’	are	‘restored’	(World	 Bank,	 2001,	 2016a,	 2016b).	 In	 practice,	 however,	 “successful	 cases	 are	 the	exception,	 not	 the	norm	 […	often,	 the	displaced	 are	 left]	 impoverished,	 disenfranchised,	disempowered,	and	in	many	other	aspects	worse	off	than	before	the	Bank-financed	project”	(Ferris	&	Cernea,	2014).	This	quote,	it	is	worth	mentioning,	is	from	an	article	co-authored	by	Michael	Cernea	who	was	“the	World	Bank’s	 first	 in-house	sociologist	 […	and	got]	 the	bank	 to	 approve	 its	 first	 comprehensive	 policy	 for	 protecting	 people	 whose	 lives	 are	upended	by	the	bank’s	projects”	in	the	1980s	(Chavkin	et	al.,	2015).	The	colossal	harm	associated	with	projects	backed	by	the	World	Bank	Group	has	been	corroborated	by	the	International	Consortium	of	Investigative	Journalists	(ICIJ),	which	led	a	 yearlong	 investigation	 involving	 over	 50	 reporters.	 The	 investments	 examined	 were	diverse,	including:	industrial	agriculture	in	Tanzania	and	Indonesia,	forest	conservation	in	Kenya,	urban	renewal	in	Nigeria,	a	‘coastal	clean-up’	program	involving	construction	of	a	high-end	tourist	resort	in	Albania,	a	coal-fired	power	plant	in	India	and	a	gold	mine	in	Peru	(for	details	see	the	various	articles	posted	on	the	Huffington	Post	and	ICIJ	webpages).		So,	how	do	World	Bank	representatives	and	policymakers	reconcile	their	institution’s	near-obsession	 with	 free	 markets	 and	 its	 bankrolling	 of	 projects	 involving	 coercive	dispossession	and	displacement?	The	short	answer	is	they	don’t.	Of	course,	there	are	surely	individual	differences	of	opinion	among	the	people	who	comprise	the	Bank	and	most	Bank	publications	contain	the	usual	disclaimer	that	the	views	of	the	author(s)	are	not	necessarily	the	same	as	those	of	the	institution.	Nevertheless,	for	analytical	reasons,	they	still	deserve	consideration.	There	are	two	broad	positions	within	World	Bank	publications,	which	are	at	odds	with	each	other	and	the	Bank’s	record	as	a	lender.		The	first	position,	found	in	the	2003	World	Bank	report	Land	Policies	for	Growth	and	
Poverty	 Reduction,	 is	 a	muted	 critique	 of	 State-backed	 dispossession.	 The	 author,	 Klaus	Deininger,	 acknowledges	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 the	 phenomenon:	 “Attempts	 by	 the	 state	 to	exercise	 its	 power	 of	 eminent	 domain	 and	 pay	 only	 nominal	 compensation	 for	 land	improvements	 made	 by	 private	 users	 are	 widespread	 virtually	 all	 over	 the	 world”	(Deininger,	2003,	p.	173).	He	also	warns	of	the	potential	negative	economic	impacts:	“the	
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extensive	 use	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 state	 to	 expropriate	 property	 […]	 undermine[s]	 the	security	 of	 individual	 property	 rights	 [which	 in	 turn	 negatively	 affects]	 incentives	 for	investment”	(ibid).	Deininger	advises	that	compulsory	acquisition	should	only	be	used	“for	clear	public	purposes”	and	 implies	 that	an	 ‘extensive	use’	of	 the	State’s	 taking	powers	 is	linked	to	corruption	and	a	weak	rule	of	law	(ibid).	This	is,	essentially,	a	reassertion	of	claims	1.3,	1.5	and	1.6	above.	A	similar	position	can	be	found	in	a	2011	World	Bank	publication	entitled	Rising	Global	 Interest	 in	Farmland:	 “Transfers	of	 land	 rights	 should	be	based	on	users’	 voluntary	 and	 informed	 agreement	 […]	 and	 should	 not	 involve	 expropriation	 for	private	purposes”	(Deininger	et	al.,	2011,	p.	xl).	These	authors	actually	provide	a	detailed	critique	of	expropriation	for	private	investments	(pp.	104-106).		 The	second	position	is	found	in	World	Bank	documents	on	‘involuntary	resettlement’.	These	publications	focus	on	‘managing’	the	‘impoverishment	risks’	inherent	in	the	process.	The	assumption	is	that	dispossession	and	associated	displacement	is	an	inevitable	part	of	economic	progress.	For	example:	“involuntary	resettlement	is	an	essential	and	historically	underappreciated	 aspect	 of	 development”	 (World	 Bank,	 2004,	 p.	 xix,	 see	 also:	 2016a).	Fundamental	 questions	 about	 whether	 and	 why	 coercion	 is	 required	 or	 under	 what	circumstances	it	is	defensible	are	largely	absent	from	the	discussions.	The	closest	thing	to	an	 explanation	 is	 this:	 “to	 ensure	 that	 public	 facilities	 or	 infrastructure	 is	 provided	 at	reasonable	cost	and	is	sited	appropriately,	all	governments	sometimes	invoke	legal	powers	-that	is,	eminent	domain-	to	expropriate	land”	(World	Bank,	2004,	p.	xxiv).		The	 Bank	 paints	 an	 idealised	 image	 of	 how	 States	 use	 their	 taking	 powers:	 for	construction	of	“a	road	that	allows	a	farmer	to	get	goods	to	market,	access	to	electricity	so	hospitals	can	refrigerate	medicines	and	children	can	do	their	homework	at	night,	providing	clean	water	 to	 reduce	 the	 incidence	of	 easily	preventable	water-borne	diseases”	 (World	Bank,	2016a).	Who	could	object	to	such	things?	The	fact	that	people	are	regularly	cleared	off	their	land	to	make	way	for	private	investments,	which	are	clearly	not	public	facilities	or	infrastructure,	 is	 conveniently	 ignored.	 Even	 projects	 that	 ostensibly	 fit	 into	 the	 latter	category,	such	as	dams	and	other	power	plants,	are	often	for-profit	ventures	and	are	not	necessarily	aimed	at	getting	electricity	to	unconnected	households.	They	may	be	aimed	at	powering	certain	industries	such	as	large-scale	mining	operations23	and	people	displaced	
                                                        23	For	example,	according	to	International	Rivers,	“[m]any	dams	have	been	constructed	worldwide	to	power	the	aluminum	industry”,	which	is	extremely	energy-intensive.	Among	other	examples	are	the	Tucuruí	dam	in	the	Brazilian	Amazon	and	the	Akosombo	dam	in	Ghana,	which	combined	are	said	to	have	displaced	more	than	100,000	people	(‘Dams	and	Mining’,	2007;	see	also	Bosshard,	2013).	
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by	 such	 projects	 often	 continue	 to	 lack	 electricity	 years	 later	 (see	 e.g.	 Kayawe,	 2013;	Tunubalá,	2008).	The	World	Commission	on	Dams	notes	that	case	study	research	“confirms	that	 those	 who	 receive	 the	 benefits	 [of	 dam	 construction…]	 are	 typically	 not	 the	 same	groups	 that	 bear	 the	 social	 costs	 […]	 Electricity	 generation	 [for	 example]	 has	 mostly	benefited	the	industrial	and	mining	sectors	[…]	and	urban	areas”	(World	Commission	on	Dams,	2000,	p.	125).	All	 in	 all,	 the	 Bank	 presents	 an	 unrealistic	 win-win	 scenario	 in	 which	 affected	communities	 actively	 participate	 in	 the	 project	 design	 and	 implementation	 so	 that	 -in	theory-	the	coercive	element	of	the	acquisition	becomes	inconsequential	and	the	effects	of	dispossession	 dissipate.	 It	 essentially	 attempts	 to	 conjure	 what	 Lara	 Coleman	 critically	labels	‘ethical	dispossession’	(on	the	multiple	ways	in	which	dispossession	is	depoliticised	and	rendered	‘ethical’	see:	Coleman,	2013,	2015b).	So,	 why	 can’t	 real-estate	 and	 tourism	 companies,	 mining	 and	 energy	 firms	 and	agribusinesses	(including	those	the	Bank	provides	funding	for)	acquire	land	via	the	markets	as	the	Bank	expects	‘the	poor’	to	do?	The	answer	hinted	at	above	is	that	coercive	acquisition	
is	required	or	justified	when	an	investor	cannot	procure	the	land	at	a	‘reasonable	cost’	and	in	
the	‘appropriate	site’	through	voluntary	transactions.	Thus,	according	to	the	World	Bank,	in	some	 cases,	 economic	 growth	 and	 development,	 driven	 by	 private	 profit-oriented	companies,	 requires	coercive	dispossession	and	displacement.	The	World	Bank	Group	 is	evidently	 unwilling	 to	 make	 such	 overt	 statements,	 but	 they	 are	 implied	 in	 its	 policy	documents	and	-above	all-	its	practice	as	a	lending	institution.			
1.8)	Dispossession	is	required	to	overcome	market	failures	and	promote	efficiency.	A	few	scholars,	mostly	within	the	subfield	of	Law	and	Economics,	have	attempted	to	provide	a	more	 systematic	 explanation	 of	 why	 coercive	 dispossession	 is	 required/defensible	 in	liberal	democracies	with	market	economies.	They	focus	specifically	on	the	expropriation	of	private	property.	Broadly,	the	very	same	principle	used	to	defend	private	property	rights	and	free	markets	is	also	used	to	justify	their	violation:	efficiency.	The	“underlying	economic	rationale”	for	eminent	domain,	according	to	Thomas	Miceli	(2011),	is	“the	goal	of	achieving	an	efficient	allocation	and	use	of	land”	(p.	3).		Most	people	(including	economists	themselves)	accept	that	in	the	real-world	things	don’t	 work	 the	way	market	models	 predict.	 As	 always,	 when	 the	 so-called	 free	market	doesn’t	 perform	 to	utopian	 standards,	 this	 is	 called	 ‘market	 failure’.	 According	 to	Miceli	
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(2011),	“an	economic	theory	of	eminent	domain	(or,	for	that	matter,	any	departure	from	voluntary	exchange)	must	be	based	on	its	ability	to	overcome	[…]	market	failures”	(p.	4).	In	short,	 the	 justification	 for	 expropriation	 is	 like	 any	 other	 economic	 rationalisation	 of	government	intervention:	when	markets	fail	to	produce	efficient	outcomes,	governments	may	 intervene.	 However,	 expropriation	 is	 not	 like	 other	 interventions:	 it	 strikes	 at	 the	foundations	of	capitalist	society	by	directly	violating	what	is	said	to	be	most	sacred	to	it:	private	property.	So,	it	is	worth	examining	these	theories	in	slightly	more	detail.		Most	 contemporary	 economic	 rationalisations	 of	 eminent	 domain	 focus	 on	bargaining	obstacles	in	land	transactions,	specifically	on	the	holdout	problem,	associated	with	land	assembly	(Kelly,	2011;	Miceli,	2011;	Becker	&	Posner,	2009;	Miceli	&	Segerson,	2000).	Certain	types	of	projects	require	large	continuous	tracts	of	land,	which	may	entail	the	purchase	of	several	plots.	This	process	is	called	‘land	assembly’.	Projects	that	demand	land	 assembly	 are	 said	 to	 be	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 ‘market	 failures’	 caused	 by	‘holdouts’.	Most	 scholars	 focus	 on	 just	 one	 type	 of	 holdout:	 the	 ‘strategic	 owner’24.	 It	 is	assumed	that	if	an	individual	realises	his	or	her	piece	of	land	is	indispensable	for	a	project,	they	are	likely	to	demand	an	abnormally	high	price.	They	will	 ‘hold	out’	or	refuse	to	sell,	hoping	the	project	developer	will	accede	to	paying	an	exorbitant	sum.	In	such	circumstances	the	seller	is	considered	to	have	a	type	of	‘monopoly’,	since	no	one	else	can	provide	the	very	specific	area	of	land	required.	This	‘monopoly	power’	interferes	with	‘perfect	competition’,	producing	a	‘market	failure’	(Miceli,	2011,	pp.	27–28;	Kelly,	2011,	p.	346;	Miceli	&	Segerson,	2000).	In	Miceli’s	(2011)	words:	“Even	if	the	properties	are	more	valuable	to	the	buyer	(that	is,	even	if	the	transactions	are	efficient),	individual	sellers	may	strategically	refuse	to	sell	in	hopes	of	extracting	a	larger	share	of	the	gains	from	trade”	(p.	73).		Expropriation	is	one	means	“to	overcome	the	inefficiency	associated	with	the	holdout	problem”	(Miceli,	2011,	p.	30)	and	“because	holdouts	can	threaten	private	as	well	as	public	projects	involving	assembly,	the	granting	of	eminent	domain	power	to	private	developers	facing	a	hold-out	problem	is	justifiable	on	economic	grounds”	(Miceli,	2011,	p.	30	and	46;	see	 also	 Becker	 &	 Posner,	 2009,	 pp.	 57–58).	 In	 other	words,	 the	 public	 use	 or	 interest	requirement	is	irrelevant	from	this	perspective.	
                                                        24	 Kelly’s	 (2011)	 inclusion	 of	 two	 additional	 types	 of	 holdouts	 (the	 ‘honest	 owner’	 and	 the	‘idiosyncratic	owner’)	complicates	the	analysis.	The	‘honest	owner’	refuses	to	sell	for	an	amount	that	is	below	their	‘true	valuation’.	The	‘idiosyncratic	owner’	is	“unwilling	to	sell	at	any	price	or	is	willing	to	sell	only	at	an	elevated	price”.	Both	of	these	owners	are	distinguished	from	‘strategic	owners’	who	attempt	to	secure	a	price	that	is	above	their	‘true	valuation’	(Kelly,	2011,	pp.	347–348).		
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As	hinted	at	above,	these	authors	argue	that	an	expropriation	is	efficient	if	it	forces	a	transfer	of	land	from	a	person	or	group	who	value	it	less	to	a	person	or	group	who	value	it	more	 (Kelly,	 2011;	Miceli,	 2011).	 In	 this	 sense,	 they	 attempt	 to	 liken	 expropriations	 to	Pareto	efficient	allocations	or	improvements,	in	which	someone	is	made	better	off	and	no	one	is	made	worse	off	(though	many	of	these	same	theorists	recognise	that	this	is	often	not	the	case	in	practice).	The	implication	is	that	coercive	redistribution	becomes	a	non-issue.	The	 State	 simply	 forces	 a	 transfer	 that	 would	 have	 theoretically	 occurred	 through	consensual	exchange	were	it	not	for	a	market	failure.	Nevertheless,	most	economists	accept	that	that	because	subjective	values	are	often	unobservable,	it	is	difficult	to	know	whether	a	transaction	forced	through	expropriation	is	‘efficient’	or	not.	Still,	Miceli	(2011)	treats	the	risk	that	expropriation	may	end	up	forcing	‘inefficient’	sales	as	just	one	issue	to	be	weighed	up	among	many	(pp.	60	and	154-155).	More	 broadly,	 the	 concept	 of	 efficiency	 is	 used	 inconsistently	 in	 economic	justifications	of	expropriation.	While	many	define	efficiency	in	terms	of	transactions	and	subjective	valuations,	efficient	land	use	and	broader	economic	benefits	also	get	thrown	into	the	equation	(e.g.	Miceli,	2011,	p.	28;	Becker	&	Posner,	2009,	p.	58).	So-called	‘efficient	land	use’	is	not	explicitly	defined	but	it	can	be	inferred	that	in	this	context	it	means	the	use	that	generates	the	most	monetary	value.	The	problem	is	that	the	person	or	group	that	values	the	land	most	will	not	necessarily	put	the	land	to	the	most	valuable	use	-	in	terms	of	monetary	yields.	Consider	the	following	extreme	example:	many	indigenous	communities	in	Colombia	would	refuse	to	sell	their	land	at	any	price	and	clearly	place	a	much	higher	subjective	value	on	it	than	any	corporation	ever	would;	however,	these	same	communities	are	also	unlikely	to	extract	the	most	exchange	value	from	the	land	(economists’	understanding	of	efficient	use)	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 high	 (non-monetary)	 value	 that	 they	 attach	 to	 it.	 Put	differently:	inefficient	transactions	may	actually	increase	monetary	yields	and	vice	versa,	efficient	 transactions	may	 reduce	monetary	wealth.	 This	 scenario	 is	 disregarded	 in	 the	literature;	efficient	transactions	and	efficient	land	use	are	assumed	to	go	together.	So,	which	should	be	prioritised:	so-called	efficient	transactions	or	so-called	efficient	land	 use?	 Ilya	 Somin	 suggests	 Miceli	 prioritises	 the	 latter:	 he	 is	 said	 to	 advocate	 for	expropriation	in	“situations	where	one	or	a	small	number	of	 individual	property	owners	who	refuse	to	sell	to	a	developer	might	block	a	project	whose	value	exceeds	that	of	the	current	
uses	of	the	land”	(Somin,	2012,	p.	55,	emphasis	added).	If	efficient	land	use	is	prioritised,	the	notion	that	expropriations	mimic	transactions	that	would	have	taken	place	in	the	absence	of	market	failures	comes	tumbling	down.	The	attempt	to	reconcile	free	market	principles	
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with	dispossession	using	rational	actor	games	failed.	We	are	left	with	a	rehashed	version	of	claim	1.7:	in	some	cases,	economic	growth	and	development	(a	euphemism	for	an	expansion	of	monetary	value)	is	better	served	by	coercive	dispossession	than	voluntary	exchange.		Like	the	World	Bank	discourse	on	involuntary	resettlement,	the	Economics	and	Law	theories	of	expropriation	attempt	to	de-politicise	and	sanitise	dispossession.	For	example:	Miceli	 (2011)	argues	 that	conceptual	 clarity	could	 “vanish”	 the	controversy	surrounding	expropriations	 favouring	 private	 entities	 that	 do	 not	 clearly	 fulfil	 the	 public	 purpose	criterion	(p.	34).	But	he	overlooks	the	key	issue:	many	people	find	the	idea	of	taking	working	people’s	homes	or	land	by	force	and	handing	it	over	to	wealthy	and	powerful	companies	abhorrent.	The	issue	is	well	captured	by	Martin	Luther	King’s	expression:	“socialism	for	the	rich,	rugged	hard	individualistic	capitalism	for	the	poor”	(King,	1968).	On	 the	 whole,	 the	 issue	 of	 socially	 regressive	 redistribution	 is	 buried.	 When	 it	surfaces,	it	is	only	conceived	as	problematic	insofar	as	it	generates	economic	‘inefficiency’.	Questions	 of	 justice	 are	 ignored	 or	 reduced	 to	 economics.	 Miceli	 (2011),	 for	 example,	recognises	 that	eminent	domain	powers	may	be	used	 to	subsidise	private	companies	by	providing	them	with	land	for	a	lower	cost	than	they	would	have	paid	in	the	open	market.	He	argues	that	sometimes	it	is	“appropriate”	to	subsidise	private	projects	but	that	in	most	cases	a	direct	 subsidy	would	be	a	 “better	approach”	since	 “eminent	domain	 is	an	overly	blunt	instrument	for	accomplishing	this	purpose	in	an	efficient	manner”	(p.	71).	Theories	that	justify	takings	when	a	holdout	blocks	an	‘efficient’	transaction	do	not	require	 that	 the	 public	 benefit.	 Even	 justifications	 of	 expropriation	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	‘efficient’	 land	 use	 do	 not	 necessarily	 demand	 that	 broader	 society	 be	made	 better	 off.	However,	 other	 efficiency	 justifications	 for	 expropriation	 are	more	 closely	 aligned	with	utilitarian	ethics	and	welfare	economics:	takings	are	seen	as	a	tool	for	maximizing	the	social	good,	defined	as	aggregate	‘personal	satisfactions’.	For	example,	Frank	Michelman	(1967)	argues	 that	 takings	are	only	 justified	 if	 they	provide	 “net	efficiency	gains”,	which	 is	 “the	excess	 of	 benefits	 produced	 by	 a	 measure	 over	 losses	 inflicted	 by	 it”.	 His	 takings	 and	compensation	test	is	akin	to	a	cost-benefit	analysis	(Michelman,	1967,	pp.	1214–1215)	and	comes	 with	 the	 same	 deficiencies.	 Namely,	 non-monetary	 gains	 and	 losses	 cannot	 be	measured	without	 introducing	value	 judgements.	This	 is	 the	same	problem	 faced	by	 the	World	 Bank	 and	 like-minded	 policymakers	 who	 defend	 dispossession	 as	 a	 necessity	 of	development:	 they	 are	 ultimately	 imposing	 their	 value	 judgements,	 their	 definition	 of	wellbeing,	upon	others.	The	alternative	is	worse:	they	are	cynically	claiming	that	the	profit	prerogatives	of	the	few	represent	the	general	interest.	
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PART	2:	LAND	DISPOSSESSION	FROM	THE	PERSPECTIVE	OF	CRITICAL	SCHOLARSHIP		The	preceding	part	of	this	chapter	indicated	the	need	for	an	analysis	of	dispossession	and	associated	displacement	that	does	not	abstract	from	history,	the	wider	political	economy,	unequal	power	relations,	social	struggles	and	ideology.	This,	broadly	speaking,	is	the	project	of	 critical	 scholarship.	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 present	 some	 of	 the	 main	 claims	 on	 land	dispossession	found	in	varied	critical	publications	that	engage	with	the	issue,	directly	or	indirectly.	Some	material	 is	based	on	my	own	interpretations	or	adaptations	of	evidence	and	 ideas	 originally	presented	 in	 a	 different	 context	 for	 another	purpose.	 I	 also	use	 the	discussions	 to	 introduce	 some	 basic	 historical	 accounts	 (e.g.	 of	 land	 dispossession	 in	Britain)	and	key	concepts/ideas	 (e.g.	 improvement,	Locke’s	 theory	of	property),	which	 I	refer	to	in	later	chapters.	In	addition,	I	advance	my	own	arguments:	both	general	tentative	propositions	(that	wouldn’t	necessarily	be	accepted	by	others	whose	work	is	included	in	the	same	section)	and	points	that	relate	to	dispossession	in	Colombia	specifically.		
2.1)	The	forging	of	modern	property	rights	-necessary	for	capitalist	development-	has	
typically	involved	coercive	dispossession.	Critical	 scholars	 have	 turned	 the	 traditional	 creation	 story	 of	 property	 on	 its	 head	 by	showing	how	the	establishment	of	many,	perhaps	most,	modern	property	regimes	involved	violent	 conflict	 and	 coercive	 dispossession	 (see	 e.g.	 Marx,	 1842,	 1867;	 Wood,	 2002;	Blomley,	2003;	Cramer,	2006;	Springer,	2013).	These	narratives	suggest	that	dispossession	is	not	due	to	a	lack	or	weakness	of	private	property	rights	(as	in	claim	1.2	above)	but	rather	corresponds	 to	 the	 imposition	 of	 this	 very	 institution.	 This	 claim	 is	 not	 only	 useful	 for	understanding	historical	dispossession,	it	may	also	shed	light	on	contemporary	processes	in	contexts	where	private	property	rights	are	still	‘under	construction’.	Property	 institutions	 shape	 the	distribution	of	power	and	wealth	within	a	 society.	Private	property	rights	give	their	holder	the	power	to	exclude	and	thus	(in	contexts	where	land	is	scarce	or	monopolised	by	a	few)	exploit	others	by	extracting	their	‘surplus	labour’,	whether	this	be	via	land	rents	or	via	wage	relations.	Given	what	is	at	stake	in	the	assignment	of	these	‘rights’,	it	is	unsurprising	that	it	has	not	typically	been	a	peaceful	and	just	process.	As	explained	by	Cramer	(2006),	transitions	to	capitalism,	more	generally,	are	“characterised	by	a	war	of	position	[…]	a	scramble	for	social	position	in	a	social	structure	whose	adhesive	has	not	yet	set”	(p.	215).		
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Idyllic	 property	 creation	 narratives	 persist	 and	 hence	 require	 continual	demystification.	 For	 example,	 Hernando	 de	 Soto	 (2001),	 one	 of	 the	 most	 famous	contemporary	 property	 theorists,	 proclaimed:	 in	 the	 “developed”	world	 “the	 process	 of	formal	property	creation	[…]	took	place	over	a	long	period	of	time	as	the	customs	and	norms	of	the	peasants	were	slowly	absorbed	into	formal	law”;	eventually	“political	regimes	in	the	West	recognized	that	property	is	a	legal	creation,	justified	by	utilitarian	concerns	and	by	the	legitimate	and	peaceful	 interests	of	the	majority”	(pp.	19	and	21).	Historians	and	critical	theorists	have	shown,	in	contrast,	that	in	many	parts	of	the	world	‘formal	property	creation’	was	actually	based	on	the	destruction	of	customary	norms	and	rights,	resulting	in	partial	or	total	dispossession	of	the	peasantry.	Modern	 private	 property	 and	 surrounding	 foundational	 myths	 first	 emerged	 in	Europe.	In	much	of	the	continent	private	property	in	land	has	existed	for	centuries.	Under	the	Roman	Empire	“a	kind	of	property	more	private	and	exclusive	than	ever	before	was	not	only	 recognised	 in	 law,	 but	 coexisted	 with	 the	 state	 in	 a	 historically	 unprecedented	partnership”	(Wood,	2009,	p.	44).	However,	private	property	took	on	a	historically	specific	form	and	function	with	the	development	of	capitalism.	Notwithstanding	the	limitations	of	the	 ‘bundle	of	 rights’	definition	cited	earlier,	 it	 is	 a	useful	way	of	distinguishing	modern	private	 property	 from	 other	 types	 of	 land	 ownership.	 In	 feudal	 Europe,	 landowners	generally	did	not	have	the	unconditional	right	to	exclude,	to	use	the	land	however	they	saw	fit,	or	to	sell	to	whomever	and	whenever	they	pleased	–	all	these	‘rights’	were	limited	by	diverse	customary	norms	(Marx,	1842,	1867;	Polanyi,	1944;	Wood,	2002;	Bragg,	2008).	Waldron	offers	a	useful	distinction	between	“three	species	of	property	arrangement”:	common,	 collective	 and	private.	 Under	 a	 common	property	 arrangement	 “resources	 are	governed	by	rules	whose	point	is	to	make	them	available	for	use	by	all”.	Under	collective	property	norms,	“the	community	as	a	whole	determines	how	important	resources	are	to	be	used”.	Under	private	property	“various	contested	resources	are	assigned	to	the	decisional	authority	 of	 particular	 individuals”	 (Waldron,	 2016a).	 Most	 feudal	 tenure	 systems	 in	Europe	were	a	mix	of	common,	collective	and	private	property	arrangements.	Under	the	open	field	system,	for	example,	peasants	farmed	“scattered	strips	[that	were]	communally	regulated	but	privately	owned”	(McCloskey,	1991,	p.	516).	These	complex	arrangements	were	partially	designed	to	serve	village	subsistence	requirements	(Bragg,	2008).	The	new	and	more	exclusive	concept	of	private	property	 that	began	to	 take	shape	between	the	16th	and	18th	centuries	was	anchored	to	the	notion	of	‘improvement’	or	the	idea	that	productivity	and	-above	all-	profitability	should	be	the	primary	criteria	of	land	use	and	
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allocation.	 Customary	 rights	 and	 practices	 stood	 in	 the	 way	 of	 improvement	 and	 were	gradually	 replaced	 by	 property	 norms	 more	 conducive	 to	 the	 generation	 of	 monetised	exchange	value	(Bragg,	2008;	Wood,	2002).	The	English	enclosures	are	perhaps	the	most	well-known	example.	The	process	took	off	 between	 the	 end	 of	 the	 15th	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 16th	 centuries,	 as	 landlords	displaced	masses	of	peasants	in	order	to	convert	“arable	land	into	sheep-walks”.	The	“direct	impulse	for	these	evictions”	was	the	“rise	in	the	price	of	wool”	(Marx,	1867,	I-27,	pp.	878-879).	The	fencing	of	the	commons	and	the	expansion	of	private	pastureland	were	just	part	of	this	transformation.	It	also	involved	the	replacement	of	tenancy	arrangements	fixed	by	customs	 or	 law	 with	 competitive	 money	 rent	 leases	 (Wood,	 2002).	 16th	 century	 rural	England	was	a	scene	of	intense	-sometimes	violent-	struggles.	As	is	to	be	expected,	many	people	resisted	being	stripped	of	 their	customary	 land	rights.	But	a	 “strong	class	of	 rich	peasants”	-capitalist	tenant	farmers	in	the	making-	mostly	favoured	the	changes,	alongside	the	rent-seeking	landlords.	This	pitted	them	against	their	former	allies	in	centuries	of	past	struggle:	the	poorer	peasants	-agricultural	wage	labourers	in	the	making-	who	depended	on	the	commons	for	subsistence	(Byres,	2009,	pp.	37–38;	40–41).	17th	century	legislation	bolstered	the	usurpers.	The	Tenures	Abolition	Act	(1660)	tore	down	 feudal	 obligations;	 the	 State	was	 compensated	 via	 new	 forms	 of	 taxation	 and	 the	landowners	“established	for	themselves	the	rights	of	modern	private	property	in	estates	to	which	they	had	only	a	feudal	title”	(Marx,	1867,	I-27,	pp.	883-884).	The	expansion	of	the	competitive	rent	system	went	hand	in	hand	with	continuing	enclosures,	as	land	that	was	previously	cultivated	in	small	strips	was	consolidated	into	larger	enclosed	units	to	be	let	under	 the	 new	 tenancy	 rules,	 permitting	 the	 adoption	 of	 innovative	 crop	 rotation	techniques	and	other	new	farming	methods	(Bragg,	2008;	Byres,	2009;	Wood,	2002).	This	long	process	of	dispossession	was	finalised	in	the	18th	and	19th	centuries	with	the	assistance	of	the	Enclosure	Acts.	Between	the	late	1400s	and	early	1600s,	authorities	had	attempted	to	limit	enclosures	(which	were	mainly	“carried	on	by	means	of	individual	acts	 of	 violence”)	 and	 at	 times	 even	 tried	 to	 halt	 and	 reverse	 them	 with	 numerous	legislations.	But	by	the	1700s	the	usurpation	of	common	lands	was	explicitly	and	legally	sanctioned:	“the	law	itself	now	becomes	the	instrument	by	which	the	people’s	land	is	stolen,	although	the	big	farmers	made	use	of	their	little	independent	methods	as	well”	(Marx,	1867,	I-27,	p.	885).	
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Meanwhile,	a	similar	process	was	occurring	in	Scotland.	Following	the	last	Jacobite	uprising	in	1745,	the	Celtic	lairds	-who	were	meant	to	represent	the	people	of	their	clan-	began	 to	 treat	 their	 community’s	 land	 as	 private	 property,	 offering	 it	 up	 ‘to	 the	 highest	bidder’	and	driving	their	fellow	clansmen	from	their	homes.	The	Highland	Clearances,	as	the	process	is	known,	continued	as	game	reserves	for	deer	hunting	replaced	sheep	pasture	as	the	latest	profit-making	scheme	(Marx,	1867,	I-27,	pp.	891-893).		In	 Ireland,	 the	 destruction	 of	 customary	 tenure	 -regulated	 by	 Brehon	 law-	 was	imposed	by	the	imperial	English	government.	Colonial	officials	of	the	1600s	claimed	that	this	system	was	an	obstacle	to	investment	and	profit	and	that	“certain	ownership	of	land”	was	a	“public	good”.	Such	arguments	were	accepted	in	the	courts	and	hence	the	destruction	of	 Irish	 land	 law	 became	 colonial	 policy.	 Communal	 clan	 lands	 were	 “systematically	allocated	 to	 new	 waves	 of	 English	 and	 Scottish	 settlers	 […	 and	 the	 Irish	 families	 that	depended	on	these	lands	became]	their	increasingly	exploited	tenants”	(Wily,	2012a,	p.	753;	see	also	Wood,	2002).	In	mainland	Europe	too,	customary	rights	were	being	gradually	demolished	in	favour	of	a	new	conception	of	property	(on	France	and	Prussia	see	e.g.	Byres,	2009).	Marx’s	(1842)	series	of	articles	entitled	“Debates	on	 the	Law	on	Thefts	of	Wood”	point	 to	 the	on-going	socio-legal	changes	in	Prussia	that	“abolished	the	hybrid,	indeterminate	forms	of	property”	on	which	the	“customary	right	of	the	poor”	was	based.	They	also	point	to	the	centrality	of	profit	in	the	legal/political	discussions	of	the	time.	By	exercising	a	customary	right	to	collect	wood	 from	the	 forest	 floor,	 the	poor	were	seen	as	denying	 the	 landowners	 the	 ‘right’	 to	profit	from	their	‘property’.	And	it	wasn’t	just	wood:	“gathering	of	bilberries	and	cranberries	[was]	also	treated	as	theft”	and	deemed	detrimental	to	the	interests	of	the	proprietors	since,	in	the	words	of	one	deputy,	“‘these	berries	have	already	become	articles	of	commerce	and	are	dispatched	to	Holland	by	the	barrel”	(cited	in	Marx,	1842).		In	brief,	across	Europe,	land	was	transformed	“into	a	merely	commercial	commodity”	(Marx,	1867,	 I-27,	p.	 885),	 put	 at	 the	 service	of	 capital	 accumulation.	As	 argued	by	Karl	Polanyi,	 the	 treatment	of	 land	as	a	mere	 commodity,	 the	 idea	 that	market	 forces	 should	determine	land	allocation	and	use,	was	historically	unprecedented.	Polanyi	suggests	that	laissez-faire	liberals	decided	our	societies	should	be	organised	by	and	for	profit-oriented	markets	 and	 tried	 to	 mould	 the	 world	 in	 ways	 that	 corresponded	 with	 their	 ‘utopian’	principles.	They	 invented,	 so	 to	 speak,	 ‘the	 commodity	 fiction’	 (land,	 labour	 and	money,	Polanyi	argues,	are	not	in	fact	commodities)	and	went	about	organising	markets	for	land	on	this	basis	(Polanyi,	1944).	Arguably,	the	capitalist	land	regime	(based	on	private	property	
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and	 land	 markets,	 preserved	 by	 a	 centralised	 legal	 system	 and	 designed	 to	 serve	productivity/profits	above	all	else)	originated	before	laissez-faire	liberalism	took	hold	-at	least	in	England-	but	this	ideology	certainly	influenced	its	development	and	still	does.	The	 breakdown	 of	 customary	 tenure	 is	 also	 part	 of	 these	 historical	 and	 critical	narratives,	 like	 in	 the	 arguments	 presented	 above	 under	 claim	 1.2.	 However,	 this	breakdown	is	not	attributed	principally	to	demographic	change,	but	rather	is	seen	as	part	of	capitalist	development	and	related	social	struggles.	Customary	norms	have	often	been	deliberately	destroyed	by	colonial	powers,	national	governments	and/or	domestic	elites.	Blomley	(2003)	explains:	“the	shifting	requirements	of	capitalism	meant	the	enforced	and	legalized	transformation	of	tenurial	systems”	(p.	128).	This	process	is	ongoing.	For	example,	the	recent	displacement	of	hundreds	of	thousands	of	Ethiopians	is	part	of	the	governments’	endeavour	to	“make	pastoralism	moribund”	(Human	Rights	Watch	2012,	cited	in	Thomson,	2014,	p.	51),	to	forcibly	transform	‘land-based	social	relations’	(term	borrowed	from	Borras	and	Franco)	and	free	up	land	for	capital	accumulation	(Abbink,	2011).	To	reiterate:	in	many	parts	of	the	world,	customary	tenure	systems	didn’t	simply	stop	working;	they	were	-or	are	being-	 demolished	 or	 discounted,	 usually	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 they	 hinder	 economic	development	(Wily,	2011,	2012a).	The	historical	account	in	this	section	shows	that	dispossession	was	often	the	purpose	of,	or	was	inherent	to,	the	destruction	of	customary	tenure	and	its	replacement	by	modern	private	property.	This	historical	perspective	permits	a	different	understanding	of	the	link	between	 property	 rights	 and	 dispossession.	 It’s	 not	 that	 a	 weakness	 or	 lack	 of	 private	property	 is	 inherently	 conducive	 to	dispossession	but	 rather	 that	 customary	 land	 rights	were	devalued.	So,	people	without	formal	titles	are	particularly	vulnerable	to	dispossession	because	 of	 a	 historical	 (or	 ongoing)	 process	 through	 which	 customary	 land	 rights	 and	established	possession	were	deemed	violable	(Wily,	2011).	Further	evidence	for	this	point	is	provided	below	 in	 the	discussion	on	Locke’s	 theory	of	property	but	 is	worth	giving	a	contemporary	example	here.	Simon	Springer	(2013)	documents	how	a	new	land	law	and	associated	registration	program	in	Cambodia,	introduced	to	“improve	land	tenure	security”,	instead	 “significantly	 increased	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 Cambodians	 to	 landlessness	 by	intensifying	 the	 need	 for	 written	 certification	 to	 prove	 ownership”	 (p.	 3).	 The	 law	invalidated	customary	landholdings	“rooted	in	orality”	and	“possession”	and	legitimised	the	eviction	 of	 people	 from	 lands	 they	 possessed	 but	 didn’t	 formally	 own	 under	 the	 new	property	rules	(Springer,	2013).		
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Of	course,	not	all	interventions	aimed	at	creating,	expanding	or	strengthening	modern	private	property	were/are	designed	to	dispossess	the	established	landholders	and	they	do	not	always	entail	massive	and	 forcible	changes	 to	established	tenure	on	the	ground.	For	example,	in	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	century	Colombia,	the	rules	governing	the	titling	of	State	 lands	 were	 meant	 to	 favour	 peasant	 settlers	 and	 the	 formalisation	 of	 existing	smallholdings,	 and	 theoretically	 did	 not	 imply	 destroying	 prevailing	 ‘land-based	 social	relations’.	In	practice,	however,	the	privatisation	process	disproportionately	favoured	elite	groups	and	many	smallholders	were	dispossessed	(see	chapters	3	and	4).	So,	even	well-meaning	programs	and	policies	have	incentivised	and	facilitated	land	grabs.	This	point	is	compatible	with	the	overall	claim	put	forward	in	this	section	but	might	also	 be	 expressed	 more	 specifically:	 titling	 and	 formalisation	 programs,	 and	 land	
privatisation	processes	more	broadly,	are	often	a	mechanism	of	dispossession	(claim	2.1a).	This	 claim	 is	 supported	by	 empirical	 evidence	 from	across	 the	world	 (Borras	&	Franco,	2010;	Grandia,	2013;	Oliveira,	2013;	Springer,	2013)	and	can	be	found	not	only	in	critical	scholarship,	but	also	in	mainstream	policy-oriented	research.	For	example,	the	2011	World	Bank	publication	cited	earlier	notes:	“If	done	poorly	formalization	of	land	rights	can	indeed	provide	an	opportunity	for	sophisticated	and	well-connected	elites	to	grab	land”	(Deininger	et	al.,	2011,	p.	100;	see	also	Deininger,	2003;	FAO,	2012).	The	problem,	again,	is	that	despite	paying	 lip	 service	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 power	 relations	 and	 politics,	 the	 institutions	promoting	such	programs	often	treat	the	risk	of	dispossession	as	a	technical	problem	(for	a	full	discussion	see	Borras	&	Franco,	2010).	The	 above	 is	 different	 from	 another	 claim	 (2.1b)	 commonly	 found	 in	 critical	scholarship:	titling,	formalisation	and	registration	programs	enable	market-led	dispossession	(Akram-Lodhi,	 2007;	Akram-Lodhi	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 La	Via	 Campesina	&	FIAN,	 2004).	 These	programs	are	often	 implemented	alongside	broader	neoliberal	restructuring	and	for	this	reason,	according	to	La	Via	Campesina	and	FIAN	(2004),	generally	“have	increased	[rural	peoples’]	vulnerability	to	losing	land”	(pp.	5-6).	This	is	“why	movements	like	the	MST	[the	Landless	Worker’s	Movement	of	Brazil]	[…]	argue	that	titling	land	re-creates	the	dynamic	of	commodification	that	allowed	(necessitated)	theft	in	the	first	place:	the	poor	gain	title	in	
order	to	lose	it”	(Wolford,	2007,	p.	559,	emphasis	added).	Policymakers	working	with	the	World	Bank	(one	of	the	most	important	funders	and	supporters	of	such	schemes)	are	aware	of	 this	 criticism:	 “Observers	 are	 often	 concerned	 that	 a	 better	 definition	 of	 land	 rights	necessarily	 implies	 higher	 levels	 of	 transferability,	 and	 thereby	 creates	 the	 danger	 that	households	could	lose	their	main	source	of	livelihood,	for	instance	because	of	distress	sales	
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[…	 But]	 increasing	 the	 security	 of	 property	 rights	 does	 not	 require	 making	 them	transferable”	(Deininger,	2003,	p.	76).	Nevertheless,	the	same	document	is	almost	entirely	focused	 on	 the	 economic	 efficiency	 justification	 of	 property	 rights	 and	 thus	 strongly	recommends	against	restricting	transferability	(ibid).			
2.2)	 In	 some	 contexts,	 property	 rights	 can	 be	 used	 as	 tool	 for	 defending	 against	
dispossession	and	resisting	certain	aspects	of	capitalist	development.	Some	authors	take	the	overarching	claim	and	related	sub-claims	of	the	previous	section	and	turn	them	into	a	normative	argument	against	titling	and	formalisation	programs.	This	is	not	my	 position	 or	 purpose,	 for	 a	 reason	 that	 is	 well	 captured	 by	 Oliviera	 (2013):	 “the	establishment	of	private	property	rights	over	as	yet	unassigned	public	land	is	certainly	a	mechanism	through	which	 land	grabbing	can	take	place	[…	however,	 it	 is	also]	a	way	to	legally	recognize	pre-existing	land-use	claims	of	small	farmers,	thus	protecting	them	from	land	 grabs	 by	 powerful	 national	 and	 transnational	 economic	 actors”	 (p.	 262).	 Many	
campesinos,	 Afro	 and	 indigenous	 peoples	 across	 Colombia	 have	 fought	 -and	 continue	 to	fight-	for	individual	and	collective	property	titles	over	their	land,	though	they	are	well	aware	that	this	will	not	magically	resolve	all	their	problems.	A	leader	from	the	Nasa	organisation	Kwe’sx	Ksxa’w	explained:	collective	titles	are	not	compatible	with	the	Nasa	understanding	of	territory	(“the	resguardo	creates	limits,	it	locks	us	in,	draws	lines”)	but,	given	the	context,	defending	the	territory	via	the	creation	and	expansion	of	resguardos	 is	the	only	available	option	(Personal	Interview,	2015).		It	is	worth	noting	that	in	Colombia	Afro	and	indigenous	groups	can	apply	for	collective	titles	 that	 are	 non-transferable.	 Economists	 often	 suggest	 that	 such	 collective	 property	rights	are	inadequate.	Hernan	De	Soto	actually	called	indigenous	land	titles	in	Peru	(which	are	or	were	similar	to	those	in	Colombia)	“irrelevant	pieces	of	paper”	with	“practically	no	function”25.	But	collective	land	titles	do	have	a	function,	simply	one	that	doesn’t	fit	well	with	
                                                        25	 In	 The	 Mystery	 of	 Capital	 Among	 the	 Indigenous	 People’s	 in	 the	 Amazon,	 De	 Soto	 argues	 that	indigenous	land	titles	in	Peru	are	useless	because	they	don’t	allow	these	communities	to	sell,	lease,	or	 use	 their	 lands	 as	 collateral	 for	 credit	 –	 among	 other	 things.	 He	 shows	 that	 internally	 these	communities	trade	titles	and	that	many	people	desire	access	to	credit	(etc.)	and	uses	these	details	to	argue	for	individual	property	rights.	But	De	Soto’s	short	film	speaks	loudest	with	its	silence.	It	was	made	 in	 response	 to	 the	 government’s	 call	 for	 “ideas	 on	 how	 to	 achieve	 peace	 in	 the	 Amazon”	following	the	2009	Bagua	conflict.	The	violent	clashes	arose	in	the	context	of	indigenous	resistance	to	oil	operations	in	their	territories.	What	De	Soto	doesn’t	say	is	that	individual	property	rights	do	NOT	allow	people	to	reject	oil	operations	on	their	lands	and	hence	won’t	resolve	the	issue	at	hand	(Beckett	&	Soto,	2009).	
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De	Soto’s	world	view:	they	are	a	tool	for	‘defending	the	territory’,	as	the	leader	cited	above	explained.	 Both	 indigenous	 and	 Afro	 groups	 in	 Colombia	 continue	 to	 demand	 the	 legal	recognition	 of	 their	 ‘land	 rights’	 via	 collective	 and	 inalienable	 (not	 private	 tradeable	individual)	 titles.	Many	value	 these	 titles	 first	and	 foremost	as	 tools	 for	shielding	against	dispossession	 and	 displacement	 and	 safeguarding	 or	 rebuilding	 cultures	 that	 regularly	clash	with	capitalist	development.		The	people	of	Nasa	Cxha	Cxha	(Putumayo),	for	example,	applied	for	a	collective	title	over	 the	 lands	 of	 La	 Tocaima,	 not	 so	 that	 they	 could	 mortgage	 it	 to	 the	 banks,	 collect	compensation	 from	 the	 oil	 companies,	 lease	 it	 to	 loggers,	 develop	 some	 agricultural	enterprise,	or	build	a	housing	complex;	they	did	so	to	prevent	these	things	happening	in	lands	they	consider	sacred.	This	is	a	particular	example	in	that	it	applies	to	lands	that	the	community	consider	to	be	completely	 ‘off-limits’	 for	spiritual	and	ecological	reasons.	But	the	fact	remains	that	many	Nasa	see	the	collective	title	as	a	means	of	defending	their	way	of	life	from	what	others	call	‘economic	development’.	Similarly,	in	the	Amazon	Pearl	Peasant	Reserve	Zone	(also	in	Putumayo)	a	campesino	organisation	solicited	private	titles	for	State	lands	to	prevent	a	businessman	from	accumulating	more	terrain	 for	various	commercial	projects	–	the	aim	was	to	defend	the	integrity	of	the	‘territory’	(Personal	Interviews,	2015).		Of	 course,	 property	 rights,	 even	 inalienable	 collective	 titles,	 do	 not	 provide	 full	protection	against	dispossession.	In	Colombia	people	with	formal	legal	titles	over	their	land	have	 been	 dispossessed	 by	 both	 the	 State	 and	 private	 actors.	 Still,	 it	 is	 important	 to	recognise	that,	in	certain	contexts,	such	titles	can	and	have	been	used	to	defend	against	land	grabs.	 Arguably,	 it	 is	 partially	 because	 titling	 does	 not	 automatically	 lead	 to	 land	 being	treated	as	a	mere	commodity	that	the	State’s	power	to	violate	property	rights	has	become	so	 important	 to	 capitalist	 growth.	 These	 points	 tend	 to	 be	 missed	 by	 those	 who	 focus	exclusively	on	privatisation	and	enclosures	or	dispossession	associated	with	the	imposition	of	private	property,	as	discussed	below.		
2.3)	 The	 contents,	 interpretation	 and	 application	 of	 the	 law	 are	 influenced	 by	
complex	power	dynamics	and	social	struggles,	meaning	that	the	legal	system	can	be	
used	as	an	‘instrument	of	theft’	and	to	prevent	or	reverse	dispossession.	In	 contrast	 to	 discourses	 that	 blame	dispossession	 on	 a	weak	 rule	 of	 law,	many	 critical	theorists	emphasise	how	the	law	is	used	to	effect	and	legitimise	dispossession	-	what	Liz	Alden	 Wily	 calls	 “the	 legal	 niceties	 of	 land	 theft”.	 EP	 Thompson	 famously	 described	
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parliamentary	 enclosures	 in	 England	 as	 “a	 plain	 enough	 case	 of	 class	 robbery,	 played	according	 to	 the	 fair	 rules	 of	 property	 and	 law	 laid	 down	 by	 a	 parliament	 of	 property-owners	and	lawyers”	(cited	in	Wily,	2012a,	p.	755).	This	observation	could	easily	be	adapted	to	other	times	and	places.		According	to	Wily	(2012),	in	contemporary	sub-Saharan	Africa	most	land	“transfers	are	undertaken	strictly	within	the	terms	of	domestic	property	laws	[…]	Broadly,	these	laws	are	designed	to	render	untitled	(but	traditionally	occupied	and	used)	 lands	as	unowned,	and	the	state,	by	default,	their	legal	owner”	(p.	752).	Likewise,	Springer	(2013)	shows	that	“most	dispossessions	[in	Cambodia]	actually	proceed	through	the	written	articles	of	law”	(p.	4),	noting	that	those	who	“suggest	that	what	is	happening	in	contemporary	Cambodia	is	a	result	of	the	corruption	of	the	law	[…]	fail	to	appreciate	that	law	is	both	the	will	of	the	sovereign	and	subject	to	the	interpretation	of	those	most	empowered	by	its	ordering”	(p.	15).	Levien’s	(2011;	2013)	analysis	of	eminent	domain	(ab)use	in	India	also	underscores	how	the	law	is	used	to	effect	and	legitimate	coercive	land	acquisition	(see	also	chapters	6	and	8	of	this	thesis	on	State-backed	dispossession	in	Colombia).	Fairbairn	advances	a	related	argument	based	on	her	research	in	Mozambique,	which	unlike	many	other	African	countries	has	laws	that	theoretically	pose	“an	obstacle	to	peasant	dispossession”	(p.	339).	In	order	“to	explain	how	a	country	with	one	of	the	most	progressive	Land	 Laws	 in	 Africa	 can	 also	 be	 raising	 some	 of	 the	 biggest	 concerns	 about	 peasant	dispossession”,	she	argues,	we	must	look	to	the	different	“sources	of	elite	power”	(Fairbairn,	2013,	p.	343),	which	 influence	the	 laws’	 interpretation	and	 implementation.	Similarly,	 in	this	 thesis	 I	examine	how	elites	managed	 to	evade	elements	of	Colombian	 land	 law	 that	should	have	hindered	dispossession	effected	by	private	agents	(see	chapters	6	and	7).	In	the	cases	described	by	Wily	dispossession	is	enabled	by	laws	that	give	precedence	to	State	ownership	over	customary	rights.	In	the	cases	described	by	Springer	dispossession	is	 enabled	 by	 laws	 that	 give	 precedence	 to	 formal	 private	 property	 over	 historical	possession.	 In	 the	 cases	described	by	 Levien	dispossession	 is	 enabled	by	 laws	 that	 give	precedence	 to	 the	 State’s	 taking	powers,	 including	 over	 private	 property.	 Finally,	 in	 the	cases	described	by	Fairbairn,	the	problem	isn’t	necessarily	the	law	itself,	but	the	way	it	is	interpreted	and	implemented.	This	is	noteworthy	because	it	shows	that	the	typical	solutions	to	land	grabs	(to	prevent	instances	such	as	those	described	by	Wily)	-changes	to	the	law	and/or	 land	formalisation	programs-	can	either	act	as	an	enabler	of	dispossession	(as	 in	Cambodia),	may	fail	to	prevent	it	(as	in	Mozambique),	or	are	largely	irrelevant	if	they	do	not	address	eminent	domain	legislation	(as	in	India).	
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Despite	the	proceeding	discussion,	few	would	accept	the	simplistic	proposition	that	the	law	is	merely	an	‘instrument	of	the	ruling	class’.	Changing	and	complex	power	relations,	class	 struggles	 and	 intergroup	 alliances,	 influence	 the	 content,	 interpretation	 and	application	 of	 the	 law.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 law	 may	 be	 used	 to	 impose	 or	 legitimise	dispossession	 but	 also	 to	 prevent,	 reverse	 or	 at	 least	 limit	 such	 processes.	 During	 the	colonial	‘scramble’	for	Africa,	for	example,	“certain	world-wise	local	leaders	[…]	used[d]	the	colonizers’	 own	 laws	 against	 them”	 (Wily,	 2012a,	 p.	 758).	 Fairbairn	 (2013)	 shows	 how	“pressure	 from	Mozambican	 civil	 society	 organizations	 and	 donor	 agencies”	 pushed	 the	government	 to	 adopt	 a	 “new	 interpretation	 of	 the	 problematic	 amendment”	 that	 had	prevented	many	communities	from	obtaining	“land	certificates”,	leaving	them	vulnerable	to	dispossession	(pp.	349-351).	And	Levien	(2013)	presents	the	case	of	“farmers	[in	India	who	successfully]	 challenged	 the	 acquisition	 of	 their	 land”	 in	 the	 courts	 by	 arguing	 that	 real	estate	 development	 does	 not	 comply	 with	 the	 public	 purpose	 requirement	 of	 eminent	domain	law	(p.	400).			 Furthermore,	while	States	often	act	“on	behalf	of	the	dominant	classes	of	capital”,	they	usually	also	seek	to	“maintain	a	minimum	level	of	political	legitimacy”	(Borras,	Franco,	et	al.,	2012,	p.	858).	This	means,	for	example,	that	while	certain	actors	within	the	Colombian	government	clearly	favour	the	elite	groups	that	benefitted	from	violent	land	appropriation,	they	do	not	usually	openly	endorse	the	outcome	but	find	subtle	ways	to	do	so	(see	chapters	6-7).	Meanwhile,	other	officials	denounce	 land	theft	and	pass	 legislations	to	prevent	and	reverse	it	(e.g.	temporary	land	market	freezes	and	the	restitution	program),	in	some	cases	because	they	genuinely	oppose	the	para-elite	land	grab	and	in	others	because	they	know	that	State	has	to	maintain	a	‘minimum	level	of	legitimacy’.		 As	suggested	in	the	preceding	paragraph,	States	are	not	unitary;	they	“never	operate	with	 one	 voice”.	 This	 makes	 it	 necessary	 to	 examine	 “the	 ways	 in	 which	 power	 flows	through	the	various	disaggregated	levels	and	functions	of	the	state”	(Wolford	et	al.,	2013,	p.	189	and	206).	For	example,	a	fairly	common	story	in	Colombia	is	that	a	judge	orders	the	restitution	 of	 stolen	 land	 to	 its	 original	 owner	 only	 to	 have	 local	 authorities	 hinder	implementation	of	the	legal	decision.	The	list	of	examples	could	go	on.	The	point	is	that	these	power	dynamics	and	struggles	that	influence	how	the	law	operates	are	not	just	played	out	between	governments	and	diverse	social	groups,	they	also	involve	different	State	actors.		 Of	course,	law	is	not	the	only	factor	that	shapes	dispossession.	However,	as	noted	by	Grajales	 (2013),	 “the	 profitability	 of	 land	 grabbing	 [usually]	 requires	 the	 institutional	recognition	of	property	rights”	(p.	223),	which	implies	managing	or	manipulating	the	legal	
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system.	So,	the	contents,	interpretation	and	application	of	the	law	do	matter,	but	these	are	not	merely	technical	problems	with	technical	solutions,	as	stressed	above.	And,	in	analysing	power	dynamics	and	social	 struggles	and	how	 they	affect	 the	 legal	 system	we	must	pay	attention	not	only	to	material	interests,	but	also	to	related	ideologies.		
2.4)	Productivist	ideologies	motivate	and	are	used	to	justify	coercive	dispossession.		Productivist	 ideologies	 come	 in	different	packages	 (e.g.	 in	 the	Global	 South	 they	usually	come	wrapped	in	development	language)	but	they	are	in	essence	very	similar:	productivity,	profitability	and	growth	are	assumed	to	be	inherently	good	and	are	prioritised	over	other	objectives.	The	ultimate	aim,	however,	 is	not	to	 increase	production	per	se,	but	rather	to	continually	increase	monetary	wealth	or,	in	Marxist	terms,	to	perpetually	expand	exchange	value	(monetary	value	being	exchange	value	expressed	in	the	money	form),	as	explained	below.	In	order	to	illustrate	the	links	between	productivist	ideologies	and	dispossession,	it	is	worth	looking	back	to	the	precursor	of	productivism,	improvement,	and	how	this	ties	in	with	Locke’s	theory	of	property	and	historical	land	appropriation.	The	notion	of	improvement	-“the	enhancement	of	the	land’s	productivity	for	profit”	(Wood,	 2002,	 p.	 106)-	 became	 increasingly	 popular	 in	 Britain	 during	 the	 17th	 and	 18th	centuries.	 ‘Improving’	agricultural	practices	usually	 implied	the	demolition	of	 traditional	land	use	regulations	determined	by	village	communities	and	customary	rights,	which	were	an	obstacle	to	productivity	and	profits	(Bragg,	2008;	Wood,	2002).	As	such,	“improvement	meant	 something	 more	 than	 new	 or	 better	 methods	 and	 techniques	 of	 farming.	Improvement	meant,	even	more	 fundamentally	new	forms	and	conceptions	of	property”	(Wood,	2002,	p.	107).		Locke’s	 theory	 of	 property	 is	 firmly	 anchored	 in	 the	 notion	 of	 improvement	 and,	according	 to	 Wood,	 was	 “emblematic	 of	 a	 rising	 agrarian	 capitalism”	 (p.	 110).	 Locke	believed	that	God	bestowed	the	Earth	on	all	mankind,	but	that	when	an	individual	works	the	land	it	then	becomes	his	private	property	by	‘natural	right’	(Hamilton	&	Bankes,	2010,	pp.	 47–48).	 Locke	 is	 sometimes	 credited	 with	 having	 developed	 a	 labour	 theory	 of	landownership.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 closer	 reading	 reveals	 that	 “there	 is	 no	 direct	correspondence	between	labour	and	property”	(Wood,	2002,	p.	111)	in	Locke’s	theory	for	two	reasons.	On	the	one	hand,	Locke	believed	that	man	“can	acquire	a	right	of	property	in	something	by	‘mixing’	with	it	not	his	own	labour	but	the	labour	of	someone	else	whom	he	employs”	(ibid).	Were	this	very	important	qualification	not	included,	then	only	the	private	
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property	of	 the	direct	 producer	would	be	defensible	under	Locke’s	 theory,	 barring	 elite	landownership	and	the	social	relations	that	define	capitalist	agriculture.	And,	as	noted	by	Wood,	Locke’s	ideal	man	was	not	the	direct	producer,	but	the	“great	improving	landlord”	(Wood,	 2002,	 p.	 114).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 what	 Locke’s	 theory	 really	 suggests	 is	 that	property	rights	are	justified	by	productivity	and	profits	-	“the	creation	of	exchange	value”	(ibid).	Wood	concludes:	in	“conflating	labour	with	the	production	of	profit,	Locke	becomes	perhaps	 the	 first	 to	 construct	 a	 systematic	 theory	 of	 property	 based	 on	 […]	 capitalist	principles”	(p.	113;	see	also	Springer,	2013	and	Levien,	2011).		It	 is	 important	 to	 remember,	 as	Wood	points	out,	 the	 context	 in	which	Locke	was	writing.	The	idea	of	improvement	-at	the	centre	of	Locke’s	theory	of	property-	was	central	to	 the	 political	 and	 legal	 discourse	used	 to	 justify	 dispossession.	Within	England	 judges	began	to	accept	improvement	as	valid	grounds	for	the	extinction	of	customary	rights.	This	same	logic	was	extended	abroad	(Wood,	2002,	pp.	109–110;	115).	 In	fact,	Locke	directly	advocated	for	colonial	land	grabs	in	North	America	using	the	notion	of	improvement:	the	‘Indians’,	he	suggested,	did	not	legitimately	own	the	land	because	they	had	failed	to	put	it	to	profitable	use.	Similar	arguments	were	used	almost	a	century	earlier	by	Sir	John	Davies	to	justify	and	promote	the	English	land	grab	in	Ireland	(ibid,	pp.	157-160).			 Both	 Locke’s	 theory	 of	 property	 and	 the	 English	 government’s	 justification	 for	 its	colonial	land	grabs	were	based	on	the	idea	that	unused	land	could	be	claimed	by	the	person	who	occupies	it	and	makes	it	productive.	In	this	sense	neither	were	particularly	original.	The	notion	of	terra	nullius	can	be	traced	back	to	the	Roman	Law	concept	of	res	nullius:	things	that	did	not	have	an	owner	or	had	been	abandoned	by	their	original	owner	could	be	claimed	as	property	through	possession.	But,	as	argued	by	Wood	(2002),	John	Locke	and	the	English	imperial	State	“took	the	argument	a	major	step	further	by	justifying	the	seizure	of	land	that	was	indeed	occupied,	and	perhaps	even	cultivated,	on	the	grounds	that	the	occupants	had	failed	to	use	the	land	productively	and	profitably	enough”	(p.	162).	In	other	words,	neither	occupancy	nor	use	was	sufficient	grounds	for	acknowledging	property	rights,	at	least	in	the	case	of	the	peasantry	at	home	and	the	Irish	and	‘Indians’	abroad	(ibid,	p.	163).	Wily	(2012)	emphasises	the	similarities	between	legal	proceedings	surrounding	land	usurpation	from	different	regions	and	epochs,	arguing	that	three	notions	remain	essentially	unchanged:	1)	lands	that	are	not	part	of	the	capitalist	system	of	property	and	production	are	represented	as	vacant;	2)	alternative	systems	of	land	use	and	ownership	are	portrayed	as	obstacles	to	growth	and	progress;	3)	and	dispossession	is	depicted	as	serving	the	public	interest.	 Drawing	 on	Wood,	 the	 latter	 is	 redefined	 as	 the	 generation	 of	 exchange	 value.	
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Indeed,	Locke	argued	that	landowners	who	carried	out	enclosures	were	“creating	value	and	therefore	giving	something	to	the	community	rather	than	taking	it	away”.	Similarly,	English	imperialists	claimed	that	“the	colonizer,	in	expropriating	local	populations,	was	not	robbing	subject	peoples	but	adding	to	the	common	good”	(Wood,	2002,	p.	165).	It	 is	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 for	 all	 the	 emphasis	 on	 productivity	 and	 increasing	production,	 exchange	 value	 and	profits	were/are	 the	 central	 concern	within	 a	 capitalist	society.	Within	a	single	sector	the	principle	of	productivity	is	simple:	a	farm	producing	15	tons	of	avocadoes	per	hectare	per	year	on	average,	versus	one	that	only	produces	8	tons,	clearly	has	a	higher	 level	of	productivity.	But	how	can	we	determine	(e.g.)	that	a	 ‘sheep-walk’,	as	Marx	called	it,	constitutes	a	more	productive	use	of	the	land	than	an	open	field	system	 producing	 various	 food	 goods?	 In	 order	 to	 claim	 that	 pastureland	 was	 an	‘improvement’	relative	to	the	type	of	land	use	it	replaced,	we	have	to	introduce	exchange	value	(measured	in	money)	into	the	equation.	An	expansion	of	exchange	value	is	usually	associated	with	a	growth	in	production	of	goods	and	services	that	have	use	value.	But	 it	should	not	be	forgotten	that	the	latter	(use	value)	is	subordinate	to	the	former	(exchange	value)	and	in	some	cases	the	two	are	at	odds.	This	is	a	wider	characteristic	of	capitalism	but	has	 specific	 implications	 for	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 land,	 as	 illustrated	 by	Marx	 in	 his	discussion	of	declining	production	and	rising	profits	in	Ireland	in	the	19th	century	(1867,	I-25,	pp.	854-859).	The	“depopulation	of	Ireland”	due	to	famine	and	emigration	had	“thrown	much	of	 the	 land	out	of	 cultivation”.	But	despite	 “a	decrease	 in	 the	 total	product”,	Marx	explains,	“the	profits	of	the	farmers	increased”	since	“a	larger	part	of	the	total	product	was	transformed	into	a	surplus”	and	“the	monetary	value	of	this	surplus	product	increased	[…]	owing	to	the	rise	in	the	price	of	meat,	wool,	etc.”	(ibid,	p.	860).			 Drawing	 on	 political	 ecology,	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘the	 capitalist	 growth	 imperative’	(term	used	by	Magdoff	&	Foster,	2011;	Magnuson,	2013)26,	I	would	argue	that	productivist	ideology	has	shaped	our	societies	so	profoundly	that	it	now	no	longer	simply	motivates	or	guides	 but	 also	 constrains	 and	 compels	 actions.	 Capitalist	 socio-economic	 systems	 are	organised	in	a	way	that	creates	an	illusion	of	dependence	on	continual	economic	growth	for	
                                                        26	 Kallis	 points	 out	 that	 capital	 accumulation	 can	 occur	 in	 low	 or	 no	 growth	 situations	 and	 thus	concludes	that	“there	is	no	[capitalist	growth]	imperative	in	the	abstract,	but	only	in	the	concrete	sense	that	capitalism	becomes	politically	and	socially	unstable	if	it	fails	to	produce	growth”	(Kallis,	2015b).	Magdoff	and	Foster	(2011)	use	the	latter	point	to	defend	the	growth	imperative	concept:	“a	steady-state	 capitalist	 economy	 is	 only	 conceivable	 if	 separated	 from	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 social,	economic	and	power	relations	of	capitalism	itself”	(p.	56).	In	any	case,	Kallis	agrees	that	“a	transition	beyond	 growth	 will	 entail	 a	 transition	 beyond	 capitalism,	 since	 the	 essence	 of	 capitalism	 is	accumulation	and	expansion”	(Kallis,	2015a).	
	 
88	
human	wellbeing.	We	only	need	to	consider	the	typical	consequences	of	zero	or	negative	growth	 to	 conceive	 of	 this	 dependence:	 layoffs	 and	 rising	 unemployment,	 declining	household	incomes,	dwindling	government	revenues	and	associated	spending	cuts,	and	so	on	and	so	forth.	Nevertheless,	 economic	 growth	 is	 an	 indirect	 and	 inefficient	means	 for	 satisfying	human	 needs.	 Rather	 than	 implementing	 projects	 aimed	 at	 improving	 wellbeing,	 our	societies	 focus	 on	 generating	 growth	 that	 may	 or	 may	 not	 improve	 wellbeing	 in	 some	respects,	while	often	worsening	it	in	others.	Furthermore,	in	capitalist	economies	growth	is	largely	driven	by	capital	accumulation	 in	which	profits,	derived	 from	the	exploitation	of	wage	 labour,	 are	 reinvested	 in	 the	 production	 process	with	 the	 aim	 of	 extracting	more	profit;	 in	other	words,	 it	 “is	based	upon	the	production	and	reproduction	of	exploitative	capital-labour	 relations”	 and	 in	 this	 sense	 is	 uniquely	 unsuited	 to	 promoting	 human	flourishing	(Selwyn,	2014,	p.	14).	Notwithstanding	mounting	criticisms,	even	from	within	the	 establishment	 (thanks	 to	 authors	 such	 as	 Amartya	 Sen	 and	 the	 UN’s	 Human	Development	Index),	the	“growth	paradigm	[…	or]	the	proposition	that	economic	growth	is	good,	 imperative,	 essentially	 limitless,	 and	 the	 principal	 remedy	 for	 a	 litany	 of	 social	problems”	(Dale,	2012)	prevails.	Gareth	 Dale	 argues	 that	 growth	 serves	 as	 a	 “means	 of	 ideological	 mystification”.	Under	the	growth	paradigm	“the	interests	of	capital	come	to	be	identified	with	the	common	good,	 because	 the	 profitability	 of	 capital	 […]	 appears	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	satisfaction	of	all	other	 interests”	(Dale,	2012).	The	“concept	has	functioned	for	decades,	even	centuries,	as	a	metonym	of	capital	accumulation”,	he	argues	(Dale,	2012).	I	would	add	that	economic	development,	frequently	used	as	a	metonym	for	growth,	also	has	a	key	role	to	play	in	this	‘mystification’.	And	yet,	zero	or	negative	growth	genuinely	impacts	people’s	lives,	especially	those	who	depend	on	selling	their	labour	power	for	wage.	Above,	I	called	the	dependence	on	growth	illusory	because	it	is	possible	to	conceive	of	a	society	organised	differently	and	because	growth	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	human	wellbeing.	But	the	growth	imperative	is	real	in	so	far	as	governments	are	compelled	to	promote	growth	and	citizens	are	compelled	to	demand	it,	as	emphasised	by	Dale,	Magnuson	and	others.		Among	the	most	violent	acts	(physically	and	symbolically),	committed	in	the	name	of	growth	or	development,	 are	dispossession	and	displacement.	As	discussed	 in	Chapter	1,	various	countries	have	changed	their	 laws	or	reinterpreted	existing	ones	so	as	to	enable	coercive	acquisitions	for	private	investments	that	are	projected	to	generate	more	exchange	value	 than	 the	 existing	 land	 use.	 In	 some	 cases,	 this	 involved	 an	 explicit	 redefinition	 of	
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public	 purpose	 or	 interest	 to	 include	 economic	 growth	 or	 development.	 Hence,	 the	motivating	and	justifying	role	of	productivist	ideologies	is	most	obvious	in	the	case	of	State-backed	 dispossession.	 But	 even	 dispossession	 effected	 by	 private	 agents	 is	 shaped	 by	productivist	 ideologies.	 In	Colombia,	many	paramilitary	commanders	saw	 themselves	as	agents	of	economic	progress	and	used	this	 to	rationalise	their	 involvement	 in	 land	theft,	presumably	 to	 themselves	 as	 well	 as	 to	 others.	 Businessmen	 involved	 in	 violent	 land	usurpation	 also	 use	 these	 discourses	 to	 defend	 their	 actions.	 Furthermore,	 the	 land	grabbers	 received	 support	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 State	 actors,	 arguably	partially	because	 the	latter	 looked	well	 upon	 the	 land-use	 changes	being	 imposed	 via	 dispossession.	 Like	 the	former	DfiD	employee	cited	earlier,	it	seems	some	government	officials	in	Colombia	were	willing	‘to	tolerate	human	rights	abuses	in	exchange	for	development’.			 Many	dispossession	researchers	focus	on	specific	ideologies,	an	issue	I	take	up	in	the	following	section.	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	useful	to	highlight	the	commonalities	-as	well	as	the	differences-	 between	 the	 different	 doctrines	 that	 motivate	 and	 are	 used	 to	 justify	dispossession:	“improvement”	(Wood,	2002),	“modernisation	ideology”	(Gellert	&	Lynch,	2004;	 Fairbairn,	 2013;	 Oliveira,	 2013),	 “national	 developmentalist	 ideology”	 (Oliveira,	2013),	the	“ideology	of	state-led	national	development”	and	“the	neoliberal	growth	model”	(Levien,	2013).	Most	would	agree	with	Gellert	and	Lynch’s	(2004)	general	argument	that	to	explain	 “why	 displacement	 [and	 dispossession]	 happens”,	 we	 must	 look	 to	 the	 diverse	ideologies	 that	 sustain	 these	 practices	 and	 the	 power-dynamics	 of	 the	 “epistemic	communities”	that	perpetuate	them	(pp.	20-23).		 One	final	point:	productivist	ideologies	do	not	affect	everyone	equally.	More	precisely	(claim	2.4a):	because	of	unequal	power	dynamics,	dispossession	is	systematically	more	likely	
to	affect	 labouring	 classes	 (variations	of	 this	 claim	and/or	 evidence	 to	 support	 it	 can	be	found	in	e.g.	Gellert	&	Lynch,	2004,	p.	23;	O’Connor,	2005,	pp.	12–13;	Thomas,	2005,	pp.	17–18;	Carpenter	&	Ross,	2009;	Levien,	2013,	p.	403).	There	are	multiple	possible	explanations	for	 this	 class	bias.	 For	example:	 land	and	homes	 in	areas	mostly	 inhabited	by	 labouring	classes	usually	have	a	lower	‘value’,	making	compensation	for	expropriation	less	costly.	In	the	Global	South,	many	smallholders	and	slum	dwellers	don’t	have	property	titles	in	the	first	place,	making	it	even	easier	and	cheaper	for	governments	to	take	their	land.	The	list	could	go	 on.	 Here	 I	 would	 like	 to	 emphasise	 elite’s	 relative	 immunity	 to	 the	 punitive	 side	 of	productivism,	evinced	in	Colombia	by	the	persistence	of	large	properties	that	remain	un-	or	under-	 used.	 Fairbairn	 (2013)	makes	 a	 similar	 argument	 regarding	Mozambique:	 elites	control	lands	that	are	“not	productively	used	but	rather	kept	as	a	reserve	of	value	[…]	These	
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land	 parcels	 act	 as	 an	 obstacle	 to	 genuine	 agricultural	 development	 but	 are	 difficult	 to	revoke	because	of	the	political	power	of	those	who	own	them”	(p.	347).	An	analogous	point	is	also	made	by	Visser	et	al.	(2012)	in	the	context	of	Russia	(p.	924).	Of	course,	the	ways	in	which	power	dynamics	between	and	within	different	social	classes	influence	dispossession	are	varied	and	complex.	The	point	here	is	that	elites	are	less	likely	to	have	their	property	confiscated	 or	 expropriated,	 even	 when	 their	 ownership	 encumbers	 the	 generation	 of	exchange	value	and	vice	versa.	This	doesn’t	mean	governments	never	take	land	belonging	to	elites;	I	simply	wish	to	highlight	a	tendency.		
2.5)	 Specific	 trajectories	 and	 visions	 of	 economic	 development	 influence	 the	
prevalence	and	character	of	dispossession.	Of	course,	productivist	 ideologies	do	not	uniformly	generate	dispossession.	 Instead,	 it	 is	specific	trajectories	and	visions	of	economic	development,	themselves	the	subject	of	social	struggles,	 that	 influence	 the	 prevalence	 and	 character	 of	 dispossession.	 One	 broad	 but	particularly	problematic	doctrine	can	be	summed	up	as:	‘the	bigger	the	better’.	Gellert	and	Lynch	(2004)	examine	the	interests,	conditions,	constraints	and	beliefs	that	create	a	“bias	toward	larger	scale”	or	“megaprojects”,	which	are	“inherently	displacing”	(pp.	15	and	20-23;	 see	 also	 Grandia,	 2013).	 Consider,	 for	 example,	 the	 implications	 -in	 terms	 of	dispossession	and	displacement-	of	choosing	to	promote	a	giant	hydroelectric	dam	instead	of	a	decentralised	energy	 system	or	of	 fostering	 industrial	open-pit	mining	over	 labour-intensive	small-scale	methods.		The	 ‘bigger	 is	better’	penchant	 takes	on	a	specific	 form	within	agriculture.	 In	 later	chapters,	 I	 argue	 that	 dispossession	 in	 21st	 century	 Colombia	 has	 been	 significantly	influenced	 by	 the	mounting	 obsession	with	 turning	 the	 country	 into	 an	 export-oriented	agroindustrial	powerhouse	via	the	promotion	of	large-scale	projects.	I	also	show	how	the	government’s	 rural	 development	model	 has	 incentivised,	 facilitated	 and	 been	 served	 by	dispossession.	But	this	was	not	always	the	case:	arguably,	the	political	will	to	address	elite-led	dispossession	was	strongest	in	the	early	20th	century	when	smallholder	agriculture	was	supporting	industrialisation;	this	resolve	weakened	as	the	government	veered	towards	a	‘landowner	path’	of	agrarian	development	around	the	1940s.	In	short,	the	specific	trajectory	and	vision	of	economic	development	 in	Colombia	has	 influenced	 the	allocation	of	public	resources,	 the	 behaviour	 of	 government	 officials,	 and	 the	 content,	 interpretation	 and	application	of	the	law	in	ways	that	have	enabled	dispossession	effected	by	private	actors.	
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Similar	arguments	can	be	found	in	research	on	other	countries.	For	example,	Visser	et	al.	(2012)	indicate	that	it	is	difficult	to	tackle	fraudulent	land	dispossession	in	Russia	in	part	because	many	“local	authorities	are	strongly	in	favour	of	large-scale	land	acquisitions”	(p.	 923).	 And	 Fairbairn	 (2013)	 looks	 to	 “control	 over	 the	 development	 agenda”	 as	 one	among	five	“sources	of	elite	power”	that	“explains	how	it	is	that	communities’	legal	right	[…]	is	not	the	primary	determining	factor	in	deciding	who	gets	Mozambican	land”	(pp.	342-343	and	349,	 emphasis	 in	 original).	 Those	who	 control	 this	 agenda	 view	 “industrial,	 export-oriented	agriculture	catalysed	by	foreign	direct	investment	as	the	best	route	to	Mozambican	agricultural	development”	(p.	350).	This	development	vision,	she	suggests,	has	motivated	subtle	changes	to	the	land	laws	in	Mozambique	that	indirectly	facilitate	dispossession.		Conversely,	a	vision	of	development	based	on	small-scale	agriculture	may	push	the	government	“to	defend	the	rights	of	smallholders	against	dispossession”	(Fairbairn,	2013,	p.	 351)	 or	 even	 to	 implement	 redistributive	 land	 reform.	 The	 latter	 is	 one	 of	 very	 few	examples	where	(a	specific	type	of)	productivist	ideology,	even	within	a	capitalist	context,	may	impel	socially	progressive	rather	than	regressive	coercive	redistribution.	As	explained	in	Chapter	5,	 this	was	part	 of	 the	 structuralist	 school’s	proposal	 for	 import	 substitution	industrialisation	(ISI)	and	there	was	some	support	for	this	idea	among	policymakers	and	politicians	in	early	20th	century	Colombia,	but	genuine	reform	was	ultimately	blocked	by	the	landowning	elite.		Beyond	 diverging	 visions	 of	 agricultural	 development,	 various	 Latin	 American	scholars	suggest	more	broadly	that	a	growing	dependence	on	primary	commodity	exports	(e.g.	oil,	coal,	precious	metals,	unprocessed	food	goods,	etc.)	and	the	rapid	expansion	of	new	infrastructure	to	support	this	extractive	economy	is	the	underlying	driving	force	of	massive	waves	of	dispossession	and	displacement	across	the	continent	in	recent	decades.	Maristella	Svampa,	 for	 example,	 argues	 that	 Latin	 America	 has	 been	 undergoing	 a	 “process	 of	 re-primarisation”	and	that	this	economic	model,	“based	on	an	over-exploitation	of	largely	non-renewable	 natural	 resources	 [...	 requires]	 a	 concentration	 of	 landownership	 and	 a	destructive	re-configuration	of	vast	territories”,	which	has	created	a	renewed	“dynamic	of	dispossession”	(Svampa,	2013,	p.	119	and	131).	It	is	evident	that	the	extractive	development	model	has	significantly	shaped	the	scope,	scale	and	character	of	dispossession.	As	 I	 argue	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 the	 growing	 economic	 dependence	 on	 mining	 and	 oil	extraction	 in	 Colombia	 necessitated	 a	 particular	 “regime	 of	 dispossession”	 (concept	borrowed	 from	 Levien),	which	 tenuously	 rests	 on	 the	 insistence	 -of	mainstream	media,	businesses	and	government	 functionaries-	 that	Colombia	cannot	 ‘develop’	without	 these	
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industries.	I	suggest	that	this	model	is	perpetuated	by	real	pressures	and	constraints	given	that	these	sectors	now	account	for	a	majority	of	foreign	exchange	earnings	in	a	context	of	rising	reliance	on	food	and	industrial	imports	following	trade	liberalisation.	In	addition,	the	State	 has	 become	 dependent	 on	 income	 from	 extractive	 rents	 and	may	 face	 very	 costly	lawsuits	-backed	by	international	treaties-	if	it	backs	down	from	this	economic	model.	Levien’s	 work	 (2013)	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 this	 subsection,	 given	 its	 unique	emphasis	 on	 “socially	 and	 historically	 specific	 political	 and	 ideological	 factors”	 and	 the	resulting	“variations	in	dispossession	across	space	and	time”	(p.	383).	This	is	the	basis	of	his	 “regimes	 of	 dispossession”	 concept,	 referred	 to	 above.	 Levien	 (2013)	 compares	dispossession	 in	 India	 during	 “the	 developmentalist	 and	 neoliberal	 periods”,	 focusing	specifically	on	“steel	towns”	and	“Special	Economic	Zones”	respectively	(pp.	381-382).	The	former	 were	 coordinated	 by	 the	 State	 as	 part	 of	 a	 national	 industrialisation	 plan,	 and	generated	large	amounts	of	employment.	Resistance	to	dispossession	for	these	steel	towns	was	weakened	because	such	projects	enjoyed	“significant	legitimacy	among	a	broad	Indian	public”	 (pp.	 384-387).	 The	 latter,	 in	 contrast,	 are	 private	 projects	 in	 which	 real	 estate	companies	 profit	 from	 developing	 and	 reselling	 land	 (acquired	 by	 force)	 for	 high-end	housing,	offices	used	by	IT	and	other	service	sector	firms	and	to	a	lesser	extent	for	use	by	export-oriented	manufacturing	ventures,	among	other	things.	The	use	of	the	State’s	taking	powers	 for	 these	 Special	 Economic	 Zones	 is	 widely	 contested,	 including	 by	 some	government	officials,	and	related	resistance	has	had	considerable	successes	(Levien,	2013,	pp.	394–400).	This	 is,	 then,	a	clear	 illustration	of	how	specific	trajectories	and	visions	of	economic	development	 influence	 the	character	of	dispossession	(though	perhaps,	 in	 this	case,	not	the	prevalence)	and	associated	struggles.		
2.6)	Land	dispossession	is	integral	to	the	development	of	capitalism	and	subsequent	
capitalist	development.	Many	critical	scholars	analyse	land	dispossession	as	a	variable	attribute	of	capitalism	(see	e.g.	Borras	&	Franco,	2012;	Borras,	Kay,	et	al.,	2012;	Edelman	et	al.,	2013;	Levien,	2013;	Oliveira,	2013;	Springer,	2013;	White	et	al.,	2012).	Still,	there	is	no	clear	agreement	as	to	the	nature	of	this	relation27.	Coercive	land	appropriation	is	an	age-old	phenomenon	and	even	
                                                        27	The	word	‘integral’	(used	in	the	subsection	title),	defined	as	“necessary	and	important	as	a	part	of	a	whole”	or	 “contained	within	 something;	 not	 separate”	 (‘integral’,	 2019),	 points	 to	 this	 relation	without	affirming	a	law	of	causality	in	either	direction.	
	 
93	
in	contemporary	settings	is	not	always	tied	to	the	dynamics	of	capitalism	(see	e.g.	Hall,	2013,	p.	 1592).	What,	 then,	makes	 dispossession	 specifically	 capitalist?	 The	 previous	 sections	already	suggest	part	of	the	answer,	but	this	issue	requires	direct	consideration,	especially	given	the	discrepancies	it	has	generated.	Analyses	that	draw	on	Marx’s	account	of	primitive	accumulation	highlight	the	role	of	land	grabs	in	“the	creation,	expansion	and	reproduction	of	capitalist	social	relations”	(Hall,	2013,	p.	1594).	The	problem,	as	noted	by	Hall	(2013),	is	that	there	is	“substantial	variation	and	ambiguity”	concerning	what	“capitalist	social	relations	are”	(p.	1585).	Nevertheless,	in	general,	 “such	 accounts	 focus	 […	 on]	 the	 enclosure	 of	 common	 land	 […]	 the	 creation	 of	private	 property	 rights	 to	 the	 land	 […]	 and	 on	 the	 (eventual)	 proletarianisation	 of	 the	dispossessed”.	 The	 overall	 idea	 being	 that	 “new	 people	 and	 resources	 are	 still	 being	incorporated	 into	 capitalist	 social	 relations”	 and	 that	 “those	 social	 relations	 need	 to	 be	reproduced”	(Hall,	2013,	p.	1585).		The	discussion	 in	 this	 subsection	mostly	 focuses	on	 the	underlying	 causes	of	 land	dispossession	within	a	capitalist	context,	but	first,	let	us	consider	the	question	of	outcomes.	Clearly,	 the	 outcomes	 of	 dispossession	 are	 innumerable,	 varied	 and	 context-specific:	ranging	from	direct	impacts	such	as	the	probable	impoverishment	of	the	dispossessed	and	possibly	 violent	 conflict	 if	 they	 resist,	 to	 consequences	 arising	 from	 the	 new	 land	 use	imposed	via	dispossession,	such	as	environmental	problems	and	landscape	change	or	the	enrichment	of	the	beneficiaries	and	perhaps	a	localised	or	even	national	economic	boom	–	to	name	just	a	few.	For	present	purposes,	I	focus	on	the	broad	outcomes	highlighted	by	Hall	(2013):	people,	land,	and	related	resources	are	incorporated	into	capitalist	social	relations.	The	problem	with	this	framing,	as	noted	by	Hall,	is	that	it	suggests	the	affected	people,	land,	and	resources	“were	previously	and	straightforwardly	‘outside’	capitalism”	(p.	1596).	I	would	argue	more	broadly	that	an	overemphasis	on	proletarianisation	as	the	key	outcome	of	land	grabbing	implicitly	suggests	that	the	dispossession	of	‘proletarianised’	or	‘semi-proletarianised’	households,	or	smallholders	engaged	in	production	for	markets	who	may	 themselves	 hire	 wage	 labourers,	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 critical	 scholars	 interested	 in	 the	relationship	between	coercive	land	acquisitions	and	capitalism.	The	forcible	conversion	of	self-sufficient	producers	into	dependent	wage	labourers	-or	one	of	the	many	unemployed	that	make	up	‘the	reserve	army	of	labour’-	is	ongoing	in	many	parts	of	the	world	and	this	is	an	important	issue,	but	there	is	no	reason	to	limit	our	analyses	of	land	dispossession	to	this	process	 and	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 way	 in	 which	 dispossession	 ‘contributes’	 to	 capitalist	development	 -	 nor	 is	 it	 necessarily	 the	 most	 important	 ‘contribution’,	 especially	 in	 the	
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contemporary	context.	Furthermore,	not	all	dispossession	turns	 the	original	 landholders	into	 proletarians	 or	 unemployed	wage-labourers	 in	 waiting;	 the	 dispossessed	might	 be	squeezed	onto	a	smaller	area,	seek	new	land	elsewhere	or	be	relocated	to	another	plot.	Moving	on,	the	claim	that	dispossession	results	in	land	and	related	resources	being	incorporated	into	capitalist	social	relations	could	mean	various	things.	For	example,	land	previously	 used	 for	 subsistence	 is	 now	 exploited	 by	 capitalist	 firms	 that	 employ	 -and	simultaneously	 exploit-	wage	 labourers.	 Again,	 this	 is	happening	 in	 Colombia	 and	 other	parts	of	the	world.	But	I	think	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	limit	analyses	of	the	dispossession-capitalism	nexus	to	this	outcome,	for	reasons	similar	to	those	mentioned	in	the	preceding	paragraph	(e.g.	is	the	dispossession	of	commercially-oriented	smallholders	not	relevant?).	Furthermore,	 many	 authors	 associate	 this	 outcome	 with	 land	 being	 ‘privatised’	 or	‘enclosed’;	however,	the	two	don’t	necessarily	go	together.	Earlier,	 I	 referred	 to	 the	 subordination	 of	 land	 use	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 capital	accumulation	as	one	of	the	key	outcomes	of	primitive	accumulation,	as	described	by	Marx.	Note:	 this	 is	 different	 to	 land	 being	 exploited	 via	 prototypical	 capitalist	 relations	 of	production;	 for	 example,	 the	 demands	 of	 capital	 accumulation	might	well	 be	 served	 by	commercialised	 family	 farming.	 The	 problem	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 here	 is	 that	 it	 is	 often	assumed	or	implied	that	once	land	has	been	brought	under	a	modern	property	regime,	‘the	job	is	done’,	so	to	speak.	While	it	is	true	that	historically	the	imposition	of	modern	property	rights	has	tended	to	mobilise	land	for	capitalist	development,	it	is	also	true	that	land	can	be	made	to	serve	to	the	demands	of	capital	accumulation	without	being	fully	privatised	and	vice-versa:	lands	already	privatised	might	not	be	used	‘productively	or	profitably	enough’	relative	to	these	demands.	Hence,	it	is	insufficient	to	focus	on	privatisation	and	enclosure	as	the	 key	 ‘outcomes’	 of	 dispossession	 and	 in	 particular	 when	 considering	 how	 these	processes	contribute	to	capitalist	development.		 Turning	 to	 underlying	 causes,	 it	 is	 sometimes	 implied	 that	 dispossession	 occurs	because	 capitalist	 production	 requires	 wage	 labourers.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	distinguish	between	policies	and	practices	designed	to	acquire	or	control	labour,	and	actions	and	processes	that	incidentally	serve	this	end.	In	Marx’s	account	of	primitive	accumulation	in	England	and	Scotland	the	usurpers	were	interested	in	expelling	peasants	to	make	way	for	more	profitable	land	uses	such	as	‘sheep-walks’	and	‘deer-preserves’.	The	land	grabbers	were	not	primarily	 concerned	with	 creating	 a	wage	 labour	 force	 for	 emerging	 capitalist	industry;	 this	 -Marx	 implies-	 was	 an	 unintended	 and	 long-run	 consequence	 of	 actions	mostly	motivated	by	different	pursuits.		
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	 The	above	contrasts	with	Marx’s	 (1867)	depiction	of	EG	Wakefield’s	proposals	 for	“systematic	colonization”,	which	were	clearly	“aim[ed]	at	manufacturing	wage-labourers”	(I-33,	 p.	 932).	 Wakefield	 had	 observed	 the	 quandary	 of	 wealthy	 Europeans	 who	 upon	arriving	in	Australia,	the	USA	and	other	colonies	found	they	could	not	make	their	money	and	machinery	productive	due	to	the	 lack	of	a	constant	supply	of	cheap	wage	 labourers.	Many	working-class	immigrants	preferred	to	venture	into	the	vast	‘frontiers’	and	produce	for	themselves	(ibid).	Thus,	colonisers	such	as	Wakefield,	“discovered	that	capital	is	not	a	thing	but	a	social	relation	between	persons	which	is	mediated	through	things”	(ibid,	p.	932).	Wakefield	recommended	that	“the	government	set	an	artificial	price	on	the	virgin	soil	[…]	that	compels	the	immigrant	to	work	a	long	time	for	wages	before	he	can	earn	enough	money	to	 buy	 land”	 (ibid,	 p.	 938).	 In	 practice,	 it	 was	 both	 “the	 shameless	 squandering	 of	uncultivated	 colonial	 land	 on	 aristocrats	 and	 capitalists”,	 and	 continuous	 “wave[s]	 of	immigration”	that	resolved	the	labour	shortages	in	the	USA	and	Australia	(ibid,	p.	940).		 Elites	 across	 the	 globe	 encountered	 this	 land/labour	 ‘problem’	 and	 commonly	attempted	to	resolve	it	via	land	grabs	and	dispossession.	Deininger	(2003)	provides	a	list	of	the	various	methods	used	by	Europeans	to	obtain	and	control	workers	in	Asia,	Africa	and	the	Americas.	Most	relevant	 for	 the	discussion	here	was	 the	 ‘artificial	 restriction	of	 land	supply’:	colonisers	claimed	exclusive	property	rights	over	large	areas	for	the	sole	purpose	of	 preventing	 local	 populations	 from	 becoming	 independent	 producers	 (pp.	 11-15).	Interestingly,	 this	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 political	 ‘distortion’	 of	 the	 true	 function	of	 property	rights	(Deininger,	2003).	In	any	case,	the	point	is	that,	historically	at	least,	land	grabs	were	often	aimed	at	acquiring	and	controlling	workers.	Nevertheless,	I	would	also	stress	that	the	objective	 was	 not	 always	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 proletariat	 class.	 This	 thesis	 shows	 that	 in	Colombia	varied	policies	and	practices	of	dispossession	and	displacement,	from	the	colonial	times	 up	 until	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 20th	 century,	 were	 motivated	 by	 elite	 interest	 in	appropriating	 surplus	 labour	 from	 the	direct	producers,	 but	 that	 the	dispossessed	were	drawn	into	non-capitalist	relations	of	production.		 What	 of	 the	 relevance	 of	 labour	 control	 to	 explaining	 more	 recent	 processes	 of	dispossession?	More	specifically,	to	what	“extent	[…	do	contemporary]	land	grabs	aim	to	create	‘free’	proletarianised	labourers”?	(Hall,	2013,	p.	1596,	emphasis	added).	I	tentatively	propose	that	dispossession	motivated	by	labour	acquisition	tends	to	decline	as	capitalism	develops,	 while	 dispossession	 driven	 by	 interest	 in	 the	 land	 and	 its	 resources	 tends	 to	increase.	In	the	Colombian	context	at	least,	this	has	been	the	most	marked	change	in	the	dynamics	of	dispossession	since	the	mid-20th	century.	
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	 I	do	not	wish	to	deny	that	dispossession	and	displacement	generate	giant	“camps	of	surplus	 labour”	 (Araghi,	 2009,	 p.	 112),	 which	 exerts	 a	 downward	 pressure	 on	 wages.	However,	 to	 claim	 that	 this	 is	why	 land	 dispossession	 happens	 or	why	 it	 “is	 central	 to	contemporary	capitalist	accumulation”	(Hall’s	interpretation	of	Araghi,	p.	1596)	is	different	altogether	from	claiming	that	it	is	an	outcome.	Nor	do	I	wish	to	deny	that	capitalist	firms	often	 “need	both	 land	and	 labour”	 (Borras	&	Franco,	2012,	p.	53).	But,	 as	 these	authors	suggest,	in	such	cases	investors	are	more	likely	to	seek	“contractualized	relationships”	that	allow	 them	 “to	 control	 land	 while	 avoiding	 dispossessing	 smallholders”	 (ibid).	 And	 the	question	 here	 is	 whether	 labour	 control	 is	 a	 common	motivation	 for	 dispossession.	 In	contemporary	Colombia,	the	answer	is	negative.	My	proposition	seems	to	be	supported	by	other	research	focused	on	diverse	contexts.	Saskia	Sassen	observes	broadly	that	the	recent	“massive	expulsion	of	people	is	not	simply	more	of	the	same	[…]	One	brutal	way	of	putting	it	 is	to	say	that	the	natural	resources	of	much	of	Africa	and	good	parts	of	Latin	America	count	more	than	the	people	on	those	lands	count	as	consumers	and	as	workers”	(Sassen,	2010,	pp.	25–26).	Levien	(2011),	writing	on	dispossession	 in	 contemporary	 India,	 explains	 that	 this	 process	 is	 linked	 to	 a	 “capital-intensive	development	in	which	the	labour-power	of	the	dispossessed	peasantry	is	largely	irrelevant”	(p.	458).	Tania	Li,	who	is	famous	for	“centering	labor	in	the	land	grab	debate”,	does	so	precisely	to	highlight	“the	predicament	of	people	whose	labor	is	not	needed	by	the	global	capitalist	system”	(p.	281)	but	whose	 land	 is.	 In	general,	as	noted	by	Hall	 (2013),	recent	land	grab	research	“finds	few	indications	of	a	‘strategy’	to	generate	a	labour	reserve”	(p.	1596).	Perhaps	most	interesting	are	the	basic	similarities	between	these	observations	about	contemporary	land	dispossession,	and	a	comment	made	by	Ellen	Wood	regarding	the	historical	development	of	capitalism:		In	pre-capitalist	societies,	land	with	labour	attached	to	it	[…]	is	generally	more	valuable	 than	 land	 by	 itself.	 Command	 over	 people	 is	 more	 immediately	important	that	direct	command	over	land.	[…]	In	capitalism,	there	is	certainly	a	need	for	a	labour	force,	but	where	competitive	pressure	to	increase	labour-productivity	 is	 the	 driving	 imperative,	 there	 are	 entirely	 new	 reasons	 for	concentrating	 property,	 and	 entirely	 new	 reasons	 for	 dispossessing	 direct	producers	(Wood,	2002,	p.	152).		
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	 In	the	examples	from	England	and	Scotland	discussed	above,	the	expulsion	of	people	was	a	defining	feature	of	the	process.	This	is	precisely	what	was	deemed	so	remarkable	at	the	 time:	 the	British	 countryside	 became	 so	 incredibly	 productive	 that	 despite	 -or	 even	because	of-	depopulation,	it	was	able	to	supply	enough	goods	for	those	who	had	been	forced	out	 and	 many	 more,	 as	 the	 total	 population	 grew	 (Overton,	 2011;	 Wood,	 2002).	 Marx	observed	that	demand	for	labour	could	not	keep	up	with	the	supply	being	generated	by	the	forced	displacements	(1867,	I-28);	in	the	contemporary	context,	capitalist	industries	are	-arguably-	even	less	well	positioned	to	‘absorb’	the	labour	power	of	the	dispossessed	and	displaced.	My	point,	however,	drawing	on	Wood	(2002),	is	that,	arguably,	even	in	the	early	stages	of	capitalism,	what	made	dispossession	driven	by	capitalist	dynamics	unique	was	the	elite’s	interest	in	the	exchange-value-generating	capacity	of	the	land	itself.		 While	mainstream	discourses	tend	to	emphasise	population	growth	as	the	main	cause	of	growing	pressures	on	land	(see,	for	example:	Deininger,	2003;	Cernea,	2004;	Deininger	et	 al.,	 2011),	 critical	 scholars	 look	 to	 the	 expansionist	 tendencies	 of	 capitalism	 and/or	capitalist	accumulation	imperatives	(see	e.g.	Wily,	2012a,	p.	752;	Borras	&	Franco,	2012,	p.	49).	Focusing	on	the	contemporary	context,	Borras	et	al.	argue	that	“the	distinctive	feature	of	current	 land	grabs	is	that	they	occur	primarily	because	of	and	within	the	dynamics	of	capital	 accumulation	 strategies	 responding	 to	 the	 convergence	 of	 multiple	 crises:	 food,	energy/fuel,	climate	change	and	financial	crisis	[…	and]	the	emerging	need	for	resources	by	newer	hubs	of	global	capital”	(Borras,	Kay,	et	al.,	2012,	p.	404).		 All	of	these	specific	reasons	for	recent	interest	in	land	acquisition	are	important,	but	I	 would	 argue	 more	 broadly,	 drawing	 on	 political	 ecology,	 that	 ‘the	 capitalist	 growth	
imperative’	described	above	creates	systemic	land	pressures	in	three	main	ways.	A	growing	world	 economy	 means	 (i)	 expanding	 demand	 for	 raw	 materials	 and	 (ii)	 the	 continual	transfiguration	 of	 space	 into	 sites	 of	 transport,	 production	 and	 consumption;	 (iii)	additionally,	during	periods	of	recession,	governments	often	attempt	to	reboot	the	economy	by	investing	in	infrastructural	projects	or	promoting	urban	redevelopment	programs.		(i)	Historically	and	currently,	economic	growth	is	inextricably	tied	to	an	expanding	use	of	natural	 resources:	more	silver,	 copper	and	gold	 for	 the	circuit	boards	 in	our	new	computers;	more	oil	 for	 the	plastics	 in	 our	 throw-away	 cutlery	 and	 toothbrushes;	more	cotton	for	our	cheap	t-shirts;	more	coal	for	the	energy	plants	powering	the	factories	that	produce	these	goods;	and	so	on	and	so	forth.	Ecological	economists	and	political	ecologists	call	this	“material	throughput”	growth	(though	the	concept	applies	to	the	matter	and	energy	used	 in	 the	whole	economic	cycle,	 from	extraction	 to	disposal).	Discussions	surrounding	
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throughput	 usually	 focus	 on	 (a)	 how	 resource	 use	 can	 be	 reduced	 without	 sacrificing	economic	 growth28;	 (b)	 whether	 throughput	 and	 economic	 growth	 can	 ever	 truly	 be	‘decoupled’;	 and	 (c)	 presuming	 the	 answer	 is	 ‘no’,	 how	 a	 no-growth	 economy	 would	function;	and	(d)	whether	capitalism	is	compatible	with	zero	growth.	Despite	disagreement	on	these	specific	points,	there	is	broad	consensus	regarding	the	physical	 impossibility	of	infinite	 throughput	 growth	 and	 the	 ecological	 unsustainability	 of	 our	 existing	 practices	(Kallis,	2015b;	Magnuson,	2013;	Magdoff	&	Foster,	2011;	UNEP,	2011).	The	 reasons	 for	 including	 the	 issue	 of	 material	 throughput	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	comparatively	modest	(I	am	not	asking	questions	about	how	to	re-organise	the	economy	in	order	to	prevent	mass	extinction):	I	believe	that	in	order	to	truly	understand	what	underlies	contemporary	dispossession,	we	must	look	to	the	expanding	consumption	of	raw	materials	and	hence	the	ever-changing	demands	being	placed	on	land	use.	How	is	land	mobilised	to	serve	 economic	 growth	 or	 how	 is	 land	 use	 subordinated	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 capital	accumulation?	 In	Colombia,	as	 in	many	other	parts	of	 the	world,	 this	has	often	 involved	coercion.	Overall,	at	present	and	historically,	securing	the	natural	resources	that	keep	the	global	growth	machine	running	involves	dispossession.	(ii)	Land	not	only	accounts	for	most	resources,	it	is	also	the	space	where	we	transport,	produce	 and	 consume	 and	 also	where	we	 dump	much	 of	 our	waste29.	 Hence	 economic	growth	requires	not	just	expanding	resource	use,	but	also	(e.g.)	new	pipelines	to	carry	the	oil	that	fuels	our	cars	or	the	gas	that	heats	our	water;	additional	roads,	railway	lines,	air	and	sea	 ports	 to	 transport	 consumer	 goods,	 from	 cars	 to	 clothes;	 new	 factories	 in	which	 to	produce	 these	 cars	 and	 clothes;	 and	more	 retail	 space	 from	which	 to	 sell	 them.	 These	projects	are	just	as	essential	to	the	growth	machine	as	the	extraction	or	production	of	raw	materials.	The	question	arises	again:	how	is	the	land	for	these	projects	secured?	It	certainly	isn’t	 always	 through	 free	markets,	 as	mainstream	economists	would	have	us	 believe.	 In	
                                                        28	 A	 2011	 United	 Nations	 Environment	 Programme	 report	 suggests	 that	 “relative	 resource	decoupling	is	[already]	happening”	(UNEP,	2011,	p.	51).	An	estimated	“25%	less	material	input	was	required	in	2002	compared	to	1980	to	produce	one	unit	of	real	GDP”	(p.	48).	Nevertheless,	this	does	not	imply	an	absolute	decline	in	resource	use.	The	report	examines	three	scenarios.	Only	the	third	scenario	maintains	 the	same	 level	of	annual	global	resource	extraction	(using	 the	year	2000	as	a	baseline	 and	 the	 year	 2050	 as	 the	 endpoint),	 supposing	 that	 “metabolic	 rates	 of	 industrial	 and	developing	countries	converge	at	around	6	tons	per	capita	per	year”	(pp.	30-31).	Even	this	best-case	scenario,	which	the	authors	suggest	is	unrealistic	(it	“can	hardly	be	addressed	as	a	possible	strategic	goal”	-	p.	31),	does	not	reduce	absolute	annual	global	resource	use.	29	Clearly,	resources	may	also	be	extracted	from	water.	Furthermore,	seas,	rivers	and	the	atmosphere	are	also	spaces	of	transport	and	receive	much	of	our	‘waste’.	However,	this	thesis	focuses	on	land.	Water	and	air	are	discussed	in	so	far	as	they	link	to	land	dispossession	and	associated	displacement.		
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Colombia,	as	we	shall	 see,	pipelines	and	seaports	have	been	built	 in	 the	wake	of	violent	displacement.	 Though	 the	 forms	 these	 processes	 take	 in	 Colombia	 are	 peculiar,	 the	dispossession	itself	is	not.	For	example:	Levien’s	series	of	articles	on	dispossession	in	India	reveal	 a	 reliance	 on	 the	 State’s	 taking	 powers	 to	 secure	 land	 for	 the	 country’s	 Special	Economic	Zones.	Examples	abound	in	the	Global	North	as	well:	consider	the	recent	conflicts	surrounding	 the	 Dakota	 Access	 and	 Key	 Stone	 pipelines	 in	 the	 USA;	 construction	 is	
dependent	 on	 the	use	of	eminent	domain	powers	 to	acquire	easements	 -land	use	 rights-	against	the	will	of	many	affected	people	(Aisch	&	Lai,	2017;	O’Connell,	2018).	(iii)	So	far,	I	have	argued	that	economic	growth	is	coupled	with	increasing	resource	use	and	demand	for	space	within	which	to	produce,	transport,	and	trade	–	which	leads	to	mounting	 land	pressures	and	sometimes	dispossession	and	displacement.	My	 final	point	here	is	slightly	different:	rather	than	economic	growth	being	the	source	of	land	pressures,	governments	take	land	in	order	to	implement	projects	aimed	at	boosting	the	economy.	In	practice,	it	may	be	difficult	to	distinguish	one	from	the	other	(e.g.	a	dam	could	be	built	to	service	a	growing	economy	or	to	encourage	growth	in	a	stagnant	one),	but	the	distinction	is	relevant,	 as	 shown	 below.	 The	 most	 obvious	 example	 of	 recession-responsive	 land	pressures	 are	 urban	 renewal	 or	 redevelopment	 schemes,	 specifically	 those	 designed	 to	attract	 investors	 and	 thus	 generate	 employment	 and	 tax	 revenues.	 In	 the	 USA,	 local	authorities	frequently	justify	dispossession	and	displacement	on	the	grounds	that	the	new	land	uses	-e.g.	conference	centres,	hotels,	office	buildings,	casinos,	resorts-	will	stimulate	a	floundering	economy	(Simon,	2004;	Stevens,	2005).		The	above	is	related	to,	but	also	distinguishable	from,	the	use	of	public	spending	to	tackle	unemployment	and	kick-start	economic	growth.	This	could	involve	non-land	related	interventions	(e.g.	pumping	public	money	 into	research	or	health	care),	but	 job	creation	through	infrastructural	investment	is	perhaps	the	most	well-known	example.	According	to	Harvey,	“the	Chinese	have	kept	their	economy	growing	and	sought	to	absorb	their	labour	surpluses	(and	curb	the	threat	of	social	unrest)	by	debt-financed	investment	in	huge	mega-projects”	(Harvey,	2004,	p.	65).	And,	such	mega-projects	usually	involve	dispossession	and	displacement,	as	discussed	earlier.	This	point	overlaps	with	Harvey’s	concept	of	“spatio-temporal	fixes”.	Harvey	argues	that	 “geographical	 expansion	 and	 spatial	 reorganisation”	 help	 to	 absorb	 surplus	 labour	power	and	surplus	capital	and	hence	to	temporarily	overcome	“overaccumulation	crises”	in	which	the	economy	stalls	or	slows	down	due	to	a	dearth	of	profit-making	opportunities.	However,	my	 overall	 argument	 is	 distinct	 from	Harvey’s	 accumulation	 by	 dispossession	
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(ABD)	 thesis	 largely	 because	 I	 am	 interested	 specifically	 in	 coercive	 land	 acquisition.	Furthermore,	because	Harvey	examines	dispossession	-first	and	foremost-	as	a	temporary	solution	to	recurrent	over-accumulation	crises,	he	 tends	to	overlook	 its	role	 in	capitalist	development	more	broadly.	Points	i.	and	ii.	above	point	to	growth	(rather	than	crisis)	as	an	underlying	driver	of	land	grabs.	Harvey	recognises	that	accumulation	by	dispossession	and	accumulation	 through	 expanded	 reproduction	 are	 “dialectically	 intertwined”,	 but	 also	insists	 that	 there	 is	an	 inverse	relation	between	the	two.	 It	may	or	may	not	be	true	that	dispossession	 increases	 during	 times	 of	 crises,	 but	 scholars	 interested	 in	 the	 political	economy	of	 land	must	also	consider	the	role	of	coercive	acquisition	in	periods	of	 ‘strong	growth’,	 as	Harvey	 calls	 them.	 In	 sum,	 an	overemphasis	 on	 “dispossessory	 responses	 to	capitalist	 crises”	 (Hall,	 2013,	 p.	 1598)	 -a	 central	 theme	 in	much	of	 the	 recent	 land	 grab	literature-	can	be	misleading	(for	a	different	and	more	detailed	critique	of	the	land	grab-crisis	nexus	thesis,	see	Hall,	2013).	To	 complicate	 matters	 further,	 Harvey	 (2004)	 implies	 that	 the	 types	 of	 projects	discussed	 above	 -infrastructural	 investments	 and	 urban	 (re)development-	 are	 an	
alternative	to	accumulation	by	dispossession.	Arguably,	this	is	a	result	of	him	affixing	the	ABD	concept	to	neoliberal	imperialism.	For	example:	in	the	post-war	years	the	US			could	 even	afford	 to	open	 its	market	 to	others	 and	 thereby	 absorb	 through	internal	 spatio-temporal	 fixes,	 such	 as	 the	 interstate	 highway	 system,	sprawling	 suburbanization,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 its	 South	 and	West	 […]	Strong	 growth	 through	 expanded	 reproduction	 occurred	 throughout	 the	capitalist	world.	Accumulation	by	dispossession	was	relatively	muted	(Harvey,	2004,	p.	77).			The	 hundreds	 of	 thousands,	 perhaps	 millions,	 of	 people	 forcibly	 displaced	 by	 highway	construction	and	urban	renewal	projects	in	the	USA	during	the	1950s	and	1960s	(see	e.g.	Miller,	 2016;	Weingroff,	 2017),	might	 dispute	 the	 above	 claim.	Do	 such	 ‘internal	 spatio-temporal	 fixes’	 not	 count	 as	 accumulation	 by	 dispossession?	 Perhaps	 Harvey	 is	merely	suggesting	that	ABD	was	less	prevalent	during	the	post-war	period	or	that	these	projects	should	be	distinguished	from	those	imposed	in	foreign	territories	by	imperialist	powers,	but	 he	 often	 suggests	 that	 such	 ‘fixes’	 are	 somehow	 distinct	 from	 accumulation	 by	dispossession	(see	also	pp.	80-82).		
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***		 So	why	 is	 land	 acquired	 via	 coercive	dispossession	 rather	 than	 voluntary	market-exchange?30	The	first	answer	to	this	question	is	very	simple:	it	is	usually	cheaper	to	acquire	land	 through	extra-economic	coercion	 than	via	consensual	 transfers,	and	 it	makes	sense	that	 profit-oriented	 investors	 and	 businesses	 would	 do	 so	 if	 conditions	 are	 favourable.	However,	this	answer	is	unsatisfactory	on	multiple	levels.	To	properly	respond	to	the	above	question,	 we	 must	 examine	 the	 specific	 historical,	 social,	 economic,	 political	 and	 legal	factors	 that	 encourage	 and	 enable	 dispossession,	 whether	 effected	 by	 private	 actors	 or	explicitly	backed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers.	This	is	the	task	taken	up	in	chapters	6-8	of	this	thesis	regarding	Colombia.		 We	might	also	reformulate	the	question:	why	is	the	State	unable	or	unwilling	to	halt	dispossession	effected	by	private	agents	or	why	does	it	use	its	own	powers	to	impose	such	dispossession?	Productivist	ideology	and	the	growth	imperative	are	part	of	the	answer,	but	it	is	also	vital	to	look	at	more	context-specific	factors	such	as	the	power	dynamics	and	social	struggles	that	influence	the	specific	trajectory	of	economic	development	and	the	content,	interpretation	and	application	of	the	law	-	as	discussed	in	the	preceding	sections.			 Implied	above	is	that	investors	and	companies	could	have	or	would	have	acquired	the	land	through	voluntary	agreement	were	the	conditions	for	dispossession	not	 favourable,	but	this	is	not	necessarily	the	case.	As	noted	earlier,	some	projects	simply	would	not	proceed	if	 the	 investor	 were	 required	 to	 procure	 land	 through	 voluntary	 negotiations	 (see	 also	Levien,	2011,	p.	463).	Investors	-whose	main	concern	is	typically	profit	margins-	may	be	unwilling	to	pay	enough	to	actually	 induce	people	to	sell/rent	their	 land	voluntarily.	Put	simply:	market	 land	prices	can	inhibit	or	 limit	 investment31.	Hence,	 the	(adapted)	World	Bank	claim	that	coercive	acquisition	may	be	required	when	the	investor	cannot	procure	the	
land	at	a	‘reasonable	cost’	(claim	1.7a),	that	is	relative	to	profit	margins.	
                                                        30	Among	the	sources	consulted	for	this	thesis,	Levien’s	(2011)	article	is	the	only	example	of	critical	research	that	tackles	this	question	head	on.	31	Consider	that	in	some	areas	of	Colombia	and	at	certain	moments	in	time,	speculative	accumulation	pushed	the	cost	of	land	above	its	‘productive	value’.	In	other	words:	“there	is	[or	was]	no	legal	activity	that	could	generate	the	new	levels	of	rent	necessary	to	cover	the	cost	of	the	land”	(Benítez	Vargas,	2005	cited	in	Thomson,	2011,	p.	345).	This	is	one	reason	agribusinesses	and	other	investors	prefer	to	purchase	in	conflict	zones	where	land	costs	are	lower.	At	present	in	Colombia	the	government	is	not	explicitly	authorised	to	use	its	taking	powers	for	agricultural	projects,	but	even	if	it	were,	it	is	unlikely	it	would	use	these	against	elite	groups	with	high-value	lands,	as	explained	earlier.	
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	 Another	 question	 arising	 from	 the	 World	 Bank	 justification	 of	 dispossession	 is	whether	the	investor	could	acquire	land	at	a	reasonable	cost	and	 in	the	 ‘appropriate	site’	through	 voluntary	 transactions.	 Investors’	 choice	 of	 location	 is	 not	 always	 so	 flexible.	Mining	and	oil	 companies,	 for	example,	 require	 land	 in	very	specific	 locations.	The	same	thing	 could	 be	 said	 about	 companies	 constructing	 ports	 and	 hydroelectric	 dams.	 Even	projects	 that	 appear	 to	 be	 relatively	 location-flexible	 face	 constraints:	 mechanised	agriculture	 requires	 flatlands	 (not	 mountainous	 slopes)	 and	 the	 right	 agro-ecological	conditions;	hotels	are	more	likely	to	be	profitable	if	they	are	located	on	beachfronts	or	near	tourist	attractions;	factories	need	to	be	well	connected	for	transport;	and	so	on.	And	land	in	these	specific	locations	is	not	always	readily	available	for	purchase	or	may	be	inhabited	by	people	who	are	simply	unwilling	to	sell,	in	some	cases,	regardless	of	the	offer.				 The	third	point	relates	to	the	question	of	land	assembly,	brought	up	by	the	Law	and	Economics	 scholars.	 Whatever	 the	 deficiencies	 of	 their	 overall	 theory,	 it	 is	 empirically	correct	 that	 projects	 requiring	 large	 and	 contiguous	 areas	 of	 land	 face	 difficulties	 in	acquiring	 it	via	market	 transfers.	The	open-pit	gold	mine	 in	Marmato	(mentioned	 in	 the	introduction),	for	example,	would	have	required	the	relocation	of	thousands	of	people;	what	are	 the	 odds	 that	 the	 company	 could	 successfully	 get	 all	 of	 them	 to	 sell	 their	 homes,	businesses	and	farms	voluntarily	and	at	a	‘reasonable	cost’	relative	to	profit	margins?	This	issue	is	also	brought	up	by	Levien	(2011),	who	notes	that	“[p]urchasing	large	tracts	of	land	for	large	development	projects	is	exceedingly	difficult	in	India	today:	the	vast	majority	of	available	land	is	in	the	hands	of	a	large	number	of	small	peasant	farmers,	who	often	do	not	want	to	relinquish	it”	(p.	462).			 Economists	assume	this	is	due	to	strategic	holdouts	acting	as	rational	self-interested	money	seekers,	who	exploit	a	‘monopoly’	power.	But	people	may	be	“unwilling	to	sell	for	many	reasons	[…	in	the	case	of	smallholders,	for	example,	a]	bleak	assessment	of	their	non-farm	 employment	 options”	 (Levien,	 2011,	 p.	 462)	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 an	 influence.	Furthermore,	many	people	value	 their	 territories,	 farms,	 family	businesses	or	homes	 for	non-monetary	 reasons;	 they	 do	 not	 treat	 their	 land	 or	 the	 buildings	 upon	 it	 as	 any	 old	‘commodity’	to	be	sold	to	the	highest	bidder.	Finally,	for	some	projects	to	be	profitable	and	hence	 implemented,	 a	 group	 of	 people	 must	 be	 made	 worse	 off;	 so-called	 ‘inefficient	transactions’	 are	 often	 necessary	 for	 so-called	 ‘efficient	 land	 use’,	 which	 based	 on	productivist	ideology	is	that	which	generates	the	most	exchange	value.	
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	 Levien32	 concludes	 that	 extra-economic	 coercion	 is	 required	 to	 mobilise	 land	 for	capital	accumulation	where	“land	markets	are	not	fully	capitalist;	while	most	of	the	land	in	rural	India	is	held	as	private	property,	it	is	not	treated	by	farmers	as	a	‘pure	financial	asset’	[…]	 consequently	 capitalists	 look	 to	 the	 state	 to	 forcibly	 make	 land	 available	 for	commodification	 through	 eminent	 domain”	 (p.	 462-463,	 emphasis	 in	 original).	 While	 I	broadly	 agree	 that	 “smallholding	 peasants”	 may	 represent	 a	 particular	 “barrier	 to	accumulation”	(ibid,	p.	457),	or	that	certain	locations	may	have	relatively	more	landholders	unwilling	to	sell;	I	don’t	know	of	a	place	where	all	land	is	held	as	a	‘pure	financial	asset’	-	based	 on	 this	 criterion,	 arguably	NO	 land	market	 is	 fully	 capitalist.	 The	 stories	 relating	resistance	to	eminent	domain	(ab)use	in	the	USA,	for	example,	show	that	a	wide	variety	of	people,	from	Native	Americans	to	Republican	ranchers,	treat	their	land/homes	as	more	than	a	‘financial	asset’33.	I	argue	instead	that	‘barriers	to	accumulation’	are	inherent	to	capitalist	land	markets	themselves.	It	 is	 not	 just	 supposedly	 ‘irrational’	 indigenous	 people	 or	 Afro-Colombians	 who	explicitly	reject	productivist	ideology	that	stand	in	the	way	of	so-called	‘efficient	land	use’.	The	capitalist	land	regime	is	laden	with	internal	contradictions.	Landowners	are	not	legally	bound	to	maximise	exchange	value.	This	would	be	 inimical	 to	market	principles	and	the	definition	of	private	property	itself.	The	right	to	choose	how	to	use	one’s	property	and	to	approve/deny	 transfers	 of	 ownership	 are	 typically	 deemed	 essential	 and	 defining	characteristics	of	private	property,	but	this	means	landowners	are	legally	free	to	use	their	land	‘inefficiently’	and	to	reject	sales	that	would	boost	exchange	value.	One	 of	 the	 central	 contradictions	 of	 the	 capitalist	 land	 regime	 is	 that	 the	 most	profitable	choice	from	the	perspective	of	the	landowner	is	not	always	the	most	productive	choice	in	terms	of	exchange	value	generation.	In	section	1.6,	I	gave	an	example	from	a	World	Bank	publication	in	which	the	smallholders	would	choose	the	option	with	the	lowest	yields.	Another	example	is	provided	in	Marx’s	discussion	of	primitive	accumulation.	Many	Scottish	landowners	replaced	crops	and	sheep	pastures	with	game	reserves	because	of	the	high	rent	payments	on	offer.	An	1866	article	published	 in	 the	Economist	bemoaned	 that	 the	game	reserves	of	Ben	Audler	“would	pasture	15,000	sheep”	and	instead	lay	“totally	unproductive”	
                                                        32	Levien	(2011)	 introduces	a	 fourth	 issue	not	considered	 in	the	main	text	above.	 In	areas	where	property	 rights	 are	not	 clearly	defined	 (e.g.)	because	 registers	 are	out-of-date	or	 imprecise,	 land	purchases	may	be	put	on	hold	by	costly	and	time-consuming	 litigation.	 In	 India,	eminent	domain	powers	provide	a	quick	and	cheap	way	around	this	problem	(pp.	462-463).	33	See,	for	example,	the	series	“Driving	the	US	pipeline	route”	on	the	Guardian	website.	
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(cited	in	Marx,	1867,	I-27,	p.	895).	The	point	here	is	that	‘market	forces’	determined	that	the	most	 ‘efficient’	use	of	 the	Scottish	Highlands	was	 for	 the	 leisure	of	 the	upper	classes.	As	explained	above,	the	Scottish	lairds	and	ladies	were	able	to	use	the	land	in	this	way	precisely	because	of	changes	to	social	property	relations,	in	which	they	claimed	exclusive	ownership	over	their	clan’s	land	and	the	right	to	lease	this	land	to	the	highest	bidder.	So,	these	‘deer	parks’	were	 just	as	much	the	outcome	of	the	relatively	new	capitalist	 land	regime	as	the	exceptionally	productive	tenant	farming	that	gave	way	to	the	agricultural	revolution.	In	the	above	example,	the	most	profitable	choice	for	the	landowner	does	not	lead	to	the	 most	 ‘efficient’	 outcome.	 In	 other	 cases,	 property	 rights	 may	 encumber	 economic	growth	because	the	landowner	does	not	necessarily	act	as	a	profit-maximising	agent.	The	majority	of	agricultural	land	in	Colombia	is	not	used	for	cultivation,	but	rather	for	extensive	cattle	 grazing	 (see	Chapter	7).	The	 reasons	 for	 this	 are	 complex	 and	must	be	 located	 in	historical	processes.	Two	points	deserve	consideration	here.	First,	multiple	observers	deem	the	use	of	vast	areas	for	extensive	cattle	grazing	as	‘inefficient’	because	some	of	this	land	is	suitable	for	cultivation	(UPRA,	2014;	Sandoval	Duarte,	2014;	Vergara,	2010).	Second,	cattle	ranching	 is	often	not	 the	most	profitable	 land	use34.	Some	proprietors	use	 their	 land	 for	cattle	grazing	rather	than	crop	production	due	to	impediments.	However,	many	cattle	farms	are	 located	 near	markets	 and	 roads,	 have	 fertile	 soils,	 and	 belong	 to	 wealthy	 absentee	landowners	 who	 could	 access	 credit	 if	 they	 wished.	 Why	 don’t	 they	 shift	 to	 a	 more	profitable/productive	 land	use?	Cattle	 grazing	 is,	 according	 to	my	 informants,	 the	 ‘easy’	option:	 it	 is	 low	 risk	 and	 low	 cost	 (Personal	 Interviews,	 2018).	 This	makes	 it	 the	 ideal	complementary	activity	 in	 cases	where	absentee	 landowners	value	 their	properties	 first	and	 foremost	 as	 a	 means	 of	 storing	 and	 accumulating	 wealth	 (on	 a	 similar	 issue	 in	Guatemala	see	Grandia,	2013,	pp.	247-248).			The	World	Bank’s	2003	 land	policy	 report	 treats	 speculative	 land	acquisition	and	hoarding	as	a	market	‘imperfection’	or	‘distortion’,	especially	prevalent	“in	situations	where	financial	markets	do	not	work	well	or	where	confidence	in	money	as	a	repository	of	value	is	low”	(Deininger,	2003,	p.	94);	but	arguably	it	is	a	systemic	problem	(not	an	aberration)	and	 one	 that	 has	 become	 particularly	 pervasive	 across	 the	 world	 in	 the	 context	 of	
                                                        34	A	group	of	agronomists	estimated	that	keeping	roughly	4-5	cows	per	hectare	in	Caldas	–which	is	much	higher	than	the	national	average	‘stocking	density’	of	just	0.6	head/ha	(Vergara,	2010,	p.	46)–	could	bring	up	to	$200,000	pesos	in	profits	per	hectare	per	month.	In	contrast,	mid-range	estimates	of	profits	from	(e.g.)	plantain	($500,000	per	ha	per	month),	orange	($500,000	to	$700,000	per	ha	per	month)	 and	 avocado	 ($1	million	 COP	per	 ha	 per	month)	 cultivations	 are	much	 higher	 (Personal	Interviews,	2018).		
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financialisation.	 It	 is	 our	 property	 system	 that	 enables	 such	 practices.	 Governments	generally	have	three	tools	for	tackling	the	issue:	taxation,	expropriation	and	confiscation	via	forfeiture	law.	However,	elite	groups	are	arguably	most	likely	to	treat	land/property	like	a	‘financial	asset’	and	least	likely	to	be	expropriated,	have	their	assets	confiscated,	or	to	be	affected	by	tax	hikes.	This	means	that	land	pressures	tend	to	be	transferred	to	smallholders	and	lower	income	homeowners.		 Hence,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 land	 dispossession	 and	 associated	 displacement	 are	integral	to	capitalist	development.	Capitalism	compels	accumulation	and	growth,	which	in	turn	 demand	 that	 land	 use	 be	made	 to	 serve	 these	 imperatives.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	requires	that	land	be	treated	as	a	commodity	to	be	sold	and	purchased	on	the	market.	And	the	 imposition	of	modern	property	rules	and	 land	markets	often	comprises	processes	of	dispossession	 and	 displacement.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 once	 established,	 capitalist	 land	markets	don’t	always	provide	enough	land	and	resources,	in	the	right	places,	at	the	right	price	–	relative,	that	is,	to	the	demands	of	capital	accumulation	and	growth.	For	that	reason,	even	once	private	property	and	free	markets	in	land	are	established,	extra-economic	force	(dispossession	and	forced	displacement)	continue	to	be	integral	to	capitalist	development.		My	 argument	 could	 also	 be	 expressed	 as	 follows:	 perpetuating	 growth	 based	 on	capital	 accumulation	 (capitalist	 development)	 relies	 on	 both	 the	 imposition	 and	 the	violation	of	private	property	rights	in	land,	both	of	which	are	commonly	characterised	by	dispossession.	 The	 role	 of	 property	 rights	 violations	 in	 mobilising	 land	 for	 capital	accumulation	 is	 frequently	 overlooked,	 even	 by	 critical	 scholars,	 since	 dispossession	 is	commonly	associated	with	enclosures	or	the	imposition	of	property	rights	(see	above)	and	it	is	often	assumed	that	extra-economic	force	is	used	only	to	enforce	private	property	(see	e.g.	Wood,	1995).	Some	governments	have	understood	that	private	property	in	land	can	act	as	both	a	driver	of,	and	obstacle	to,	growth	and	profits	and	have	therefore	opted	to	impose	the	system	partially	–	excluding	some	areas	from	privatisation.	State-owned	lands	allow	governments	and	companies	to	initiate	large-scale	projects,	which	in	other	contexts	would	have	required	the	 violation	 of	 established	 property	 rights,	which	 usually	 implies	 higher	 compensation	costs	 and	 lengthier	 legal	 processes.	 These	 types	 of	 land-grabs	 (involving	 neither	 the	expansion	of	private	property	rights	nor	their	violation)	also	tend	to	entail	dispossession	and	displacement.	
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	 The	 preceding	 pages	 require	 an	 explicit	 qualification.	 As	 highlighted	 above,	 the	character	 and	 prevalence	 of	 land	 dispossession	 is	 contingent	 upon	 multiple	 factors.	Ultimately,	dispossession	is	not	inevitable	and	it	is	not	helpful	to	treat	it	as	a	mere	‘function’	of	 capitalism	 (Levien,	 2011,	 2013).	 This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 understanding	 land	dispossession	 requires	 context-specific	 political	 economy	 analysis;	 however,	 it	 has	 also	shown	the	importance	of	considering	the	wider	capitalist	system	in	which	it	takes	place.		 Finally,	to	conclude,	I	unravel	an	apparent	tension	in	my	analysis.	The	attentive	reader	may	have	noticed	my	 favoured	use	of	Ellen	Wood’s	work	 in	 general	 and	her	 concept	 of	market-dependence	 (referred	 to	 in	Chapter	1)	 in	particular.	According	 to	Wood	 (2002),	capitalism	“is	a	system	in	which	the	bulk	of	society’s	work	is	done	by	propertyless	labourers	who	are	obliged	to	sell	their	labour-power	in	exchange	for	a	wage	in	order	to	gain	access	to	the	means	of	life”	(p.	3).	As	explained	earlier,	the	dependence	of	the	direct	producers	on	the	market	is	paralleled	by	that	of	the	capitalist.	It	is	this	market-dependence	(of	both	capitalist	firms/investors	and	direct	producers)	that	differentiates	capitalism	from	other	modes	of	production	or	“social	forms”,	according	to	Wood.	This	dependence	turns	“competition	and	profit-maximization”	 into	 “the	 fundamental	 rules	 of	 life”	 and	 “the	 production	 and	 self-expansion	of	capital”	into	the	“basic	objective”	of	our	societies	(ibid,	pp.	2-3).	On	the	surface,	my	argument	that	coercive	land	dispossession	and	associated	displacement	are	integral	to	both	the	development	of	capitalism	and	subsequent	capitalist	development	may	appear	to	contradict	Wood’s	thesis.	However,	I	believe	the	apparent	contradiction	is	illusory.			 Capitalism	is	defined	in	part	by	market	dependence	and	associated	competition,	as	highlighted	by	Wood.	However,	capitalists	clearly	have	an	interest	in	reducing	their	market	dependence	and	circumventing	competition	wherever	possible,	as	well	as	in	co-opting	the	State	 to	 help	 them	 do	 that.	 Moreover,	 States	 sometimes	 use	 their	 legislative	 and	military/police	 powers	 to	 perpetuate	 growth	 and	 capital	 accumulation,	 especially	 in	instances	 where	 the	 capitalist	 market	 itself	 poses	 obstacles	 to	 these	 objectives.	Nevertheless,	 this	 does	 not	 negate	 the	market-dependence	 thesis.	 Indeed,	Wood	 herself	discusses	the	role	of	State	coercion	in	sustaining	capital	accumulation.	In	her	article	on	the	separation	of	the	‘economic’	and	the	‘political’	under	capitalism,	she	explains:	“[t]he	political	sphere	in	capitalism	has	a	special	character	to	the	extent	that	the	coercive	power	supporting	capitalist	exploitation	is	not	wielded	directly	by	the	appropriator	and	is	not	based	on	the	producer’s	political	or	 juridical	subordination	to	an	appropriating	master”	(1995,	p.	30).	None	of	this	is	inconsistent	with	what	I	have	argued	above.	Finally,	Wood	is	concerned	with	“the	appropriation	of	surplus	labour”,	which	under	capitalism	“takes	place	in	the	‘economic’	
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sphere	 by	 ‘economic’	 means”,	 and	 ultimately	 rests	 upon	 “the	 appropriator’s	 absolute	private	property	in	the	means	of	production”	(Wood,	1995,	pp.	28–29).	The	point	is	that	“[d]irect	extra-economic	pressure	or	overt	coercion	are,	in	principle,	unnecessary	to	compel	the	 expropriated	 labourer	 to	 give	 up	 surplus	 labour	 […]	 economic	 need	 supplies	 the	immediate	compulsion”	(ibid,	p.	29).	In	contrast,	my	arguments	pertain	to	the	control	of	land	itself	and	related	resources,	which	as	argued	in	Chapter	1,	has	received	insufficient	attention	from	 critical	 political	 economists	 –	 including	Wood.	 So,	Wood	uncovers	what	 is	 specific	about	capitalism	via	a	historical	comparison	with	other	modes	of	production	(especially	in	terms	of	how	surplus	labour	is	appropriated	from	the	direct	producer),	while	my	arguments	illuminate	some	activities	or	processes	that	occur	within	that	system	or	-more	precisely-	the	way	capitalist	land	markets	(mal-)function	within	particular	contexts.			
Summary	and	conclusion	This	 chapter	 offered	 an	 overview	 and	 critical	 evaluation	 of	 some	 key	 claims	 on	 land	dispossession	 found	 in	 varied	 literature,	 which	 addresses	 the	 issue	 either	 directly	 or	indirectly.	The	first	part	focused	on	the	conventional	view	of	dispossession	as	defined	by	orthodox	economic	and	liberal	political	and	legal	paradigms,	which	I	show	to	be	inadequate	in	general	and	for	explaining	land	dispossession	in	Colombia	in	particular.	The	second	part	examined	the	ideas	put	forward	by	critical	scholars	from	diverse	backgrounds.	As	should	be	clear	from	the	discussion	above,	I	believe	critical	political	economy	analysis	highlights	and	 provides	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 deficiencies	 of	 those	 approaches	 that	 abstract	 from	 (or	minimise	 the	 importance	 of)	 history,	 power	 relations,	 social	 struggles,	 ideology	 and	 the	wider	political	and	economic	context,	which	 includes	capitalism	as	a	historically	specific	global	system	and	the	changing	and	contingent	forms	it	takes	across	space	and	time.	This	chapter	 has	 served	 a	 quadruple	 purpose:	 (1)	 to	 locate	 my	 research	 within	 a	 broader	literature;	(2)	to	show	how	my	investigation	on	historical	and	contemporary	dispossession	in	 Colombia	 undercuts	 or	 bolsters	 some	 of	 the	 key	 claims	within	 this	 literature;	 (3)	 to	construct	a	conceptual	framework	from	and	for	the	rest	of	this	thesis;	and	(4)	to	put	forward	some	 of	 my	 own	 arguments	 –	 including	 original	 theoretical	 propositions	 and	 specific	assessments	of	the	political	economy	of	dispossession	in	Colombia.		 	
-	3	-	
Dispossession	and	displacement	in	Colombia	during	the	colonial	era			This	chapter	provides	an	overview	of	dispossession	and	displacement	in	Colombia	during	colonial	rule.	As	emphasised	previously,	the	historical	narrative	presented	in	this	thesis	is	unusual	in	that	it	focuses	on	the	political	economy	of	land,	specifically	dispossession	and	associated	 displacement.	 One	 of	 the	main	 aims	 is	 to	 show	 how	 and	 why	 practices	 and	policies	of	dispossession	and	displacement	change	over	 time.	This	historical	perspective	also	reveals	the	deep	roots	of	Colombia’s	current	land	problems.	Additionally,	it	establishes	a	basis	for	identifying	what	is	distinctive	about	contemporary	land	grabs;	examples	of	what	might	be	called	pre-	or	non-	capitalist	forms	of	dispossession	and	displacement	serve	as	a	point	of	contrast	for	later	chapters.		The	first	section	contains	a	brief	outline	of	early	colonial	land	grabs	-underpinned	by	a	notion	 of	 property	 based	 on	 divine	 rights-	 in	what	 is	 now	 Colombia.	 It	 shows	 that	 the	resulting	extermination	and	exodus	of	the	territories’	original	inhabitants	were	contrary	to	the	 interests	of	 the	colonial	economy,	which	depended	on	the	exploitation	of	 indigenous	labour.	The	Crown	actually	forbade	the	usurpation	of	indigenous	lands	(though	only	those	
occupied)	and	the	encomienda	system	was	supposed	to	ensure	native	communities’	access	to	arable	terrain	necessary	for	the	extraction	of	tributes	in	kind.		The	second	section	briefly	examines	land	policies	established	in	the	late	16th	century.	It	reveals	that	the	Crown’s	prioritisation	of	fiscal	objectives	undermined	the	other	alleged	aims	 of	 the	Royal	 Order:	 to	 tackle	 illegal	 usurpation	 (i.e.	 not	 authorised	 by	 the	 colonial	government)	 and	unproductive	 land	hoarding.	This	 ‘reform’	 essentially	 sanctioned	 illicit	land	appropriation;	a	practice	repeated	throughout	Colombian	history	up	to	present	day.	Section	 three	 discusses	 involuntary	 resettlement	 policy	 and	 the	 associated	 titling	program	 (initiated	 in	 the	 1590s),	 reiterating	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 colonial	 economy	depended	upon	the	controlled	displacement	of	the	dispossessed.	Some	historians	claim	that	the	 colonial	 government	 granted	 indigenous	 groups	 titles	 over	 areas	 of	 land	 -known	 as	
resguardos-	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 them	 from	dispossession	 and	 displacement.	 There	 is	 an	element	 of	 truth	 in	 this	 claim	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 disorderly	 land	 usurpation	 and	 the	concomitant	 uprooting	 of	 indigenous	 communities	 posed	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 stability	 of	 the	colonial	system.	However,	17th	century	resguardo	policy	is	better	understood	as	an	attempt	
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to	order	and	control	processes	of	dispossession	and	displacement.	Collective	 titling	was	part	 of	 a	 reformed	 resettlement	 program,	 which	 favoured	 colonisers’	 land	 and	 labour	demands	and	facilitated	missionaries’	conversion	work.	Nevertheless,	 indigenous	groups	learnt	to	use	colonial	institutions	to	their	advantage;	they	demanded	more	autonomy	for	their	cabildos	(formally	recognised	local	authorities),	used	the	law	to	defend	against	private	land	grabs,	and	sought	the	creation	of	new	resguardos	or	the	expansion	of	existing	ones.	The	fourth	section	analyses	the	dissolution	of	the	resguardos	during	the	second	half	of	the	18th	century.	It	provides	further	evidence	that	collective	titling	was	not	a	policy	of	benevolent	protection;	the	colonial	government	began	to	revoke	and	reduce	these	titles	as	the	 communities’	 ability	 to	 supply	 tributes	 declined.	 Thus,	 indigenous	 peoples	 were	dispossessed	and	displaced	once	again,	according	to	the	demands	of	the	colonial	economy.	The	specific	motivations	behind	the	destruction	of	the	resguardos	is	a	point	of	contention;	however,	observers	agree	that	the	result	was	to	increase	land	concentration	and	strengthen	the	hacienda	system	based	on	tenant	farming	and	sharecropping.			The	fifth	and	final	section	provides	a	concise	discussion	of	the	hacienda	system	(in	which	elites	extracted	land	rents	from	peasants	paid	in	labour	and	in	kind	and	to	a	lesser	extent	in	money)	that	came	to	define	life	in	New	Granada	(as	Colombia	was	then	called)	in	the	18th	century	and	the	contradictions	of	late	colonial	land	policy.	Many	colonial	officials	commented	on	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 ills	 caused	by	 land	 concentration.	However,	 the	Crown	did	little	to	resolve	the	issue.	In	fact,	the	dissolution	of	the	resguardos	exacerbated	the	 problem	 as	 the	 extricated	 land	was	 sold	 at	 auction	 to	 those	with	 the	 ability	 to	 pay.	Regardless	 of	 the	 Crown’s	 intentions,	 this	 resulted	 in	 further	 consolidation	 of	 the	
hacendados’	power.		
1)	Early	colonial	land	grabs,	uncontrolled	displacement	and	labour	shortages	In	the	early	1500s	the	conquistadors	established	a	number	of	bases	(most	notably	Santa	Marta	and	Cartagena)	on	the	Caribbean	coast	of	what	 is	now	Colombia.	From	there	they	launched	numerous	expeditions,	gradually	extending	their	colonisation	to	the	interior.	After	looting	the	indigenous	populations’	gold,	the	Spanish	began	mining	for	the	precious	metal	throughout	the	Kingdom	of	New	Granada.	Gold	was	the	colony’s	only	export	until	the	late	1700s.	Still,	the	colonisers	depended	on	domestic	agricultural	production	and	hence	were	interested	in	controlling	arable	flatlands	as	well	as	mineral-rich	areas	(Bohórquez,	2002;	Jaramillo	Uribe,	1996;	Williams,	1999).	
  
110	
For	the	Catholic	conquistadors	and	their	patrons,	God	was	the	creator	and	thus	true	owner	of	all	the	earth,	and	only	the	Pope	-deemed	God’s	most	important	representative-	had	the	authority	to	bestow	rights	over	His	land.	Hence,	with	the	Pope’s	blessing,	the	‘New	World’	 became	 ‘property’	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Crown.	 The	 Crown,	 in	 turn,	 licensed	 its	conquistadors	(via	capitulaciones	-	essentially	contracts	containing	rights	and	obligations)	to	 explore,	 colonise	 and	 control	 the	 ‘new’	 territories.	 Among	 other	 things,	 these	
capitulaciones	granted	the	beneficiary	rights	over	land	and	the	authority	to	distribute	plots	amongst	other	Spanish	settlers	who	accompanied	 them.	The	Crown	also	conceded	 lands	directly	 through	Royal	Orders.	These	 land	grants	 -known	as	mercedes	 (derived	 from	the	word	 ‘mercy’)	or	repartimientos	 (derived	 from	the	word	 ‘distribute’)	 -	were	designed	 to	recompense	the	Crown’s	soldiers	and	explorers	and	to	stimulate	settlement.	Land	grants	were	usually	conditional35	and	some	historians	argue	they	conferred	rights	of	possession	rather	than	property	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	21–26;	Mayorga,	2002).	Notably,	unlike	English	colonial	policy	in	Ireland	and	the	USA,	the	Spanish	Crown’s	justification	of	the	dispossession	of	the	native	population	was	not	rooted	in	capitalist	or	Lockean	conceptions	of	property	but	was	based	solely	on	the	notion	of	divine	rights.	By	Royal	Order,	land	grants	were	to	exclude	the	‘property’	of	the	‘indians’.	However,	this	exclusion	applied	to	territories	‘effectively	occupied’	by	the	natives	‘at	the	time	of	the	repartition’	and	hence	overlooked	the	land	requirements	of	the	nomadic	and	semi-nomadic	groups	that	had	inhabited	the	Colombian	territories	for	millennia.	In	any	case,	these	were	dead	 letter	 laws	 and	 usurpation	 advanced	 irrespective	 of	 indigenous	 people’s	 ability	 to	prove	‘occupation’	of	their	ancestral	home	(Bohórquez,	2002,	pp.	11–13;	Mayorga,	2002).		The	conquistadors	and	settlers	occupied	fertile	flatlands,	destroying	native	farming	communities	in	the	process.	For	example,	the	Tairona	people	(from	whom	the	Aruhuacos	are	descended)	historically	cultivated	the	plains	of	the	Caribbean	coast	but	were	pushed	up	into	 the	 Sierra	 Nevada	 mountains	 –	 to	 areas	 that	 were	 relatively	 inaccessible	 to	 their	aggressors	(Minahan,	2013,	pp.	36–37).	Similar	dispossession	occurred	across	the	country:	“by	the	end	of	the	16th	century,	the	indians	of	the	savannah	of	Bogotá	had	lost	95%	of	the	lands	 they	 occupied	 before	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 Spanish”	 (Bohórquez,	 2002,	 p.	 12).	 Many	groups	fought	against	the	land	grabs	and	colonial	abuses	in	general	but	the	invaders	-armed	
                                                        35	The	Crown’s	land	grants	usually	came	with	obligations	to	live	in	the	area	for	a	certain	number	of	years,	plant	crops,	erect	buildings,	and	raise	livestock	–	only	those	who	met	these	conditions	could	access	a	title,	later	enabling	them	to	sell	or	rent	their	land	(Machado,	2009;	Mayorga,	2002).	
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with	steel	swords	and	foreign	disease-	defeated	waves	of	regional	resistance	one	by	one36.	Countless	communities	fled	to	the	mountainous	slopes	and	distant	forested	zones	in	order	to	escape	Spanish	rule	(Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015;	Minahan,	2013;	Williams,	1999).	The	settlers	and	the	Crown	had	obvious	interests	in	establishing	control	over	lands	containing	 gold	 deposits,	 areas	 suitable	 for	 agriculture	 and	 settlements,	 and	 strategic	locations	for	war	and	transport.	But	“the	dispersion	of	the	indigenous	to	inaccessible	places	[…]	presented	a	constant	obstacle	to	the[ir]	‘civilising’	and	evangelising	objectives”	(Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015,	p.	32).	More	importantly,	vast	‘unconquered’	territories	were	swallowing	up	the	 workforce	 on	 which	 the	 Crown’s	 economy	 depended.	 This	 exodus	 -combined	 with	genocide,	war	and	disease	-	contributed	to	severe	labour	shortages	(Jaramillo	Uribe,	1996;	Machado,	2009,	p.	39).	Flight	to	remote	lands	was	a	recurring	issue	throughout	the	colonial	era:	many	people	shipped	from	Africa	to	solve	‘the	labour	problem’	became	fugitive	slaves	or	cimarrones,	who	established	autonomous	subsistence	communities	called	palenques,	far	from	their	oppressors	(Mosquera	Mosquera,	2001).		Initially,	 the	 Spanish	 attempted	 to	 secure	 a	 labour	 force	 by	 enslaving	 indigenous	peoples.	However,	the	direct	enslavement	of	the	native	population	was	quickly	outlawed37,	and	some	estates	and	mines	began	to	‘import’	people	from	Africa	for	slave	labour,	as	noted	above.	The	dwindling	indigenous	population	was	-nevertheless-	still	very	important	to	the	colonial	economy	and	was	subject	to	a	different	type	of	exploitation	under	the	encomienda	system.	The	encomenderos	 in	 charge	of	 this	 system	were	essentially	 granted	 rights	over	indigenous	 labour	 -	 supposedly	 in	 exchange	 for	 protection	 and	 religious	 instruction.	Indigenous	people	were	forced	to	pay	tributes	in	kind	and	in	services,	including	draft	labour	-referred	to	as	concierto	or	la	mita38-	for	agricultural	estates,	mines,	cloth	factories	and	the	construction	of	 infrastructure	(González	Garzón,	2013,	pp.	26–27;	Ángel,	2012a;	Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	8–9).	
                                                        36	 See,	 for	 example:	 the	 indigenous	 resistance	 led	 by	 the	 chief	 Gaitana,	 which	 united	 various	ethnicities,	in	the	Cauca/Huila	region	during	the	mid-1500s	(González	Garzón,	2013,	p.	25);	or	the	rebellion	of	indigenous	groups	in	Chocó	(Williams,	1999).	37	Legislation	from	1512	“defined	the	indian	as	a	‘free	vassal	of	the	King’,	with	which	his	condition	as	a	slave	was	denied”	(Machado,	2009,	p.	43).	38	The	word	mita	is	taken	from	the	Quechan	mit’a.	The	latter	was	an	obligatory	public	service	during	the	 Incan	 Empire.	 The	 Spanish	 adapted	 both	 the	 word	 and	 the	 institution	 to	 suit	 their	 needs.	Depending	on	place	and	time,	there	may	be	differences	between	the	colonial	mita	and	the	encomienda	system;	but	“generally,	in	the	New	World	the	terms	repartimiento,	mita,	cuatequil,	and	encomienda	became	interchangeable”	(Rodriguez,	1997,	pp.	436–437,	544).	
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The	 encomienda	 system,	 it	 is	 worth	 stressing,	 was	 not	 based	 on	 the	 complete	dispossession	 of	 indigenous	 communities.	 In	 fact,	 the	 “laws	 regulating	 the	 encomienda	regime	 specified	 that	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 encomendero	 were	 limited	 to	 the	 acquisition	 of	indigenous	tributes,	and	that	he	could	not	-on	any	account-	dispose	of	their	lands”	(Mayorga,	2002;	see	also	Machado,	2009,	p.	38).	Nevertheless,	the	encomenderos	found	ways	around	such	rules	and	began	asserting	property	rights	over	 large	areas	(Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015;	Machado,	2009;	Bohórquez,	2002).	This	generated	conflicts	between	settlers	and	between	them	and	indigenous	peoples.	It	also	contributed	to	ongoing	processes	of	extermination	and	exodus,	causing	further	problems	for	the	colonial	economy.	The	Crown	devised	a	number	of	policies	 to	address	 these	 issues.	The	granting	of	 collective	 titles	 to	 indigenous	groups	helped	stabilise	the	situation	to	a	degree,	but	fiscal	concerns	enfeebled	other	aspects	of	the	reform	and	the	consolidation	of	large	idle	estates	continued	unabated,	as	shown	below.		
2)	Late	16th	century	land	policy	and	the	legalisation	of	illicit	appropriation	In	1591	the	King	issued	a	Royal	Order,	which	Machado	(2009)	and	other	historians	liken	to	a	land	reform:	“it	constituted	the	first	process	of	property	redistribution	after	the	conquest”	(p.	29).	According	to	Liévano	(2002),	the	Crown	knew	that	the	majority	of	titleholders	had	not	complied	with	the	original	conditions	attached	to	their	land	grants	and	was	also	aware	that	“deficiencies	 in	 the	demarcation	system”	had	allowed	“a	merced	of	500	hectares”	 to	become	an	“unproductive	latifundio	of	20,000	hectares”	(cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	31).	The	Order	was	 supposed	 to	 promote	 productive	 use	 of	 land	 and	 organisation	 of	 ownership,	while	generating	income	for	the	Crown	in	order	to	resolve	a	fiscal	deficit.	As	shown	below,	the	Crown	sacrificed	the	former	in	order	to	secure	the	latter.		The	1591	document	 reiterated	earlier	 instructions	 to	allocate	and	 title	 indigenous	lands	and	ended	donations	to	Spanish	settlers	in	the	form	of	mercedes	-	they	would	have	to	purchase	land	in	public	auctions	instead.	It	also	ordered	(among	other	things)	all	those	in	possession	 of	 land	 to	 present	 their	 titles	 so	 that	 illegal	 occupants	 could	 be	 removed	 or	forced	to	pay	a	fee	(composición)	in	exchange	for	a	title.	(Lands	confiscated	for	incompliance	could	be	sold	at	auction	alongside	other	‘royal	lands’.)	Essentially,	composición	was	a	form	of	legalising	land	occupations	not	backed	by	a	title	or	beyond	the	limits	of	existing	titles	or	based	 on	mercedes	 granted	 by	 officials	 that	 were	 not	 technically	 authorised	 (Machado,	2009;	Mayorga,	2002;	Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015).	According	to	Mayorga	(2002),	“composición	
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became	the	preferred	form	of	acquiring	land”	during	the	colonial	era;	at	 least,	“for	those	who	had	the	means	and	information	to	go	through	with	the	process”	(Machado,	2009,	p.	30).	Arguably,	 the	 1591	 order	 amounted	 to	 a	 formalisation	 program	 (not	 a	comprehensive,	 and	much	 less	 a	 redistributive,	 reform)	 that	 actually	 legalised	 property	concentration.	Evidence	suggests	that	the	Crown’s	interest	in	resolving	its	fiscal	problems	outweighed	its	concerns	for	redistributing	land	and	promoting	production.	Machado	(2009)	claims	 the	Order	demanded	 lands	be	put	 to	productive	use	 (pp.	28-30),	but	he	does	not	specify	 whether	 the	 Crown	 actually	 confiscated	 idle	 properties.	 It	 seems	 confiscation	applied	to	those	who	did	not	have	a	legal	title	and	could	not	afford	to	pay	the	composición.	In	other	words,	the	wealthy	could	legalise	their	land	appropriations	ex	post	facto,	while	poor	Spanish	settlers	 faced	 losing	 their	 farms.	Concentration	of	 land	ownership	was	probably	further	entrenched	by	the	auctioning	of	land	to	the	highest	bidder.		All	 of	 this	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 Order	 was	 aimed	 at	 resolving	 the	problem	of	unproductive	latifundios	(see	quotation	above)	or	that	it	was	designed	to	“avoid	and	punish	usurpations	[…]	by	greedy	encomenderos”	(Salazar	cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	29).	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 legalised	 these	 usurpations.	 Machado’s	 text	 (2009)	 includes	countless	details	that	reveal	inconsistencies	between	the	alleged	aims	of	the	reform	and	the	means	and	outcomes.	He	provides	just	one	example	of	‘redistributive’	action,	resulting	from	the	1591	Order:	the	granting	of	resguardo	titles	to	indigenous	communities	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	 28–32).	 However,	 resguardo	 policy	 is	 better	 understood	 as	 a	 resettlement	 strategy,	aimed	at	subordinating	indigenous	peoples	to	the	colonial	organisation	of	land	and	labour,	as	argued	in	the	following	section.			
3)	Forced	relocation	or	controlled	displacement:	reducciones	and	resguardos		The	 encomienda	 system	 -and	 the	 colonial	 economy	 in	 general-	 required	 the	 controlled	displacement	of	the	native	population.	Local	officials	and	designated	missionaries	were	in	charge	 of	 implementing	 congregaciones	 or	 reducciones	 -	 essentially	 a	 policy	 of	 forced	relocation,	which	favoured	the	coloniser’s	land	and	labour	demands	and	the	objectives	of	Catholic	 conversion.	 Caroline	 Williams’	 (1999)	 account	 of	 Spanish	 colonisation	 and	indigenous	rebellion	in	Chocó	(northwest	Colombia)	during	the	1670s	and	1680s	clearly	depicts	this,	in	addition	to	the	regional	particularities	of	colonial	resettlement	policy:			
  
114	
Spanish	miners	did	not	 intend	 to	employ	 indians	 in	mining	activities;	 for	 this,	slaves	would	be	imported.	But	the	local	indians	were	to	be	assigned	a	central	role	in	the	emerging	mining	economy.	They	were	to	provide	foodstuffs	for	the	mining	camps,	[…]	serve	as	guides	and	carriers,	and	build	dwellings	for	both	miners	and	slaves.	To	enable	Indians	to	 fulfil	 these	roles,	 the	small	scattered	communities	would	 have	 to	 be	 brought	 together	 in	 larger	 settlements	 close	 to	 the	mining	camps	(p.	406).			The	 reducciones	 in	 Chocó	 were	 chaotic.	 The	 original	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 region	 were	accustomed	to	moving	after	each	harvest	(a	practice	that	allowed	for	soil	recuperation)	and	repeatedly	deserted	the	designated	settlements.	They	rejected	the	missionaries’	authority.	The	Spanish	were	unable	to	identify	clear	and	stable	hierarchical	power	structures	within	their	communities	and	hence	had	difficulty	co-opting	their	leaders.	Some	groups	refused	to	trade	in	order	to	“starve	the	settlers	out”;	for	a	time,	they	were	successful,	as	the	lack	of	food	forced	many	miners	and	missionaries	to	abandon	their	projects.	In	the	end,	the	missionaries	and	local	colonial	officials	resorted	to	direct	force	(apparently,	disobeying	the	‘peaceable’	intentions	of	their	superiors),	leading	to	clashes	with	the	indigenous	communities	and	with	numerous	Spanish	settlers	who	sided	with	them.	A	handful	of	people	were	removed	from	their	posts,	leading	to	a	brief	period	of	calm.	Ultimately,	however,	the	region	erupted	into	conflict:	violent	rebellion	was	followed	by	brutal	repression	(Williams,	1999,	pp.	404–424).	By	1690	the	rebels	had	been	defeated	and	“flight	[w]as	the	only	remaining	way	to	resist	the	Spaniards	 […	 the	native	 population	was]	 unable	 to	 stem	 the	 Spanish	 advance	 into	 their	territory	and	 its	 subsequent	 conversion	 into	a	major	mining	 region	of	 late	 colonial	New	Granada”	(ibid,	p.	424).		As	stressed	by	Quiroga	(2015),	 the	reducciones	were	highly	contingent	on	regional	factors.	 In	 some	areas,	 such	as	 the	Province	of	Neiva,	Catholic	missionaries	 initiated	 the	resettlements	and	the	encomiendas	were	formed	after	the	fact	(p.	31).	In	the	Paéz	Province,	in	contrast,	the	encomenderos	obligated	the	indigenous	population	to	move	multiple	times	according	 to	 their	 own	 interests:	 “the	 encomenderos	 did	 not	 have	 the	 legal	 authority	 to	assign	lands	to	the	indigenous,	nor	to	promote	population	transfers.	Nevertheless	[…]	the	displacements	were	endorsed	by	the	local	colonial	administration”	(ibid,	p.	28).	The	Spanish	government	 intervened	 in	1639,	essentially	 formalising	 the	allocation	carried	out	by	 the	
encomenderos	through	the	granting	of	resguardo	titles	(Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015,	pp.	29–30).	
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The	 resguardos	 were	 areas	 of	 land	 with	 collective	 titles,	 granted	 by	 the	 Spanish	government	 to	 the	 indigenous	 communities.	 Some	 commentators	 suggest	 that	 the	 1591	Royal	 Order	 -which	 instigated	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 first	 resguardos39-	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	hinder	 further	 usurpation	 of	 native	 lands	 and	 resulting	 social	 disintegration.	 Other	observers	present	the	resguardos	as	a	means	of	‘stabilising’	the	indigenous	population	and	‘protecting’	 them	 from	 continuous	 abuses	 and	 dislocation	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 unscrupulous	settlers	and	encomenderos	(for	a	full	critique	of	the	‘benevolent	protection’	explanation	of	resguardo	 policy,	 see	 Bohórquez,	 2002;	 see	 also	 Quiroga	 Zuluaga,	 2015).	 These	 claims	contain	a	grain	of	truth,	in	so	far	as	private	land	grabs	were	destabilising	the	colonial	regime.	However,	it	would	be	disingenuous	to	suggest	that	the	objective	was	to	protect	indigenous	peoples;	 resguardo	 policy	 can	 be	 better	 understood	 as	 the	 State’s	 attempt	 to	 control	processes	of	dispossession	and	displacement.		In	practice,	“the	lands	assigned	to	the	aboriginals	almost	never	corresponded	to	their	ancestral	 possessions”;	 instead	 the	 resguardos	 were	 established	 in	 accordance	with	 the	interests	of	the	colonial	government	and/or	the	regional	elite.	In	some	regions,	the	royal	visitors	simultaneously	approved	the	allocation	of	native	lands	and	multiple	composiciones	over	 lands	 the	Spanish	had	occupied	de	 facto	(Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015,	p.	30).	Hence,	 the	constitution	of	the	resguardos	often	went	hand	in	hand	with	the	legalisation	of	usurpation.		Furthermore,	 resguardo	 titles	 were	 never	 secure,	 as	 ultimate	 “property	 [rights]	always	remained	in	the	hands	of	the	Crown,	which	could	later	impose	a	new	relocation	and	offer	those	lands	to	the	white	population”	(Bohórquez,	2002,	pp.	14–15).	Officials	frequently	‘transferred’	people	from	one	resguardo	to	another	or	regrouped	communities	(referred	to	as	 agregaciones),	 at	 the	 convenience	 of	 the	 missionaries40	 and	 according	 to	 the	requirements	of	the	colonial	economy41	(Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015,	pp.	33–43;	Bonnett	Vélez,	2001,	 p.	 11).	Bohórquez	 (2002)	highlights	 the	 “violent	 rupture”	 brought	 about	by	 these	
                                                        39	 The	 word	 resguardo	 first	 appears	 in	 legislation	 from	 1561,	 the	 order	 to	 assign	 lands	 to	 the	indigenous	population	was	reasserted	in	1591	and	the	first	resguardos	were	created	in	the	1590s	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	44–45;	Bonnett	Vélez,	2001,	pp.	10–11).	40	 Indigenous	 families	were	often	relocated	according	 to	 the	availability	of	missionaries	(Quiroga	Zuluaga,	 2015);	 the	 resguardos	 were	 said	 to	 facilitate	 the	 Church’s	 work	 by	 concentrating	 the	 -formerly	dispersed-	native	population	in	designated	areas	(Bohórquez,	2002).		41	 Transfers	 were	 used	 to	 ‘correct’	 the	 proportion	 of	 persons	 to	 land	 (the	 colonial	 government	reasoned	 that	 each	 tributary	 should	 have	 no	 more	 than	 1.5	 hectares)	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	 each	
resguardo	 was	 able	 to	 provide	 its	 established	 quota	 of	 tributes	 (Bonnett	 Vélez,	 2001,	 p.	 10).	 As	explained	 by	 Bohórquez	 (2002):	 “a	 fall	 in	 tributes	 almost	 always	 led	 to	 new	 reducciones	 or	
agregaciones”	(p.	8).	
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transfers	 in	 which	 groups	 with	 different	 customs	 and	 languages	 were	 forced	 to	 live	 in	confined	spaces,	unfamiliar	climates,	and	on	lands	that	were	inadequate	for	their	traditional	cultivation	practices.		Hence,	 collective	 land	 titles	 neither	 recognised	 ancestral	 territorial	 claims,	 nor	‘protected’	native	communities	from	‘continuous	dislocation’.	The	resguardos	were	part	of	a	controlled	displacement	strategy;	they	“served	to	uproot	and	dispossess	the	indigenous”	population	(Bohórquez,	2002,	p.	15).	The	aim	was	to	concentrate,	segregate,	and	prevent	the	annihilation	of	the	indigenous	population,	in	order	to	ensure	the	latter’s	contributions	to	colony	and	Crown	(Bonnett	Vélez,	2001;	Machado,	2009).	In	effect,	the	establishment	of	the	resguardos	can	be	seen	as	an	adaptation	of	earlier	resettlement	policy.	According	to	Bohórquez	(2002),	the	Spanish	government	introduced	the	 resguardos	 as	 a	 ‘solution’	 to	 the	 disorder	 generated	 under	 the	 original	 encomienda	regime,	which	was	marked	by	constant	conflicts	over	land	and	labour	(pp.	4-5).	The	new	institutional	arrangement	(including,	but	not	limited	to,	the	resguardos)	took	power	away	from	 the	 encomenderos	 and	 reaffirmed	 the	 State’s	 authority.	 The	 encomenderos	 still	received	indigenous	tributes,	but	no	longer	controlled	them;	the	reforms	“prohibited	direct	relations	 between	 the	 encomendero	 and	 the	 encomendados	 [i.e.	 indigenous	 persons]”	(González	cited	in:	Machado,	2009,	p.	44).	Hence,	“despite	benefitting	from	the	freeing	of	land	 [resulting	 from	 the	 forced	 displacement	 and	 concentration	 of	 the	 indigenous	population],	 the	encomenderos,	who	were	used	 to	commanding	at	 their	whim	the	 indian	labour	 force	 under	 their	 ‘care’,	 always	 opposed	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 resguardos”	(Bohórquez,	2002,	p.	7).		To	 an	 extent,	 the	 resguardos	 were	 self-governed	 through	 cabildos	 -	 indigenous	authorities	recognised	by	the	colonial	administration.	But	the	colonial	government	assigned	a	special	functionary,	known	as	the	corregidor	de	indios,	to	each	resguardo.	The	corregidor,	in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 local	 cacique	 or	 chief	 (head	 of	 the	 cabildo),	 was	 in	 charge	 of	overseeing	 production	 within	 the	 resguardo,	 controlling	 commerce	 with	 outsiders,	coordinating	labour	tributes,	and	collecting	and	distributing	tributes	in	kind,	which	were	shared	 among	 the	 King,	 the	 Church,	 the	 encomendero	 and	 the	 colonial	 authorities	 –	including	 the	 corregidor	 himself.	 The	 corregidor	 and	 a	 designated	 priest	 were	 the	 only	people	authorised	to	interfere	in	the	resguardos;	all	other	personal	or	commercial	relations	with	outsiders	were	strictly	forbidden	(Bohórquez,	2002,	p.	3).		
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Most	 early	 resguardos	 were	 constituted	 on	 arable	 land	 near	 colonial	 towns	 and	settlements;	 this	 facilitated	 the	 exploitation	 of	 indigenous	 labour,	 the	 Catholic	indoctrination	of	 the	native	population,	and	the	appropriation	of	 the	 latter’s	agricultural	production	in	the	form	of	tributes42	(Bonnett	Vélez,	2001,	p.	10).	However,	as	the	economic	importance	of	the	indigenous	population	declined,	the	resguardos	were	relegated	to	poor	quality	lands	far	away	from	the	urban	centres	(Machado,	2009,	p.	19)	–	as	discussed	below.	Initially,	 resguardo	 policy	 was	 no	 more	 successful	 than	 other	 forms	 of	 forced	resettlement:	many	indigenous	communities	refused	to	remain	on	the	lands	that	had	been	assigned	to	them	(Bohórquez,	2002,	pp.	8–9;	Bonnett	Vélez,	2001,	pp.	10–11).	However,	in	some	regions,	the	granting	of	land	rights	aided	indigenous	acceptance	of	the	reducciones.	The	Spanish	government	recognised	their	success	in	this	regard.	One	official	argued	that	
resguardo	 lands	should	be	extended	in	order	to	entice	groups	hiding	in	the	mountains	to	come	down	and	adopt	the	Catholic	faith	(cited	in	Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015,	p.	37).		At	the	same	time,	many	indigenous	leaders	learnt	to	use	the	resguardo	and	associated	colonial	 institutions	 -such	 as	 the	 cabildo-	 to	 their	 advantage.	Nasa	 chief,	 Juan	Tama,	 for	example,	demanded	more	indigenous	autonomy	and	obtained	titles	for	important	areas	of	Nasa	territory	in	the	1600s43.	Quiroga	documents	how	indigenous	authorities	in	the	Paéz	and	Neiva	provinces	presented	 themselves	 as	 ‘vassals	 of	 the	King’	 in	 order	 to	negotiate	directly	 with	 the	 Royal	 Audience.	 They	 used	 the	 colonial	 legal	 system	 to	 solicit	 the	establishment	or	enlargement	of	resguardo	titles	and	to	denounce	usurpations	by	settlers.	In	 this	 way,	 some	 groups	 were	 able	 to	 regain	 territory	 lost	 through	 repeated	 forced	displacements	(Quiroga	Zuluaga,	2015,	pp.	35–41).	As	part	of	 the	same	process,	Quiroga	(2015)	 argues,	 indigenous	 leaders	 came	 to	 play	 an	 “active	 role”	 in	 the	 reducciones	 they	initially	resisted	(p.	47).	Legal	 land	battles	had	a	number	of	shortcomings	 from	the	 indigenous	perspective.	Some	 Spanish	 settlers	 refused	 to	 acknowledge	 indigenous	 landownership	 and	 regularly	encroached	 on	 resguardo	 lands.	 They	 took	 advantage	 of	 poor	 legal	 and	 physical	
                                                        42	 Bohórquez	 (2002)	 argues	 that	 one	 of	 the	 main	 functions	 of	 the	 resguardos	 was	 to	 “ensure	 a	permanent	and	sufficient	supply	of	food	required	by	the	villas	and	Spanish	towns”.	Tributes	in	kind	included	foreign	crops	such	as	wheat	and	oats,	which	were	central	to	the	European	diet	(p.	5).	43	Juan	Tama	de	la	Estrella	(“of	the	Star”)	is	both	historical	and	mythical	figure.	The	elders	are	said	to	have	summoned	a	child	-a	star	sent	by	the	spirits-	who	would	become	a	great	leader.	The	baby	was	rescued	from	the	Pátalo	 lake-fed	stream	and	raised	by	the	community.	Having	fulfilled	his	role	 in	strengthening	the	organisation	and	identity	of	the	Nasa	people,	Juan	Tama	is	said	to	have	returned	to	the	lake	from	which	he	was	born,	a	sacred	place	which	still	bears	his	name	(Yonda	Canencio,	2015).	
  
118	
demarcation.	In	addition	to	de	facto	usurpation,	the	Spanish	government	regularly	used	its	legislative	powers	to	‘dissolve’	or	‘reduce’	the	resguardos,	particularly	in	areas	where	the	diminished	population	was	unable	to	prop	up	the	colonial	economy.	This	type	of	State-led	dispossession	increased	over	time,	culminating	in	a	process	known	as	the	“decomposition	of	the	resguardos”	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	45–46;	Bohórquez,	2002,	p.	15;	Mayorga,	2002).		
4)	The	dissolution	of	the	resguardos	and	the	pursuit	of	agricultural	development	By	the	mid	1700s	“the	resguardos	could	no	longer	provide	significant	agricultural	surpluses	and	had	ceased	to	be	a	dependable	source	of	draft	labour”	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	9).	Increasingly	commercialised	 haciendas	 began	 to	 replace	 the	 resguardos	 as	 the	 main	 source	 of	 food	production	 (Zambrano	 Pantoja,	 1982,	 pp.	 139–140).	 Many	 haciendas	 relied	 on	sharecroppers	 and	other	 types	of	 tenants	 (as	 opposed	 to	 indigenous	 tributes	or	African	slave	labour),	mostly	drawn	from	the	poor	white	and	growing	mestizo	population	–	who	were	not	officially	tied	to	the	colonial	labour	system	(Bejarano,	1983).		Regional	elites,	plus	landless	communities	and	unofficial	tenants	living	in	and	around	the	 resguardos	 -	 known	 as	 vecinos44,	 pressured	 for	 reform,	 arguing	 that	 indigenous	communities	“underutilised”	their	lands	(Bonnett	Vélez,	2001,	p.	14).	This	argument	chimed	with	the	interests	of	the	colonial	regime,	which	had	become	increasingly	concerned	with	promoting	agricultural	development	(Mayorga,	2002).	According	to	Zambrano	(1982),	the	“central	 objective”	 of	 the	 Bourbon	 reforms,	 implemented	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 18th	century,	was	 to	 “convert	 the	colonies	 into	producers	of	primary	goods	and	a	market	 for	metropolitan	 manufactures”	 (p.	 164).	 While	 non-indigenous	 labouring	 classes	 were	interested	in	gaining	rights	over	resguardo	lands	for	themselves,	the	creole	elites	believed	existing	land	access	favouring	the	direct	producers	was	part	of	the	problem	–	they	blamed	limited	production	on	labour	shortages	and	argued	that	the	resguardos	were	retaining	part	of	the	workforce	(ibid).		The	government	was	also	facing	significant	fiscal	pressures	and	saw	an	opportunity	to	capture	the	rents	charged	to	the	vecinos	living	and	working	within	the	resguardos,	and/or	to	 use	 this	 violation	 of	 the	 law45	 as	 a	 rationale	 for	 selling	 resguardo	 lands	 at	 auction.	
                                                        44	“The	term	vecino	[…]	refers	to	the	mestizo,	free	black	or	poor	white	population,	lodged	near	or	within	the	resguardo	territories”	(Bonnett	Vélez,	2001,	p.	11).		45	All	authors	concur	that	-originally-	it	was	illegal	for	indigenous	authorities	to	rent	or	sell	resguardo	land.	While	 some	 suggest	 that	 the	 violation	of	 this	 law	was	used	 to	 justify	 the	dissolution	of	 the	
resguardos	(Mayorga,	2002),	implying	that	it	was	in	place	until	at	least	the	mid-18th	century,	Machado	
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Ironically,	many	indigenous	communities	had	resorted	to	renting	their	lands	to	outsiders	precisely	in	order	to	supplement	the	otherwise	unmanageable	tributes	imposed	on	them	by	the	government	(Machado,	2009;	Bohórquez,	2002;	Mayorga,	2002;	Bonnett	Vélez,	2001).		Cohabitation	within	 the	 resguardos	 led	 to	 both	 conflict	 and	 cooperation,	 either	 of	which	could	be	presented	as	a	threat	and	used	to	justify	their	dissolution.	In	some	areas,	interracial	mixing	(mestizaje)	had	 led	 to	 the	near	disappearance	of	an	ethnically	distinct	indigenous	community,	which	had	been	the	basis	of	resguardo	policy	(Bonnett	Vélez,	2001;	Mayorga,	2002).	Towards	the	end	of	the	colonial	period,	the	mestizo	population	was	more	than	double	the	indigenous;	according	to	a	1778	census,	the	total	population	was	750,000	-	mestizos	represented	48.0%;	white	inhabitants	accounted	for	25.6%;		and	indigenous	and	black	peoples,	19.4%	and	6.8%	respectively	(Jaramillo	Uribe,	1996).	In	general,	 the	resguardos	 came	to	be	seen	as	economically	 inefficient	and	socially	obsolete.	Hence,	in	the	second	half	of	the	18th	century,	colonial	policy	shifted	towards	the	revocation	and	reduction	of	resguardo	 titles.	Some	groups	stayed	in	their	resguardos	but	after	 the	 reductions	 were	 confined	 to	 a	 much	 smaller	 area,	 others	 were	 relocated	 to	marginal	regions,	and	many	became	day	labourers	and	tenants	on	the	growing	haciendas	(Machado,	2009;	Jaramillo	Uribe,	1996).	Several	authors	draw	direct	links	between	the	rise	of	 the	 haciendas	 and	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 resguardos	 (Machado,	 2009,	 p.	 42;	 see	 also	Bohórquez,	2002;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982).		According	to	Machado	(2009),	some	campesinos	were	able	to	access	land	extricated	from	the	resguardos,	“forming	a	layer	of	small	property	owners”	(pp.	35-36).	However,	most	
resguardo	territory	ended	up	in	the	hands	of	a	“small	group	of	landowners”.	On	the	whole,	the	demands	of	the	landless	poor	went	unanswered	(ibid,	p.	46).	Zambrano	(1982)	suggests	that	 the	 government	 never	 intended	 for	 the	 population	 living	 around	 the	 resguardo	 to	become	small	proprietors.	They	anticipated,	he	claims,	that	they	would	be	forced	to	work	on	the	haciendas;	and	hoped	that	this	influx	of	‘freed’	labour	would	boost	production	(pp.	142-143).	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	very	difficult	 to	establish	 the	 intentions	of	 the	government,	which	simultaneously	permitted	further	land	concentration	(from	Zambrano’s	perspective	this	was	deliberate),	while	 also	 condemning	 its	 negative	 consequences,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	following	section.	
                                                        (2009)	 claims	 that	 the	 colonial	 government	 actually	 authorised	 this	 practice	 in	 the	 17th	 century	because	it	allowed	indigenous	communities	to	meet	their	tributes	(p.	46).	
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5)	The	colonial	legacy:	unproductive	land	concentration	and	the	hacienda	system	Government	 functionaries	 were	 aware	 of	 land	 concentration	 and	 the	 problems	 this	generated:	“it	was	clear	for	the	observers	of	the	Crown	that	at	the	end	of	the	18th	century	the	 best	 lands	were	 controlled	 by	 a	 few	proprietors,	 and	 that	 this	 impeded	 agricultural	development”	(Machado,	2009,	p.	36).	According	to	Zambrano	(1982),	“the	royal	authorities	continually	denounced	that	the	large	property-owners	did	not	work	the	land	and	that	they	appropriated	extensions	much	larger	than	they	could	exploit”	(p.	142).	Various	reports	also	commented	on	 the	abuse	of	 the	 landless	poor,	who	were	unable	 to	pay	 the	extortionate	rents	 demanded	 of	 them	 (Machado,	 2009,	 pp.	 34–35).	 In	 1776	 one	 official	 lamented:	“inhabitants	of	the	kingdom	live	at	the	mercy	of	the	landowners”	(cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	36).	However,	it	seems	the	authorities	disagreed	on	how	land	issues	should	be	addressed.		The	Viceroy	Manuel	Guirior	requested	a	Royal	Order	to	obligate	owners	to	give	up	lands	 that	were	not	productively	used.	The	Crown,	however,	was	not	 in	 favour	of	using	coercive	measures	against	landowners	and	argued	for	a	softer	policy	that	would	encourage	titleholders	to	rent	or	sell	 idle	 lands	(Mayorga,	2002;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982).	The	San	Lorenzo	Order	of	1754	and	the	San	Ildefonso	Order	of	1780	were	the	last	to	be	published	before	the	Wars	of	Independence.	The	latter	established	that	Royal	land	should	be	donated	to	those	in	need	and	who	were	willing	to	cultivate	the	soil,	rather	than	sold	to	the	highest	bidder,	even	if	this	went	against	the	immediate	financial	interests	of	the	Crown.	Both	Orders	asserted	the	eminent	domain	of	the	Spanish	State	and	its	right	to	confiscate	lands	that	were	not	 put	 to	 productive	 use	 (Machado,	 2009,	 pp.	 35–37).	 However,	 the	 1780	 Order	 also	contained	reassurances	that	legitimate	titleholders	would	“not	be	obligated	to	sell	or	rent	their	lands	against	their	will”	(cited	in	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982,	p.	142).	Whatever	the	intention	of	the	reforms,	at	the	end	of	the	18th	century,	large	haciendas	dominated	 the	 countryside	 in	 New	 Granada46.	 The	 hacienda	 had	 become	 “the	 most	important	social	structure	[…]	with	very	few	regional	exceptions,	the	hacienda	imprinted	its	seal	on	customs	and	social	values	and	was	the	basis	of	political	power	and	social	prestige”	(Jaramillo	Uribe,	 1996).	 The	hacendados	 extracted	 land	 rents	 from	 the	 direct	 producers	
                                                        46	As	noted	by	Jaramillo	(1996),	“though	the	large	haciendas	predominated,	there	were	regions	with	small	and	medium	property”.	For	example:	most	property	owners	in	the	Medellín	area	had	farms	of	less	than	3	hectares.	 Jaramillo	attributes	this	to	the	fact	that	the	Antioquian	economy	was	mainly	based	on	mining	and	commerce,	rather	than	agriculture.	
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“paid	 in	 money,	 in	 kind	 and	 in	 days	 of	 work”	 (Jaramillo	 Uribe,	 1996;	 Zamosc,	 1986;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982).	Zambrano	argues	that	sharecropping	and	tenant	farming	were	preferred	because	of	reduced	risks	and	costs;	he	claims	that	both	slave	and	wage	labour	required	large-scale	production	to	be	profitable	and	that	salaried	day	labourers	were	hired	only	for	specific	tasks	(p.	145).		In	any	case,	by	the	end	of	the	18th	century,	elites	no	longer	depended	on	the	obligatory	indigenous	tributes	that	had	defined	much	of	the	colonial	period.	Though	la	mita	was	not	formally	abolished	until	after	independence	in	1820	(Machado,	2009,	p.	42),	the	encomienda	system	began	disintegrating	long	before.	According	to	Jaramillo	(1996)	these	institutions	had	practically	vanished	in	most	regions	by	the	1740s.	Meanwhile,	the	Crown’s	land	policies	(whether	deliberately	 or	 not)	 contributed	 to	 a	 further	 concentration	 of	 property,	which	helped	ensure	subjugation	to	the	haciendas.	Despite	 the	socio-political	 importance	of	 the	hacienda,	agriculture	continued	 to	be	overshadowed	 by	 mining	 and	 commerce.	 New	 Granada	 never	 had	 extensive	 export-oriented	 plantations	 like	 those	 that	 existed	 in	 other	 colonies.	 The	 haciendas	 mostly	produced	 for	 regional	 and	 local	 consumption.	 In	 a	 few	exceptional	 cases	 they	produced	leather,	 cotton	 and	 cacao	 for	 international	 markets.	 Hence,	 the	 Spanish	 government’s	attempts	to	promote	diversification	had	limited	success:	though	agricultural	exports	tripled	towards	the	end	of	the	1700s,	non-mining	products	still	only	represented	around	10%	of	sales	abroad	(Jaramillo	Uribe,	1996;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982).	Notwithstanding	 the	 mediocre	 results	 of	 the	 Crown’s	 agricultural	 development	policies,	Zambrano	(1982)	argues	that	the	Bourbon	reforms	in	New	Granada	had	two	main	effects:	to	accelerate	changes	in	labour	exploitation	(see	above)	and	land	appropriation	(p.	153).	The	liberalisation	of	trade,	in	particular,	created	“expectations	of	linkages	to	the	world	market”,	which	provoked	a	shift	in	attitudes	towards	the	land.	It	“acquired	more	importance	as	 a	 factor	 of	 production	 and	 was	 converted	 into	 an	 object	 of	 commerce”	 (Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982,	pp.	140–141).	In	addition	to	prospects	of	land	valorisation,	the	landowning	elite	expanded	their	property	claims	in	order	to	retain	and	gain	labourers	for	their	estates	(ibid,	 pp.	 142-144).	 The	 “latifundios	 were	 constantly	 chasing	 the	 agrarian	 frontier”	 to	prevent	the	establishment	of	an	independent	peasantry	(Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982,	p.	144;	see	also	p.	147).	As	discussed	in	the	subsequent	chapter,	these	two	practices	-speculative	land	 acquisition	 and	 the	 use	 of	 property	 claims	 to	 acquire	 and	 retain	 a	 dependent	workforce-	continued	to	define	dispossession/displacement	throughout	the	19th	century.	
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The	 discontent	 of	 the	 dispossessed	 (in	 particular	 those	 displaced	 from	 the	
resguardos)	 contributed	 to	 the	 demise	 of	 Spanish	 rule,	 but	 Independence	 did	 not	 bring	about	the	transformations	the	masses	had	hoped	for	(Fals	Borda,	2009,	p.	61;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982,	p.	143).	As	argued	by	Zambrano	(1982):	“the	creole	oligarchy,	which	took	over	the	direction	of	the	independence	movement,	didn’t	feel	it	was	creating	a	revolution,	but	 instead	 inheriting	 power,	 considered	 its	 own”	 (p.	 164).	 And	 so,	 the	 inequities	 and	inefficiencies	of	the	colonial	land	regime	carried	over	to	19th	century	Colombia.		
Summary	and	conclusion	This	 chapter	 examined	 three	 overlapping	 waves	 of	 dispossession	 and	 displacement	 in	Colombia	during	the	colonial	era.	First,	 land	grabs	by	conquistadors	and	Spanish	settlers	resulted	 in	 the	 uncontrolled	 displacement	 of	 indigenous	 peoples,	 who	 were	 also	disappearing	 due	 to	 disease,	 war	 and	 genocide.	 This	 posed	 problems	 for	 the	 colonial	economy	of	the	16th	century,	which	depended	upon	the	exploitation	of	indigenous	labour.	Second,	in	response,	the	Crown	attempted	to	order	and	control	dispossession/displacement	through	involuntary	resettlement	and	related	resguardo	policy.	From	the	1590s	onwards,	colonial	authorities	began	to	allocate	lands	(known	as	resguardos)	to	indigenous	groups	and	forcibly	relocate	them	to	these	areas.	They	frequently	reorganised	the	resguardos	according	to	the	land	and	labour	requirements	of	the	colonial	economy.	Still,	some	indigenous	leaders	attempted	 to	 use	 colonial	 institutions	 to	 turn	 the	 resguardos	 into	 a	 cohesive	 and	 stable	territory	for	their	communities.	Third,	by	the	18th	century	the	tribute	system	was	no	longer	central	 to	 the	 colonial	 economy	 and	 the	 government	 began	 to	 dissolve	 the	 resguardos,	displacing	and	dispossessing	 indigenous	communities	yet	again.	Many	mestizo	and	poor	white	families	who	lived	in	the	resguardos	were	also	dispossessed/displaced	in	the	process.		Four	broad	observations	can	be	drawn	from	the	description	and	analysis	presented	in	this	chapter.	(i)	Labour	control	was	central	to	practices	and	policies	of	displacement	and	dispossession	during	the	colonial	era.	This	stands	in	contrast	to	contemporary	land	grabs,	which	are	primarily	aimed	at	controlling	the	land	itself	and	related	resources,	with	little	or	no	concern	for	the	labour	power	of	the	dispossessed	or	the	destination	of	the	displaced.	For	example,	recent	processes	of	involuntary	resettlement	(imposed	by	the	State)	have	mostly	been	 aimed	 at	 removing	 people	 from	 lands	 demanded	 for	 some	 investment	 or	 another,	rather	than	relocating	them	to	places	where	their	labour	is	required	–	as	in	the	colonial	era.		
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	(ii)	Private	land	grabs,	law,	policy	and	different	economic/political	interests	interact	in	complex	and	contradictory	ways	and	require	extensive	analysis.	For	example,	the	Crown	ordered	its	conquistadors	and	settlers	to	respect	the	‘property	of	the	indians’	and	forbade	the	 encomenderos	 from	 ‘disposing’	 of	 indigenous	 peoples’	 lands.	 Nevertheless,	 it	simultaneously	encouraged	and	facilitated	these	processes	of	dispossession,	including	-but	not	only-	through	the	policy	of	composición,	which	allowed	for	the	legalisation	of	unofficial	land	appropriations.	Also,	the	problems	generated	by	private	land	grabs	motivated,	at	least	partially,	the	implementation	of	the	resguardo	titling	program,	which	was	part	of	the	State’s	attempt	to	control	(not	halt)	processes	of	dispossession	and	displacement	–	a	policy,	it	is	worth	reiterating,	that	many	encomenderos	opposed.	(iii)	In	Colombia,	the	tension	between	property	rights	and	(in	this	case	non-capitalist	forms	of)	economic	development	was	manifest	even	in	the	colonial	era.	Over	centuries,	the	Crown	passed	numerous	legislations,	ostensibly	to	address	illicit	land	grabs	(i.e.	those	not	condoned	by	the	State)	and	the	formation	of	unproductive	latifundia.	However,	its	short-term	fiscal	interests	eclipsed	concerns	for	ensuring	that	lands	were	used	productively.	This	tension	 intensified	 in	 the	 latter	half	of	 the	18th	century	during	the	Bourbon	reforms:	 the	colonial	government	was	eager	to	increase	and	diversify	production	within	the	colonies	and	was	aware	 that	unproductive	 land	hoarding	was	a	hindrance	 to	 these	goals.	The	Crown	reiterated	its	right	to	confiscate	lands	that	were	not	put	to	productive	use,	but	ultimately	decided	against	coercive	measures,	presumably	in	fear	of	an	elite	revolt	–	which	eventually	happened	anyway.		(iv)	The	drivers	and	outcomes	of	dispossession	and	displacement	are	so	varied	that	any	assumptions	about	 them	would	be	 ill	 advised.	Colonial	 land	grabs	 in	 the	Colombian	territories	were	essential	to	the	gold-centred	economy	that	dominated	for	approximately	three	hundred	years.	The	Spanish	and	the	elites	in	New	Granada	clearly	profited	from	the	dispossession	 of	 Colombia’s	 indigenous	 peoples.	 However,	 as	 this	 chapter	 has	 shown,	neither	 the	 amassing	 of	 huge	 swathes	 of	 land	 by	 the	 encomenderos	 and	 other	 powerful	Spanish	settlers,	nor	the	exodus	of	indigenous	peoples	that	this	prompted,	were	favourable	to	 economic	 development	 –	 capitalist	 or	 otherwise.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 early	 colonial	economy,	which	depended	upon	the	exploitation	of	indigenous	labour,	was	destabilised	by	the	uncontrolled	displacement	of	the	dispossessed.	On	the	other	hand,	unproductive	land	concentration	is	said	to	have	encumbered	agricultural	production	–	much	of	the	rural	elite	in	 New	 Granada	 were	 nothing	 like	 Locke’s	 idealised	 improving	 landlords.	 In	 contrast,	involuntary	 resettlement,	 which	 was	 essentially	 a	 State	 policy	 of	 dispossession	 and	
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displacement,	played	a	much	clearer	role	in	upholding	the	colonial	economy,	as	it	served	both	the	land	and	labour	demands	of	the	regime.	The	later	dissolution	of	the	resguardos,	yet	another	form	of	dispossession	and	displacement,	was	supposed	to	boost	production.	The	short	and	medium-term	effects	it	had	on	actual	agricultural	output	are	unclear.	What	is	clear	is	that	it	contributed	to	the	consolidation	of	patently	non-capitalist	haciendas,	which	many	historians	 have	 labelled	 as	 economically	 inefficient.	 Finally,	Wood	 (2002)	 suggests	 that	Spain	“expended	its	massive	colonial	wealth	in	essentially	feudal	pursuits”	and	points	out	that	many	scholars	believe	the	country’s	dependence	on	the	gold	and	silver	it	stole	from	the	Americas	actually	hindered	its	economic	development	(pp.	148-149	and	151).	In	this	sense,	any	attempt	to	apply	the	primitive	accumulation	concept	to	the	processes	described	in	this	chapter	may	obscure	rather	than	illuminate	our	understanding.	As	argued	in	the	subsequent	chapter,	 elite-led	 dispossession,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 continued	 to	 hinder	 economic	development	in	Colombia	during	the	19th	century	post-independence.			 	
Figures	2	&	3	–	The	“Viceroyalty	of	Santa	Fé”	or	“New	Granada”	in	1810	
	
 
 
 Note:	Figure	2	is	the	original	image	and	Figure	3	is	a	cropped	version	of	the	same	image.	Original	Source:	Atlas	geográfico	e	histórico	de	la	República	de	Colombia,	1890.	Legal	 license	notice:	Agostino	Codazzi	 creator	QS:P170,Q1888523,	Manuel	Maria	Paz,	Felipe	Pérez,	División	política	del	Vireinato	de	Santafé	1810,	marked	as	public	domain,	more	details	on	Wikimedia	Commons.	
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The	political	economy	of	land	in	19th	century	Colombia:	privatisation,	
property	concentration	and	dispossession	on	the	agrarian	frontier	
	This	 chapter	 sketches	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 land	 in	 19th	 century	 Colombia,	 focusing	especially	on	the	dispossession	of	frontier	settlers	in	the	mid	to	late	1800s.	It	shows	that	this	usurpation	was	mainly,	though	not	solely,	driven	by	traditional	landowners’	interests	in	 maintaining	 and	 expanding	 a	 dependent	 workforce	 within	 a	 predominantly	 non-capitalist	 regime	 of	 production	 and	 labour	 exploitation.	 On	 this	 basis,	 I	 argue	 that	 land	grabbing	 by	 elite	 groups	 in	 post-independence	 Colombia	 contributed	 little	 to	 the	development	of	domestic	capitalism.	 I	also	examine	how	 ‘early	globalisation’	 fuelled	and	shaped	a	national	land	rush	and	ensuing	social	conflicts.	More	generally,	as	with	the	other	historical	chapters	in	this	thesis,	the	narrative	that	follows	facilitates	a	better	understanding	of	 the	 origins	 of	 Colombia’s	 contemporary	 land	 issues,	 by	 illustrating	 how	 the	 property	regime	 actually	 formed,	 while	 also	 offering	 a	 point	 of	 comparison	 and	 insights	 into	continuity	and	change.		The	first	section	offers	an	overview	of	the	post-independence	context.	This	is	followed	by	 a	 brief	 description	 of	 land	 privatisation	 in	 the	 early	 and	 mid-19th	 century.	 The	government	began	 selling	 and	 conceding	baldíos,	 as	well	 as	 issuing	bonds	 that	 could	be	redeemed	for	these	State	lands.	This	spurt	of	privatisation	was	mainly	aimed	at	paying	off	government	debt,	but	 concessions	were	also	offered	 in	exchange	 for	 the	 construction	of	infrastructure	 and	 to	 encourage	 settlement	 in	 ‘peripheral’	 areas.	 Like	 its	 colonial	predecessor,	the	newly	independent	State	prioritised	fiscal	objectives	for	much	of	the	19th	century,	contributing	to	further	land	concentration.		The	 third	 section	 examines	 some	 key	 liberal	 reforms	 of	 the	 mid-19th	 century,	 in	particular:	the	abolition	of	slavery	and	the	land	and	labour	conflicts	that	followed;	resguardo	partition/privatisation	 and	 the	 subsequent	 strengthening	 of	 the	 haciendas;	 and	 the	confiscation	 and	 auction	 of	 Church	 property,	 which	 further	 entrenched	 the	 unequal	property	regime.	The	liberal	ideals	that	were	meant	to	represent	a	break	from	the	colonial	past	only	served	to	concentrate	land	in	the	hands	of	a	minority	and	reproduce	the	agrarian	structures	formed	under	Spanish	rule.	
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Section	 four	examines	 the	baldío	 policy	 reforms	of	 the	1870s	and	1880s.	Growing	global	demand	 for	 raw	materials	and	 food	stuffs	prompted	a	 land	rush	around	 the	mid-century,	which	meant	that	property	rights	acquired	increasing	importance	in	frontier	zones.	The	new	 legislations	marked	a	 shift	 away	 from	 fiscal-driven	 land	policy.	They	sought	 to	encourage	agricultural	expansion	by	improving	legal	protections	for	peasant	settlers	who	cultivated	State	terrain	(including	a	rule	essentially	designed	to	prevent	dispossession)	and	by	making	the	validity	of	newly	granted	titles	conditional	upon	economic	use	of	the	land.	Nevertheless,	the	contents	of	these	policies	were	contradictory;	for	this	and	other	reasons,	accelerated	privatisation	disproportionately	benefitted	large	landowners.	The	 fifth	 and	 sixth	 sections	 present	 the	 basic	 dynamics	 of	 agricultural	 frontier	migration	in	the	mid	to	late	19th	century.	Frontier	lands	offered	the	masses	the	possibility	of	breaking	free	from	exploitative	work	relations.	In	a	context	of	labour	scarcity,	this	was	particularly	problematic	 for	 the	 landed	elite,	who	attempted	 to	 recreate	 and	maintain	 a	dependent	workforce	through	multiple	methods	(punitive	labour	laws,	police	control,	debt	trickery),	but	especially	by	asserting	property	rights	over	vast	tracts	of	land.	The	laws	that	theoretically	favoured	peasant	settlers	were	largely	ineffective,	and	many	were	forced	to	become	tenants	or	 labourers	on	 land	that	was	once	their	own	or	were	displaced	further	afield.	Some	resisted	dispossession,	resulting	in	conflicts	that	could	last	for	decades.	Labour	acquisition	was	not	 the	only	motivation	 for	 land	grabbing	during	 this	period.	Some	 ‘real	estate	developers’	sought	to	profit	from	frontier	migration	by	forcing	settlers	to	pay	for	the	land	they	occupied.	Nevertheless,	many	acts	of	dispossession	during	the	19th	century	did	not	correspond	to	an	interest	in	the	land	itself,	but	rather	in	control	over	labour.		The	final	section	outlines	the	main	characteristics	of	the	Colombian	economy	in	the	late	19th	 century	and	 furthers	 the	argument	 that	elite-led	 land	dispossession	during	 this	period	contributed	little	to	the	development	of	capitalism.	I	suggest	that	this	land	grabbing	actually	hindered	economic	development	(capitalist	or	otherwise)	in	the	double	sense	that	the	dispossessed	were	being	forcibly	 incorporated	into	a	 ‘semi-servile’	and	economically	inefficient	 hacienda	 regime	 and	 because	 unproductive	 land	 hoarding	 stifled	 peasant	production,	which	was	becoming	increasingly	important	to	the	wider	national	economy.					
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1)	Post-independence	Colombia	What	is	now	Colombia	was	part	of	five	different	States	after	the	declaration	of	independence	in	181047.	These	incorporated	varying	parts	of	present-day	Ecuador,	Venezuela,	Panama,	Peru	and	Brazil	 (see	Figure	1	vs.	Figures	2&3).	Even	after	 the	Republic	of	Colombia	was	formed	in	1886,	the	country’s	external	borders	and	internal	regional	divisions	continued	to	change	 considerably.	 For	 example:	 in	 1887	 the	 country	was	divided	 into	 just	 9	political	regions	 (compared	 to	 32	 since	 1991),	 including	 Panama	 (separated	 in	 1903)	 and	 an	enormous	Cauca	province,	which	stretched	into	territories	that	have	since	been	assimilated	into	 neighbouring	 countries	 (Sociedad	 Geográfica	 de	 Colombia,	 2017).	 For	 the	 sake	 of	simplicity,	I	use	the	label	‘Colombia’	flexibly,	focusing	on	those	regions	that	remain	part	of	the	country	today.	During	the	19th	century,	Colombia	 lived	through	the	Wars	of	 Independence	(1810-1819),	followed	by	8	civil	wars	and	a	dozen	local	armed	conflicts48.	This	almost	continuous	violence	links	closely	to	contested	State-formation	(Moncayo	Cruz,	2015,	pp.	38–40).	The	country	teetered	between	liberal	and	conservative	regimes,	and	federal	and	central	forms	of	government,	which	mixed	with	regional	power	skirmishes	and	diverse	class	struggles.	It	is	not	my	intention	to	explain	these	violent	conflicts	and	the	socioeconomic,	political	and	territorial	transformations	of	which	they	were	part.	However,	it	is	worth	emphasising	the	tumultuous	 setting	 in	which	 the	 processes	 described	 in	 this	 chapter	 -land	privatisation,	agricultural	expansion	and	frontier	migration-	took	place.		Many	people	were	uprooted	by	the	unrelenting	violence	(Tovar	Pinzón,	1996)	and,	according	to	Tirado,	land	“usurpation	came	with	every	civil	war”,	facilitating	the	expansion	of	the	latifundios	“at	the	expense	of	the	peasantry”	(cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	54).	Still,	it	would	be	inaccurate	to	conclude	that	the	landowning	elite	emerged	unscathed.	The	Wars	of	Independence,	 in	particular,	 debilitated	many	 colonial	 haciendas:	workers	were	 forcibly	recruited	to	battle,	buildings	were	occupied	as	bases,	agricultural	produce	and	other	goods	were	commandeered	to	supply	the	armies,	and	the	credit	system	broke	down.	Civilians	and	
                                                        47	These	include:	United	Provinces	of	New	Granada	(1811-1816);	Gran	Colombia	(1819-1831);	the	Republic	of	New	Granada	(1831-1858);	the	Granadine	Confederation	(1858-1863);	the	United	States	of	Colombia	(1863-1886);	and	finally	the	Republic	of	Colombia	(1886-present).	48	The	Battle	of	Boyacá	in	1819	is	considered	decisive	in	the	War	of	Independence.	However,	the	final	battle	was	in	1824.	Posterior	conflicts	include:	The	War	of	Supremes	(1839-1841),	Civil	War	of	1851,	Civil	War	of	1854,	Civil	War	of	1860-1862,	Civil	War	of	1876-1877,	Civil	War	of	1884-1885,	Civil	War	of	1895	and	the	War	of	a	Thousand	Days	(1899-1902).	In	addition,	Colombia	is	said	to	have	suffered	14	local	wars	during	the	1800s	(Moncayo	Cruz,	2015,	p.	20).	
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soldiers	began	to	loot	loyalist	wealth.	Some	peasants	used	the	Wars	as	an	opportunity	to	take	vengeance	against	their	oppressors;	many	landowners	abandoned	their	haciendas	and	fled	the	country.	Finally,	the	newly	independent	government	confiscated	properties	of	those	loyal	to	the	Crown	(Machado,	2009;	Tovar	Pinzón,	1996;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982).		Nevertheless,	 independence	 did	 not	 radically	 transform	 social	 property	 relations.	Many	 liberation	 heroes	 were	 themselves	 from	 wealthy	 landowning	 families.	 Hence,	countless	colonial	 titles	were	 left	 intact.	Furthermore,	high-ranking	military	officials	and	regional	 elites	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 republican	 cause	 were	 the	 main	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	abandoned	and	confiscated	properties	that	formerly	belonged	to	Spanish	loyalists.	Overall,	the	landowning	class	managed	to	conserve	and	adapt	the	hacienda	system	and	independent	Colombia	 inherited	 the	 unequal	 agrarian	 structures	 formed	 during	 the	 colonial	 era.	 A	privileged	few	controlled	the	most	fertile	and	strategically	located	lands	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	74,	53);	while	much	-perhaps	most-	of	the	rural	population	“worked	in	the	haciendas	under	nonwage	arrangements	as	sharecroppers,	tenants,	peons,	or	domestic	laborers”	(F.	Sánchez,	del	Pilar	López-Uribe,	&	Fazio,	2010,	p.	379).			
2)	Privatisation	policies	and	land	concentration	in	the	early	to	mid-19th	century	Notwithstanding	the	landed	power	of	the	elites,	the	majority	of	the	country’s	lands	were	not	covered	by	legal	private	titles	and	hence	were	considered	baldíos	or	State	property.	These	
baldíos	were	at	 the	 centre	of	19th	 century	 land	policy,	 directed	by	 three	main	goals:	 the	resolution	 of	 government	 financial	 problems,	 the	 stimulation	 of	 economic	 development	(construction	 of	 infrastructure	 and	 agricultural	 expansion)	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	settlements	 in	 marginal	 areas.	 Like	 its	 Spanish	 predecessors,	 the	 newly	 independent	government	allowed	fiscal	interests	to	trump	other	purposes	for	much	of	the	19th	century49,	which	contributed	to	entrenched	land	concentration.	Independence	came	with	heavy	financial	burdens.	The	State	had	accrued	enormous	debts	 during	 the	 wars	 with	 Spain	 and	 its	 coffers	 were	 practically	 empty.	 The	 multiple	domestic	 armed	 conflicts	 that	 followed	only	 increased	pressure	 on	 the	Treasury	 (Tovar	Pinzón,	 1996;	 Zambrano	 Pantoja,	 1982).	 Successive	 governments	 attempted	 to	 use	 the	
                                                        49	During	the	first	phase	of	baldío	policy	(1820-1870),	the	government	prioritised	payment	of	foreign	and	 domestic	 debts	 through	 bond	 issuance	 and	 auctions,	while	 during	 the	 second	 phase	 (1870-1930),	policy	shifted	towards	productive	use	of	frontier	lands	(Le	Grand	cited	in	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010;	Machado,	2009).	
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country’s	 land	wealth	 to	help	 resolve	 these	 fiscal	difficulties.	Legislation	passed	 in	1826	made	the	payment	of	external	loans	via	the	sale	or	renting	of	baldío	territory	a	formal	policy.	At	the	time,	most	baldío	lands	had	low	monetary	value,	and	the	government	had	to	privatise	enormous	 swathes	 in	 order	 to	 make	 a	 tiny	 dent	 in	 the	 amount	 owed	 to	 its	 creditors	(Machado,	 2009,	 pp.	 62–63).	 This	 fiscal-driven	 land	 policy	 was	 maintained	 throughout	much	 of	 the	 19th	 century;	 lawmakers	 ranked	 national	 debt	 payment	 as	 the	 priority	destination	of	baldío	concessions	as	late	as	1873	(ibid,	pp.	92-94).		The	government	began	issuing	land	bonds	or	“certificates	of	public	debt	redeemable	in	public	lands”	(F.	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010,	p.	382).	It	had	hoped	that	foreign	recipients	would	redeem	 these	 land	 bonds,	 increasing	 the	 country’s	 population	 and	 agricultural	development.	Land	bonds	were	also	used	to	meet	obligations	owed	to	military	officials	and	soldiers	that	could	not	be	covered	with	the	properties	confiscated	from	Spanish	loyalists.	Many	 of	 the	 original	 recipients	 sold	 their	 bonds,	 creating	 a	 secondary	 market,	 which	facilitated	further	land	concentration	(Vélez	Álvarez,	2012,	p.	3;	F.	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010,	p.	382;	Machado,	2009,	pp.	74–75;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982,	p.	184).	According	to	Zambrano	(1982),	national	speculators	acquired	significant	quantities	of	these	land	bonds	at	reduced	rates	(e.g.	5%	of	their	nominal	value)	–	this	speculation	became	one	of	the	most	important	“mechanisms”	of	land	concentration	in	the	early	19th	century	(pp.	184	and	188-189).	The	State	also	offered	individuals	and	companies	direct	titles	and	bonds	to	encourage	the	construction	of	infrastructure	such	as	roads,	bridges,	and	railways.	Between	1832	and	1850,	some	654,600	 fanegadas	or	more	than	400,000	ha	of	baldío	 lands	were	granted	in	exchange	for	public	works.	A	single	law	(passed	in	April	1854)	conceded	128,000	hectares	to	 one	 General	 Tomás	 Cipriano	 de	Mosquera	 as	 a	 subsidy	 for	 construction	 of	 the	 road	between	Cali	and	Buenaventura	(details	of	individual	contracts	provided	in	Machado,	2009,	pp.	72–74).	According	to	Machado	(2009),	in	a	handful	of	cases	the	promised	infrastructure	was	never	completed,	but	the	businesses/individuals	kept	the	land	anyway	(p.	58).	Finally,	 the	 government	 attempted	 to	 entice	 settlement	 in	marginal	 territories	 by	offering	small	land	grants	with	conditions	attached,	requiring	that	the	beneficiary	live	on	and	cultivate	the	assigned	land.	Initial	policy	was	especially	generous	towards	foreigners,	presumably	because	the	government	assumed	they	were	more	likely	to	bring	investment	than	their	domestic	counterparts.	However,	diverse	schemes	failed	to	attract	European	and	North	American	migrants,	and	policy	later	shifted	towards	promoting	‘internal	colonisation	of	the	agricultural	frontier’	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	69–71).	As	discussed	below,	even	policies	expressly	designed	to	favour	peasant	settlers	were	unable	to	halt	land	concentration.	
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3)	Liberal	reform:	the	end	of	slavery	and	privatisation	of	resguardo	and	Church	lands	In	the	second	half	of	the	19th	century,	the	government	set	in	motion	a	number	of	reforms,	including	but	not	limited	to:	freedom	of	press	and	religion;	the	cancellation	of	colonial	taxes	such	 as	 the	 diezmo50;	 the	 gradual	 liberalisation	 of	 trade;	 the	 abolition	 of	 slavery;	 the	privatization	of	resguardo	land;	and	the	confiscation	of	ecclesiastical	property.	This	is	often	referred	to	as	the	period	of	‘radical	liberalism’.	Many	authors	represent	these	reforms	as	the	moment	when	Colombia	shook	off	its	colonial	past.	However,	as	we	shall	see,	old	habits	die	hard.	The	Rionegro	Constitution	of	1863	was	only	in	place	until	1886;	the	Constitution	that	replaced	it	reversed	many	reforms	achieved	just	over	two	decades	earlier.	The	push	and	pull	of	radical,	moderate	liberal	and	conservative	forces	created	conflicts	that	carried	over	to	 the	 20th	 century	 (Cardona	 Alzate,	 2013;	 Machado,	 2009;	 Melo,	 1996).	 This	 section	focuses	on	some	of	these	reforms	with	the	aim	of	explaining	continuity	and	change	in	the	political	economy	of	land.	The	 struggles	 between	 slave	 resistance	 movements	 and	 anti-abolitionist	 groups	contributed	 to	 numerous	 local	 and	 regional	 conflicts	 post-independence.	 Even	 after	abolition	in	1851,	some	slave	‘owners’	refused	to	give	in,	contributing	to	yet	another	civil	war.	Violent	conflicts	over	land	and	labour	followed.	The	hacendados	attempted	to	tie	freed	slaves	to	the	haciendas	through	debt	bondage	and	other	forms	of	servitude	–	with	relative	success.	Nevertheless,	many	Afro-Colombians	 relocated	 to	 remote	areas	and	established	subsistence	 communities.	 Some	 joined	 the	 masses	 of	 small-scale	 independent	 miners	(mazamorreros),	whose	modest	panning	ventures	accounted	for	a	considerable	portion	of	national	 gold	production51.	Others	 stayed	put,	but	 resisted	 the	new	 forms	of	oppression	mentioned	above	(Ángel,	2012b,	2012c,	2012d;	Fals	Borda,	2009;	Tovar	Pinzón,	1996).		In	the	North	of	Cauca,	for	example,	freed	slaves	occupied	unused	hacienda	land	and	refused	 to	 pay	 rents.	 The	hacendados	 imposed	 numerous	 evictions	with	 the	 support	 of	government	 troops,	 while	 black	 communities	 organised	 small	 guerrilla	 and	 armed	 self-defence	groups.	These	land	conflicts	in	northern	Cauca	carried	on	into	the	early	20th	century	
                                                        50	 The	 ecclesiastical	 diezmo,	 which	 applied	 specifically	 to	 the	 agricultural	 sector,	 demanded	 a	contribution	of	between	30%	and	40%	of	production	(Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982,	pp.	184–185).	51	Tovar	(1996)	claims	that	independent	small-scale	mining	took	off	 in	the	18th	century	and	grew	further	with	the	abolition	of	slavery.	According	to	Jaramillo	(1996),	at	the	end	of	the	18th	century	these	 mazamorreros	 already	 accounted	 for	 some	 80%	 of	 gold	 production	 in	 Antioquia.	 Many	communities	combined	panning	with	subsistence	agriculture	(Melo,	1996).	
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(Ángel,	2012c,	2012d)	–	a	period	defined	by	diverse	agrarian	struggles,	as	discussed	in	the	following	chapter.	According	to	Ángel	(2012c),	the	regional	landowning	elite	was	eventually	forced	to	break	up	its	estates	and	sell	them	piece	by	piece	to	local	Afro	inhabitants:	“by	1940	the	North	of	Cauca	was	home	to	an	economically	and	socially	autonomous	community	of	black	campesinos”,	who	were	able	to	successfully	compete	on	the	global	cacao	market.	While	 the	Black	population	was	united	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 slavery,	 for	 indigenous	communities	the	benefits	of	the	government’s	‘modernising’	reforms	were	not	so	clear-cut.	After	 independence,	 the	 government	 ordered	 an	 end	 to	 the	 tribute	 system	 and	 the	restitution	of	usurped	resguardo	lands.	Nevertheless,	it	also	stipulated	that	the	resguardos	would	be	partitioned	into	individual	plots.	Legislation	passed	in	1850	reiterated	the	order	to	 partition	 and	 privatise	 resguardo	 lands	 and	 declared	 complete	 freedom	 to	 sell	 and	purchase	 the	 resulting	 titles.	The	decision	was	presented	as	a	 recognition	of	 indigenous	peoples’	rights	to	private	property	(Fals	Borda,	2009,	pp.	62–63;	Machado,	2009,	pp.	48–49;	Patiño,	1995;	Tovar	Pinzón,	1996).	However,	according	to	Fals	Borda	(2009),	the	underlying	objective	was	to	“cut	their	ties	to	the	land	they	had	received	and	to	leave	them	disposed	to	work	as	peons	on	the	haciendas	or	plantations”	(p.	63;	see	also	Ángel,	2012e).	Whether	or	not	 this	 was	 the	 intention,	 it	 was	 certainly	 a	 common	 result:	 “many	 families	 were	 left	without	sufficient	lands”	and	“a	considerable	portion	of	the	work	force	that	used	to	live	in	the	resguardos	 […]	became	sharecroppers,	renters,	or	simple	day	 labourers”.	Meanwhile,	parcels	 apportioned	 from	 the	 collective	 titles	 were	 “[re-]consolidated”	 to	 “form	 new	haciendas”	(ibid,	p.	64).	Indigenous	groups	resisted	but	only	a	select	few	colonial	resguardos	survived	the	onslaught	(Ángel,	2012e;	Machado,	2009,	pp.	48–49;	Tovar	Pinzón,	1996).	The	 resguardo	 and	 the	 cabildo	were	 reinstated	 under	 Law	 89	 of	 1890.	 The	 new	Conservative	government	restored	these	colonial	institutions	as	part	of	its	plan	to	‘promote	civilisation’	and	 ‘govern’	 the	 so-called	 ‘savages’	via	Catholic	missions.	As	 in	 the	past,	 the	recognition	of	indigenous	land	claims	was	a	function	of	other	motives.	Ironically,	however,	this	 overtly	 racist	 law,	became	a	key	 tool	 of	 indigenous	 resistance,	 used	 to	defend	 their	territories	via	the	resguardos,	the	right	to	self-government	or	autonomy	via	the	cabildos	and	to	counter	other	 legislation	that	permitted	the	sale/confiscation	(many	more	 indigenous	communities	were	 dispossessed	 in	 this	way	 during	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 20th	 century)	 of	
resguardo	lands	(Jiménez	Herrera,	2014;	Pineda	Camacho,	2002).	The	same	discourse	that	underwrote	the	privatisation	of	the	resguardos	was	also	used	to	 attack	 the	Church’s	 land	 control.	 In	1861,	 the	 government	 (still	 Liberal	 at	 this	 point)	passed	a	decree	to	confiscate	ecclesiastical	property,	a	policy	known	as	desamortización.	
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Many	 of	 the	 Church’s	 assets	 were	 ‘surrendered	 to	 God’	 through	 testaments	 and	 wills.	Ecclesiastical	real	estate	was	 inalienable	 -it	could	not	be	bought	and	sold-	under	Church	rules.	Liberals	argued	that	the	hoarding	of	land	by	religious	institutions	was	detrimental	to	economic	development,	which	required	the	free	exchange	of	private	property	(Knowlton,	1969;	Machado,	2009).		Some	 observers	 lauded	 the	 redistributive	 potential	 of	 the	 confiscations;	 however,	these	properties	were	sold	at	public	auction.	The	decision	to	sell	the	Church’s	land	to	the	highest	bidder	was	motivated	by	fiscal	concerns:	“proceeds	from	the	sale	of	the	confiscated	property	were	earmarked	expressly	for	the	reduction	of	the	internal	debt”	(Knowlton,	1969,	p.	392).	As	in	the	past,	the	government’s	financial	problems	ended	up	dictating	policy;	“the	unfortunate	 result	 was	 to	 replace	 one	 kind	 of	 property	 concentration	 with	 another”	(Knowlton,	1969,	p.	400;		see	also	Machado,	2009,	pp.	85–86).	Ironically,	much	of	the	income	gained	 from	 the	 auctions	 would	 eventually	 be	 channelled	 back	 to	 the	 Church	 as	compensation	for	the	confiscations.	The	Conservative	government,	which	gained	power	in	the	1880s,	“restored	to	the	Church	all	property	not	yet	disposed	of	and	acknowledged	as	a	debt	the	value	of	the	real	estate	[already]	sold”	(Knowlton,	1969,	p.	401).		All	in	all,	the	liberal	ideals	that	were	meant	to	represent	a	break	from	the	colonial	past	served	to	further	concentrate	land	in	the	hands	of	a	minority	and	reproduce	the	inefficient	and	inequitable	agrarian	structures	formed	under	Spanish	rule.	One	partial	exception	to	this	tendency	was	the	abolition	of	slavery	and	the	resulting	expansion	of	free	black	communities	in	 ‘peripheral’	 territories,	 as	 well	 as	 their	 establishment	 -via	 decades	 of	 struggle-	 as	independent	producers	within	hacienda-dominated	 areas.	Nevertheless,	 as	 noted	 above,	many	 freed	slaves	were	 forced	 into	other	 forms	of	 servitude,	 such	as	debt	bondage;	 the	elite’s	land	monopoly	limited	the	social	transformations	brought	about	by	abolition.		Alongside	 the	 privatisation	 of	 resguardo	 and	 Church	 land,	 the	 disposal	 of	 baldíos	continued	apace.	The	great	majority	of	newly	privatised	lands	were	acquired	by	speculators	and	a	very	small	percentage	were	actually	occupied	and	cultivated	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	94–95).	Some	politicians	were	critical	of	 these	 laissez-faire	 land	policies,	which	 they	argued	served	“the	greed	of	the	strongest	[…]	best	situated	to	take	advantage	of	‘let	it	be	and	let	it	pass’	[…	and	had	generated]	a	scandalous	waste	of	that	great	fountain	of	wealth”	(Manuel	Murillo	Toro,	Treasury	Secretary	in	1851,	cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	78).	The	government	eventually	changed	baldío	policy	in	the	1870s;	though	certainly	more	progressive	than	what	they	replaced,	these	new	legislations	did	not	put	an	end	to	the	‘scandalous	waste’	of	land,	as	explained	in	the	following	section.	
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4)	Export	booms,	accelerated	privatisation	and	the	1874/1882	baldío	policy	reforms		Despite	 the	 squandering	 of	 baldíos	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 independence,	 an	 estimated	 75%	 of	Colombian	 lands	were	 still	 in	 the	 public	 domain	 as	 of	 1850.	 These	baldíos	were	mostly	located	in	isolated	tropical	lowlands,	“but	throughout	the	Andes	and	along	the	coast,	vast	properties	 formed	 in	 the	 colonial	 period	 lay	 interspersed	with	 equally	 vast	 expanses	 of	public	lands	to	which	no	one	claimed	ownership”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	29).	This	soon	began	to	change,	partially	as	a	result	of	improving	economic	prospects,	linked	to	a	rise	in	global	demand	for	raw	materials.		While	 Colombia’s	 participation	 in	 early	 globalisation	 was	 comparatively	 weak	(Bejarano,	1983;	F.	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010),	this	economic	uptick	still	had	considerable	knock-on	social	and	political	effects.	Furthermore,	available	data	reveals	a	marked	transition	away	from	the	historical	dependence	on	mining	exports,	which	arguably	in	itself	represents	an	important	economic	transformation.	According	to	Zambrano,	agricultural	produce	(cotton,	coffee,	 tobacco,	 indigo	 and	 leather)	 and	 products	 extracted	 from	 the	 country’s	 forests	(rubber	and	quina	for	the	production	of	quinine)	came	to	represent	the	majority	of	sales	abroad	(rising	from	8%	of	total	exports	in	1835	to	almost	65%	in	1855)	for	the	first	time	in	Colombian	history	in	the	mid	19th	century.	Meanwhile,	mining	exports	fell	from	74%	to	just	under	15%	(Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982,	p.	189).	Melo	(1996)	provides	more	disaggregated	data	 and	 includes	 later	 periods,	 allowing	 for	 the	 identification	 of	 successive	 economic	booms:	tobacco	in	the	1850s,	quina	in	the	1880s,	and	banana	and	coffee	in	the	1890s.	As	argued	by	LeGrand	(1984),	“hacendados	who	aimed	to	profit	from	improved	world	market	conditions	by	producing	export	crops	had	first	to	increase	their	labor	force”	(p.	27).	However,	 the	 ‘open’	 agricultural	 frontier	made	 it	 difficult	 to	 retain	workers	 ‘freed’	 from	their	colonial	chains.	It	is	in	this	context	that	dispossession	-in	particular,	the	assertion	of	property	 rights	over	baldío	 lands	used	by	peasant	 settlers-	became	a	key	mechanism	of	labour	acquisition	and	control.			 Prior	to	the	economic	booms	of	the	mid	to	late	19th	century,	peasant	settlers	(colonos)	mostly	relied	on	informal	land	rights;	“little	more	was	needed	because	the	frontier	land	was	abundant	and	economic	opportunities	from	land	were	limited”	(F.	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010,	p.	380).	 However,	 rising	 migration,	 combined	 with	 new	 profit-making	 possibilities,	 led	 to	
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increased	 land	 values52.	 Property	 rights	 acquired	 a	 new	 relevance	 in	 frontier	 zones.	Traditional	landowners	began	to	assert	the	validity	of	timeworn	colonial	titles	for	lands	that	they	 had	 left	 unexploited.	 Others	 forged	 entirely	 new	 ownership	 claims.	 Bondholders	rushed	to	trade	 in	 their	papers	 for	 land.	 In	short,	changes	 in	global	economic	conditions	contributed	 to	 a	 land	 rush,	 which	 accelerated	 the	 privatisation	 process53,	 as	 well	 as	prompting	alterations	to	baldío	policy.		The	government	 sought	 to	 “encourage	 the	expansion	of	 the	agricultural	 economy”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	38)	by	offering	land	grants	to	those	who	established	crops	in	previously	uncultivated	zones.	Law	61	of	1874	recognised	settlers	who	cultivated	baldío	 land	for	at	least	five	consecutive	years	as	‘possessors’,	making	them	eligible	for	property	titles.	The	law	also	established	that	titles	gained	through	possession	could	be	revoked	if	the	beneficiary	left	the	land	abandoned	for	more	than	four	years.	Law	48	of	1882	built	upon	and	modified	the	1874	legislation.	It	specified	that	settlers	should	have	access	to	fair	legal	proceedings	when	their	land	claims	were	challenged.	They	could	not	be	expelled	from	the	land	unless	their	challenger	could	show	a	legal	title	granted	prior	to	the	dispute.	If	a	court	ruled	that	the	cultivator	had	unknowingly	(in	‘good	faith’)	settled	on	private	property,	the	titleholder	was	required	to	compensate	the	occupant	 for	crops	and	improvements	prior	to	eviction.	The	new	 law	 also	 imposed	 limits	 on	 individual	 concessions	 (5,000	 ha	 maximum)	 and	 the	enclosure	of	surrounding	lands,	as	new	titles	could	not	cover	more	than	double	the	area	cultivated.	 In	 other	words,	 legislation	 appeared	 to	 discourage	 speculative	 accumulation	(Melo,	1996;	Machado,	2009,	pp.	92–93;	F.	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010,	p.	382).		According	 to	 LeGrand	 (1984),	 these	 were	 the	 first	 legislations	 (apart	 from	 those	promoting	government-planned	settlements)	aimed	specifically	at	benefitting	independent	settlers.	 They	 “permitted	 peasants	 to	 form	 homesteads	 wherever	 they	 wished	 on	 the	national	domain”	and	meant	“that	the	land	they	farmed	was	legally	theirs	and	should	not	be	taken	from	them,	even	if	they	had	not	as	yet	obtained	written	titles”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	38).	But	things	worked	quite	differently	in	practice,	as	shown	in	subsequent	sections.		
                                                        52	Land	prices	 increased	rapidly	 in	 some	areas:	 “notary	data	on	 land	sales	 for	 the	Department	of	Cundinamarca	show	that	the	price	per	fanegada	(0.66	ha)	rose	by	more	than	200	per	cent	between	the	1850s	and	the	end	of	the	century”	(F.	Sánchez,	del	Pilar	López-Uribe,	&	Fazio,	2010,	p.	380).		53	 Sánchez	 et	 al.	 found	 that	 “the	 titling	 of	 public	 land	 followed	 the	 cycles	 in	 export	 prices”.	 For	example:	“during	the	quinine	and	tobacco	export	booms	of	the	1870s,	land	granting	skyrocketed	to	nearly	4,000	square	kilometers	per	year	[…]	After	a	reduction	in	titling	in	the	early	1880s,	a	new	rise	of	over	50	percent	in	coffee	export	prices	and	export	growth	led	titling	to	a	new	peak	”	(F.	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010,	p.	383).	
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Furthermore,	 legislation	 and	 policy	 were	 themselves	 inconsistent.	 For	 example,	Decree	 640	 of	 1882	 (regulating	 Law	 48)	 redefined	 the	 amount	 of	 land	 that	 should	 be	cultivated	in	order	to	retain	property	rights	over	former	baldíos:	“a	concession	that	was	not	more	than	200	hectares	required	cultivation	of	40%	of	the	terrain,	but	one	between	3,000-5,000	hectares	demanded	the	cultivation	of	 just	10%”	(Machado,	2009,	p.	102).	 In	other	words,	 large	 titleholders	could	“maintain	a	high	proportion	of	unproductive	 land”	(ibid).	Law	48	of	1882	itself	increased	the	amount	of	time	-from	4	to	10	years-	that	baldío	lands	could	remain	unproductive	before	being	recovered	by	the	State	(details	of	laws	provided	in	Machado,	2009,	pp.	92–93,	but	interpretation	is	my	own).	Thus,	in	some	ways	the	new	laws	endorsed	land	accumulation	and	permitted	large	areas	to	be	left	idle	for	long	periods.	In	general,	land	privatisation	continued	to	disproportionately	favour	businesses	and	large	landowners	(LeGrand,	1984b;	Melo,	1996;	Machado,	2009;	F.	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010)	54.	One	study	found	that	the	vast	majority	of	baldío	 territory	titled	between	1891	and	1904	went	to	bondholders,	while	a	very	small	portion	(fluctuating	between	3.2%	and	8.8%)	was	allocated	to	colonos	(cited	 in	Machado,	2009,	p.	103).	The	government	also	continued	to	grant	 huge	 areas	 in	 exchange	 for	 infrastructural	 development	 (legal	 documents	 suggest	over	1.5	million	ha	were	offered	or	ceded	for	public	works	between	1867	and	1892,	details	provided	 in	 Machado,	 2009,	 pp.	 97–99).	 Furthermore,	 titling	 data	 does	 not	 reveal	 the	amount	of	State	 land	usurped	by	 illegal	means,	which	Melo	 (1996)	and	LeGrand	 (1984)	suggest	may	be	even	more	than	the	amount	acquired	through	formal	privatisation.			
5)	The	dynamics	of	agricultural	frontier	migration		The	‘colonisation’	of	secluded	lands	was	not	a	novel	phenomenon.	The	colonial	government	promoted	 the	 foundation	 of	 new	 towns	 and	 villages	 until	 the	 very	 end	 of	 its	 reign.	 For	centuries,	 runaway	 slaves	 and	 defiant	 indigenous	 groups	 established	 communities	 in	remote	areas	as	a	means	of	escaping	colonial	rule.	And	poor	white	and	mestizo	farmers	had	long	 sought	 space	 to	 establish	 as	 independent	 producers.	 However,	 frontier	 settlement	increased	significantly	in	the	second	half	of	the	19th	century.	This	rise	in	migration	has	been	attributed	to	multiple	factors.	Sánchez	et	al.	(2010)	suggest	that	“population	growth	from	
                                                        54	Though	all	 authors	 agree	 that	 large	 landowners	 received	 titles	 for	 a	 larger	 total	 area	 than	 the	
colonos,	precise	data	is	elusive.	Melo	(1996),	drawing	on	Le	Grand,	suggests	that	73%	of	privatised	land	was	titled	in	plots	of	1,000	ha	or	more,	while	titles	of	less	than	100	ha	accounted	for	just	11%;	the	remaining	16%	was	distributed	among	farms	of	100	to	1,000	ha.	However,	the	period	this	data	covers	is	unclear.	
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two	to	five	million	people	between	1851	and	1913	prompted	the	occupation	of	the	vacant	lands”	 (p.	 380).	Melo	 (1996)	maintains	 that	 demographic	pressures	 and	 soil	 exhaustion	combined	 with	 property	 concentration	 to	 push	 people	 out	 of	 densely	 inhabited	 areas.	LeGrand	(1984)	highlights	how	settlers	sought	to	take	advantage	of	“new	opportunities”	offered	by	foreign	markets	(p.	30-31).	However,	she	also	notes	that	migrants	“included	rural	artisans	 displaced	 by	 the	 influx	 of	 cheap	 European	 manufactures,	 minifundistas	impoverished	 by	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 their	 properties,	 Indians	 dispossessed	 of	 their	communal	lands,	and	political	refugees	fleeing	the	civil	wars”	(ibid).	These	migrations	were	fostered	and	facilitated	by	improvements	in	transport,	which	were	also	 stimulated	by	 the	emerging	export	businesses.	Until	 the	mid-19th	 century,	 the	majority	 of	 people	 and	 goods	 moved	 along	 mule/horse	 paths,	 and	 up	 and	 down	 the	Magdalena	 River	 in	 small	 boats	 propelled	 by	 oars	 and	 poles.	 Steamboats	 only	 started	making	regular	trips	in	the	1850s.	The	growth	in	commerce	also	motivated	investments	in	roads	 (suitable	 for	 carriages	 and	 not	 just	 horses	 or	 mules)	 and	 railways	 (Melo,	 1996;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982).	New	infrastructural	projects	acted	as	migratory	magnets;	often	the	first	lands	to	be	cleared	were	on	the	edges	of	roads	and	railways	and	along	the	banks	of	rivers	 used	 as	 trading	 routes	 (Machado,	 2009).	 According	 to	 LeGrand,	 this	 reflects	 a	“preference	for	sites	with	market	access”	and	the	“frontier	settler’s	concern	with	economic	independence	and	advancement”	 (p.	31).	Many	colonos	produced	commercial	 crops	 (e.g.	“sugar	cane,	rice,	cotton,	tobacco,	cacao,	wheat,	and	coffee”),	as	well	as	food	for	their	own	consumption	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	32;	Melo,	1996).	Some	settlements	were	organised	by	the	government.	According	to	LeGrand,	“people	belonging	to	these	[planned]	settlements	[circa	21	of	them	were	established	between	1830	and	1910]	were	among	the	few	frontier	settlers	in	Colombia	to	receive	title[s]”	(p.	34).	Other	migrations	were	directed	by	“colonisation	businessmen”	(Machado,	2009,	p.	93)	or	“real	estate	developers”	(Christie,	1978).	For	example,	merchants	from	Medellín	traded	in	their	land	bonds	for	such	purposes;	in	addition	to	forming	their	own	haciendas,	“they	built	crude	roads	and	founded	small	villages	in	order	to	sell	land	at	a	good	profit	to	incoming	settlers”	(Christie,	1978,	p.	264;	see	also	Melo,	1996).	Other	landowners	permitted	colonos	to	clear	land	within	their	estates	but	had	no	intention	of	selling55.	
                                                        55	“Tenants	known	as	colonos	a	partido	were	allowed	to	clear	a	parcel	of	land	for	their	own	use	on	the	undeveloped	outskirts	of	 the	property	on	 the	condition	 that	 they	 turn	 it	over	 to	 the	 landlord	planted	in	pasture	grasses	after	two	or	three	years”	(LeGrand,	1984,	p.	37).	
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Many	more	migrations	“were	entirely	spontaneous	in	nature”.	Colonos	often	had	to	provide	their	own	infrastructure,	working	collectively	to	construct	a	church,	marketplace,	school,	and	other	essential	components	of	the	new	caserío	or	village.	Those	families	who	settled	 in	 isolated	 areas	 banded	 together	 “to	 cut	 mule	 paths	 to	 the	 nearest	 town	 or	waterway”	or	“sent	impassioned	pleas	to	the	government,	asking	for	penetration	roads	that	would	allow	them	to	break	into	the	market	economy”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	pp.	31–32).	The	popular	narratives	surrounding	these	colono	migrations	might	be	compared	to	those	 romanticising	 the	 ‘Westward	 Expansion’	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 ‘Antioquian	colonisation’,	which	began	in	the	late	1700s	and	early	1800s,	for	example,	is	considered	an	emblem	of	the	‘democratic	frontier’	in	which	“bare-foot,	ruana-clad	peasants	successfully	defeat[ed]	latifundistas	in	their	search	for	land	and	security”	(Christie,	1978,	p.	260).	Such	accounts	of	frontier	settlement,	as	with	many	good	myths,	combine	truth	and	fantasy56.		
	
6)	Land	conflicts	and	dispossession	on	the	agrarian	frontier		Across	Colombia,	the	agricultural	frontier	was	a	site	of	intense,	and	often	violent,	conflict	(Christie,	 1978;	 LeGrand,	 1984b;	 Melo,	 1996).	 Though	 not	 analysed	 in	 the	 literature	consulted,	frontier	migration	clearly	led	to	the	dispossession/displacement	of	indigenous	peoples	in	some	regions	(see	e.g.	IDMC,	2007,	p.	48),	and	presumably	to	conflicts	between	settlers	 and	 these	 communities.	 Furthermore,	 colonos	 frequently	 quarrelled	 amongst	themselves,	especially	over	delimitations	between	their	farms.	Often,	“the	first	settlers	to	enter	a	given	region	claimed	large	areas	of	unimproved	land	around	their	fields.	They	tried	to	keep	other	settlers	out	or	else	charged	them	for	the	right	to	settle	there”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	32).	However,	on	the	whole,	settlers	relied	on	cooperation	for	survival.	The	most	virulent	conflicts	were	not	among	 the	colonos,	 but	between	 them	and	a	varied	elite	 -	who	either	wanted	to	profit	from	the	establishment	of	independent	producers	or	halt	the	process	all	together.	Here	I	focus	on	this	elite-led	dispossession	of	peasant	settlers	57.	
                                                        56	 Christie	 (1978)	 deconstructs	 the	 legendary	 democracy	 of	 the	 Gran	 Caldas	 frontier	 –	 a	 key	settlement	route	of	the	‘Antioquian	colonisation’.	He	describes	how	a	handful	of	influential	families	came	to	control	economic,	political	and	social	life	in	the	newly	settled	areas	(Christie,	1978,	p.	281).		57	The	discussion	does	not	consider	the	dispossession	of	indigenous	communities	by	colonos	or	land	struggles	between	settlers	–	neither	of	which	are	well	documented	in	the	literature	consulted.	Given	limitations	of	space	and	my	chosen	focus	on	land	grabbing	by	elites,	these	issues	are	-unfortunately-	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	
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Baldío	lands	offered	the	masses	the	possibility	of	breaking	free	from	exploitative	work	relations.	In	a	context	of	labour	scarcity,	this	was	particularly	problematic	for	the	traditional	and	emerging	landowning	class,	who	“sought	to	tie	labor	to	the	estates	by	asserting	control	over	the	land,	that	is,	by	enclosing	the	peasants'	fields”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	33).	LeGrand’s	research	draws	on	 various	 government	documents	 that	 “allude	 to	 the	 labor	motive”	 for	dispossessing	the	peasantry.	For	example:	“the	hacendados	have	taken	over	vast	zones	of	public	 lands	 …	 which	 they	 neither	 work	 themselves	 nor	 allow	 others	 to	 work.	 By	monopolizing	 the	 land	 they	 aim	 only	 to	 undermine	 the	 position	 of	 the	 independent	cultivators	so	as	to	form	from	their	ranks	groups	of	dependent	laborers”	(Letter	from	the	Espejuelo	Municipal	Council,	dated	1907,	 cited	 in	LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	35).	Other	authors	concur	 that	 the	elite	 accumulated	huge	areas	of	 land	precisely	 in	order	 to	maintain	and	reproduce	a	dependent	workforce	(Bejarano,	1983;	Melo,	1996;	Zambrano	Pantoja,	1982).	Thus,	during	this	era,	many	acts	of	dispossession	did	not	correspond	to	an	interest	in	the	land	itself,	but	rather	in	control	over	labour.		Solano’s	(2010)	discussion	of	19th	century	labour	laws	highlights	some	of	the	other	mechanisms	 through	which	a	 seemingly	desperate	 landowning	 class	 tried	 to	overpower	workers.	The	1857	Bolívar	State	Police	Code	required	all	labour	contracts	(voluntary	and	forced)	to	be	registered	with	the	police	and	allowed	for	imprisonment	of	workers	who	did	not	fulfil	 their	obligations.	The	State’s	Civil	Code	of	1862	redefined	labour	contracts	as	a	matter	 of	 civil	 law.	 However,	 posterior	 regional	 legislation	 (e.g.	 Law	 42	 of	 1867)	reintroduced	coercive	measures	such	as	prison	time	for	workers	who	violated	the	terms	of	their	contract.	The	hacendados	who	controlled	the	Legislative	Assembly	in	Bolívar	lobbied	for	the	maintenance	and	reintroduction	of	such	punitive	measures	in	a	context	of	 labour	shortages	combined	with	economic	growth	(Solano,	2010).	While	the	government	abolished	the	colonial	tribute	system	and	formal	slavery,	it	did	little	to	tackle	other	forms	of	servitude	such	as	concierto	forzado	or	institutionalised	forced	labour.	According	to	Solano	(2010),	the	word	concierto	refers	to	“any	type	of	salaried	labour	contract,	 whether	 voluntary	 or	 forced,	 for	 domestic	 servants,	 agricultural	 labourers,	 or	highly	qualified	artisans”	(p.	202).	(It	is	worth	noting	that	in	many	regions	of	19th	century	Colombia	salaries	were	not	paid	 in	money,	but	 in	kind.)	Forced	labour	agreements	often	applied	in	cases	of	vagrancy,	which	was	considered	a	crime.	The	term	was	also	used	more	generally	to	describe	a	 form	of	debt	bondage	(concertados	por	deuda).	 In	addition	to	the	
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concertados	 or	 salaried	 contract	 workers,	 the	 hacendados	 also	 used	 debt	 trickery58	 to	ensnare	sharecroppers	and	tenants.	In	some	regions	such	labour	relations	survived	into	the	early	20th	century;	for	example,	concierto	forzado	wasn’t	formally	outlawed	in	Bolívar	until	1921	(Solano,	2010;	Fals	Borda,	2009;	Ferraro,	2004,	pp.	56–59;	Bejarano,	1983).		Given	 the	 extreme	 levels	 of	 exploitation	 found	across	Colombia,	 it	 isn’t	 difficult	 to	imagine	 why	 people	 might	 want	 to	 venture	 into	 the	 wilderness	 and	 try	 their	 luck	 as	independent	 producers.	 The	 elites	 found	 half	 a	 dozen	ways	 to	 prevent	 such	 autonomy.	According	to	Melo	(1996),	“the	use	of	police	pressure”	and	“debt	peonage”	link	directly	to	the	 hacendados’	 inability	 to	 “close	 the	 agrarian	 frontier”.	 Though	 they	 could	 never	completely	‘close’	this	escape	route,	they	certainly	tried	to	control	it.	Sometimes	colonos	occupied	unused	lands	that	had	already	been	titled,	which	made	them	 extra	 vulnerable	 to	 dispossession.	 However,	 elites	 often	 deliberately	 applied	 for	property	rights	over	public	terrain	that	had	already	been	cultivated	by	settler	families.	The	land	grabbers	also	appropriated	territory	de	facto:	they	simply	fenced-off	baldío	lands	and	demanded	payment	for	their	use.	Others	illicitly	extended	the	boundaries	of	existing	titles	on	 paper,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 the	 ground.	 Some	 used	 more	 creative	 methods,	 such	 as	 filing	“imaginary	mining	claims	in	order	to	monopolize	the	surrounding	land”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	35;	see	also	Machado,	2009;	Melo,	1996).	According	 to	LeGrand,	 “mayors,	 judges,	and	surveyors	[…]	facilitated	such	usurpations”.		Dispossession	was	enabled	by	the	fact	that	most	colonos	did	not	have	property	titles.	Though	legislation	favoured	cultivators	with	‘free’	land	grants,	many	campesinos	could	not	afford	to	pay	for	the	application	process.	Generally,	this	involved	contracting	a	surveyor	to	measure	 and	 delineate	 the	 terrain	 and	 a	 lawyer	 to	 help	 with	 paperwork;	 postage	 or	transportation	costs	to	file	the	application;	travel	expenses	of	witnesses	to	the	land	claim;	and	property	registration	fees	if	the	application	was	approved	(F.	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010,	p.	382).	Just	the	cost	of	hiring	a	surveyor	“generally	exceeded	the	value	of	the	cultivated	land”,	in	 particular	 when	 the	 plot	 was	 smaller	 than	 50	 hectares	 (LeGrand,	 1984b,	 p.	 33).	Furthermore,	it	is	estimated	that	70%	of	the	population	was	illiterate	in	late	19th	century	(Melo,	 1996);	 the	 percentage	 was	 probably	 higher	 among	 the	 peasantry	 and	 certainly	effected	their	ability	to	apply	for	titles	and	to	defend	themselves	in	judicial	processes.	
                                                        58	Fals	Borda	(2009)	describes	how	hacendados	tied	workers	to	the	hacienda,	increasing	their	debts	through	 false	 accounting,	 outrageous	 overcharging	 for	 items	 purchased	 on	 loan,	 and	 extreme	undervaluation	of	payments	made	in	labour	or	in	kind.	
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The	 titleholders	 (alleged	 or	 genuine)	 usually	 offered	 the	 settlers	 tenancy	 or	 other	labour	 contracts.	 However,	 many	 colonos	 preferred	 independence	 and	 moved	 to	 other	
baldío	lands.	Despite	laws	ordering	compensation,	they	often	received	no	payment	for	their	years	of	work.	Many	were	displaced	yet	again	after	establishing	 in	new	areas	 (LeGrand,	1984b,	pp.	36–37;	see	also	Melo,	1996;	Machado,	2009).	Some	accepted	neither	subjugation	nor	displacement:				Faced	with	the	settlers'	refusal	either	to	sign	labour	agreements	or	to	vacate	their	 parcels,	 the	 proprietors	 called	 on	 local	 mayors	 to	 evict	 them.	 Even	 if	evicted,	however,	settlers	often	defied	the	authorities,	returning	doggedly	to	farm	their	 fields	once	 the	officials	had	withdrawn.	When	 this	happened,	 the	landlords	responded	with	more	direct	harassment.	They	threw	pasture	seed	in	the	settlers'	crops	and	turned	cattle	into	their	fields,	pulled	down	bridges	to	cut	market	 access,	 and	 jailed	 colono	 leaders	 on	 trumped-up	 charges.	 In	 some	instances	 hacendados	 also	 formed	 vigilante	 bands	 to	 attack	 the	 most	recalcitrant	colonos	in	order	to	intimidate	the	others	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	39).		Such	conflicts	 increased	after	1875,	as	more	settler	groups	“threatened	by	a	single	land	 entrepreneur,	 began	 to	 organize	 purposefully	 to	 defend	 themselves	 against	encroachment”	(ibid,	p.	37).	This	increase	in	resistance,	LeGrand	argues,	is	directly	related	to	 the	 passing	 of	 the	 legislations	mentioned	 above,	 which	 offered	 legal	 recourse	 to	 the	
colonos.	Many	communities	combined	meagre	resources	to	hire	a	lawyer.	LeGrand	found	over	 400	 legal	 appeals	 or	 collective	 petitions	 (dated	 1874	 to	 1931)	 in	 the	 Public	 Land	Archives,	written	on	behalf	of	colono	groups	-ranging	from	5	to	100	families-	and	requesting	that	the	government	protect	them	from	usurpation	(p.	38-39;	see	also	Sánchez	et	al.,	2010,	p.	390-391).	Sometimes	the	peasants	were	victorious,	especially	“in	regions	where	settlers	were	numerous	 and	where	 they	 found	middle-class	 allies”	 (LeGrand,	 1984b,	 p.	 39).	 But	often	the	land	grabbers	were	successful	and	forcibly	transformed	“frontier	squatters	into	tenant	farmers	and	laborers”	(ibid).	It	is	important	to	reiterate	that	labour	control	was	probably	the	most	important,	but	by	no	means	the	only	motive	for	dispossession.	Some	of	the	usurpers	wanted	to	profit	from	rising	land	prices.	Christie	(1978)	distinguishes	between	the	“classic	latifundista-squatter	struggle”	and	those	conflicts	involving	commercial	proprietors	or	“real	estate	developers”	
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(p.	264).	In	contrast	to	those	landowners	who	attempted	to	control	the	rural	population	by	limiting	their	access	to	titles,	the	latter	actively	sought	to	sell	land	to	the	colonos.	Hence,	in	such	cases	disputes	arose	simply	because	the	settlers	could	not	or	would	not	pay	for	the	land.	The	outcome	of	these	conflicts	also	varied;	some	land	companies	were	successful	in	extracting	payment	from	the	settlers,	others	were	not	(Christie,	1978).		
7)	The	weak	advance	of	capitalism	in	Colombia	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century	There	 is	 little	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 processes	 of	 dispossession	 described	 above	contributed	to	the	development	of	domestic	capitalism	in	Colombia.	In	the	late	1800s	the	majority	of	Colombia’s	population	worked	in	agriculture	and	capitalist	social	relations	and	production	 (for	 exchange,	 based	 on	 the	 exploitation	 of	 wage	 labour,	 and	 driven	 by	competition,	 accumulation	and	profit-maximisation	–	 see	EM	Wood)	were	weak	or	non-existent	 in	 most	 rural	 areas.	 Despite	 gradual	 commercialisation	 and	 the	 growth	 and	diversification	of	exports,	most	agricultural	output	was	still	destined	for	subsistence	or	sale	on	 local	 markets59.	 What	 market-oriented	 production	 existed	 involved	 haciendas	 that	usually	 relied	 on	 sharecroppers/tenants	 and	 small	 farms	 that	 were	 predominantly	dependent	 on	 family	 labour.	 The	 use	 of	 salaried	 workers	 was	 limited	 in	 both	 cases,	acquiring	 particular	 importance	 only	 during	 harvest	 periods	 (Zambrano	 Pantoja,	 1982;	Bejarano,	1983;	Melo,	1996).		Dispossessed	peasants	who	did	not	search	 for	new	 land	were	generally	subsumed	into	the	hacienda	system.	What	types	of	social	relations	and	production	systems	were	the	peasant	settlers	forcibly	drawn	into	via	land	dispossession?	According	to	Bejarano	(1983),	types	 of	 labour	 exploitation	 in	 the	 haciendas	 varied	 significantly	 from	 region	 to	 region.	However,	on	the	whole,	he	categorises	them	as	“precapitalist,	oppressive	to	the	extreme,	and	 of	 a	 semi-servile	 character,	 based	 on	monopoly	 over	 the	 land”.	 He	 argues	 that	 this	corresponded	to	two	imperatives:	control	over	a	scarce	labour	force	and	the	reduction	of	monetary	costs	(p.	264).	Hence,	in	general,	dispossession	perpetuated	feudal-like	relations	of	production;	it	was	mostly	aimed	at	appropriating	rents	from	the	peasantry.		
                                                        59	 Melo	 (1996)	 asserts	 that	 production	 for	 “internal	 consumption”	 remained	 much	 larger	 than	production	 for	 export	 and	 that	 “the	 majority	 of	 agricultural	 produce	 […]	 did	 not	 enter	 into	commercial	circuits,	or	only	moved	in	local	markets”.	He	argues	that	the	national	market	was	limited	due	to	the	enormous	number	of	self-sufficient	producers,	the	existence	of	relatively	autonomous	and	isolated	regions,	and	high	transport	costs.	He	claims	only	those	producers	linked	to	foreign	markets	were	able	to	accumulate	capital	(see	also	Zambrano,	1982).	
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Even	 the	 export-oriented	 coffee	 haciendas,	 which	 Bejarano	 (1996)	 claims	 were	among	 the	 “most	 dynamic”	 sub-sectors	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 invested	 little	 in	increasing	productivity.	Furthermore,	such	haciendas	sought	to	reduce	reliance	on	salaried	workers	 and	mostly	 charged	 tenancy	 rents	 in	work	 and/or	 in	 kind	 rather	 than	money,	which	translated	into	weak	monetisation	and	integration	of	surrounding	local	economies	(Bejarano,	1996).	The	 fact	 that	 independent	 peasants	 produced	 the	 majority	 of	 food	 consumed	internally	 (LeGrand,	 1984b,	 p.	 32;	 Melo,	 1996)	 implies	 the	 haciendas’	 economic	predominance	 had	 started	 to	 wane,	 at	 least	 in	 terms	 of	 production	 for	 domestic	consumption60,	despite	the	continued	accumulation	of	land	by	elite	groups.	By	the	1920s	small	 farms	 were	 sustaining	 Colombia’s	 nascent	 industrialisation,	 as	 explained	 in	 the	chapter	that	 follows.	As	such,	 it	became	increasingly	clear	that	 the	type	of	dispossession	described	 in	 this	 chapter	 (aimed	 at	 subjugating	 campesinos	 to	 the	 hacienda),	 which	continued	into	the	new	century,	was	actually	hindering	growth	and	capitalist	development.	In	the	literature	consulted,	there	is	no	mention	of	the	dispossessed	migrating	to	urban	areas;	in	any	case,	industrial	growth	had	not	yet	taken	off.	At	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	Colombia	 had	 a	 small	 number	 of	 ‘modern’	 manufacturing	 industries	 dedicated	 to	 the	production	 of	 textiles,	 cigarettes,	 matches,	 glass	 bottles,	 liquor,	 beer	 and	 chocolate.	However,	 artisanal	 workshops	 produced	 many	 goods,	 including	 clothing,	 hats,	 ceramic	dishware,	 soap,	 perfume,	 candles,	 shoes,	 etc.	 Evidence	 suggests	 small-scale	 independent	producers	outnumbered	wage	 labourers	even	 in	mining	 -	 the	 sector	 that	attracted	most	international	 investment.	 In	 the	 1860s	 the	 department	 of	 Antioquia	 accounted	 for	 two-thirds	of	national	gold	production,	yet	only	3,000	of	the	15,000	miners	in	the	region	were	salaried	 (Melo,	 1996;	 see	 also	 Tovar	 Pinzón,	 1996).	 Overall,	 non-agricultural	 sectors	employed	 relatively	 few	 people	 and	 independent	 producers	were	 central	 even	 to	 these	areas	of	the	economy.		Before	 proceeding,	 the	 arguments	 presented	 above	 demand	 three	 qualifications.	First,	 and	 most	 importantly,	 this	 chapter	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 dispossession	 of	 peasant	settlers	by	elite	groups	and	thus	did	not	discuss	the	dispossession	of	indigenous	peoples	by	the	 colonos.	Without	 a	 doubt	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 agricultural	 frontier	 signified	 further	encroachment	onto	indigenous	lands.	As	explained	above,	the	colonisation	of	new	areas	was	
                                                        60	Unfortunately,	I	have	not	found	any	information	regarding	the	proportion	of	export	production	accounted	for	by	smallholders	relative	to	the	haciendas.	
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partly	driven	by	the	economic	upswing	and	many	peasant	settlers	established	commercial,	as	well	as	 subsistence,	 crops;	 in	 this	 sense,	dispossession	and	economic	dynamism	were	linked.	Second,	space	is	insufficient	to	examine	the	impacts	of	those	industries	based	on	the	extraction	of	materials	from	Colombia’s	natural	forests,	such	as	the	cutting	of	quina	bark,	rubber	tapping	and	tree	felling	for	timber.	These	industries	contributed	to	the	displacement	and	-in	some	cases-	obliteration	of	various	indigenous	groups.	So,	again,	land	grabs	can	be	linked	with	export-oriented	growth	within	the	context	of	capitalist	globalisation.	Third	and	finally,	the	sources	on	which	this	chapter	is	based	do	not	include	any	examples	of	elite-led	land	grabs	driven	by	export	crop	expansion;	 it	 is	 implied	that	these	were	established	on	lands	already	controlled	by	the	haciendas.	However,	this	does	not	mean	such	cases	didn’t	exist.	The	evidence	presented	by	the	cited	authors	simply	suggests	that	labour	control	was	the	main	 motivating	 factor	 behind	 dispossession.	 Put	 simply:	 for	 the	 elites,	 expanding	production	was	a	question	of	acquiring	more	workers,	not	more	land.		
Summary	and	conclusion	The	post-independence	period	was	marked	by	almost	constant	war	and	political/territorial	restructuring.	Nevertheless,	the	tumult	did	not	lead	to	significant	transformations	in	social	property	relations;	 the	hacienda	system	formed	during	 the	colonial	era	prevailed.	 In	 the	early	19th	century,	the	government	began	selling	and	conceding	State	lands,	mostly	in	order	to	pay	off	debts;	this	contributed	to	further	property	concentration.	Later	reforms	driven	by	liberal	ideals,	including	the	partition/privatisation	of	resguardo	land	and	the	confiscation	and	 auction	 of	 ecclesiastical	 property,	 served	 to	 further	 entrench	 the	 unequal	 property	regime.	Land	policy	shifted	 in	 the	1870s.	Prompted	by	 the	market	openings	afforded	by	early	globalisation	and	pressures	to	tackle	 land	hoarding,	the	government	promised	free	land	grants	to	productive	settlers.	The	new	laws	included	rules	designed	to	defend	peasants	against	dispossession	and	to	tie	newly	granted	property	rights	to	economic	use	of	the	land.	Still,	unproductive	latifundios	grew,	large	landowners	remained	the	primary	beneficiaries	of	privatisation,	and	peasants	continued	to	be	dispossessed.	Frontier	settlement	accelerated	in	 the	 mid	 to	 late	 1800s,	 driven	 by	 both	 push	 and	 pull	 factors.	 In	 a	 context	 of	 labour	shortages,	this	posed	a	problem	for	the	haciendas.	The	traditional	landed	elite	attempted	to	halt	 and	 reverse	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 independent	 peasantry	 by	 asserting	 property	rights	 (genuine	 and	 bogus)	 over	 the	 lands	 they	 cultivated.	 Some	 peasant	 settlers	 were	forcibly	converted	into	tenants	and	labourers,	many	ventured	on	in	search	of	new	lands,	while	others	stayed	and	resisted,	leading	to	conflicts	that	often	turned	violent.		
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Four	 broad	 observations	 merit	 emphasis:	 (i)	 Like	 in	 the	 colonial	 period,	 labour	control	was	central	to	many,	and	perhaps	most,	processes	of	elite-led	dispossession	in	19th	century	Colombia.	As	we	shall	see,	this	motivation	for	land	grabbing	dwindled	as	capitalist	social	relations	proliferated,	methods	of	production	changed,	and	the	population	grew.			(ii)	The	narrative	above	reveals	the	complex	ways	dispossession	enacted	by	private	agents	 interacts	 with	 government	 policy	 and	 legislation.	 The	 dispossession	 of	 peasant	settlers	 in	 the	 19th	 century	was	 not	 formally	 endorsed	 by	 the	 State,	 unlike	 the	 forcible	relocations	of	indigenous	peoples	and	the	resguardo	dissolutions	under	colonial	rule.	Post-independence	 land	 legislation	 favoured	 elite	 groups	 for	 multiple	 reasons,	 but	 it	 wasn’t	
purposefully	 designed	 to	 dispossess	 the	 peasantry;	 laws	 passed	 in	 the	 late	 1800s	 were	actually	 meant	 to	 benefit	 productive	 smallholders.	 Like	 the	 colonial	 authorities,	 the	independent	government	introduced	rules	to	prevent	private	land	grabs;	however,	elites	flouted	legislation	favouring	peasant	settlers,	just	as	their	predecessors	had	ignored	rules	favouring	 indigenous	 communities	 in	 the	 16th	 to	 18th	 centuries.	 And,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	following	chapter,	the	independent	government	eventually	legalised	the	elites’	illicit	land	claims,	as	the	Spanish	did	via	composición.	(iii)	The	property	regime	continued	to	pose	an	obstacle	to	economic	development,	as	the	landowning	elite	amassed	more	land,	which	they	left	idle.	The	privatisation	process	in	the	 early	 to	mid-19th	 century	was	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 fiscal	 interests,	which	 favoured	those	with	purchasing	power	and	hence	facilitated	the	concentration	of	ownership	–	similar	to	what	happened	in	the	colonial	era.	Like	the	Crown,	the	independent	government	changed	its	policy	when	interests	in	expanding	production	came	to	the	fore.	But	neither	effectively	tackled	unproductive	land	hoarding.	The	problem	intensified	in	the	20th	century,	as	shown	in	the	subsequent	chapter.		(iv)	 Consistent	 with	 the	 claim	 reiterated	 throughout	 this	 thesis,	 this	 chapter	 has	shown	 that	 the	motivations	 and	 outcomes	 of	 land	 dispossession	 are	 varied	 and	 do	 not	necessarily	serve	economic	development,	capitalist	or	otherwise.	The	landowning	elite	of	19th	century	Colombia	attempted	to	use	exclusionary	property	rights	to	forcibly	incorporate	the	direct	producers	into	a	predominantly	non-capitalist	production/labour	regime.	Hence,	like	with	 the	 dispossession	 that	 occurred	 during	 colonial	 rule,	 the	 concept	 of	 primitive	accumulation	 offers	 an	 interesting	 analytical	 benchmark,	 but	 is	 in	 itself	 inadequate	 for	explaining	 what	 happened	 in	 this	 period	 of	 Colombian	 history.	 Furthermore,	 elite-led	dispossession	had	 little	 to	 do	with	 coerced	 land	use	 change	 and	 associated	 increases	 in	exchange	 value.	 Chapter	 2	 discussed	 the	 centrality	 of	 improvement	 ideology	 to	 the	
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extinction	of	customary	rights	within	England	and	to	its	colonial	land	policy	in	Ireland.	In	both	cases	the	main	objective	was	land	clearance;	overall,	landowners	were	not	interested	in	retaining	peasants,	but	rather	in	displacing	them	to	make	way	for	more	productive	and	-above	all-	more	profitable	land	uses.	In	contrast,	much	of	the	dispossession	that	took	place	in	19th	century	Colombia	was	not	aimed	at	clearing	the	land	to	make	way	for	more	profitable	projects,	but	at	squeezing	rents	out	of	the	peasantry.	Forcible	displacement	was	often	the	outcome	of	land	struggles	on	the	frontier,	but	usually	because	peasants	refused	to	accept	work	as	tenants	or	day	labourers.	As	shown	in	the	following	chapter,	this	started	to	change	in	the	mid-20th	century.		 	
-	5	-	
Economic	development	and	land	conflicts	in	Colombia	during	the	early	
to	mid	20th	century:	occupations,	evictions,	reform	and	counter-reform		
	This	chapter	examines	the	political	economy	of	dispossession	and	associated	displacement	in	 Colombia	 between	 the	 1920s	 and	 the	 1970s.	 I	 show	 that	 during	 the	 initial	 years	 of	industrial-take	 off,	 elite-led	 land	 grabs	 were,	 on	 the	 whole,	 inimical	 to	 economic	development,	which	was	 being	 upheld	 by	 smallholder	 production.	Many	 politicians	 and	officials	understood	 this	and	hence	supported	an	overhaul	of	 the	property	regime	and	a	‘peasant	path’	of	agricultural	expansion.	However,	this	idea	never	gained	full	State	backing.		The	 political	 and	 economic	 dynamics	 surrounding	 dispossession	 began	 to	 change	around	the	1940s,	largely	-but	not	solely-	as	a	result	of	the	government’s	decision	to	support	large-scale	agriculture	at	the	expense	of	the	smallholder	economy.	This	shift	to	a	model	of	development	 based	 on	 turning	 traditional	 landowners	 into	 capitalist	 businessmen	weakened	 resolve	 to	 address	 historical	 and	 ongoing	 land	 usurpation	 and	 resulting	concentration,	 which	 seemed	 more	 ‘functional’	 to	 the	 economy	 once	 the	 policy	 of	propagating	 ‘modern’	 agribusiness	 and	 mechanised	 farming	 started	 to	 bear	 fruit.	 This	outcome	was	far	from	inevitable.		Multiple	 factors	 had	 favoured	 development	 based	 on	 family	 farming.	 Small	 and	medium	farms	came	to	account	for	the	majority	of	coffee	production,	which	was	Colombia’s	main	 export	 until	 the	 1970s/1980s	 and	 a	 major	 engine	 of	 growth	 in	 early	 phases	 of	industrialisation.	They	also	produced	most	of	the	country’s	 food,	despite	being	squeezed	onto	a	tiny	proportion	of	land.	And,	notwithstanding	the	success	of	industrial	agriculture	in	some	sectors	and	regions,	considerable	areas	of	land	controlled	by	elite	groups	remained	un-	 or	 under-	 used.	 Furthermore,	 by	 the	 mid-century	 policymakers	 were	 interested	 in	decelerating	migration	to	the	country’s	cities,	given	rising	unemployment.	Finally,	pressure	for	 land	 reform	 was	 strong	 and	 the	 peasantry	 had	 some	 allies	 within	 the	 political	establishment.	Nevertheless,	the	government	could	not	or	would	not	effectively	challenge	the	landed	elite.	For	these	reasons,	and	others	discussed	below,	policy	vacillated	for	much	of	the	20th	century,	between	legitimising	dispossession	and	attempting	to	prevent	and/or	reverse	such	processes.	Ultimately,	however,	the	landowner	path	became	the	State’s	chosen	route	of	agrarian	development.	
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The	chapter	begins	with	an	overview	of	socio-economic	change	during	the	early	20th	century.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 a	 discussion	 of	 various	 agrarian	 struggles.	 In	 addition	 to	conflicts	 between	 hacendados	 and	 peasant	 settlers,	 tenants	 of	 established	 haciendas	demanded	changes	to	their	contracts	or	refused	to	pay	rents,	while	other	groups	organised	mass	land	occupations.	The	landed	elite	began	imposing	evictions	to	defend	their	property	claims.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 oil	 and	 banana	 export	 industries	 were	 fuelling	 other	 forms	 of	dispossession	and	displacement.	Section	three	considers	how	the	land	question	came	to	be	seen	as	an	urgent	issue	of	national	 interest	 in	 the	 1920s	 and	 examines	 the	 State’s	 initial	 response.	 The	 question	became	 more	 pressing	 in	 the	 context	 of	 urbanisation	 and	 industrialisation,	 as	 the	agricultural	sector	was	unable	to	keep	up	with	rising	demand.	Factions	of	both	traditional	parties	(Conservative	and	Liberal)	believed	that	expanding	production	required	ensuring	the	 peasantry’s	 access	 to	 land,	which	meant	 -at	minimum-	 halting	 dispossession	 on	 the	frontier.	 The	 government	 responded	 by	 strengthening	 its	 ‘colonisation’	 program.	 Many	deemed	this	‘solution’	‘insufficient’;	however,	even	baldío	titling	proved	controversial.	The	 fourth	 section	 analyses	 the	 land	 laws	 introduced	 by	 successive	 Liberal	governments,	 which	 ultimately	 benefitted	 large-landowners.	 The	 1936	 reform	 legalised	elite	 land	 claims	 secured	 through	 decades	 of	 dispossession.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 clause	 that	allowed	those	who	unwittingly	settled	on	unused	private	lands	to	obtain	property	rights	instilled	 fear	 in	 the	 hacendados,	 leading	 to	 further	 evictions	 of	 tenants	 and	 colonos.	Ironically,	legislation	designed	to	boost	agricultural	production	had	a	detrimental	effect	on	the	economy,	as	crops	were	replaced	with	pasture	for	extensive	cattle	grazing.	A	subsequent	(1944)	law	attempted	to	revive	tenant	farming;	still,	the	hacienda	clearances	continued.	Section	 five	 focuses	 on	 the	 period	 of	 civil	 war	 known	 as	 La	 Violencia,	 which	intertwined	with	struggles	over	land.	The	violence	enabled	dispossession	and	encouraged	sales	 at	 clearance	 prices,	 favouring	 land	 concentration	 and	 large-scale	 commercial	agriculture	 in	 some	 regions.	 However,	 in	 other	 regions,	 the	 violence	 was	 used	 as	 an	opportunity	to	challenge	and	reverse	usurpation	and	contributed	to	land	(re)distribution.		Section	six	surveys	the	Colombian	economy	between	the	1940s	and	1970s	when	the	government	used	varied	types	of	protectionist	and	interventionist	measures	to	boost	select	manufacturing	industries	-	Colombia’s	own	version	of	import-substitution-industrialisation	(ISI).	These	policies	also	underwrote	the	take-off	of	capitalist	agribusiness,	further	altering	the	dynamics	of	dispossession	and	related	displacement.		
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The	seventh	section	examines	more	closely	the	vacillations	and	contradictions	of	the	government’s	agricultural/land	policies.	Treatment	of	the	agrarian	problem	changed	in	the	1940s,	as	policymakers	sought	to	transform	haciendas	into	capitalist	businesses.	Unequal	land	distribution	was	no	longer	seen	as	a	problem	per	se;	in	fact,	many	believed	property	concentration	could	be	beneficial,	so	long	as	large	landholdings	were	productive.	Though	ISI	 type	 policies	 were	 relatively	 successful	 at	 promoting	 industrial	 agriculture,	 this	development	strategy	contributed	to	economic,	social	and	political	problems,	which	some	believed	could	be	partially	resolved	with	redistributive	land	reform.	The	 final	 section	 discusses	 the	 rise	 and	 decline	 of	 land	 reform,	 and	 the	 national	peasant	 organisation	 -	 ANUC,	 in	 the	 late	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s.	 ANUC	 pressured	 the	recently	 established	 land	 reform	 agency	 (INCORA)	 to	 act	 and	 pushed	 landowners	 to	negotiate.	However,	a	government	changeover	in	1970	reversed	the	situation	dramatically.	In	1972	the	government	made	yet	another	pact	with	the	landed	elite,	promising	to	limit	land	reform	and	back	 large-scale	commercial	agriculture.	And,	 for	multiple	reasons,	 including	violent	 repression	 and	 persecution	 by	 the	 State,	 the	 national	 campesino	movement	was	gradually	debilitated.	In	short,	the	possibility	of	a	‘peasant	path’	of	development	in	Colombia	was	forcefully	quashed.	
	
1)	The	coffee	boom,	industrialisation	and	socio-economic	change		In	the	1920s	Colombia	enjoyed	an	unparalleled	economic	boom.	Between	1925	and	1929	average	 annual	 economic	 growth	 reached	 a	 high	 of	 7.7%.	 The	 total	 value	 of	 Colombia’s	exports	more	than	doubled	from	a	yearly	average	of	$44.5	million	USD	between	1915	and	1919,	to	$112	million	between	1925	and	1929.	Coffee,	which	by	1924	accounted	for	almost	80%	of	exports,	was	the	main	engine	of	growth	(Bejarano,	1996;	El	Espectador,	2013a).		Increased	foreign	exchange	earnings	allowed	for	the	importation	of	machinery	and	other	goods	to	support	industrialisation	efforts.	Between	1920	and	1929	at	least	811	new	industrial	 companies	were	 founded.	Most	 “were	 oriented	 to	 traditional	 light	 industries”	such	as	cigarette	and	textile	production.	However,	new	companies	within	the	“intermediary	goods	 and	 metal-machinery	 sectors”	 also	 emerged	 (Bejarano,	 1996).	 This	 growth	 was	enabled	by	expanding	domestic	demand,	which	was	largely	a	result	of	coffee	sales	incomes,	but	also	due	to	public	investment	(Bejarano,	1996;	Ocampo,	1996a).		
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The	Colombian	government’s	financial	situation	improved	with	revenues	from	trade	taxes,	the	$25	million	it	received	from	the	USA	as	part	of	the	Thompson-Urrutia	Treaty	on	the	separation	of	Panama,	and	better	access	to	international	credit	markets.	Public	spending	rose	from	$5.5	to	$13.7	USD	per	capita	between	1926	and	1929.	Much	of	this	money	was	pumped	into	the	national	transport	system,	with	many	new	projects	dedicated	to	improving	connections	 between	 the	 country’s	 regions,	 thus	 facilitating	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 national	market	(Bejarano,	1996;	Ocampo,	1996a;	Campos	López,	2003;	Machado,	2009,	p.	125).		Many	 authors	 pinpoint	 the	 1920s-1930s	 as	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 Colombian	 history.	Production	by	small	and	medium	coffee	 farms	began	to	overtake	the	haciendas	that	had	dominated	 the	sector	during	 the	 late	1800s.	According	 to	Bejarano	 (1996),	 independent	coffee	farmers	and	merchants	played	a	particularly	important	role	in	Colombia’s	economic	development	during	this	period,	among	other	reasons,	because	they	had	a	greater	impact	on	internal	demand	than	the	former	centralised	hacienda	system.	The	implication	is	that	the	 ‘home	 market’	 expanded	 due	 to	 the	 strengthening	 of	 a	 commercial	 smallholder	economy,	 rather	 than	 through	 the	dispossession	of	 the	peasantry.	 In	general,	campesino	production	 was	 stimulating	 and	 financing	 the	 country’s	 industrial	 development.	 The	traditional	landowning	class	felt	threatened	by	the	strength	of	the	smallholder	economy	and	the	 corresponding	 decline	 of	 the	 hacienda	 system	 on	 which	 their	 power	 was	 based.	Confrontations	between	tenants/colonos	and	the	landed	elite	intensified	(Bejarano,	1996;	Ocampo,	1996a;	Fajardo,	2015;	Molano	Bravo,	2015;	Moncayo	Cruz,	2015),	as	discussed	in	the	following	section.	In	addition,	economic	growth	was	accompanied	by	the	expansion	of	wage	labour	and	related	social	movements	and	struggles	 in	both	urban	and	rural	areas.	Construction	and	transport	 labourers,	workers	 from	 the	 newly	 established	 banana	 and	 petroleum	 export	enclaves,	and	employees	of	the	budding	national	manufacturing	sector	began	to	organise	strikes	aimed	at	achieving	varied	objectives.	The	Conservative	government	responded	with	persecution.	 Some	 observers	 suggest	 at	 least	 8,000	 people	 involved	 in	 workers’	organisations	 were	 incarcerated	 in	 the	 1920s	 (Bejarano,	 1996).	 The	 infamous	 ‘banana	massacre’	is	one	of	the	bloodiest	examples	of	the	State’s	repression	during	this	period:	in	December	 1928	 the	 Colombian	Army,	 under	 pressure	 from	 the	US	 government	 and	 the	United	 Fruit	 Company	 to	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	 banana	worker’s	 strike,	 killed	 an	 unknown	number	-some	say	as	many	as	3,000-	of	protestors	who	were	concentrated	in	the	square	of	Ciénaga	(Fajardo,	2015,	pp.	101–107).	
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Just	8	months	after	the	carnage	at	the	United	Fruit	Company’s	installations	came	the	1929	 Wall	 Street	 crash,	 which	 swiftly	 brought	 the	 upswing	 of	 the	 1920s	 to	 an	 end.	Government	spending	fell	and	public	works	were	practically	“paralysed”	(Ocampo,	1996a).	Coffee	prices	fluctuated;	in	1940	they	hit	a	low	of	7.5	USD	cents	per	pound.	GDP	growth	was	negative	at	the	beginning	of	the	1930s;	and	though	it	rose	towards	the	end	of	the	decade,	it	dropped	again	during	the	Second	World	War	(Ocampo,	1996a).	In	many	ways,	however,	the	Depression	 and	WWII	 served	 to	 foment	 capitalist	 development	 and	 State	 formation	 in	Colombia.	In	this	volatile	context,	the	Colombian	government	experimented	with	a	variety	of	interventionist	policies.	Also,	a	limited	capacity	to	import,	left	the	domestic	market	open	to	nascent	national	industries	(Ocampo,	1996a).	Indeed,	according	to	Moncayo	(2015),	the	1929	crash	was	“definitive”	 in	Colombia’s	“industrial	 take-off”	(p.	45).	Similarly,	Ocampo	(1996)	claims	that	the	international	crises	of	the	1930s	and	1940s	accelerated	the	socio-economic	transformation	that	had	been	set	in	motion	during	the	boom	years.			
2)	The	agrarian	struggles	of	the	early	20th	century	The	 construction	 of	 new	 transport	 routes	 and	 increased	 demand	 for	 agricultural	 goods	reinvigorated	frontier	migration	and	associated	struggles	over	land	and	labour.	As	in	the	past,	hacendados	attempted	to	extend	their	dominion	over	State	lands	occupied	by	colonos	in	order	to	forcibly	incorporate	them	into	the	haciendas.	Economic	changes	also	detonated	conflicts	within	established	haciendas.	Tenants	started	 to	demand	modifications	 to	 their	contracts,	in	particular	permission	to	plant	coffee	on	their	rented	plots61	and	freedom	to	sell	their	produce,	as	well	as	payment	of	rents	in	money	or	kind	instead	of	labour.	Others	took	a	more	radical	stance:	they	questioned	the	validity	of	the	hacienda	titles	–	the	basis	of	their	subjugation	(Bejarano,	1996;	Fajardo,	2015,	pp.	101–105;	Machado,	2009,	pp.	123–129).		Multiple	observers	concur	that	the	rural	masses	mobilised	around	the	spuriousness	of	the	elites’	land	ownership	claims	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	41;	Bejarano,	1996;	Ocampo,	1996a;	Fajardo,	2015,	p.	105;	Machado,	2009,	p.	178).	Ocampo	(1996)	suggests	that	these	types	of	conflicts	 were	 most	 common	 in	 areas	 where	 the	 landowner’s	 arrival	 in	 the	 area	 or	expansion	onto	additional	State	land	was	relatively	recent;	in	contrast,	campesino	struggles	within	haciendas	with	long-standing	property	titles	tended	to	focus	on	improving	tenancy	
                                                        61	Many	hacendados	prohibited	their	tenants	from	planting	coffee,	fearing	that	they	would	neglect	their	hacienda	duties	and	compete	with	them	for	hired	labour	during	harvest	time.	Some	were	also	concerned	that	tenants	would	use	coffee	crops	to	claim	rights	over	the	land	(Bejarano,	1996).		
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contracts	(see	also	Bejarano,	1983).	Nevertheless,	disputes	over	property	rights	were	not	limited	to	areas	with	fresh	stories	of	usurpation.	Ocampo	himself	defines	“firmly	rooted”	property	 claims	 as	 those	 dating	 from	 prior	 to	 the	 mid-1800s.	 And	 memories	 of	dispossession	from	the	late	19th	century	were	still	raw:	many	peasants	were	convinced	of	“the	illegitimacy	of	the	properties	on	which	they	worked”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	41).	Tenants	refused	to	pay	rents,	while	other	groups	-including	migrants	and	day	labourers-	organised	mass	land	occupations.		Like	 in	 the	 19th	 century	 (recall	 that	 the	 laws	 introduced	 in	 the	 1870s	 and	 1880s	emboldened	peasant	resistance),	legislative	changes	are	said	to	have	played	a	key	role	in	activating	“rural	consciousness”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	pp.	41–43).	In	1926	the	Supreme	Court	determined	that	in	order	to	validate	property	rights,	the	alleged	owner	had	to	prove	that	that	these	originated	in	a	title	granted	by	the	State.	The	decision	was	part	of	wider	efforts	to	increase	agricultural	production	by	facilitating	peasant’s	access	to	land	(ibid,	p.	43;	see	also	section	3	below).	A	year	later,	“in	1927,	Congress	[…]	ordered	all	proprietors	of	farms	larger	 than	 2,500	 hectares	 to	 present	 their	 titles	 before	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Industries	 for	revision”	 (Machado,	 2009,	 p.	 184)62.	 The	 landowning	 class	 protested,	 labelling	 the	 new	property	test	“diabolical”.	They	organised	a	legal	challenge	and	stalled	investigations	into	the	legality	of	their	property	claims.	Meanwhile,	the	Court’s	ruling	gave	strength	to	peasant	struggles:	“Many	[campesinos]	knew	that	the	haciendas	where	they	worked	did	not	have	such	titles	because	they	had	been	formed	through	the	usurpation	of	public	lands”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	43;	on	the	importance	of	the	1926	Supreme	Court	ruling,	see	also	Fajardo,	2015;	Machado,	2009;	Bejarano,	1996).	LeGrand’s	(1984)	research	indicates	that	major	land	occupations	occurred	in	at	least	seven	different	 areas	of	 the	 country.	 Coffee	production	predominated	 in	 at	 least	 four	of	these	zones:	Sumapaz,	Quindío,	Huila	and	northern	Valle	del	Cauca.	In	the	other	two	areas	cattle	 ranching	 (Sinú)	 and	 banana	 production	 (rural	 Santa	Marta)	 predominated.	 These	peasant	 movements	 were	 “organizationally	 unconnected”,	 but	 shared	 a	 number	 of	contextual	characteristics:	“all	emerged	in	regions	of	large	latifundia	with	a	recent	history	of	 land	 concentration	 […	 and]	 tended	 to	 be	 commercially	 important	 areas	 in	which	 the	impact	of	the	Great	Depression	was	felt	with	particular	severity”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	44).		
                                                        62	According	to	Machado	(2009),	between	1931	and	1936	just	320,000	hectares	were	recovered	and	returned	to	the	State	domain	(pp.	184-185).	
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As	 suggested	earlier,	 the	economic	boom	and	 the	associated	 rise	 in	 land	and	 crop	prices,	contributed	to	igniting	the	agrarian	conflicts	of	the	1920s.	The	rapid	contraction	of	the	economy	after	1929	only	gave	 further	 impetus	 to	peasant	struggles.	Wage	 labourers	who	 had	 been	 laid	 off	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 downturn	 joined	 the	 rising	 tide	 of	 land	occupations	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	44;	Machado,	2009,	pp.	179–180;	Fajardo,	2015,	p.	110).	In	the	words	of	Le	Grand:	“A	popular	agrarian	reform	was	in	the	making”	(p.	44).	The	landed	elite	fought	back.	Many	called	on	government	forces	to	defend	their	property	claims	and	evict	unruly	campesinos,	leading	to	violent	skirmishes	(Fajardo,	2015,	p.	110).		As	explained	 in	 later	sections,	 the	clearance	of	hacienda	 lands	 intensified	after	 the	first	 agrarian	 reform	 law	 was	 passed	 in	 1936,	 continued	 into	 the	 1940s	 despite	 the	government’s	attempts	to	restore	tenant	farming,	and	was	revived	in	the	1960s	following	the	passing	of	new	reformist	legislation.	Hence,	displacement	(uncontrolled,	as	opposed	to	forcible	 resettlement)	 became	 an	 overt	 and	 widespread	 objective	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	Colombian	history	 in	 the	1930s.	Rather	 than	attempting	 to	acquire	and	control	workers	through	dispossession,	the	landed	elite	were	now	deliberately	forcing	them	off	the	land.	It	deserves	reiteration	that	many	(perhaps	most)	of	these	clearances	were	aimed	at	securing	property	 claims;	 unlike	 the	 historical	 ‘sweeping	 of	 people	 off	 the	 land’	 in	 England	 and	Scotland,	 these	 actions	 were	 not	 driven	 by	 investment	 interests	 and	 were	 largely	detrimental	to	the	generation	of	exchange	value.		
Hacendados	whose	 land	holdings	were	not	under	question	 faced	other	 challenges:	increased	worker	mobility,	combined	with	peasant	demands	for	changes	to	their	tenancy	agreements,	were	also	destabilising	the	“pre-capitalist	hacienda”	(Ocampo,	1996a;	see	also	Bejarano,	 1996;	 Fajardo,	 2015).	 Furthermore,	 the	 commercial	 success	 of	 small	 coffee	producers	 defied	 the	 traditional	 landowning	 classes’	 economic	 power.	 According	 to	Bejarano	(1983),	 forcible	evictions	were	not	only	used	to	defend	against	campesino	 land	claims,	but	also	as	a	tool	for	undermining	the	smallholder	coffee	economy	(pp.	282-283).		The	 political	 system	 was	 also	 undergoing	 a	 transformation	 that	 threatened	 the	traditional	elite.	A	handful	of	new	political	parties	supported	the	peasant	resistance	and	the	wage	 worker’s	 struggles	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 While	 the	 Conservatives	attempted	 to	 suppress	 this	 diversification,	 the	 Liberals	 responded	 by	 embracing	 or	 co-opting	(depending	on	the	observer’s	viewpoint)	people	from	other	parties	and	campesino	and	urban	labour	movements	(Fajardo,	2015,	p.	111).	The	new	political	groups	and	changes	within	 the	 Liberal	 Party	 “gave	 a	 national	 dimension”	 to	what	were	 otherwise	 relatively	discrete	land	and	labour	conflicts	(Ocampo,	1996a).	Below,	I	discuss	a	few	of	these	struggles.	
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The	Quintín	Lame	movement	and	the	defence	of	the	resguardo	The	surge	in	peasant	resistance	is	usually	dated	to	the	1920s	and	1930s;	however,	at	least	one	 very	 important	movement	 predates	 this	 period.	 This	movement	was	 galvanised	 by	Manuel	Quintı́n	Lame	(1880-1967)	a	farmer,	self-taught	lawyer	and	author	of	Nasa	origin.	Lame,	who	had	suffered	the	injustices	of	the	tenant	farmer	or	terrazguero	first	hand,	taught	himself	 the	workings	of	 the	 legal	system	in	order	to	better	understand	not	only	tenant’s	rights,	but	the	laws	protecting	indigenous	communities’	land.	Ironically,	he	found	that	Law	89	of	1890,	introduced	by	the	Conservatives	with	the	aim	of	‘reducing’	so-called	savages	to	‘civilised	life’	(see	previous	chapter),	could	be	used	to	support	indigenous	struggles63.	He	began	sharing	his	ideas	with	friends	and	tenants	on	neighbouring	haciendas,	encouraging	them	 to	 refuse	 the	 terraje	 or	 rents	 paid	 in	 labour.	 Lame	 visited	 various	 indigenous	communities	in	Cauca,	Tolima,	Huila	and	Valle;	the	indigenous	resistance	movement	started	to	expand	(Herrera	Ángel,	1993).		In	 1914	 Lame	made	 the	 first	 of	many	 trips	 to	 Bogotá,	 in	which	 he	 presented	 his	arguments	to	different	government	functionaries.	Lame	demanded	an	end	to	the	division	and	dissolution	of	the	resguardos	and	the	return	of	lands	that	indigenous	communities	had	already	 lost	 to	such	policies	and	other	methods	of	dispossession.	He	also	argued	 for	 the	participation	 of	 indigenous	 leaders	 in	National	 Congress	 and	 respect	 for	 the	 cabildos	 as	autonomous	 authorities.	 In	 1938	 he	 managed	 to	 get	 the	 government	 to	 pass	 a	 Decree	ordering	the	reestablishment	of	the	Ortega	and	Chaparral	resguardos,	but	local	authorities	refused	to	implement	it.	The	movement,	however,	was	never	limited	to	legal	battles	(ibid).		Indigenous	groups	recovered	lands	de	facto	via	occupations,	denied	rent	payments	to	landowners,	and	refused	taxes	on	resguardo	land.	The	landowning	elite	put	pressure	on	the	authorities	to	act,	as	well	as	taking	matters	into	their	own	hands	-	or,	at	least,	those	of	their	hired	 thugs.	Dozens	of	 people	were	killed	 and	many	movement	 leaders	were	 jailed	 and	tortured.	Lame	himself	was	detained	at	least	five	times	and	spent	a	number	of	years	behind	bars.	The	indigenous	land	struggles	initiated	by	Quintı́n	Lame	continued	(and	continue	to	date)	through	various	movements	and	organisations	(Herrera	Ángel,	1993;	Alape,	1999).	
                                                        63	While	the	law	was	built	on	explicitly	racist	foundations,	it	also	contained	clauses	that	could	be	used	to	defend	indigenous	self-governance	through	the	cabildos	and	territory	via	the	resguardos.	Over	the	years	many	 indigenous	 leaders,	organisations	and	movements	 invoked	this	 law	 in	 their	struggles	(Jiménez	Herrera,	2014).	
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Peasant	mobilisations	and	the	fight	for	land	in	Sumapaz	This	mountainous	area	south	of	Bogotá	was	home	to	one	of	the	largest	peasant	movements	of	the	early	20th	century.	As	in	other	parts	of	the	country,	the	hacendados	of	Sumapaz	had	a	history	of	forcibly	converting	colonos	 into	tenants	by	laying	claim	to	the	State	lands	on	which	they	had	settled.	According	to	Molano	(2015),	land	struggles	in	the	area	can	be	traced	to	the	arrival	of	new	peasants	following	the	Thousand	Days	War64,	“but	Decree	1110	of	1928	was	the	fuse	that	ignited	Sumapaz”	(p.	171;	see	also	Bejarano,	1983,	p.	280;	Machado,	2009,	p.	 183).	This	 legislation	provided	 legal	 backing	 for	 the	 establishment	of	 six	 ‘agricultural	colonies’	-	including	one	in	Sumapaz.	It	promised	titles	to	new	colonos	and	settlers	already	established	in	the	‘colonisation	zones’	(Presidencia	de	la	República,	1928a).		Regional	leader,	Erasmo	Valencia,	began	to	investigate	which	areas	had	private	titles	and	to	demarcate	baldíos	for	inclusion	in	the	colony.	Inhabitants	of	the	area,	with	the	help	of	 Valencia	 and	 other	 leaders,	 formed	 the	 Sociedad	 Agrícola	 de	 la	 Colonia	 de	 Sumapaz	(Machado,	 2009,	 pp.	 183,	 200).	 This	 organisation	 was	 comprised	 of	 “more	 than	 6,000	peasants	who	claimed	the	land	of	haciendas	illegally	consolidated	in	the	1830-1930	period”	(LeGrand,	 1984b,	p.	 46).	The	hacendados	 appealed	 to	 the	 local	 authorities	 and	police	 to	defend	 their	 land	 claims,	 leading	 to	 clashes.	 But	 the	 central	 government	 backed	 the	
campesinos	by	acquiring	a	number	of	latifundios	for	redistribution.	Small	independent	farms	gradually	replaced	many	of	the	local	coffee	haciendas	(Molano	Bravo,	2015,	pp.	170–172).		The	campesino	success	in	Sumapaz	was	later	destabilised	during	La	Violencia	of	the	1950s.	Repression	under	the	Conservative	regime	“led	the	colonos	 to	organise	militarily”	(Molano	Bravo,	2015,	p.	173).	Various	peasant	self-defence/guerrilla	groups	united	under	the	leadership	of	Juan	de	la	Cruz	Varela.	In	1953	the	majority	agreed	to	demobilise	on	the	condition	that	usurped	land	be	returned	to	the	campesinos.	When	this	and	other	conditions	were	not	met,	many	began	to	reorganise.	In	1955	the	government	declared	Sumapaz	a	‘zone	of	military	operations’.	The	‘anti-communist’	offensive	led	to	the	displacement	of	thousands	of	 peasants.	 They	 fled,	 under	 the	 protection	 of	 guerrilla	 fighters,	 to	 the	 highlands	 of	Sumapaz,	towards	southern	Tolima,	and	to	Huila,	Meta	and	Caquetá.	This	process	is	often	referred	to	as	‘the	armed	colonisation’;	it	led	to	the	creation	of	the	so-called	‘independent	republics’	and	was	fundamental	to	the	birth	of	the	FARC	(Molano	Bravo,	2014,	2015).		
                                                        64	Circa	100,000	people	were	killed	and	an	unknown	number	displaced	during	this	conflict	(1899-1902),	which	ended	with	the	defeat	of	the	Liberal	guerrilla	forces	by	the	Conservative	government.		
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Indigenous	resistance	to	dispossession	and	displacement	by	the	oil	industry	New	 conflicts	materialised	with	 the	 development	 of	 the	 oil	 industry.	 Indigenous	 groups	were	 worst	 affected.	 The	 exploitation	 of	 the	 1905	 Mares	 Concession	 in	 the	 Middle	Magdalena	region	led	to	the	total	annihilation	of	the	Yariguı́e	peoples	by	the	1940s.	They	had	resisted	the	invasion	of	their	territories,	but	were	defeated	by	the	oil	contractors	and	their	firearms	(Velásquez	Rodríguez,	2013).	Similarly,	the	Motilón-Barı́	lost	circa	two-thirds	of	 their	 ancestral	 lands	 -in	and	around	North	Santander-	 and	half	 their	population	after	three	decades	of	oil	operations.	The	Motilón-Barı́	resistance	was	supressed	with	the	help	of	Law	80	of	1931,	which	approved	the	deployment	of	State	armed	forces	to	protect	petroleum	operations65	(Avellaneda	Cusaría,	2004,	pp.	464–465;	Murillo,	2004,	pp.	138–139).		The	 wave	 of	 usurpation	 led	 by	 the	 oil	 companies	 was	 usually	 followed	 and/or	preceded	by	another	driven	by	large	landowners	who	sought	to	take	advantage	of	the	newly	constructed	 roads,	 bridges	 and	 ports	 servicing	 the	 extractive	 industry.	 Speculators	 also	rushed	to	acquire	property	titles	in	and	around	the	oil	concessions	in	order	to	benefit	from	rising	land	values.	Similar	dynamics	(e.g.	improved	infrastructure,	demand	for	agricultural	produce	from	the	oil	boom	settlements,	land	price	rises,	jobs)	attracted	colonos	and	other	migrants,	 who	 often	 clashed	 with	 the	 indigenous	 inhabitants	 and	 established	 peasant	settlers	(Avellaneda	Cusaría,	2004,	pp.	456–466;	Flórez	&	Moncayo,	2011,	pp.	47–50).	Oil-related	land	conflicts	spread	and	intensified,	as	the	industry	gained	increasing	importance	in	the	Colombian	economy.	For	many	 indigenous	peoples’,	 the	dispossession	 carried	out	by	 the	oil	 companies	with	State	backing	was/is	a	continuation	of	colonial	land	grabs.	A	leader	from	Nasa	Cxha	Cxha	in	Putumayo	explained:	“Just	like	the	Spanish	came	to	plunder	the	gold,	now	they	are	coming	to	plunder	the	black	gold”	(Personal	Interview,	2015;	see	also	the	narrative	of	a	Barí	in	IDMC,	2007,	pp.	45–49).	While	there	are	clearly	some	basic	similarities,	these	processes	of	dispossession	were/are	different	 in	that	 they	are	shaped	by	the	demands	of	capitalist	enterprise;	 growing	 systemic	 pressures	 for	 exploiting	 land-based	 wealth;	 productivist	ideologies	-	in	particular	the	notion	of	national	economic	development;	and	disinterest	in	native	people’s	 labour,	which	 shifted	 the	objective	 from	retention	and	 control	 to	 simply	pushing	indigenous	groups	out	of	the	way.	
                                                        65	“The	government	will	provide	the	contracting	companies	with	due	protection	to	prevent	or	repel	attacks	by	the	Motilones	or	savages	that	reside	in	the	regions	[…]	subject	to	this	contract,	it	will	do	this	using	groups	of	armed	police	or	the	public	forces”	(Law	80	of	1931,	Article	XIXb).	
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Land	struggles	in	the	United	Fruit	banana	export	enclave	Alongside	 oil-related	 land	 grabs,	 another	 important	 form	 of	 investment-driven	dispossession	was	occurring	in	the	banana	export	enclave	near	Santa	Marta.	The	US-based	United	Fruit	Company	had	established	a	vast	empire	in	the	region	by	the	1920s.	It	controlled	the	railway	 lines,	 irrigation	systems	and	credit	markets,	whilst	asserting	property	rights	over	60,000	hectares	of	land	and	forming	contracts	with	some	350	suppliers	who	worked	another	20,000	ha	(LeGrand,	1984a,	pp.	178–184;	see	also	Machado,	2009,	pp.	126–129).	The	infamous	banana	massacre	of	1928	has	drawn	attention	to	the	history	of	wage-labour	struggles	 in	 the	 area;	 however,	 less	 well-known	 are	 the	 associated	 battles	 over	 land,	described	by	LeGrand.	The	 economic	 boom	 generated	 by	 United	 Fruit	 Company’s	 activities	 attracted	migrants	from	other	parts	of	the	country.	Some	became	wage	labourers,	but	many	set	up	as	independent	cultivators	on	baldío	lands.	Others	became	‘semi-proletarians’	-	farming	their	own	land	whilst	also	taking	on	seasonal	salaried	employment.	LeGrand	describes	the	mass	dispossession	 of	 these	 peasant	 settlers	 owing	 to	 the	 United	 Fruit	 Company’s	 “constant	encroachment	on	to	public	lands”	(p.	184).	The	firm	got	local	authorities	to	forcibly	evict	the	campesinos	 or	 imprison	 their	 leaders	 and	 sent	 its	 goons	 to	destroy	 their	 farms.	The	
campesinos	petitioned	the	central	government	for	protection,	generally	to	no	avail.	Peasants	resisting	dispossession	 joined	 forces	with	 the	 labour	unions	 in	 the	battle	against	United	Fruit.	Later,	as	the	banana	export	economy	declined,	the	dispossessed	and	laid-off	workers	organised	land	occupations,	generating	further	conflicts	(LeGrand,	1984a,	pp.	184–192).	Initial	dispossession	was	 tied	 to	a	coercive	change	 in	 land	use.	The	banana	export	crops	expanded	at	the	expense	of	peasant	food	production	(for	subsistence	and	for	sale	on	local	and	regional	markets):	land	“pressures	reached	a	peak	during	the	boom	years	of	the	1920s	when	the	area	planted	in	bananas	around	Santa	Marta	doubled	in	size”	(LeGrand,	1984a,	p.	184).	Still,	large	areas	of	the	land	claimed	by	the	United	Fruit	remained	unused;	this	 may	 be	 “explained	 by	 the	 Company’s	 concern	 to	 keep	 out	 competitors	 and	 by	 the	struggle	with	banana	blight,	which	required	shifting	cultivation	and	the	continual	opening	of	new	land”	(ibid).	According	to	LeGrand,	land	appropriation	was	also	partially	motivated	by	the	company’s	desire	to	maintain	and	expand	a	wage	labour	force.			
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3)	The	land	question	as	a	national	problem	and	the	‘agricultural	colonies’	solution	The	explosion	in	rural	conflicts	intertwined	with	renewed	attention	to	the	land	question	at	the	 State	 level.	 Between	 1926	 and	 1927	 the	 cost	 of	 “subsistence	 goods”	 in	 urban	 areas	(home	to	a	quarter	of	the	population,	at	the	time)	rose	by	around	30%.	The	government	had	to	introduce	an	emergency	law	to	reduce	or	eliminate	tariffs	on	certain	food	imports.	This	generated	 tense	 debates	 surrounding	 the	 agricultural	 sector’s	 inability	 to	 keep	 up	with	rising	demand	(Bejarano,	1996;	see	also	Fajardo,	2015,	p.	103;	LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	43).		Some	 attributed	 the	 problem	 to	 labour	 shortages,	 worsened	 by	 the	 outflow	 of	workers	from	the	haciendas	to	construction	and	other	sectors	that	offered	higher	wages66.	Fajardo	 (2015)	notes	how	the	hacendados	 even	attempted	 to	use	penal	 law	 to	stop	 “the	drain	of	workers”	(p.	103).	This	is	particularly	interesting	because	it	suggests	that	initial	industrialisation	 in	 Colombia	 was	 at	 least	 partially	 supported	 by	 voluntary	 migration,	rather	than	forcible	displacement.	In	contrast	to	Marx’s	account	of	primitive	accumulation	in	England	where	the	expulsion	of	the	peasant	population	by	the	landowning	class	helped	forge	an	industrial	wage	labour	class,	in	early	20th	century	Colombia,	the	landed	elite	was	desperately	trying	to	stop	workers	from	leaving	their	estates	to	work	elsewhere.		Many	 others	 blamed	 urban	 food	 price	 inflation	 on	 land	 hoarding	 by	 elite	 groups	(Bejarano,	1996;	see	also	Fajardo,	2015,	pp.	103–104).	Policymakers	were	aware	“that	most	foodstuffs	 for	 internal	 markets	 were	 supplied	 not	 by	 the	 large	 estates	 but	 by	 peasant	producers”	(LeGrand,	1984b,	p.	43),	who	had	difficulty	accessing	or	maintaining	access	to	land.	It	was	becoming	increasingly	clear	that	the	concentration	of	land	ownership	(achieved	via	 decades	 of	 dispossession),	 and	 the	 property	 system	 that	 sustained	 unproductive	
latifundios,	posed	obstacles	to	the	country’s	economic	development67.	Again,	the	contrast	with	the	‘English	experience’	is	striking:	for	the	most	part,	elite-led	land	grabs	in	Colombia	were	not	aimed	at	revolutionising	agriculture;	they	were	the	prelude	to	a	very	long	history	of	idle	landownership,	a	problem	that	still	impedes	Colombia’s	agricultural	sector	to-date.	
                                                        66	Construction	salaries	in	Bogotá	rose	by	75%	between	1923	and	1929	and	the	difference	of	pay	between	agriculture	and	public	works	was	almost	100%	in	Antioquia,	60%	in	Santander	and	20%	in	Valle	del	Cauca.	In	addition,	the	“general	working	conditions”	on	the	haciendas	tended	to	be	poorer	than	those	in	urban	industries	and	State-funded	construction	sectors	(Bejarano,	1996).	67	Consider	the	following	quote	from	the	Minister	of	Finance	(1927-1929	and	1931-1934)	Esteban	Jaramillo:	“the	true	gravity	of	all	these	conflicts	lies	in	the	nature	of	our	property	system,	which	is	consecrated	 by	 formulas	 that	 do	 not	 fit	 well	with	 the	 necessities	 that	 have	 been	 created	 by	 the	national	development”	(cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	194).	
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Between	1830	and	1930	the	government	approved	over	5,500	concessions	of	public	land,	totalling	circa	3.3	million	hectares.	Some	80%	of	the	privatised	land	was	granted	in	parcels	of	1,000	hectares	or	more	(LeGrand	cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	59).	An	even	larger	area	 was	 privatised	 and	 concentrated	 via	 illegal	 appropriation	 (LeGrand,	 1984b;	 Melo,	1996;	Machado,	2009).	The	high	proportion	of	land	used	for	pasture	relative	to	cultivation	(by	 1934	 crops	 still	 only	 accounted	 for	 2.4%	 of	 land	 use68)	 provides	 an	 indication	 of	speculative	accumulation.	As	noted	by	Bejarano	(1996),	extensive	cattle	grazing	was	the	easiest	route	for	establishing	claims	over	large	areas	of	baldíos	(see	also	Machado,	2009).		In	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 successive	 laws	 made	 modifications	 to	 the	 land	 titling	regime,	maintaining	the	basic	principles	of	the	1874	and	1882	legislations	(see	Chapter	4),	which	-in	theory-	favoured	productive	peasant	settlers.	The	government	reiterated	the	need	to	recover	State	lands	(see	previous	discussion	of	the	1926	Supreme	court	ruling)	that	were	not	put	to	economic	use	and	its	commitment	to	titling	smallholdings	(see	e.g.	Law	56	of	1905	and	Law	71	of	1917).	However,	as	in	the	past,	the	costs	of	applying	for	a	title	-though	the	titles	 themselves	 were	 free-	 excluded	 many	 colonos	 from	 the	 privatisation	 process	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	129–147,	152–155;	Fajardo,	2015,	p.	105).		Those	who	participated	 in	 the	 government’s	 official	 ‘colonisation’	 programs	had	 a	better	 chance	 of	 receiving	 a	 title.	 Such	 schemes	 had	 existed	 since	 the	 19th	 century,	 but	government-backed	settlements	received	special	attention	in	the	1920s	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	 148–158).	 Decree	 839	 of	 1928	 provided	 unified	 guidelines	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	these	‘agricultural	colonies’	(Presidencia	de	la	República,	1928b).	The	Decree	determined	that	all	participants	should	be	offered	a	small	amount	of	money	for	the	first	6	months,	a	house,	basic	furniture,	a	number	of	farm	animals,	and	agricultural	tools.	The	cost	of	these	start-up	 resources	was	 to	be	paid	back	 to	 the	 government	over	 a	20-year	period	at	6%	annual	 interest,	with	 the	 settler’s	 land	 title	 serving	as	 loan	 collateral	 (Article	7	&	9).	All	
colonos	who	participated	in	the	government’s	settlement	programs	were	entitled	to	a	land	grant	 of	 between	 10	 and	 75	 ha;	 the	 Colonisation	 Commission	 was	 responsible	 for	 lot	demarcations,	paid	for	by	the	government	(Articles	7	&	8).	So,	the	settlers	of	these	‘colonies’	were	 exempted	 from	 the	 surveying	 fees	 and	 other	 costs	 normally	 implied	 in	 the	 titling	application	process.		
                                                        68	This	data	is	taken	from	Bejarano’s	(1996)	text.	It	is	unclear	whether	the	figure	of	2.4%	is	relative	to	the	total	land	area	of	Colombia	or	the	area	cleared.	The	author	writes:	43.7%	of	the	“utilised	area”	was	grassland	mostly	dedicated	to	cattle	grazing	and	that	“the	remainder	was	destined	to	forests”.	
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Some	 observers	 critiqued	 the	 colonisation	 programs	 as	 an	 evasion	 of	 necessary	redistribution	(Machado,	2009).	However,	even	the	titling	of	State	lands	was	perceived	as	a	threat	 by	 factions	 of	 the	 landed	 elite.	 Consider	 the	 story	 of	 Sumapaz,	 discussed	 earlier:	conflicts	intensified	following	the	creation	of	a	‘colony’	in	the	region.	The	government	was	essentially	offering	support	for	the	establishment	of	an	independent	peasantry,	a	process	that	many	hacendados	had	spent	decades	trying	to	stop.	Thus,	up	to	a	point,	the	‘agricultural	colonies’	could	be	read	as	the	governments’	response	to	the	hacedados	relentless	pursuit	of	settlers	in	frontier	zones;	i.e.	a	bid	to	curtail	the	dispossession	of	productive	smallholders.	Diverging	 visions	 of	 the	 country’s	 development	 generated	 tensions	 within	 and	between	 political	 parties	 (Fajardo,	 2015,	 pp.	 103–106).	 Segments	 of	 the	 political	establishment	(Conservatives	and	Liberals	alike)	believed	facilitating	the	peasantry’s	access	to	land	was	necessary	in	order	to	achieve	the	increase	in	agricultural	production	required	to	supply	the	food	and	raw	materials	for	industrialisation.	In	addition,	some	advocated	for	the	 expansion	 of	 a	 rural	 middle	 class	 that	 could	 sustain	 demand	 for	 domestic	manufacturing.	Radical	Liberals	and	their	left-wing	allies,	in	particular,	favoured	a	complete	transformation	 of	 the	 agrarian	 structure,	 which	 would	 require	 more	 than	 colonisation	programs	(Machado,	2009,	p.	169).			
4)	The	return	of	the	Liberals	and	the	disastrous	new	land	laws	The	1930	elections	ended	more	than	four	decades	of	Conservative	rule.	The	new	Liberal	government	 promised	 a	 break	 from	 the	 policies	 and	 practices	 of	 their	 predecessors.	However,	notwithstanding	some	very	important	advances	in	labour	law	-such	as	the	right	to	 strike,	 to	 form	unions	 and	 the	 8-hour	work	 day	 (Ocampo,	 1996a)-	 the	 Liberals	were	unable	or	unwilling	to	fully	implement	the	agenda	on	which	they	were	elected,	especially	with	regard	to	land.	The	government	implemented	a	re-distribution	program	in	a	limited	number	of	areas	affected	by	land	conflicts.	The	program	allowed	alleged	proprietors	to	sell	un-used	land	at	a	 good	 price,	 sometimes	 “exaggeratedly	 high”;	 while	 the	 campesino	 ‘beneficiaries’	 were	saddled	with	debt,	which	they	took	out	to	pay	for	the	redistributed	plots.	Much	of	this	land	“had	been	usurped	or	had	dubious	titles”	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	190–191).	In	other	words,	the	government	 (and	 indirectly	 the	peasants)	 effectively	paid	hacendados	 for	properties	they	 had	 acquired	 illicitly.	 Estimates	 suggest	 just	 430,000	 ha	were	 distributed	 between	20,000	beneficiaries	in	the	1930s	-1940s	(Ocampo,	1996a;	see	also	Bejarano,	1983,	p.	281).	
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Those	 hacendados	 affected	 by	 the	 above-mentioned	 ‘fire-fighting’	 redistribution	program	 accepted	 this	without	much	 resistance;	 it	 allowed	 them	 to	 receive	 commercial	prices	for	mostly	marginal	lands	within	or	surrounding	their	estates,	even	in	cases	where	they	 lacked	 legitimate	 title	 (Machado,	 2009;	 Ocampo,	 1996a).	 However,	 opposition	 to	broader	reform	was	organised	and	strong.	Reformist	legislators	had	put	forward	a	draft	law	that	 was	 supposed	 to	 bolster	 existing	 norms	 linking	 property	 rights	 to	 the	 ‘economic	exploitation	of	the	soil’.	Apparently,	“if	the	1933	project	had	become	Law,	more	than	three	fourths	of	private	property	in	Colombia	would	have	been	reverted	to	the	nation”	(LeGrand	cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	187).	Critics	portrayed	the	proposals	a	“Bolshevik”	project	that	“sought	to	destroy	private	property	in	Colombia”	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	200–207;	Fajardo,	2015,	 pp.	 112–113).	 And,	 according	 to	Melo,	 “the	 conservation	 of	 a	minimum	 of	 peace	between	 the	 two	parties	was	 conditioned	on	 leaving	 the	 rural	 situation	 intact”	 (cited	 in	Fajardo,	 2015,	 p.	 107).	 So,	 the	 landed	 elite	 and	 their	 allies	managed	 to	water	 down	 the	original	 proposal	 and	 the	 resulting	 legislation	 ended	 up	 reinforcing	 the	 inequitable	property	regime	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	200–207;	Fajardo,	2015,	pp.	111–113).		The	 new	 agrarian	 legislation	 (Law	 200	 of	 1936)	 benefitted	 the	 landed	 elite	 in	 a	number	of	ways.	First	and	foremost,	it	put	an	end	to	the	Supreme	Court’s	‘diabolical	test’,	which	had	established	that	only	land	claims	backed	by	a	title	granted	by	the	State	were	valid.	In	other	words,	the	legislation	allowed	usurped	State	lands	to	become	legal	private	property	(Fajardo,	 2015;	 LeGrand,	 1984b;	 Ocampo,	 1996a).	 The	 government	 essentially	 opted	 to	‘forgive’	and	‘forget’	decades	of	dispossession.		The	hacendados	were	also	given	an	additional	10	years	to	make	their	land	productive.	According	 to	 Ocampo	 (1996),	 even	 after	 the	 decade	 long	 extension	 had	 expired,	 idle	properties	were	not	confiscated.	Furthermore,	Law	200	accepted	the	presence	of	livestock	as	sufficient	proof	of	land	use;	“with	the	introduction	of	a	few	heads	of	cattle,	[one]	could	establish	private	property	 and	 avoid	prescription	or	 reversion	of	 property	 to	 the	 State”	(Machado,	2009,	p.	269).	This	opened	the	way	to	“extensive	cattle	latifundios”	(ibid).		Hence,	many	observers	agree	that	Law	200	did	very	little	to	change	rural	structures	(LeGrand,	1984b;	Ocampo,	1996a;	Machado,	2009;	Fajardo,	2015).	Sánchez	and	Meertens	(1983)	characterise	the	Law	as	“a	landowner	solution	to	the	agrarian	problem,	based	on	gradually	 transforming	 latifundistas	 into	 capitalist	 entrepreneurs”	 (p.	 31).	 Even	 this	objective	was	pursued	timidly:	the	Law	did	not	“obligate	the	latifundistas	to	immediately	modernise	the	conditions	of	production”	(Moncayo	cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	171).		
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Neverthless,	the	few	pro-campesino	elements	of	the	reform	that	survived	the	botching	of	the	original	project	were	enough	to	ensure	a	ferocious	reaction	from	many	landowners.	The	most	controversial	aspect	of	the	Law	(from	the	landowners’	perspective)	was	Article	12,	which	allowed	‘good	faith’	occupants,	who	had	cultivated	private	land	for	more	than	5	years,	to	acquire	property	rights	via	prescription	(Law	200	of	1936	cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	197).	This	Article	was	supposed	to	protect	peasants	who	unwittingly	settled	on	unused	private	property,	believing	it	to	be	baldío	 land.	However,	according	to	Ocampo	(1996),	 it	also	allowed	rebellious	tenants	to	claim	ownership	over	the	land	they	worked	by	disowning	any	 informal	 tenancy	 agreements.	 (Note:	 in	 some	 cases,	 this	may	have	been	State	 lands	claimed	illegitimately	by	the	landowning	elite,	but	which	were	now	recognised	as	private	property	under	 the	new	 law.)	 Fearful	 landowners	 began	 to	 evict	 peasants.	 These	 “mass	expulsions”	led	to	an	“extension	of	cattle	grazing	on	hacienda	land”,	which	meant	-ironically-	that	 Law	200	had	 exactly	 the	 opposite	 of	 the	 desired	 effect:	 agricultural	 production	 fell	(Bejarano,	1983,	p.	282;	see	also	Machado,	2009,	pp.	200–215).		In	1944	the	government	passed	Law	100,	which	granted	further	concessions	to	the	landed	elite.	The	new	law	made	it	easier	for	landowners	to	evict	tenants	and	endorsed	the	prohibition	 of	 slow-yield	 or	 permanent	 crops	 (cultivos	 de	 tardío	 rendimiento)	 on	 rented	land,	 which	 excluded	 many	 campesinos	 from	 participating	 in	 the	 coffee	 market.	 It	 also	obligated	 a	 shift	 from	 informal	 verbal	 agreements	 to	 formal	 written	 contracts,	 which	combined	 with	 the	 landlords’	 right	 to	 forbid	 permanent	 cultivations,	 made	 it	 nearly	impossible	for	tenants	to	claim	the	plot	they	worked.	These	same	contracts	could	be	used	to	 prove	 active	 economic	 exploitation	 of	 the	 land	 by	 absentee	 proprietors	 and	 hence	enabled	 them	 to	 avoid	 forfeiture	 proceedings.	 The	 landowners	 were	 also	 granted	 an	
additional	5-year	extension	for	putting	their	properties	to	use	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	231–238;	see	also	Fajardo,	2015;	Moncayo	Cruz,	2015).		Law	100	was	meant	to	counteract	the	effects	of	Law	200	and	revive	tenancy	farming.	Nevertheless,	evictions	continued	apace.	Later	laws	aimed	at	stimulating	the	cattle	industry	contributed	to	further	land	clearances.	In	1945	a	journalist	warned:	“the	threat	of	eviction	is	always	upon	the	tenant	peasants;	the	policy	of	the	landowners	is	to	raze	the	fields	sown	by	 small	 producers,	 to	 clear	 the	 land,	 and	 convert	 all	 plots	 into	 cattle-grazing	pastures”	(Diario	Popular	article	dated	June	10th	1945,	cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	272).	By	the	end	of	the	 1940s	 an	 estimated	 43	million	 hectares	were	 used	 for	 cattle	 grazing,	while	 just	 2.1	million	ha	were	cultivated	(Machado,	2009,	p.	277).			
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5)	La	Violencia:	dispossession/displacement	and	the	origins	of	contemporary	conflict	By	the	late	1940s,	Colombia	had	plunged	into	yet	another	civil	war.	This	period	of	conflict,	known	 as	 La	 Violencia,	 is	 usually	 considered	 to	 have	 begun	 in	 1948,	 following	 the	assassination	of	Liberal	presidential	candidate	Gaitán.	However,	violence	between	political	groups	and	 linked	to	 land/labour	struggles	had	been	escalating	since	the	1930s.	Molano	(2015)	asserts	an	alternative	periodization	of	La	Violencia	(1925-1955),	pointing	out	that	approximately	14,000	people	had	died	in	violent	clashes	by	the	end	of	1947	(pp.	152,	163).	In	any	case,	the	violence	intensified	and	spread	after	Gaitán’s	murder.	Riots	in	the	country’s	main	cities	were	put	down	relatively	quickly	via	military	occupation,	but	rural	areas	were	engulfed	by	bloodshed.	Circa	200,000	people	were	killed	over	the	following	decade	and	1-2	million	were	displaced	(Reyes	Posada,	2009,	p.	40;	Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	14–17).		According	to	Sánchez	and	Meertens	(1983),	“the	most	salient	characteristic	of	the	first	two	 governments	 during	 La	 Violencia	 (1946-1953)	 was	 state	 terrorism”	 (p.	 38).	 The	Conservatives	 used	 government	 forces	 and	 militia	 groups	 to	 launch	 a	 brutal	 campaign	against	 liberal	 and	 communist	 sympathisers.	 Liberals	 and	 communists	 responded	 by	organising	guerrilla	groups	and	peasant	self-defence	forces.	Many	of	these	groups	were	just	as	 ruthless	 as	 their	 conservative	 counterparts,	 attacking	 civilians	 and	 soldiers	 alike.	Meanwhile,	 the	 army	bombed	 guerrilla-strongholds	 and	 committed	massacres	 in	 liberal	areas	 (Molano	Bravo,	 2015,	 pp.	 174–175,	 169).	Massive	 forced	displacements	 served	 to	further	“politically	homogenise	villages	and	regions”	(G.	Sánchez	&	Meertens,	1983,	p.	38).	
Gamonales	 or	 powerful	 landowners69	mobilised	 peasants	 under	 their	 influence	 to	attack	opponents	and	communities	dominated	by	the	rival	party.	They	usurped	lands	and	crops	by	getting	their	henchmen	to	displace	or	murder	the	original	owner	and	forced	sales	at	 low	prices.	Many	also	sought	reprisals	against	 the	peasant	 leaders/organisations	who	had	challenged	them	in	the	preceding	years.	Some	observers	even	refer	to	La	Violencia	as	‘the	landowner’s	revenge’.	However,	campesinos	also	used	violence	on	their	own	account,	to	displace	and	dispossess	families	of	the	opposing	group	or	to	avenge	their	repressors	and	usurpers	(G.	Sánchez	&	Meertens,	1983,	p.	38;	Ocampo,	Avella,	Bernal,	&	Errázuri,	1996;	Molano	Bravo,	2015,	p.	175;	Machado,	2009,	pp.	310–311).	In	sum:	“landlords	and	peasants	were	beginning	to	use	the	Violencia	to	settle	by	force	old	and	new	land	disputes”	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	15).	
                                                        69	A	gamonal	is	“the	rich	man	of	a	small	place,	who	owns	or	possesses	the	most	valuable	lands,	he	is	like	a	feudal	lord	of	the	republican	parish,	who	influences	and	dominates	the	district”	(Melo,	1998).		
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Despite	 some	 unifying	 elements,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 La	 Violencia	 were	 markedly	different	from	region	to	region	(Bejarano,	1983).	Sánchez	and	Meertens	(1983)	note,	 for	example,	that	the	liberal	guerrillas	in	southern	Tolima	were	“the	most	directly	manipulated	by	 businessmen	 and	hacendados”.	 In	 Sumapaz,	 in	 contrast,	 peasant	 associations	 “with	 a	solid	 tradition	 of	 organised	 struggle”	 were	 “transformed	 into	 a	 wide	 and	 disciplined	guerrilla	movement”,	which	forced	the	government	to	“treat	the	problem	in	the	region,	not	as	a	case	of	public	[dis]order,	but	as	a	land	conflict”	(pp.	39-40).	By	far	the	largest	guerrilla	force	was	that	of	the	eastern	plains.	Initially	the	guerrilla	of	the	plains	worked	in	alliance	with	the	liberal	hacendados,	like	in	southern	Tolima.	However,	the	landowning	elite	of	the	region	later	disowned	the	rebels	they	had	once	backed	and	formed	an	agreement	with	the	army	(Fajardo,	2015,	p.	116;	Molano	Bravo,	2015,	p.	170;	Machado,	2009,	pp.	312–315).		There	were	an	estimated	40,000	to	55,000	guerrilla	fighters	across	Colombia	by	1953	(Molano	Bravo,	2015,	p.	175).	The	sheer	quantity	and	the	changing	quality	of	these	armed	groups	presented	a	growing	threat	to	the	country’s	elite,	liberals	and	conservatives	alike.	Many	 gamonales	 lost	 control	 over	 the	militias	 they	 had	 created.	 In	 some	 regions,	 class	struggles	began	to	overpower	conflicts	between	members	of	opposing	political	groups.	In	1953	segments	of	both	parties	supported	the	installation	of	a	military	government	under	General	 Rojas	 Pinilla	 (Bejarano,	 1983;	 G.	 Sánchez	 &	 Meertens,	 1983;	 Machado,	 2009),	putting	an	end	 to	 “the	 last,	 and	 the	most	 important,	 of	 the	 clientelist	wars	 in	Colombia”	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	18).	Soon	after	assuming	power,	Rojas	offered	amnesty	to	the	various	guerrilla	groups.	He	then	 passed	 a	 law	 to	 make	 communism	 illegal,	 imposed	 heavy	 press	 censorship	 and	launched	a	major	military	offensive	to	squash	the	last	of	the	armed	subversion.	Months	of	bombing	and	ambushes	-especially	in	the	area	of	Villarrica	between	1954	and	1955-	caused	thousands	of	civilians	and	guerrillas	to	flee,	leading	to	the	‘armed	colonisation’	mentioned	earlier	(Molano	Bravo,	2015,	pp.	170–178;	Machado,	2009,	p.	319;	G.	Sánchez	&	Meertens,	1983,	p.	41).		Rojas	soon	began	to	demonstrate	 too	much	autonomy	from	the	oligarchy	 that	had	rushed	him	into	power.	Once	again	Colombia’s	elite	were	forced	to	make	a	pact	in	order	to	maintain	control.	Negotiations	gave	rise	to	the	National	Front	in	which	the	Conservatives	and	the	Liberals	agreed	to	alternate	power	and	to	share	government	positions.	The	power	sharing	deal,	which	excluded	alternative	political	parties,	began	in	1958	and	lasted	16	years	until	1974	(G.	Sánchez	&	Meertens,	1983,	pp.	41–42;	Moncayo	Cruz,	2015,	p.	51;	Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	15–16).		
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Formally,	the	military	takeover	and	subsequent	National	Front	agreement	meant	the	end	of	La	Violencia,	but	it	also	marked	the	transition	to	another	phase	of	violent	conflict.	In	many	areas,	the	landed	elite	continued	to	control	small	armed	squadrons,	which	they	used	to	 persecute	 the	 political	 opposition	 and/or	 recalcitrant	 campesinos.	 Meanwhile,	 some	‘political	bandits’,	as	Sánchez	and	Meertens	(1983)	call	them,	coordinated	with	State	forces	and	 “acted	 as	 agents	 of	 terror	 against	 the	 organised	 struggle	 of	 the	 peasantry”	 (p.	 63).	Others	were	more	like	“criminals	for	hire”;	for	example,	the	pájaros	in	Cauca	Valley	“fulfilled	a	clear	function	of	expropriating	and	dispossessing	peasants,	at	the	service	of	the	booming	sugar	business”	(p.	55).	Finally,	there	were	‘social	bandits’	who	acted	as	“spokespersons	for	the	discontented	peasantry”	(G.	Sánchez	&	Meertens,	1983,	p.	42	and	62;	see	also	Bejarano,	1983,	p.	293).		Some	 groups	 fall	 outside	 the	 category	 of	 ‘bandits’	 entirely.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 of	 the	radical	liberal	peasant	self-defence	communities	turned	communist	guerrilla.	The	success	of	 the	 insurgency	 in	 Cuba,	 combined	with	 exclusionary	 and	 repressive	politics	 at	 home,	contributed	 to	 a	 formal	 acceptance	 of	 armed	 struggle	within	 the	Colombian	Communist	Party,	 which	 continued	 to	 work	 with	 the	 guerrilla	 forces	 that	 had	 formed	 during	 La	
Violencia.	Meanwhile,	US	military	 assistance	 to	 Colombia	 received	 a	 boost	 following	 the	Cuban	Revolution.	In	1959	the	US	sent	a	team	of	counterinsurgency	experts	to	the	country.	Plan	LASO	or	the	Latin	American	Security	Operation	was	launched	a	few	years	later	in	1962.	Following	the	battle	at	Marquetalia	in	1964,	a	number	of	guerrilla	groups,	plus	members	of	the	 Communist	 Party,	 held	 the	 ‘First	 Guerrilla	 Conference’.	 They	 drew	 up	 an	 Agrarian	Program	–	containing	the	guiding	objectives	of	their	struggle.	In	1966,	during	the	‘Second	Guerrilla	 Conference’,	 the	 rebels	 changed	 their	 name	 from	 ‘Bloque	 Sur’	 to	 FARC	 or	 the	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	of	Colombia	(Molano	Bravo,	2015,	pp.	182–188).		In	 another	 region	 of	 Colombia,	 a	 group	 of	 youths	 -just	 returned	 from	 a	 visit	 to	revolutionary	 Cuba-	 joined	 forces	 with	 union	 leaders,	 student	 groups	 and	 peasant	organisations	 (with	 historical	 links	 to	 the	 liberal	 guerrilla)	 to	 form	 the	ELN	or	National	Liberation	Army.	They	launched	their	first	attack	in	Simacota	-	Santander	in	January	1964.	A	few	years	later,	in	1967,	the	EPL	or	Popular	Liberation	Army	carried	out	their	first	assault	in	Córdoba.	The	EPL	was	the	armed	wing	of	the	Marxist	Leninist	Communist	Party	(PCML),	which	arose	after	those	critical	of	the	Soviet	Union	broke	away	from	the	Communist	Party	(Molano	Bravo,	2015,	pp.	188–189,	196).	The	following	year,	the	Colombian	government	passed	a	legislation,	reaffirming	existing	policy	that	allowed	the	Military	to	arm	and	train	civilians	as	part	of	the	State’s	counterinsurgency	efforts	(Prensa	Colectivo,	2006).		
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In	 sum,	 La	 Violencia	 was	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 contemporary	 armed	 conflict	 in	Colombia.	Explanations	of	this	bloody	episode	are	diverse70,	but	many	agree	that	struggles	over	land	were	a	crucial	element	(Machado,	2009;	Molano	Bravo,	2015;	Fajardo,	2015).	The	effects	of	this	phase	of	conflict	are	equally	varied	and	perhaps	even	more	intensely	debated	than	 its	 origins.	 There	 is	 considerable	 disagreement	 specifically	 over	 the	 causal	 links	between	 La	 Violencia	 and	 the	 ‘modernisation’	 of	 agriculture	 (arguments	 discussed	 in	Bejarano,	1983,	pp.	296–297;	Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	17–18;	Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).		It	is	ambiguous	whether	dispossession	during	this	period	contributed	to	an	expansion	of	the	rural	proletariat.	Available	data	suggests	the	overall	proportion	of	agricultural	wage	labourers	 compared	 to	 independent	 producers	 did	 not	 change	 significantly	 in	 the	 long	run71.	Still,	a	number	of	authors	emphasise	a	drop	in	rural	wages	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	due	to	a	temporary	‘oversupply’	of	labour	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996;	see	also	Machado,	2009,	p.	307)	 -	 possibly	 an	 indication	 that	 the	 violence	 contributed	 to	 a	 temporary	 surge	 in	 the	number	of	salaried	workers.	Meanwhile,	rural	to	urban	migration	did	accelerate	around	this	time	 and,	 thus,	 the	 violence	may	 have	 added	 to	 the	wage	 labour	 class	 in	 the	 towns	 and	cities72.	However,	the	unequivocal	outcome	of	the	violence	was	the	further	opening	of	the	agricultural	frontier,	as	many	of	the	campesinos	forcibly	displaced	and/or	dispossessed	fled	to	these	‘colonisation’	zones	to	re-establish	as	autonomous	producers73.	
                                                        70	Bejarano	 (1983)	provides	 a	 succinct	 list	 (citations	omitted):	La	Violencia	 “was	 a	 revolutionary	tension	[…],	it	was	an	instrument	of	repression	and	revenge	of	the	landowner	against	the	popular	classes,	 it	 was	 a	 communist	 subversion	 in	 reaction	 to	 anti-communist	 repression,	 it	 was	 the	conflictive	response	of	a	feudal	or	pre-modern	society	to	modernisation,	or	the	other	way	around	-	a	disordered	demand	for	change	[…],	it	was	also	a	violent	reaction	to	monogamy	and	catholic	marriage”	(pp.	284-285).		71	According	to	Ocampo	et	al.	 (1996),	 the	proportion	of	wage	 labourers	 in	rural	areas,	relative	 to	independent	producers,	 fluctuated	between	42%	and	46%.	The	authors	do	not	provide	a	precise	period	for	this	data;	though	they	suggest	it	applies	from	1938	until	the	time	the	chapter	was	written	(presumably	 the	 late	 1980s,	 though	 the	 book	 was	 republished	 in	 1996).	 Also,	 comparing	 the	population	census	of	1954	to	that	of	1964,	Zamosc	(1986)	actually	 found	“a	slight	 increase	 in	the	proportion	of	the	rural	population	engaged	in	independent	farming”	(p.	25,	emphasis	added).	72	It	 is	difficult	to	find	urban	vs.	rural	population	data	that	covers	the	period	of	 interest.	Circa	2.3	million	Colombians	moved	from	the	countryside	to	the	cities	between	1951	and	1964	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	 23);	 i.e.	 in	 the	 later	 phases	 of	 conflict.	 Zamosc	 estimates	 that	 violent	 forced	 displacement	 can	account	for	only	a	third	of	this	population	shift.	73	I	have	not	encountered	any	data	on	the	numbers	of	people	who	moved	to	the	agricultural	frontier	during	this	time	(1940s	and	1950s),	but	countless	documents	make	reference	to	the	thousands	of	displaced	families	that	re-established	in	these	‘colonisation’	zones.	Indeed,	the	literature	consulted	emphasises	this	outcome	far	more	than	rural	to	urban	migration.	
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Even	in	terms	of	land	control,	the	overall	outcome	is	not	clear-cut.	According	to	one	source,	some	393,648	“parcels”	were	usurped	during	this	period,	mainly	in	Valle	de	Cauca,	Cundinamarca,	Tolima,	Gran	Caldas	and	Norte	de	Santander	(CNMH,	2015b,	p.	43).	Some	authors	suggest	that	this	dispossession	reinforced	unequal	agrarian	structures.	Indeed,	a	number	of	studies	document	how	elites	took	advantage	of	the	violence	in	order	to	extend	their	 landholdings.	At	 the	 same	 time,	qualitative	 research	also	 reveals	 cases	of	 land	 (re-)distribution	amidst	or	after	La	Violencia	 (Bejarano,	1983;	G.	Sánchez	&	Meertens,	1983;	Machado,	2009).	 Zamosc	 (1986)	 sums	up:	 it’s	 a	 “complex	picture	 that	 includes	not	only	landlord	 encroachments	 against	 peasants	 but	 also	 gains	 by	 peasants	 at	 the	 expense	 of	landlords,	[and	the]	dispossession	of	peasants	by	peasants	in	factional	strife”	(pp.	17-18).	The	 government	 did	 little	 to	 address	 violent	 land	 usurpation.	 Law	 201	 of	 1959	declared	 that	 consent	may	 be	 considered	 void	 for	 property	 transfers	 that	 exploited	 the	“internal	 commotion”.	 However,	 the	 legislation	 was	 not	 widely	 applied.	 Similarly,	 the	Tribunals	of	Conciliation	and	Equity,	which	were	meant	to	ensure	the	restitution	of	lands	and	 other	 assets	 usurped	 during	 the	 conflict,	 were	 disbanded	 after	 a	 year.	 This	 failure,	combined	with	 government	 attacks	 on	 areas	where	many	displaced	people	 took	 refuge,	most	likely	contributed	to	the	rise	of	the	armed	insurgency	(CNMH,	2015b,	pp.	46–48)	and	renewed	land	conflicts.	As	shown	in	previous	sections,	memories	of	dispossession	tend	to	shape	 ongoing	 struggles.	 And,	 notwithstanding	 ambiguity	 regarding	 the	 overall	distributional	effects	of	the	violence,	many	campesinos	perceive(d)	the	war	as	a	“strategy	[…	to]	 dispossess	 the	 peasants	 who	 had	 the	 best	 lands”	 (son	 of	 man	 displaced	 during	 La	Violencia	cited	in	IDMC,	2007,	p.	141;	also	Personal	Interviews,	2014-2015).	
	
6)	The	consolidation	of	industrial	capitalism	and	persistence	of	peasant	production	According	 to	 Ocampo	 et	 al.	 (1996)	 “the	 capitalist	 development	 that	 had	 accelerated	 in	Colombia	in	the	first	 few	decades	of	the	20th	century	consolidated	definitely	 in	the	years	after	 the	 Second	 World	 War”.	 The	 Colombian	 economy	 prospered	 amidst	 the	 violent	conflict:	between	1944/5	and	1954/5	gross	domestic	product	(GDP)	grew	at	an	average	of	5%	per	year;	 industrial	production	grew	even	 faster	at	9.1%	over	 the	 same	period.	The	government	 adopted	 import	 substitution	 industrialisation	 or	 ISI	 as	 the	 main	 economic	strategy.	 By	 the	 late	 1950s,	 domestic	 manufacturers	 were	 able	 to	 supply	 most	 of	 the	country’s	consumer	goods,	and	had	begun	to	produce	many	intermediate	and	capital	goods	also	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).		
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Colombia	maintained	varied	versions	of	ISI	-later	combined	with	export	promotion74-	until	the	mid	1970s.	Despite	diverse	economic	problems,	the	country	sustained	relatively	high	growth	 rates	overall	 during	 this	 era75.	 Protectionist/interventionist	measures	were	partially	inspired	by	the	theories	promoted	by	the	Economic	Commission	for	Latin	America	and	 the	 structuralist	 school,	 which	 challenged	 development	 models	 based	 on	 export-dependent	growth	and	free-markets.	However,	as	noted	by	Kalmanovitz	&	López	(2006),	Colombia’s	experience	of	ISI	was	very	different	from	the	“populist	projects	in	the	Southern	Cone”;	it	was	essentially	an	elitist	enterprise	(p.	4).	Powerful	manufacturing	and	agricultural	interest	groups	encouraged	and	were	the	main	beneficiaries	of	the	ISI	strategy	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996;	Kalmanovitz	&	López,	2006;	Machado,	2009,	p.	268).		Though	 ISI	 is	 most	 commonly	 associated	 with	 the	 promotion	 of	 manufacturing	industries,	Colombia	also	applied	the	model	to	some	agricultural	sectors.	For	example,	the	government	 nurtured	 domestic	 cotton	 production	 (serving	 national	 textile	 industries)	using	ISI	type	measures	and	the	country	transitioned	from	importing	to	exporting	cotton	in	just	 over	 a	 decade.	 According	 to	 Ocampo	 et	 al.	 (1996),	 Colombia	 was	 able	 to	 avoid	 an	“excessive	 industrialist	 bias”.	 Overall,	 they	 argue,	 industrialisation	 served	 agricultural	development,	and	advances	in	agriculture	served	industrial	growth76.		Coffee	continued	to	account	for	the	majority	of	Colombia’s	export	earnings;	in	fact,	the	proportion	rose	from	66%	of	the	total	between	1925	and	1949	to	71%	of	total	export	value	between	1950	and	1969	(GRECO,	2001,	p.	11).	Nevertheless,	Ocampo	et	al.	(1996)	argue	 that	 the	 coffee	 sector,	 which	 had	 driven	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 Colombia’s	 industrial	development,	 lost	momentum	 in	 the	post-war	era.	This,	 they	 suggest,	 also	had	 symbolic	import:	 smallholder	 coffee	 production	 remained	 predominant	 -63.9%	 of	 the	 total	 area	planted	with	coffee	corresponded	to	 farms	of	 less	 than	10	hectares-	but	 the	country	“no	longer	praised	 the	peasant	 coffee	 farmer	 as	 a	national	hero”	 (Ocampo	et	 al.,	 1996).	The	
                                                        74	From	1967	onwards	the	government	actively	promoted	export	diversification	(Ocampo,	Avella,	Bernal,	&	Errázuri,	1996).	This	“induced	a	rapid	growth	of	manufactured	exports,	which	grew	to	US	$100	million	in	1970	and	increased	by	500	percent	in	the	four	subsequent	years”	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	99).		75	GDP	growth	averaged	4.4%	between	1954/5	and	1966/7	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	The	World	Bank	has	records	for	Colombia	starting	from	1961.	Their	data	shows	that	annual	GDP	growth	did	not	fall	below	4%	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	except	for	3	years:	1963	(2.9%),	1965	(3%)	and	1975	(2.2%)	and	was	above	6	per	cent	for	7	of	these	20	years	(World	Bank,	2017a).	76	Kalmanovitz	and	López	(2006)	are	NOT	convinced	of	the	overall	benefits	of	protecting	agriculture.	They	suggest	 that	“industry	was	 forced	to	pay	prices	above	those	 in	 international	markets	 for	 its	agricultural	inputs	and	this	interfered	with	the	growth	of	some	branches”	of	the	economy	(p.	16).		
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lacklustre	of	the	coffee	sector	in	the	1950s	and	1960s77	coincided	with	the	rise	of	industrial	farming,	which	 replaced	 the	 traditional	 hacienda	 in	 some	 regions	 (Zamosc,	 1986,	 p.	 24;	Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	Bolstered	by	ISI	policies,	many	large	and	some	medium-sized	farms	began	to	adopt	new	production	methods	(e.g.	by	the	1960s	a	quarter	of	cultivations	were	mechanised)	and	to	 replace	 tenants	 and	 sharecroppers	with	wage-labourers.	 This	 process,	 however,	was	limited	 to	 certain	 sectors	 (e.g.	 cotton,	 rice,	 refined	 sugar	 cane	 and	 export	 bananas)	 and	regions	(e.g.	Valle	and	Huila).	On	the	whole,	capitalist	agribusiness	became	predominant	in	flatlands	amenable	to	mechanisation;	while	peasant	agriculture	prevailed	in	the	mountains	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	Zamosc	(1986)	confirms	this	generality,	while	also	outlining	a	more	complex	portrait	of	rural	Colombia	 in	 the	1960s,	 including	variations	within	 the	Andean	
campesino	 economy,	 the	 prevalence	 of	 colonos	 in	 the	 Amazon	 plains,	 the	 persistence	 of	traditional	latifundia	especially	in	the	coastal	regions,	and	the	limited	geographical	reach	of	‘agrarian	capitalism’	(pp.	25-32).	Still,	 the	 growth	 of	 domestic	 agribusiness	 and	 changes	 in	 production	 techniques	started	 to	alter	 the	political	economy	of	dispossession	and	displacement.	Mechanisation,	combined	with	population	growth,	meant	that	land	grabbing	as	an	explicit	method	of	labour	acquisition	 became	 less	 common.	 It	 may	 have	 even	 given	 ‘modernising’	 landowners	additional	 motives	 for	 expelling	 tenants	 (other	 than	 to	 protect	 their	 property	 claims),	especially	during	the	later	phases	of	hacienda	clearance.	Nevertheless,	according	to	Ocampo	et	 al	 (1996),	 mechanised	 crops	 were	 mostly	 established	 on	 lands	 formerly	 used	 for	extensive	cattle	ranching	and	hence	usurped	from	colonos	or	cleared	of	tenants	in	earlier	epochs.	So,	land	accumulated	through	dispossession	in	decades	and	even	centuries	past	was	being	incorporated	into	the	capitalist	production	system.	Property	rights	claims	that	had	long	hindered	economic	development	were	now	underwriting	an	expansion	of	exchange	value,	at	least	in	some	regions.	Historical	land	concentration	was	sometimes	insufficient	to	satisfy	rising	demand;	in	this	sense,	agribusiness	growth	also	stimulated	new	processes	of	dispossession78.		
                                                        77	This	 loss	of	dynamism	was	 turned	around	 in	 the	mid-1970s.	 In	 the	decade	prior,	The	National	Coffee	Grower’s	Federation	began	implementing	a	program	of	technical	assistance	-	contributing	to	the	sector’s	revitalisation	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	78	For	example,	the	dispossession	and	displacement	of	the	peasantry	during	La	Violencia	is	said	to	have	served	 the	expansion	of	 the	sugar	 industry	across	 the	Cauca	Valley	between	 the	1940s	and	1960s	(Mondragón,	2007;	G.	Sánchez	&	Meertens,	1983).	
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While	national	and	international	observers	celebrated	the	“spectacular	expansion	of	large-scale	mechanized	agriculture”	in	Colombia	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	21),	small	farmers	were	still	pulling	much	of	the	country’s	economic	weight.	The	first	agricultural	census	of	1960	revealed	that	61.3%	of	total	production,	in	terms	of	volume,	came	from	farms	with	less	than	20	 hectares.	 This	 same	 group	 -farms	 smaller	 than	 20	 ha,	 the	 majority	 of	 which	 were	
minifundios	with	fewer	than	5	ha-	represented	86%	of	production	units	but	controlled	just	14.5%	of	the	country’s	land	(Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	24–26).			
7)	Unresolved	agrarian	problems	and	diverging	solutions	
	 Well-off	men	or	those	with	moderate	fortunes	hoard	land,	making	it	more	and	more	 difficult	 for	 the	 agricultural	worker	 to	 acquire	 a	 parcel.	 […]	 The	 anti-economic	system	of	land	purchases	based	on	[speculative]	investment	criteria	continues	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 most	 serious	 obstacles	 to	 the	 development	 of	Colombian	 agriculture	 […	 The	 government	 must]	 guarantee	 adequate	solutions	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 the	 need	 for	 drastic	 measures	 such	 as	expropriation	 (Economic	 Development	 Comittee	 report	 from	 1951,	 cited	 in	Machado,	2009,	p.	328).		The	above	quote	reveals	persistent	concerns	surrounding	 land	hoarding.	The	committee	had	 been	 formed	 to	 examine	 the	 findings	 and	 recommendations	 of	 the	 1949-1950	International	 Bank	 for	 Reconstruction	 and	 Development	 (World	 Bank)	 mission	 led	 by	Lauchlin	Currie	(Machado,	2009,	pp.	327–328).	Currie’s	report	underscored	the	inefficiency	of	land	use	in	Colombia:	“flat	extensions	situated	in	the	fertile	valleys	are	dedicated	to	cattle-ranching,	while	the	mountain	slopes	are	employed	for	agriculture”	(cited	in	Machado,	2009,	p.	277).	One	of	Currie’s	main	proposals	was	a	tax	increase	on	unused	or	underused	land.	However,	according	 to	Machado,	 this	policy	was	never	properly	applied	due	 to	practical	obstacles	 and	opposition	 from	 the	 traditional	 landowning	 elite,	which	 “found	 important	allies”	in	the	urban	middle	class	who	also	had	speculative	land	investments	(pp.	326-329).		The	 Colombian	 government	 opted	 instead	 for	 a	 regime	 of	 positive	 incentives	 -including	 tax	 breaks,	 subsidies	 and	 various	 forms	 of	 assistance-	 to	 encourage	 increased	production.	 This	 strategy	was	 relatively	 successful	 at	 promoting	 large-scale	 commercial	
  
170	
agriculture	 in	 some	 regions	 (Ocampo	 et	 al.,	 1996;	 Zamosc,	 1986;	 Machado,	 2009),	 as	discussed	 previously.	 However,	 these	 measures	 were	 insufficient.	 Indeed,	 the	 problem	identified	by	Currie	-the	disproportionate	use	of	arable	land	for	cattle	grazing-	exists	to	date.	Overall,	 from	 the	 1940s	 onwards,	 the	 Colombian	 government’s	 treatment	 of	 the	agrarian	problem	changed.	Low	productivity,	 rather	 than	unequal	 land	distribution,	was	considered	the	main	obstacle	to	economic	growth	(Machado,	2009,	p.	305;	Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	 Policy	 makers	 sought	 to	 transform	 unproductive	 landowners	 into	 capitalist	entrepreneurs.	 Agrarian	 political	 economists	 call	 this	 the	 junker	 path	 or	 the	 landowner	solution	to	the	agrarian	question.	From	this	perspective,	unequal	land	distribution	is	not	necessarily	a	problem	and	can	actually	be	beneficial	to	economic	development,	so	long	as	large	 landholdings	 are	 used	 productively.	 This	 was	 the	 view	 espoused	 by	 the	 Lauchlin	Currie	who	played	an	active	role	in	Colombian	policymaking	between	the	1950s	and	the	1970s	(Brittain,	2005,	p.	342).		Currie	supported	the	promotion	of	large-scale	mechanised	agriculture	on	Colombia’s	flat	 lands,	 which	 was	 favoured	 by	 concentrated	 property	 holdings.	 Furthermore,	 he	considered	peasant	production	to	be	“an	irrational	use	of	labor	power”	and	claimed	that	the	rural	masses	would	be	better	exploited	as	workers	in	urban	industries	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	21).	 James	 Brittain	 (2005)	 sums	 up:	 for	 Currie	 “depeasantization	 (=	 dispossession,	displacement)	would	[…]	fuel	a	virtuous	cycle	of	growth/development”	(p.	344).	Brittain	(2005)	argues	that	Currie’s	theory	of	“accelerated	economic	development”,	which	insisted	on	the	benefits	of	mass	rural	to	urban	migration,	effectively	endorsed	the	violent	uprooting	of	the	peasantry	in	Colombia.	Brittain’s	critiques	are	well	founded,	but	arguably	his	article	overstates	 Currie’s	 influence	 and	 understates	 the	 importance	 of	 other	 issues/actors	 in	determining	 land	 and	 agrarian	 policies	 in	 Colombia79.	 By	 the	 1960s,	 the	 partial	implementation	of	a	Currie-style	strategy	had	started	to	cause	significant	social,	political	and	economic	problems.	It	seemed	that	some	of	these	problems	could	be	-at	least	partly	and	temporarily-	resolved	by	democratising	land	access.		
                                                        79	Brittain	(2005)	himself	mentions	the	pro-land	reform	influence	of	the	Economic	Commission	for	Latin	America,	the	structuralist	school	and	the	Alliance	for	Progress.	However,	he	does	not	say	how	this	 impacted	 upon	 agrarian	 policy	 in	 Colombia	 and	 insinuates	 instead	 that	 Colombia	 became	 a	testing	ground	for	Currie’s	theory	(p.	343).	However,	the	‘Currie	model’	was	not	applied	consistently;	the	 negative	 impacts	 of	 this	model	 -identified	 by	 Brittain-	 forced	 the	 Colombian	 government	 to	implement	 countermeasures.	 In	 some	 ways	 Colombia’s	 policy	 choices	 from	 the	 1950s	 to	 1970s	directly	contravened	those	recommended	by	Currie.	In	fact,	according	to	Kalmanovitz	&	López,	“the	government	formally	rejected	[Currie’s]	proposal”,	even	though	many	politicians	supported	it	(p.	7).	
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This	view	was	supported	by	 the	Latin	American	structuralists,	who	proposed	 land	redistribution	 as	 a	 solution	 to	 multiple	 issues.	 It	 would	 permit	 increased	 agricultural	production	by	 transferring	 the	means	of	production	 from	 idle	 landowners	 to	productive	peasants,	thus	reducing	the	wasteful	use	of	foreign	currency	to	pay	for	food	imports	and	the	raw	materials	 required	 by	 domestic	 industries.	 It	 would	 stimulate	 internal	 demand	 for	domestically-produced	consumption	goods	by	permitting	a	more	equitable	distribution	of	wealth	and	encouraging	the	formation	of	a	rural	middle	class.	And	it	would	help	to	quell	rural	 tensions	 and	 to	 integrate	 the	 peasantry	 into	 democratic	 politics	 and	 civil	 society	(Brittain,	2005,	pp.	339–340;	Kay,	1998,	pp.	9–16).	In	short:	redistributive	reform	was	not	dead	-	though	Currie	and	other	advocates	of	‘the	landowner	path’	might	have	wished	it	so.	Despite	 the	manufacturing	 boom	 of	 the	 1940s	 and	 1950s,	 urban	 industries	 were	unable	to	provide	sufficient	work	for	newly	arriving	migrants	and	displaced	persons.	The	government	was	keen	 to	stem	the	 flow	of	people	 from	rural	 to	urban	areas.	Meanwhile,	agricultural	mechanisation	 limited	 job	creation,	and	 in	some	cases	 led	 to	 job	 loss,	 in	 the	countryside.	Real	wages	in	the	agricultural	sector	were	stagnating	or	 in	decline.	The	gap	between	 rich	 and	 poor	 was	 widening.	 Some	 saw	 rural	 poverty	 as	 a	 strain	 on	 internal	demand,	which	would	 eventually	 limit	 national	 industrial	 growth.	 And	while	 the	 urban	working	class	fared	slightly	better	than	their	rural	counterparts,	many	families	were	forced	to	limit	their	consumption	of	non-essential	items	during	periods	of	food	price	inflation.	Crop	expansion	 and	 productivity	 gains	were	 limited	 to	 a	 few	 commercial	 cultivations,	 which	combined	with	population	growth,	contributed	to	bouts	of	 ‘food	scarcity’	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996;	Zamosc,	1986).		All	 of	 these	 factors	 influenced	 the	government’s	decision	 to	pass	another	agrarian	reform	act.	But	perhaps	the	main	motivations	were	political.	Land	struggles	persisted	and	even	intensified	in	many	areas	after	La	Violencia	(Machado,	2009,	p.	341;	Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	40–45).	Furthermore,	the	communist	‘threat’	had	been	transformed	from	a	ghost	story	into	a	tangible	possibility	following	the	Cuban	Revolution.	The	US	government	had	considerable	influence	 over	 Colombian	 policymaking.	 Its	 communist	 containment	 strategy	 in	 Latin	America	combined	military	aid	and	economic	and	social	programs	under	the	Alliance	for	Progress	(Fajardo,	2015,	pp.	117–118).	This	initiative	“played	an	important	part	in	bringing	about	agrarian	reform”	in	a	handful	of	countries	across	South	America	during	the	1960s	(Kay,	1998).	As	noted	by	Molano	(2015),	it	was	not	a	coincidence	that	President	Kennedy	visited	Colombia	the	same	week	that	the	1961	Agrarian	Reform	Law	was	passed	(p.	179).	
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In	sum,	almost	exclusive	government	support	for	large-scale	-especially	mechanised-	farming	since	the	1940s	was	increasingly	questioned	by	policymakers	for	economic,	social	and	political	 reasons.	Some	authors	suggest	 that	 the	new	reform	program	was	merely	a	palliative	and	was	not	intended	to	transform	rural	structures	in	Colombia.	Whether	or	to	what	extent	renewed	interest	in	land	reform	was	genuinely	aimed	at	supporting	a	‘peasant	path’	of	agricultural	development	is	a	question	that	cannot	be	resolved	here.	In	any	case,	the	programs	 and	 policies	 activated	 in	 the	 late	 1960s	 were	more	 successful	 than	 previous	attempts	at	reform	(thanks	to	an	organised	peasantry,	which	enjoyed	a	brief	period	of	State	support),	 but	were	 quickly	 cut	 short	 and	 ultimately	 didn’t	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	overall	land	distribution	-	as	shown	in	the	following	section.			
8)	The	rise	and	decline	of	agrarian	reform	and	the	ANUC	peasant	movement	Law	 135	 of	 1961	 was	 supposed	 to	 help	 “eliminate	 and	 prevent	 the	 inequitable	concentration	of	rural	property	and	its	anti-economic	fragmentation”	(Article	1,	Paragraph	1).	 Other	 aims	 included:	 promoting	 economic	 use	 of	 idle	 lands,	 increasing	 agricultural	production,	 enabling	 tenants	 and	 salaried	 workers	 to	 access	 their	 own	 properties,	 and	improving	the	socio-economic	welfare	of	the	peasantry.	The	legislation	established	INCORA,	the	Colombian	Agrarian	Reform	Institute,	which	was	put	in	charge	of	acquiring	private	lands	and	redistributing	these	to	campesinos,	as	well	titling	State	lands,	overseeing	and	organising	the	 colonisation	 of	 the	 agricultural	 frontier,	 and	 ensuring	 that	 producers	 had	 access	 to	infrastructure,	technical	support	and	financial	assistance	–	among	other	things	(Articles	2-3,	Law	135	of	1961).		According	to	Ocampo	et	al.	(1996),	between	1962	and	1967	INCORA’s	activities	were	mostly	 directed	 at	 the	 provision	 of	 infrastructure,	 technical	 support	 and	 credit.	 As	 in	previous	eras,	land	reform	efforts	were	confined	to	‘firefighting’	and	“very	little	was	done	in	the	areas	of	 latifundia,	where	the	major	redistribution	effort	should	theoretically	have	taken	 place”	 (Zamosc,	 1986,	 p.	 36).	 A	 handful	 of	 politicians	 openly	 criticised	 the	 scant	results	of	 the	program.	Leading	this	group	was	Carlos	Lleras	Restrepo,	elected	to	 fill	 the	Liberal	presidential	quota	in	1966.	He	understood	that	the	political	establishment	was	likely	to	block	genuine	reform,	so	he	looked	to	the	rural	masses	to	impulse	it	themselves.	Lleras	formed	a	special	committee	to	help	build	“a	direct	corporatist	bridge	between	the	peasantry	and	the	state”	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	52;	see	also	Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	The	project	began	with	Presidential	Decree	755	of	1967,	which	proclaimed	the	need	for	‘popular	participation’	in	
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government	 programs	 and	 established	 a	 process	 for	 registering	 present	 and	 potential	beneficiaries	or	‘users’	of	the	State’s	agricultural	services.	Next,	they	launched	a	campaign	to	encourage	membership,	got	local	government	agencies	to	administer	registration	forms,	sent	‘promoters’	to	rural	areas	to	organise	municipal	and	departmental	associations	of	the	registered	users,	and	provided	training	courses	for	local	peasant	leaders.	Three	years	later	the	ANUC	(National	Association	of	Peasant	Users)	was	fully	operational.	By	October	1971	the	organisation	had	grown	 to	 include	634	municipal	 associations	 and	28	departmental	associations,	with	989,306	members	(Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	54–57).		Meanwhile,	 land	 conflicts	were	 intensifying	 in	 various	 regions	 across	 the	 country.	Some	of	these	struggles	were	linked	to	legislation	aimed	specifically	at	assisting	tenants	and	sharecroppers	 who	 wished	 to	 become	 proprietors	 of	 their	 rented	 plots80.	 Landowners	launched	 yet	 another	mass	 eviction	 campaign	 in	 response.	 This	 dynamic	was	 especially	visible	 in	 the	 coastal	 plains,	where	 traditional	 tenant	 farming	was	 demolished	 in	 just	 a	couple	of	years.	The	evicted	tenants	began	to	organise	land	invasions	with	the	help	of	the	ANUC.	 In	 this	 and	 other	 regions,	 the	 strength	 and	 persistence	 of	 the	 ANUC	 forced	 the	landowners	 to	 negotiate;	 INCORA	 would	 step	 in,	 acquire	 the	 occupied	 property	 and	coordinate	redistribution	to	the	peasants	(Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	49–50,	67,	79,	88–96;	see	also	Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	In	many	ways,	Lleras’	plan	had	worked:	the	ANUC	process	had	strengthened	peasant	organisation	and	helped	campesinos	project	a	loud	and	united	voice	in	favour	of	land	reform.	But	Lleras	finished	his	term	in	1970,	just	as	ANUC	was	taking	off.	Meanwhile,	the	landed	elite,	which	was	already	organised	into	economic	interest	groups,	had	launched	their	own	campaign,	 proliferating	 communist	 scare	 stories	 in	 the	 press	 and	 pressuring	 the	government	 to	 ‘restore	 order’.	 The	new	Conservative	 president	Misael	 Pastrana	 (whose	electoral	victory	was	tainted	by	allegations	of	fraud,	giving	rise	to	a	fourth	guerrilla	group:	the	M-19)	had	promised	to	continue	the	reform	efforts	of	his	predecessor,	but	just	a	year	after	taking	office,	he	backtracked.	The	armed	forces	were	given	the	green	light	to	evict	land	invaders	and	functionaries	supportive	of	the	ANUC	were	fired.	By	late	1971	the	institution	had	established	a	blacklist	of	people	to	be	excluded	on	the	basis	of	their	participation	in	‘illegal	activities’,	including	land	occupations	(Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	68–72,	103–104).	
                                                        80	According	 to	Ocampo	et	al.	 (1996),	 the	sharecropper/tenant	program	initiated	under	Law	1	of	1968	 had	 a	 very	 limited	 impact,	 other	 than	 scaring	 landlords	 who	 proceeded	 to	 impose	 mass	evictions.	In	figures:	“INCORA	only	managed	to	acquire	20.5%	of	the	land	registered	in	the	program,	covering	12%	of	aspiring	applicants”	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	
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The	 government/landowner	 reaction	 only	 fuelled	 the	 ‘radicalisation’	 of	 ANUC	members,	who	 called	 for	 the	 “immediate	 and	 free	 redistribution,	 expropriation	without	indemnification	 of	 all	 latifundia,	 limitation	 of	 the	 size	 of	 landed	 property,	 […]	collectivization	of	capitalist	agricultural	enterprises”,	among	other	things		(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	72).	These	demands	were	 incorporated	 into	 the	subsequent	 ‘Peasant	Mandate’,	which	proposed	that	the	campesinos	should	achieve	these	goals	themselves,	rather	than	wait	for	concessions	 from	 the	 State.	 ANUC	 coordinated	 approximately	 1,000	 land	 occupations	between	 1970	 and	 1975;	 the	 majority	 (645)	 took	 place	 in	 1971	 –	 the	 year	 of	 ANUC’s	‘radicalisation’	and	the	year	the	government	reinstated	repression	as	the	principle	tool	for	dealing	with	the	peasantry	(Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	73–75).	During	the	1970s	the	government	militarised	entire	areas	and	sent	the	armed	forces	to	break	up	protests	and	land	occupations.	The	army	and	police	killed	dozens	of	peasants	and	threw	entire	groups	in	jail.	In	addition,	the	landowners	continued	to	use	militias	and	hired	thugs	to	attack	campesinos.	These	pájaros,	as	they	are	sometimes	called,	were	allowed	to	operate	with	impunity	and	assassinated	an	unknown	number	of	ANUC	leaders	(Molano	Bravo,	2015,	p.	182;	Reyes	Posada,	2009,	p.	29;	Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	103–104,	127–129).	This	violent	repression	and	legal	persecution,	alongside	many	other	factors,	contributed	to	the	gradual	weakening	of	the	ANUC	(for	a	full	explanation	of	ANUC’s	decline	see	Zamosc,	1986).	In	January	1972	the	Pastrana	administration	called	a	meeting	with	representatives	from	both	political	parties	and	from	the	private	sector.	The	government	swore	to	limit	land	reform	and	to	boost	support	for	large-scale	agricultural	production	(which	it	did),	while	the	landowners	 accepted	 taxes	 based	 on	 the	 census	 value	 of	 their	 land	 (this	 was	 not	 fully	implemented,	according	to	Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	The	agreement	came	to	be	known	as	the	‘Pact	of	Chicoral’,	after	the	town	where	the	meeting	took	place.	Zamosc	(1986)	labels	the	agreement	“a	formal	declaration	of	agrarian	counter-reform”,	arguing	that	it	signalled	“the	final	 breakdown	 of	 the	 attempt	 to	 forge	 an	 alliance	 between	 the	 peasantry	 and	 the	bourgeoisie”	 (pp.	 98-99).	 In	 brief:	 the	 landowner	 path,	 which	 had	 never	 been	 fully	abandoned,	became	the	State’s	official	chosen	route	of	agrarian	development.		Arguably,	changing	economic	conditions	shaped	this	decision:	the	shift	to	an	export-led	growth	strategy	lessened	pressures	to	boost	internal	demand	by	improving	the	lot	of	the	 peasantry;	 rural	 to	 urban	 migration	 once	 again	 became	 desirable,	 as	 this	 could	contribute	 to	 wage	 suppression	 required	 for	 competitiveness	 on	 global	 markets;	 and	capitalist	agriculture	was	supposed	to	provide	the	primary	inputs	for	industry	and	food	for	urban	workers	more	cheaply	than	‘traditional	peasant	production’	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	99).	
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New	legislation	(e.g.	Laws	4	and	5	of	1973	and	Law	6	of	1975)	institutionalised	the	pact.	 Law	 4	 erected	 numerous	 barriers	 to	 confiscation/expropriation;	 for	 example,	 by	loosening	the	definition	of	“adequately	exploited”	land	and	by	guaranteeing	compensations	at	market	value	(instead	of	census	value)	with	a	larger	portion	paid	in	cash	up	front	and	higher	 interest	 rates	 on	 deferred	 payments.	 This,	 combined	 with	 budget	 cuts,	 severely	limited	INCORA’s	redistribution	power.	Law	5	established	the	Agricultural	Financial	Fund,	which	would	support	mainly	large-scale,	mechanised,	commercial	cultivations	with	special	subsidised	credits.	And	 finally,	Law	6	 imposed	new	rules	 for	sharecropping	and	tenancy	contracts.	Among	other	 things,	 lands	within	estates	cultivated	by	peasants	under	official	tenancy/shareholding	 agreements	 were	 protected	 from	 redistribution	 (Ocampo	 et	 al.,	1996;	Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	98,	126).		Between	1962	and	1985	INCORA	acquired	approximately	4.5	million	ha,	which	were	redistributed	between	65,000	 families.	The	vast	majority	of	 these	 lands	 (3.6	million	ha)	were	acquired	through	forfeiture	proceedings	(extinción	de	dominio);	the	original	owners	‘forfeited’	their	property	rights	because	they	had	left	the	land	idle	for	more	than	10	years	(as	 in	Article	6	of	Law	200	of	1936).	 Just	under	66,000	hectares	were	expropriated.	The	remaining	 lands	were	 acquired	 through	purchase	 or	 cession	 (Ocampo	 et	 al.,	 1996).	 The	1970	 agrarian	 census	 revealed	 that	 at	 least	 800,000	 rural	 families	 in	 Colombia	 were	landless.	Many	other	families	were	land	poor	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	Hence	65,000	reform	beneficiaries	in	over	20	years	was	a	relatively	modest	number,	and	even	that	was	hard	won	by	campesino	struggle.	As	noted	by	Ocampo	et	al.	land	redistribution	peaked	between	1968	and	1971,	as	a	result	of	peasant	actions	(see	also	Zamosc,	1986,	pp.	147–148).		The	 bulk	 of	 INCORA’s	 efforts	 were	 directed	 at	 encouraging	 colonisation	 of	 the	agricultural	frontier	or	titling	existing	occupations	within	these	zones.	The	average	size	of	State	 land	grants	 fell	after	1961,	presumably	as	a	result	of	 the	new	 laws	placing	stricter	limits	on	titling	(Villaveces	Niño	&	Sánchez,	2015,	p.	27).	Nevertheless,	there	are	suggestions	that	privatisation	continued	to	favour	large	landowners,	even	if	the	tendency	was	much	less	marked	than	in	the	previous	eras	(see	e.g.	Machado,	2009,	pp.	289–290).	All	in	all,	INCORA	granted	circa	260,000	titles,	covering	more	than	7.7	million	ha	of	baldíos,	between	1962	and	1982.	The	most	important	‘colonisation	zones’	were	in	the	south/southeast	of	the	country	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996).	As	discussed	in	the	following	chapter,	these	also	became	important	coca	growing	regions	and	areas	of	rebel	stronghold.	In	general,	the	government’s	decision	to	‘resolve’	the	land	problem	by	encouraging	colonisation	contributed	to	the	most	recent	phase	of	violent	conflict	(Fajardo,	2015;	Gutiérrez	Sanín,	2015b;	Molano	Bravo,	2015).	
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Summary	and	conclusion	This	chapter	has	outlined	the	changing	political	economy	of	land	in	Colombia	between	the	1920s	 and	 the	 1970s.	 In	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 on	 the	 whole,	 Colombia’s	 economic	development	proceeded	despite	-rather	than	because	of-	dispossession	and	displacement.	These	processes	threatened	to	undercut	smallholder	production,	which	was	supporting	and	fuelling	industrialisation.	The	traditional	rural	elite	continued	to	lay	claim	over	State	lands	in	order	to	subjugate	workers	to	the	haciendas	until	at	least	the	1920s.	However,	as	peasant	movements	 became	more	 combative,	 the	hacendados’	priorities	 changed.	 They	 imposed	evictions	in	order	to	guard	against	peasants’	land	claims.	The	clearance	of	hacienda	lands,	which	intensified	in	the	1930s	-1940s,	was	largely	detrimental	to	agricultural	production.	Initially,	 the	 government	 seemed	 intent	 on	 halting	 and	 reversing	 processes	 of	dispossession	and	supporting	 the	development	of	 the	 smallholder	economy.	The	central	government,	with	the	backing	of	the	Supreme	Court,	initiated	a	campaign	to	recover	State	lands	 acquired	 illegally;	 though	 in	 the	 end	 this	was	 unsuccessful.	 It	 also	 revived	 official	colonisation	programs,	which	can	be	read	as	an	attempt	 to	ensure	campesinos’	access	 to	land	on	the	agrarian	frontier	and	to	prevent	the	further	usurpation	of	baldíos	by	the	elite.	Finally,	reformist	legislators	put	forward	a	land	law	that	was	supposed	to	bolster	existing	norms	linking	property	rights	to	the	‘economic	exploitation	of	the	soil’.	However,	the	landed	elite	managed	to	water	down	the	original	proposal	and	the	resulting	legislation	(Law	200	of	 1936)	 ended	 up	 reinforcing	 the	 inequitable	 property	 regime	 and	 legalising	 the	accumulation	of	land	achieved	via	decades	of	dispossession.		After	 the	 first	 failed	 attempt	 at	 reform	 in	 the	 1930s,	 the	 Colombian	 government’s	treatment	of	 the	 ‘agrarian	problem’	changed:	 low	productivity,	 rather	 than	unequal	 land	distribution,	was	considered	the	main	obstacle	to	economic	growth.	Policymakers	began	to	actively	promote	the	conversion	of	unproductive	haciendas	into	dynamic	capitalist	firms.	The	role	of	dispossession	and	displacement	in	the	Colombian	economy	started	to	shift	mid-century	with	the	growth	of	domestic	agribusiness	and	especially	mechanised	farming.	Many	proprietors	 made	 use	 of	 idle	 or	 pasture	 lands,	 much	 of	 which	 had	 been	 usurped	 from	peasants	in	the	past.	Others	acquired	additional	lands	and	in	some	cases	were	aided	by	La	
Violencia	during	which	hundreds	of	thousands	of	properties	changed	hands	and	millions	of	people	were	displaced.		
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Though	‘de-peasantisation’	was	part	and	parcel	of	the	development	model	unofficially	adopted	by	the	Colombian	State	as	far	back	as	the	1940s,	it	also	posed	serious	economic,	political	 and	 social	 problems.	 The	 renewed	 attempt	 to	 implement	 a	 redistributive	 land	reform	in	the	1960s	was	aimed	at	addressing	or	minimising	these	issues.	This	was	more	successful	 than	previous	endeavours	but	didn’t	have	a	significant	 impact	on	overall	 land	distribution.	 The	 landed	 elite	 held	 considerable	 sway	 over	 the	 central	 government	 and	quickly	stymied	the	reform	efforts.	All	in	all,	from	the	early	1920s	up	until	the	early	1970s,	government	 policy	 in	 Colombia	 teetered	 between	 legitimising	 dispossession	 and	displacement	 and	 attempting	 to	 halt,	 or	 at	 least	 slow,	 such	 processes.	 Eventually,	 State	policy	veered	definitively	towards	favouring	a	landowner	path	of	agrarian	development.		This	chapter	includes	the	following	key	points:	(i)	Dispossession	motivated	by	labour	acquisition	diminished	as	capitalist	agriculture	developed	and	the	hacienda	system	-based	on	squeezing	rents	from	the	peasantry-	began	to	decline.	Though	seasonal	labour	shortages	persisted	 in	 some	 rural	 areas,	 mechanised	 production	 and	 other	 labour-saving	technologies,	combined	with	population	growth,	meant	that	acquiring	a	workforce	ceased	to	be	a	primary	concern	of	the	landed	elite.	Land	conflicts	accelerated	this	process	and	led	to	widespread	hacienda	clearances,	which	represented	the	inverse	of	previous	processes	of	dispossession	that	had	been	aimed	at	retaining	campesinos	within	the	large	estates.	Finally,	land	 grabs	 driven	 by	 investment	 interests	 became	 more	 frequent	 with	 the	 growth	 of	capitalist	agribusiness	and	the	oil	industry.	This	type	of	dispossession	became	ubiquitous	at	the	end	of	the	20th	century,	as	discussed	in	subsequent	chapters.	(ii)	 Dispossession	 carried	 out	 by	 private	 actors	 interrelates	 with	 State	 policy	 in	complex	 and	 changing	 ways.	 In	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 like	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 the	dispossession	of	peasant	settlers	was	not	 formally	condoned	by	the	central	government.	Legislation	continued	to	recognise	colonos	as	the	legitimate	possessors	of	the	baldío	lands	they	occupied	and	cultivated.	Nevertheless,	the	government	also	legitimised	and	perhaps	even	incentivised	the	elite’s	land	grabbing	practices:	in	the	first	instance	by	purchasing	land	without	legal	title	for	redistribution	-	effectively	compensating	hacendados	for	properties	they	had	acquired	illegally,	and	in	the	second	instance	by	repealing	the	so-called	diabolical	property	test,	a	decision	that	translated	into	the	legal	recognition	of	vast	estates	established	through	the	usurpation	of	baldíos.	Moreover,	 the	 later	hacienda	clearances	were	broadly	‘legal’	 precisely	 because	 the	 government	 had	 recognised	 the	 property	 rights	 of	 large	landowners,	 including	 over	 State	 lands	 they	had	 accumulated	 illicitly.	Nevertheless,	 this	process	went	against	the	objectives	of	the	agrarian	legislation(s)	that	encouraged/enabled	
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it	and	hence	was	not	State	policy,	unlike,	for	example,	the	English	parliamentary	enclosures	of	the	18th	and	19th	centuries.	Finally,	this	chapter	also	suggests	that	political	will	to	address	historical	 and	 ongoing	 dispossession	 and	 resulting	 land	 concentration	 diminished	 as	government	policy	shifted	towards	the	promotion	of	large-scale	commercial	agriculture.	(iii)	 Just	 as	 in	 the	 colonial	 era	 and	 the	 19th	 century,	 government	 officials	 and	policymakers	 continued	 to	 comment	on	 the	problems	caused	by	a	property	 system	 that	allowed	a	small	group	of	people	to	maintain	large	areas	of	un-	or	under-used	land.	As	in	the	past,	little	was	done	to	address	the	issue	–	at	least,	until	the	late	1960s	when	INCORA	started	acquiring	idle	lands	for	redistribution	through	forfeiture	proceedings.	However,	INCORA’s	activities	were	significantly	reduced	following	the	Pact	of	Chicoral	and	the	problem	of	land	hoarding	 persists	 to	 this	 day.	 It	 is	 worth	 recalling	 that	 legislation	 explicitly	 accepted	
extensive	cattle	ranching	as	sufficient	economic	exploitation	of	a	property	for	legal	purposes,	despite	the	fact	that	many	government	officials	label[led]	this	as	‘inefficient’	land	use.		(iv)	 The	 above	 two	 points	 link	 closely	 with	 another	 claim,	 not	 underlined	 in	 the	previous	chapters.	Violence	in	Colombia,	past	and	present,	is	intertwined	in	complex	ways	with	the	property	regime.	As	indicated	by	Blomley	(2008),	it	is	usually	assumed	that	‘the	poor’	constitute	the	greatest	threat	to	stable	property	rules	(p.	125),	but	in	Colombia	the	landed	elite	set	the	precedent.	Their	disregard	for	the	law	can	be	traced	back	to	the	colonial	era,	 though	 arguably	 the	 decisive	 period	 was	 the	 late	 19th	 to	 early	 20th	 century.	 The	landowning	class	simply	refused	to	recognise	norms	protecting	peasant	settlers’	land	rights.	The	peasantry	began	to	mobilise	around	the	spuriousness	of	the	elite’s	 land	claims;	they	knew	much	of	the	area	controlled	by	the	haciendas	didn’t	have	legal	title.	The	State	only	perpetuated	 the	 problem:	 various	 policies	 implicitly	 and	 explicitly	 endorsed	 illicit	 land	accumulation.	Later	peasant	land	occupations,	such	as	those	organised	by	the	ANUC	in	early	1970s,	must	be	understood	in	this	context	of	past	processes	of	dispossession.	Subsequent	chapters	show	this	to	be	an	ongoing	cycle	in	Colombia.		(v)	Finally,	this	chapter	illustrates	the	importance	of	closely	examining	the	drivers,	motivations	and	outcomes	of	 land	dispossession	and	associated	displacement,	which	are	varied	and	changing.	It	reiterates	the	argument	that	we	cannot	just	assume	such	processes	contribute	 to	 economic	 development.	 It	 also	 shows	 that	 concepts	 such	 as	 primitive	accumulation	are	useful	analytical	tools	in	that	they	can	be	used	to	compare	and	contrast,	but	 that	 they	 should	 not	 be	 applied	 blindly.	 I	 believe	 these	 points	 are	 explained	 and	explicitly	 linked	 to	 the	 empirical	 detail	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 chapter,	 so	 that	 a	 detailed	recapitulation	is	not	required	here.	 	
-	6	-	
Contextualising	land	dispossession	in	contemporary	Colombia	
	As	outlined	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	 the	political	 economy	of	 dispossession	 in	Colombia	began	 to	 shift	 around	 the	1930s/1940s.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	hacendados	became	more	concerned	with	defending	their	existing	land	claims	against	rebellious	peasants	than	with	extending	 them	 to	 retain/acquire	 a	 labour	 force.	 They	 started	 evicting	 campesinos,	 thus	inverting	the	historical	tendency	of	using	extra-economic	force	to	tie	the	direct	producers	to	 the	 large	 estates.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 labour	 scarcity	 ‘problem’	 dissipated	 as	 the	population	 grew	 and	modern	 agribusiness	 superseded	 the	 traditional	 hacienda	 system.	Meanwhile,	dispossession	driven	by	interest	in	the	land	itself	and	related	resources	(rather	than	 labour	 control)	 became	more	 common	with	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 oil	 industry	 and	 the	advance	of	capitalist	farming.	The	State,	for	its	part,	started	to	actively	promote	industrial	agriculture.	 This	 model	 of	 development	 generated	 multiple	 problems,	 which	 the	government	 attempted	 to	 curtail	with	 redistributive	 reform	 in	 the	1960s.	 These	 efforts,	however,	were	quickly	stunted.	The	1972	Pact	of	Chicoral	between	large	landowners	and	the	political	establishment	represented	a	blow	to	the	prospect	of	a	‘peasant	path’,	which	had	seemed	attainable	at	the	beginning	of	the	century.		Agrarian	counter-reform	was	consolidated	in	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	centuries	as	a	new	phase	of	dispossession	set	in.	This	and	the	subsequent	chapters	describe	and	analyse	this	 most	 recent	 phase,	 which	 represents	 both	 continuity	 and	 change	 compared	 to	 the	previous	period.	Colombia	now	has	one	of	the	most	unequal	land	distributions	in	the	world	(Moloney,	2016).	Land	concentration	increased	over	the	last	three	decades81.	In	contrast	to	the	 ambiguous	 distributional	 outcomes	 of	 the	mid-century	 civil	 war,	 the	 contemporary	conflict	unequivocally	facilitated	the	transfer	of	land	to	elite	groups.	However,	violence	was	not	the	only	enabling	factor	behind	recent	land	accumulation.	The	mere	existence	of	war	cannot	account	for	the	prevalence	and	character	of	dispossession	–	to	truly	understand,	we	must	look	to	the	broader	political	economy,	as	shown	throughout	this	thesis.	
                                                        81	According	to	one	estimate,	Colombia’s	 land	GINI	 increased	from	0.849	 in	1985	to	0.86	 in	2010	(Contraloría,	2013,	p.	48).	A	calculation	that	takes	into	account	the	accumulation	of	more	than	one	property	by	the	same	person/company	shows	the	GINI	 increased	from	0.877	in	2000	to	0.891	 in	2010	(ibid).	The	figure	could	be	higher	since	the	 latter	does	not	account	for	testaferrato,	where	a	person	disguises	their	property	by	getting	someone	else	(the	testaferro)	to	appear	as	the	titleholder.	
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This	 chapter	 presents	 the	 broad	 context	 necessary	 for	 understanding	 the	political	economy	 of	 dispossession	 -both	 ‘legal’	 and	 ‘illegal’-	 in	 contemporary	 Colombia.	 It	 pays	particular	 attention	 to	 the	 country’s	 specific	 trajectory	 and	 policies	 of	 economic	development	 (plus	 related	 power-dynamics	 and	 conflicts),	 which	 I	 argue	 have	fundamentally	shaped	dispossession	and	associated	displacement.	My	emphasis	contrasts	with	 accounts	 of	 land	 grabbing	 in	 Colombia	 that	 focus	 almost	 exclusively	 on	 the	 armed	conflict	 and	 mainstream	 explanations	 more	 broadly	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 deficiencies	 of	property	rights	institutions	and	the	rule	of	law	or	present	dispossession	as	an	act	imposed	by	the	government	for	the	public	good.		 The	 chapter	 begins	 by	 describing	 Colombia’s	 economic	 liberalisation,	 which	contributed	 to	 the	 relative	 decline	 of	 domestic	 agricultural	 and	 manufacturing	 sectors.	Meanwhile,	mining	and	oil	extraction	acquired	increasing	weight	in	the	economy,	in	terms	of	 foreign	 exchange	 earnings	 and	 government	 income.	 The	 growing	 reliance	 on	 these	industries,	partially	an	upshot	of	export-oriented	growth	strategies,	has	had	implications	for	the	State’s	land	use	priorities	and	dispossession/displacement,	as	discussed	below	and	Chapter	8.	This	first	section	also	briefly	mentions	the	market-led	land	loss	associated	with	economic	 restructuring	 and	 how	 the	 Colombian	 ‘experience’	 compares	 with	 broader	narratives	about	the	relationship	between	neoliberal	globalisation	and	dispossession.		 Section	two	examines	the	rise	of	the	illicit	drug	economy	and	how	this	shaped	violent	conflict	and	the	political	economy	of	land	in	Colombia.	It	suggests	that	the	expansion	of	coca	cultivation	is	closely	linked	to	the	country’s	specific	trajectory	of	agrarian	change,	including	historical	processes	of	dispossession	and	displacement.	It	also	briefly	discusses	the	narco	land	 rush,	 which	 I	 argue	 should	 be	 distinguished	 from	 the	 paramilitary	 land	 grab.	 In	addition,	 this	section	refers	 to	 the	displacements	caused	by	the	 ‘War	on	Drugs’,	an	 issue	analysed	 further	 in	 the	report	 I	wrote	on	the	Putumayo	region,	where	many	 inhabitants	insist	that	militarised	counternarcotics	policies	are	part	of	a	wider	land	clearance	strategy.	The	third	section	offers	a	basic	overview	of	the	contemporary	armed	conflict.	My	aim	is	limited	to	providing	background	for	subsequent	discussions.	I	emphasise,	in	particular,	the	 expansion	 of	 paramilitary	 groups,	 which	 worked	 in	 collaboration	 with	 government	forces,	were	 formed,	 funded	 and	 backed	 by	 diverse	 elites,	 and	mostly	 targeted	 civilians	deemed	 ‘subversive’.	 I	 also	 discuss	 the	 transformation	 of	 paramilitarism	 following	 the	demobilisation	process	in	the	mid-2000s.	These	points	are	key	for	understanding	the	para-elite	land	grab	and	the	repression	of	resistance	to	State-backed	investments.	Put	simply:	the	paramilitaries	helped	preserve	and	advance	Colombia’s	elite-led	development	model.	
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	 Section	four	surveys	some	key	elements	of	contemporary	land	legislation	introduced	under	Law	160	of	1994	and	the	1991	Constitution	that	inspired	it.	The	discussion	indicates	that	the	relationship	between	law	and	dispossession	is	not	straightforward,	as	is	sometimes	implied	(see	Chapter	2);	for	example,	the	same	specific	norm	may	simultaneously	enable	and	hinder	such	processes.	Nonetheless,	I	suggest	that,	overall,	the	laws	passed	in	the	early	1990s	introduced	new	rules	and	strengthened	existing	ones	that	should,	theoretically,	have	prevented	and	limited	dispossession.	The	fact	that	they	failed	to	do	so	in	many	instances	cannot	be	blamed	simply	on	a	‘weak	rule	of	law’,	as	shown	in	later	sections	and	chapters.		 The	 fifth	 section	 reviews	 numerous	 policies	 and	 laws	 introduced	 in	 the	 early	 21st	century,	 designed	 to	 promote	 agricultural	 exports	 and	 industrial	 farming,	 and	 that	complement	 different	 forms	 of	 dispossession.	 It	 focuses	 on	 what	 I	 call	 the	 legislative	counter-reform	offensive:	various	attempts	to	rescind	those	norms	contained	in	the	1994	Law,	which	are	meant	to	favour	the	campesino	population.	This	offensive	includes	proposals	to	‘forgive	and	forget’	historical	violations	of	Colombia’s	land	laws.	The	section	ends	with	a	mini	illustrative	case	study	of	the	recent	land	rush	in	the	Altillanura	region.	Section	six	reviews	the	specific	‘regime’	of	State-backed	dispossession	that	sustains	Colombia’s	 mining	 and	 oil	 industries.	 It	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 various	 legal	mechanisms	used	to	 impose	these	operations,	which	in	practice	overlap	with	the	violent	conflict,	 as	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 8.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 an	 examination	 of	 recent	 struggles	between	 citizens’	 groups,	 local/regional	 authorities	 and	 various	 central	 government	entities.	Here	I	provide	further	evidence	of	the	mining	and	energy	sectors’	reliance	on	extra-economic	coercion,	but	also	 indicate	 the	contradictions	and	conflicts	 that	arise	 from	 the	State’s	role	in	facilitating	capital	accumulation.	The	section	ends	with	a	brief	discussion	of	how	trade	and	 investment	 treaties	may	 influence	 these	struggles	by	pushing	 the	central	government	to	violate	its	own	laws	and	to	dispossess	and	displace	its	citizens	on	behalf	of	international	investors.		
1)	Colombia’s	‘economic	restructuring’	and	implications	for	land	dispossession				In	the	mid-1970s	the	Colombian	government	initiated	a	shift	away	from	the	ISI-type	policies	that	had	defined	 the	 last	 three	decades.	 It	 began	 to	withdraw	subsidies,	 financial	 sector	regulations,	 and	 trade	 barriers	 previously	 used	 to	 promote	 and	 protect	 select	 national	industries.	While	some	interventionist	and	protectionist	measures	were	reintroduced	in	the	wake	 of	 the	 1982	 economic	 crisis,	 the	 government	 soon	 returned	 to	 its	 liberalisation	
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program.	 This	 was	 extended	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 under	 a	 set	 of	 policies,	 known	 as	 the	‘economic	opening’,	which	included	additional	reductions	in	tariff	and	non-tariff	barriers,	the	 privatisation	 of	 diverse	 public	 entities,	 a	 further	 relaxing	 of	 restrictions	 on	 foreign	investment,	financial	sector	deregulations,	and	an	overall	loosening	of	capital	and	currency	controls	(Ocampo,	1996b;	see	also	Ocampo	et	al.,	1996;	Kalmanovitz	&	López,	2006).		This	 period	 of	 reform	 contributed	 to	 important	 macro-economic	 changes.	Construction,	services	and	mining-energy	acquired	 increasing	weight	 in	 the	economy,	as	agriculture	and	manufacturing	entered	 into	 relative	decline82.	According	 to	Clavijo,	Vera	and	Fandiño	(2012),	“deindustrialisation”	in	Colombia	is	closely	tied	to	the	mining-energy	boom,	 driven	 by	 rising	 global	 commodity	 prices.	 Though	 these	 sectors	 represent	 a	comparatively	small	proportion	of	Colombia’s	GDP,	they	have	become	an	important	source	of	foreign	exchange	earnings	and	government	income.	As	illustrated	in	Figure	4,	petroleum	and	 its	 derivatives	went	 from	 representing	 5%	of	 total	 annual	 export	 value	 on	 average	during	the	1970s	to	29%	between	2000	and	2010,	while	the	mining	sector’s	participation	increased	from	an	average	of	2%	to	19%	over	the	same	period	(my	own	calculations	based	on	data	supplied	by	government	agencies:	DANE,	2014,	2017;	UPME,	2014a).	In	 2012,	 around	 the	 height	 of	 the	 most	 recent	 boom,	 mining	 and	 hydrocarbons	combined	represented	almost	three-quarters	of	total	annual	export	values	(UPME,	2014a,	p.	12)	 and	more	 than	80%	of	 foreign	direct	 investment	 in	Colombia	 (Mincomercio,	 2014).	Between	2010	and	2013	the	mining	and	energy	sectors	accounted	for	11.2%	of	total	GDP	and	-in	the	latter	year-	32%	of	State	income	(DNP,	2015,	p.	135).	In	the	context	of	neoliberal	globalisation,	export	growth	has	become	even	more	imperative	(consider,	for	example,	the	implications	 of	 Colombia’s	 mounting	 reliance	 on	 food	 imports);	 arguably,	 this	 has	exacerbated	the	government’s	drive	to	expand	these	extractive	industries	(reflected	in	its	land	use	priorities	and	related	laws	and	policies,	which	permit	coercion	to	be	used	to	this	end)	 in	order	 to	 secure	 the	 foreign	exchange	required	 to	keep	 the	economy	running.	As	discussed	 later,	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 these	 sectors	 has	 markedly	 shaped	dispossession	and	displacement	in	Colombia	in	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	centuries.	
                                                        82	Agricultural	value	added	as	a	per	cent	of	GDP	dropped	from	circa	24%	in	1975	to	15%	in	1995	to	just	below	7%	in	2015.	The	figures	for	manufacturing	reveal	a	drop	from	around	24%	to	16%	to	12%	over	the	same	time	period	(World	Bank,	2017b).	Relative	employment	in	both	sectors	also	fell,	from	29%	(agriculture)	and	25%	(industry)	to	19%	and	13%	(respectively)	between	the	late-1970s	and	the	mid-2000s	(Clavijo,	Vera,	&	Fandiño,	2012,	p.	40).	
Figures	4	&	5	–	The	mining	and	oil	sectors	in	Colombia’s	export	composition		
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Note:	the	data	only	covers	coal,	nickel,	gold	and	emeralds	for	the	mining	sector	and	the	latter	two	(gold	and	emeralds)	are	not	included	for	the	years	2014-2016,	as	the	data	was	not	available.	The	oil	sector	includes	“petroleum	and	derivatives”.		Graphs	elaborated	by	the	author	using	data	from	Colombia’s	National	Department	of	Planning	(DNP)	for	the	period	1970-2005	and	from	the	National	Department	of	Statistics	(DANE)	and	the	National	Mining	and	Energy	Planning	Unit	(UPME)	for	the	2006-2016	period.	
  
183	
The	shift	away	from	ISI	strategies	also	had	huge	repercussions	 for	the	agricultural	sector.	The	Colombian	landscape	was	transformed	as	certain	crops	ceased	to	be	profitable	following	the	withdrawal	of	protectionist	policies	(Ocampo	et	al.,	1996;	Ocampo,	1996b).	The	appreciation	of	the	peso	-associated	with	the	mining	and	energy	boom-	also	negatively	affected	 the	agricultural	 sector	by	making	 imports	cheaper	and	exports	 less	competitive	(Zerda	Sarmiento,	2015,	p.	18).	Imports	of	food	and	primary	agricultural	goods	increased	almost	 fivefold	between	1991	and	1997,	 rising	 from	circa	1.25	million	 to	over	5	million	tonnes	annually	(Tovar	Martinez,	1997).	Evidence	suggests	that	rural	upper	classes,	who	had	been	the	primary	beneficiaries	of	ISI	policies,	lost	most	in	economic	terms	due	to	the	reforms,	compared	to	other	groups	(Balcázar,	2008,	pp.	139–140).	However,	the	lifting	of	import	barriers	affected	farmers	of	all	types	and	sizes	(Suárez	Montoya,	2015)	and	large	producers	were	soon	provided	with	new	subsidies	and	support,	as	discussed	below.	The	 rise	 in	 rural	unemployment	 in	 the	early	1990s	and	opposition	 to	 free	market	policies	pushed	the	government	to	reintroduce	protections	for	certain	agricultural	products	(Balcázar,	2008,	pp.	134–135;	Ocampo,	1996).	However,	mostly,	these	were	reduced	once	again	as	various	free	trade	agreements	entered	into	force,	in	particular	with	the	USA	and	the	European	Union	in	2012	and	2013	respectively.	By	2015	Colombia	was	importing	more	than	28%	of	its	food	and	primary	agricultural	goods	or	circa	10.3	million	tonnes	per	year	(García	Sierra,	2015)	–	double	the	1997	figure	above.	Farmers	across	Colombia	struggle	to	compete	with	cheap	and	often	subsidised	imports	(Suárez	Montoya,	2015).	They	risk	losing	their	 land	 through	 market-mechanisms	 of	 dispossession,	 such	 as	 bank	 foreclosure	 or	distress	sales.	A	study	on	land	markets	in	Colombia	-published	by	the	World	Bank-	reports	that	47%	of	people	included	in	the	sample	“who	sold	land	in	the	1994-99	period”	did	so	to	pay	off	debts	(Deininger,	Castagnini,	&	González,	2004,	p.	15).	A	dairy	and	potato	farmer	from	Boyacá	explained:	“We	are	not	displaced	because	of	the	violence,	but	because	of	the	economy”	(cited	in	Suárez	Montoya,	2015,	p.	66).		While	 large	 and	 small	 agricultural	 producers	 alike	 suffer	 economic	 pressures,	 the	latter	are	more	vulnerable	to	market-led	dispossession,	in	part	because	they	are	less	likely	to	receive	State	support.	On	the	whole,	the	Colombian	government	has	continued	to	provide	backing	for	large-scale	agriculture	-	though	the	scale,	scope	and	focus	of	policy	has	changed	in	particular	towards	promoting	export	crops.	As	shown	in	the	subsequent	chapter,	these	same	policies	also	facilitate	and	incentivise	violent	land	grabs.	Overall,	Colombian	farmers	-especially	campesinos-	have	faced	a	triple	threat	of	dispossession	and	displacement	during	the	neoliberal	era:	land	loss	driven	by	economic	factors,	plus	the	exodus	imposed	by	armed	
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groups	 and	usurpation	at	 the	hands	of	paramilitaries	 and	allied	 elites,	 as	well	 as	 forced	relocations	and	coerced	property	transfers	(backed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers)	to	make	way	for	mining	and	energy	projects.	Much	 has	 been	written	 about	 the	 general	 connections	 (i.e.	 beyond	 the	 Colombian	context)	between	dispossession/displacement	on	the	one	hand;	and	neoliberal	reform	and	globalisation	on	the	other.	Akram	Lodhi,	for	example,	put	forward	the	notion	of	“neoliberal	enclosures”,	which	he	argues	“facilitate	a	market-led	appropriation	of	 land”	especially	 in	areas	not	yet	 “fully	colonised	by	capital”	 (Akram-Lodhi,	2007,	p.	1446).	This	 is	achieved	through	 “neoliberal	 agrarian	 restructuring”,	which	 includes	an	array	of	policies	 such	as:	trade	 liberalisation,	 the	 deregulation	 of	 agricultural	 markets,	 the	 privatisation	 or	withdrawal	 of	 rural	 services,	 the	 dismantling	 of	 State-backed	 land	 reforms,	 and	 their	replacement	by	titling	and	other	programs	aimed	at	building	land	markets	(Akram-Lodhi	et	al.,	2009).	Similarly,	Araghi	(2009)	argues	that	peasants	across	the	Global	South	are	being	forced	 from	 their	 land,	 in	 particular	 due	 to	 policies	 that	 oblige	 them	 to	 compete	 with	subsidised	 producers	 from	 the	 Global	 North,	 combined	 with	 a	 “withdrawal	 from	 the	agrarian	 welfare	 state”	 (p.	 131).	 He	 calls	 neoliberal	 globalisation	 “the	 storm	 that	 is	depeasantizing	the	Earth’s	population”	(Araghi,	2009,	p.	112).	Some	elements	of	the	above	narrative	describe	what	has	been	happening	in	Colombia	quite	 accurately;	 others	 do	 not.	 The	 import	 of	 cheap	 food	 goods	 set	 in	motion	market-mechanisms	of	dispossession,	which	mostly	affect	small	farmers.	However,	other	aspects	of	neoliberal	 restructuring	 mainly	 impacted	 large	 landowners,	 who	 were	 the	 principle	beneficiaries	of	Colombia’s	‘agrarian	welfare	state’.	In	terms	of	land	reform,	the	rollback	in	Colombia	began	with	the	Pact	of	Chicoral	in	1972,	before	neoliberalism	had	taken	off.	The	government	then	passed	a	new	agrarian	law	in	1994,	discussed	below.	Some	elements	of	this	legislation	are	quintessentially	neoliberal,	such	as	the	market-led	land	redistribution	program;	but	others,	including	diverse	restrictions	that	apply	to	reform	lands,	are	inimical	to	free	market	ideology.	The	government	started	to	reverse	these	regulations	just	over	a	decade	later	and	is	still	-as	I	write-	amidst	this	legislative	counter-reform.	Finally,	in	the	case	of	Colombia,	dispossession	due	to	the	expansion	of	the	mining	and	oil	industries	and	the	intensification	of	the	armed	conflict	has	-up	to	a	point-	overshadowed	market-led	land	loss.		
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2)	Coca	farming,	the	‘War	on	Drugs’	and	the	narco	land	rush	The	decline	of	the	legal	agricultural	and	manufacturing	industries	was	conducive	to	the	rise	of	the	illicit	drug	economy	in	Colombia.	The	business	took	off	in	the	1970s,	shortly	after	US	president	 Nixon	 declared	 the	 ill-conceived	 ‘War	 on	 Drugs’	 and	 just	 as	 economic	restructuring	in	Colombia	began.	Marijuana	served	as	the	commercial	stepping-stone.	By	the	1990s,	 the	country’s	 illicit	drug	economy	had	diversified	 into	cocaine	and	to	a	 lesser	extent	heroin	(Sáenz	Rovner,	2016;	Molano	Bravo,	2015;	Thoumi,	2002).		Initially,	Colombian	businesses	processed	and	trafficked	cocaine	produced	from	coca	paste	imported	from	Peru	and	Bolivia.	But	domestic	coca	cultivation	proliferated	steadily	and	by	the	late	1990s	Colombia	had	more	coca	crops	than	any	other	country	in	the	world	(Thoumi,	 2002).	 Coca	 is	 predominantly	 (though	 not	 exclusively)	 grown	 in	 southern	‘colonisation	zones’.	Settlement	in	these	areas	increased	significantly	during	La	Violencia	and	continued	 in	 the	1960s	and	1970s	 in	part	 thanks	 to	 the	 failures	of	distributive	 land	reform.	 In	many	 of	 these	 zones,	 soil	 types	 and	 climate	 pose	 limitations	 for	 agricultural	production;	infrastructure	and	basic	public	services	are	poor	or	non-existent;	and	the	cost	of	 transporting	bulky	 low-value	produce,	even	to	regional/local	markets,	 is	prohibitively	high.	This,	combined	with	years	of	policy-bias	towards	large-scale	farming,	limited	support	for	the	colonos,	and	the	import	of	cheap	goods	following	the	‘economic	opening’	contributed	to	a	situation	in	which	coca	was	the	only	viable	commercial	crop	for	many	peasant	settlers.		Narcotraffickers	 effectively	 brought	 the	 market	 to	 Colombia’s	 furthest	 flung	agricultural	frontiers.	They	established	processing	laboratories	and	transport	routes	(often	using	private	air	strips),	generating	demand	for	a	high-value	crop	that	is	durable	and	-once	processed-	 relatively	 compact.	 Hence,	 coca	 cultivation	 offered	 peasant	 settlers	 a	 tool	 of	survival	 amidst	 adverse	 structural	 conditions	 arising	 from	 the	 country’s	 trajectory	 of	agrarian	 change	 and	 chosen	 development	 strategies.	 Sociologist	 and	 journalist	 Alfredo	Molano	(2015)	sums	up:	“For	the	colonos	illicit	cultivations	represented	the	incarnation	of	their	dreams	and	the	demands	they	had	made	to	the	State:	access	to	markets,	credit,	roads,	health,	 education,	 diversion.	 In	 a	 short	 time,	 they	 emerged	 from	 bankruptcy	 and	 were	integrated	into	the	world	of	consumption”	(p.	193).	It	should	be	said,	however,	that	small	coca	farmers	-who	receive	on	average	just	1%	of	total	revenues	from	the	cocaine	trade	(OAS,	2013,	 p.	 19)-	 derive	 comparatively	 modest	 benefits	 from	 the	 business.	 Still,	 the	opportunities	 afforded	 by	 the	 coca	 boom	 combined	 with	 on-going	 forced	 displacement	contributed	to	further	population	growth	in	the	colonisation	zones	(Gutiérrez	Sanín,	2015b,	pp.	14–16).	
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These	same	regions	in	southern	Colombia	were	also	the	traditional	strongholds	of	the	FARC	rebels.	Initially,	the	guerrilla	mostly	opposed	the	illicit	drugs	industry.	In	some	areas,	the	FARC	had	attempted	to	convince	peasants	to	stop	cultivating	coca	and	even	burnt	down	cocaine	 laboratories.	However,	 they	were	unable	 to	offer	 their	 support	base	 (actual	 and	potential)	an	alternative	source	of	income.	Presumably	they	also	foresaw	the	advantages	of	using	the	illicit	business	to	fund	the	insurgency.	Hence,	the	FARC	soon	shifted	its	strategy	and	began	to	regulate	and	tax	the	drug	trade.	This	included	forcing	the	narcotraffickers	to	make	 minimum	 payments	 to	 the	 small	 coca	 farmers,	 which	 fortified	 the	 guerrilla’s	legitimacy	among	many	settlers	(CNMH,	2012a;	Molano,	1989;	Semana,	1989b).		Whether	the	FARC	were	attacking	the	illicit	drugs	business	or	taxing	and	regulating	it,	 they	were	 interfering	with	 the	narcotraffickers’	 profits.	At	 the	 same	 time,	many	drug	barons	were,	or	had	become,	large	landowners	-	the	typical	targets	of	guerrilla	extortion.	This	 combined	 with	 other	 factors	 and	 events	 led	 the	 narcos	 (led	 in	 in	 particular	 by	Rodríguez	 Gacha,	 alias	 El	 Mexicano)	 to	 join	 the	 army’s	 war	 against	 the	 guerrillas	 and	civilians	accused	of	supporting	the	insurgency	(CNMH,	2012a;	Semana,	1989b).		Initially,	the	Colombian	government	almost	openly	‘tolerated’	the	illicit	drug	industry	(Reyes	Posada,	2009,	pp.	4–5;	see	also	Sáenz	Rovner,	2016).	This	started	to	change	with	pressure	from	the	US	government	and	as	violence	began	to	permeate	all	corners	of	society.	Conflict	between	the	Medellín	and	Cali	‘Cartels’	escalated	and	the	Medellín	narcos	launched	a	violent	campaign	against	the	government’s	extradition	agreement	with	the	USA.	They	put	bombs	in	passenger	aircrafts,	press	offices	and	State	buildings;	and	sent	their	hit	men	after	journalists,	judges,	police	and	other	government	functionaries.	The	break-up	of	the	Cartels	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	led	to	a	dispersion	of	the	business	into	hundreds	of	smaller	firms		–	many	of	them	with	links	to	paramilitary	groups,	which	were	engaged	in	counterinsurgency	warfare	 alongside	 government	 forces	 (Reyes	 Posada,	 2009,	 pp.	 5–6	 and	 87–88).	 Hence,	historically,	at	least,	the	‘War	on	Drugs’	in	Colombia	has	been	fairly	selective.	The	main	victims	of	 this	 ‘War’	have	been	the	campesinos	who	 live	 in	coca-growing	regions.	 In	 addition	 to	 being	 targeted	 by	 counterinsurgency	 operations	 from	 which	militarised	 counter-narcotics	 campaigns	 are	 sometimes	 indistinguishable,	 an	 unknown	number	of	people	have	been	forcibly	displaced83	and/or	left	destitute	by	the	State’s	aerial	
                                                        83	It	is	difficult	to	gauge	the	scale	of	the	tragedy	since	the	government,	it	seems,	does	not	accept	this	as	 a	 ‘legitimate’	 cause	 of	 displacement.	 Inhabitants	 of	 the	 Amazon	 Pearl	 PRZ	 report	 that	 many	families	left	destitute	by	the	spraying	were	advised	to	claim	the	guerrilla	uprooted	them	in	order	to	receive	the	humanitarian	aid	that	they	so	desperately	needed	(Personal	Interviews,	2015).		
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fumigation	campaigns.	In	addition	to	loss	of	subsistence	crops,	many	farmers	face	loans	they	cannot	pay	off	because	their	commercial	-including	licit-	cultivations	were	destroyed	by	the	spraying	 (Personal	 Interviews,	 2015).	 As	 outlined	 by	Molano	 (2015),	 aerial	 fumigations	helped	incite	some	of	the	largest	peasant	protests/blockades	in	Colombian	history.	In	Putumayo,	aerial	fumigations	have	also	facilitated	the	occupation	of	surrounding	lands	by	oil	companies,	adding	to	resentment	towards	the	State.	This	is	how	someone	from	Jerusalén-San	Luis	in	Villagarzón	put	it:	“they	fumigate	everything	one	has,	food,	everything.	[…]	the	State	itself	does	that	so	that	the	civilian	population,	the	indigenous	people,	start	to	leave	 their	 territories”	 (Personal	 Interview,	 2015).	 Another	 person	 from	 Kwe’sx	 Nasa	Çxayu’çe	in	Puerto	Caicedo	explained:	“The	government	is	fumigating	our	territories	[...]	to	see	 if	 it	 can	 clear	 out	 our	 territory	 through	hunger,	 because	 they	 are	 fumigating	 all	 our	subsistence	crops	[...]	There	is	no	coca	in	my	community.	We	are	17	families	in	2015,	we	used	 to	 be	 27	 families.	 The	 other	 10	 families	 have	 left,	 displaced”	 (Personal	 Interview,	2015).	Many	people	from	different	parts	of	Putumayo	expressed	the	view	that	fumigations	are	linked	to	oil	interests	(see	also	testimonies	from	North	Santander	in	IDMC,	2007,	p.	51).	Whatever	the	intentions,	aerial	spraying	has	certainly	caused	displacement	and	destitution	that	weakens	people’s	ability	to	resist	the	imposition	of	oil	operations	in	their	lands.	While	small	coca	farmers	and	narco	kingpins	-and	to	a	lesser	extent	coca	pickers	or	
raspachines,	jungle	chemists	and	hired	guns-	tend	to	receive	the	brunt	of	media	attention,	the	reality	is	that	the	illegal	drug	industry	depends	on	diverse	participants	(e.g.	government	officials,	pilots,	 lawyers,	accountants,	etc.)	reaching	across	 the	social	strata	 including	 the	upper	 echelons,	 where	 a	 significant	 portion	 of	 Colombia’s	 drug	 profits	 actually	 end	 up	(Sáenz	Rovner,	2016;	Reyes	Posada,	2009;	Thoumi,	2002).	Drug	money	fuelled	an	unprecedented	“real	estate	boom”	in	urban	and	rural	areas	(Thoumi,	 2002,	 p.	 110).	 This,	 combined	 with	 a	 tax	 regime	 that	 encourages	 speculative	property	accumulation,	pushed	up	farmland	prices.	In	some	regions,	prices	reached	levels	“significantly	 above	 the	 net	 present	 value	 of	 profits	 from	 agricultural	 production”	(Deininger	 et	 al.,	 2004,	 p.	 3).	 Indeed,	 according	 to	 Reyes	 (2009),	 the	 narco	 land	 rush	exacerbated	 agricultural	 sector	 stagnation	 by	 pushing	 rural	 property	 prices	 above	 their	productive	value	and	consolidating	the	use	of	fertile	terrains	for	extensive	cattle	ranching	(pp.	74-77).	Though	Reyes’	emphasis	on	the	links	between	drug	money	and	speculative	land	acquisition	is	justified,	it	should	be	said	that	profits	from	this	illicit	business	have	also	been	funnelled	 into	 ‘productive’	 ventures,	 such	 as	 the	 establishment	 of	 oil	 palm	 monocrops	(Ballvé,	2013;	Grajales,	2013).	
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Farmland	acquisition	has	served	narco-elites,	 in	particular,	 in	at	 least	 four	ways:	 it	allowed	them	to	launder	drug	money	(via	the	land	purchase	itself	and	the	licit	businesses	set	up	on	 that	 land),	 store	and	accumulate	wealth,	 control	key	 trafficking	corridors,	 and	better	accommodate	infrastructure	(e.g.	cocaine	laboratories	and	private	air	bases)	for	their	illicit	ventures.	The	narcotraffickers	“reinforced	and	generalised”	the	established	practice	of	using	private	armed	groups	to	defend	landed	property,	leading	to	a	further	weakening	of	peasant	struggles	in	some	regions	(Reyes	Posada,	2009,	p.	80).		It	is	important	to	distinguish	between	the	narco	land	rush	briefly	discussed	here	and	the	 para-elite	 land	 grab,	 examined	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	 subsequent	 chapter	 (see	 also	Gutiérrez	Sanín	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016;	Reyes	Posada,	2009).	I	use	the	term	‘narco	land	rush’	to	 refer	 to	 the	 rise	 in	 rural	 property	 acquisition	 by	 narcotraffickers.	 This	was	 certainly	associated	with	coercive	dispossession	in	some	regions	and	at	certain	periods	of	time,	but	this	 was/is	 not	 always	 the	 case.	 And,	 as	 implied	 by	 Gutiérrez	 and	 Vargas	 (2016),	 an	overemphasis	 on	 the	 role	 “illegal	 elites”	 in	 coercive	 dispossession	 can	 obscure	 the	participation	of	“legal	elites”,	which	in	turn	may	perpetuate	oversimplified	narratives	that	reduce	the	phenomenon	to	a	problem	of	the	criminal	underworld.	In	fact,	Gutiérrez	and	Vargas	(2016)	argue	that	narcotraffickers	“were	only	involved	in	practices	of	dispossession	under	very	special	conditions”	(p.	3;	for	details	see	pp.	25-26).	And,	according	to	Reyes	(2009),	historically	at	least,	narcotraffickers	mostly	purchased	land	from	large	property	owners;	in	particular	those	who	wished	to	withdraw	from	areas	where	their	physical	and	financial	security	were	under	threat	from	the	guerrillas.	The	narcos	were	awash	 with	 money	 they	 were	 eager	 to	 legalise	 and	 hence	 were	 often	 willing	 to	 pay	exorbitant	prices	(pp.	73-74).	This	type	of	land	acquisition	was	particularly	common	during	the	 1980s.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 dispossession	 imposed	 by	 the	 para-elite	 mostly	 affected	smallholders,	who	were	usually	given	a	pittance	-if	anything	at	all-	for	land	that	was	taken	from	them	by	 force.	This	phenomenon	didn’t	 truly	 take	off	until	 the	1990s.	Paramilitary	commander,	 alias	 Doble	 Cero,	 himself	 observed	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 narcos’	purchase	of	land	from	elites	at	“inflated	prices”	during	the	1980s	and	the	acquisition	of	land	from	the	displaced	by	“unscrupulous	AUC	members”	in	the	decades	that	followed	(cited	in	CNMH,	2012c,	p.	93).		Nevertheless,	 this	distinction	between	 the	narco	 land	 rush	and	 the	para-elite	 land	grab,	 while	 conceptually	 relevant,	 has	 limitations.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 even	 if	 -as	 Reyes	suggests-	the	acquisition	of	large	properties	via	purchase	at	high	prices	predominated	in	the	 1980s,	 narcotraffickers	 (some	 of	who	were	 involved	 in	 counterinsurgency	warfare)	
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certainly	also	acquired	 smallholdings	during	 this	period	and	used	violence	or	 threats	 to	force	 at	 least	 some	 land	 sales.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 many	 paramilitary	 groups	 were/are	involved	in	the	illicit	drug	business	and	many	cases	of	paramilitary-led	usurpation	were/are	also	clearly	connected	with	narcotrafficking	interests	–	(e.g.)	drug	money	was	laundered	via	licit	businesses	set	up	on	stolen	land	and	dispossession	was	sometimes	aimed	at	controlling	key	 trafficking	 corridors,	 setting	 up	 coca	 cultivations	 and	 better	 accommodating	infrastructure	for	illicit	drugs	ventures.			
3)	The	intensification	and	‘paramilitarisation’	of	the	armed	conflict		Between	 the	1970s	and	1980s	multiple	 factors	 coalesced,	 giving	way	 to	 a	new	phase	of	violence	in	Colombia,	which	intensified	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s.	By	the	new	century,	Colombia	had	the	largest	internally	displaced	population	in	the	world,	more	land	mines	than	any	other	country	except	Afghanistan,	was	considered	the	most	dangerous	place	on	earth	to	be	a	trade	unionist	and	had	seen	an	entire	political	party	(the	left-wing	UP84)	liquidated	in	what	 has	 been	 recognised	 as	 a	 ‘political	 genocide’.	 In	 the	 pages	 that	 follow,	 I	 do	 not	attempt	to	provide	a	full	explanation	of	Colombia’s	armed	conflict.	Instead,	I	aim	to	give	a	basic	overview	and	to	highlight	some	key	dynamics	vital	for	understanding	the	latest	phase	of	dispossession	in	Colombia.	The	government’s	decision	to	block	 land	reform	and	 its	de	 facto	criminalisation	of	unionism85,	plus	the	use	of	military	force	to	repress	rural	and	urban	protests,	lent	legitimacy	to	the	various	rebel	groups.	A	number	of	authors	suggest	there	is	a	direct	link	between	the	closing	 down	 of	 reformist	 channels	 and	 the	 violent	 repression	 of	 non-armed	 social	movements	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	strengthening	of	the	armed	insurgency	on	the	other	(Molano	Bravo,	2015,	p.	192;	Reyes	Posada,	2009,	pp.	2–3	and	29–30;	for	a	slightly	different	version	of	this	thesis,	see	Gutiérrez	Sanín,	2015,	pp.	10-11).	There	were	at	least	six	different	guerrilla	groups	 in	operation	in	the	1980s.	Four	of	 them	(the	M-19,	 the	EPL,	 the	Quintín	Lame	Armed	Movement	and	the	Revolutionary	Workers’	Party)	demobilised	between	1990	and	1991,	leaving	the	two	oldest	and	largest	guerrilla	groups:	the	ELN	and	the	FARC.		
                                                        84	 Paramilitaries	 and	 government	 forces	 killed	 around	4,000	members	 and	 supporters	 of	 the	UP	(Unión	Patriótica	or	Patriotic	Union)	party	in	less	than	a	decade,	including	2	presidential	candidates,	7	congress	members,	70	councillors,	and	11	mayors.	The	party	had	considerable	success	in	general	and	local	elections	in	1986	and	1988	respectively	(Ávila,	2016;	Urrego	Mesa,	2004).	85	Under	López	Michelsen	(1974-1978),	“all	strikes	were	declared	illegal.	The	policy	of	harassment	and	repression	was	extended	to	the	Liberal	and	Conservative	unions	as	well”	(Zamosc,	1986,	p.	124).	
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By	 the	 late	 1980s	 the	 ELN	 had	 become	 a	 fully-fledged	 guerrilla	 army.	 Its	military	strengthening	 was	 facilitated	 by	 extortion	 payments	 from	 the	 burgeoning	 oil	 industry,	which	became	one	of	the	main	targets	of	its	attacks	and	a	focal	point	of	the	group’s	social	/political	 program	 (FIP,	 2015).	 The	 ELN	 acquired	 significant	 support,	 especially	 in	 the	northeast	of	the	country	where	it	acted	as	an	advocate	for	peasant	settlers	and	oil	workers	(Reyes	Posada,	2009,	pp.	65–66).	The	organisation	had	circa	4,000	fighters	by	the	end	of	the	1990s;	 this	 number	 had	 fallen	 significantly	 (to	 an	 estimated	 1,500	 combatants)	 by	 the	2010s	 (El	 Tiempo,	 2012c).	 As	 of	 2017,	 the	 ELN	 was	 engaged	 in	 peace	 talks	 with	 the	Colombian	government.	Meanwhile,	the	FARC	had	also	begun	to	multiply	its	fronts	and	extend	its	control.	By	the	1990s	it	had	presence	in	approximately	700	of	the	country’s	1,098	municipalities.	This	expansion	was	partially	financed	through	the	organisations’	taxation	of	the	illicit	drug	trade;	their	involvement	in	the	business	appears	to	have	increased	overtime,	though	this	remains	a	contested	issue.	The	FARC	became	the	most	‘effective’	of	the	guerrilla	groups	in	military	terms,	 but	 many	 analysts	 suggest	 that	 its	 success	 as	 an	 armed	 actor	 had	 negative	consequences	 for	 its	 social/political	 legitimacy.	Still,	 the	FARC	retained	sympathies	with	segments	of	the	civilian	population	and	was	able	to	continually	recruit	new	members.	At	its	height	 in	 2002,	 the	 FARC	 had	 an	 estimated	 17,000	 full	 time	 fighters	 and	 13,000	militia	members	(Gutiérrez	Sanín,	2015b,	pp.	17–18,	27–30;	Reyes	Posada,	2009,	pp.	57–58).	By	the	time	of	their	disarmament	in	2017,	membership	had	fallen	to	circa	7,000	fighters	and	1,500	militias	(Marulanda	Rendón,	2017).		Government	 armed	 forces,	 politicians	 and	 elite	 groups	 were	 the	 guerrillas’	 main	targets.	 Police	 and	 military	 were	 killed	 in	 assaults	 and	 held	 as	 ‘prisoners	 of	 war’;	government	 functionaries	 and	 other	 notables	 faced	 death	 threats	 and	 were	 taken	 as	political	hostages;	and	large	landowners,	cattle-ranchers,	business	representatives,	among	others,	were	subject	 to	extortion	and	 financially-motivated	abductions.	 In	many	regions,	elite	groups	also	felt	threatened	by	land	occupations,	union	movements,	and	the	growing	popularity	of	left-wing	political	parties	–	in	particular	the	UP	(see	footnote	above).	These	factors	combined	led	an	assortment	of	individuals	to	organise	and	fund	paramilitary	groups.	Private	armed	groups,	 in	particular	 those	directed	by	elites,	have	a	 long	history	 in	Colombia.	 Throughout	 the	19th	 and	20th	 centuries	 the	 traditional	 landowning	 class	 used	personal	squadrons	or	hired	guns	to	defend	and	extend	their	land	claims	and	for	diverse	political	ends.	The	arming	and	mobilisation	of	campesinos	by	the	landed	elite	was	a	defining	characteristic	 of	 La	 Violencia.	 The	 military,	 for	 its	 part,	 involved	 civilians	 in	
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counterinsurgency	warfare	since	it	was	launched	in	the	1950s.	This	strategy	was	bolstered	by	 the	US	 government	 (which	 endorsed	 and	provided	 advice	 on	 the	use	 of	 civilian	 self-defence	forces	–	see	Stokes,	2003)	and	legalised	through	Decree	3398	of	1965	and	Law	48	of	1968.	The	latter	was	repealed	in	1989	(CAJAR,	2006),	but	later	laws	also	sanctioned	the	paramilitary	expansion86.	As	explained	by	Gutiérrez	(2015),	the	paramilitaries	were	“semi-legal”	armed	groups	(p.	136).		According	to	Reyes	(2009),	 the	military	started	actively	organising	anti-subversive	militias	during	the	Turbay	Ayala	(1978-1982)	administration	and	continued	their	efforts	during	Betancur’s	presidency	(1982-1986),	calling	on	regional	elites	 to	provide	 financial	backing	for	these	groups.	The	army	used	the	incipient	paramilitary	forces	to	circumvent	a	ceasefire	declared	during	the	Betancur	administration’s	efforts	to	negotiate	with	various	guerrilla	groups	(see	also	Stokes,	2005,	pp.	71–78;	CNMH,	2015b,	p.	66).		Henceforth,	an	assortment	of	local	and	regional	right-wing	armed	groups	proliferated	across	 the	country.	A	handful	originated	 in	 the	army’s	counter-insurgency	project,	while	many	were	formed	independently	of	the	military,	but	quickly	gained	their	blessing.	Some	were	founded	and	controlled	by	drug	barons	from	the	beginning;	others	were	taken	over	by	 the	 narcos	 or	 got	 involved	 in	 the	 business	 later-on.	 Military	 capacity	 and	political/ideological	training	also	diverged	widely	between	groups.	Despite	this	diversity,	they	had	two	things	in	common:	they	actively	participated	in	counterinsurgency	warfare	(which	 mainly	 involved	 assassinating,	 disappearing	 or	 displacing	 civilians	 accused	 of	supporting	guerrilla	groups	or	organisations	deemed	subversive)	and	for	that	reason	were	tolerated	or	even	directly	supported	by	the	government	Armed	Forces	(Gutiérrez	Sanín	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	pp.	5–6;	Reyes	Posada,	2009,	pp.	82,	95,	100).		It	 should	 be	 stressed	 that	 counterinsurgency	 (CI)	 has	 been	 as	 much	 a	 political,	economic	 and	 social	 undertaking,	 as	 a	military	mission.	 Since	 the	1950s,	 the	Colombian	army	has	been	inculcated	with	CI	doctrine	that	defines	‘the	enemy’	broadly,	so	as	to	include	civilians	considered	to	subversive,	 including	left-wing	politicians,	trade	unionists,	critical	journalists	 and	 teachers,	 environmentalists,	 and	 members	 of	 peasant	 and	 indigenous	movements	 or	 any	 other	 organisations	 demanding	 substantial	 social,	 political	 and/or	economic	change	(Stokes,	2003,	2005,	pp.	60–78).	This	CI	 logic	was	also	imprinted	upon	
                                                        86	 The	 Gaviria	 (1990-1994)	 and	 Samper	 (1994-1998)	 administrations	 legalised	 private	 ‘security	cooperatives’,	known	as	CONVIVIR,	which	were	used	by	paramilitary	groups	for	acquiring	funds	and	weapons	and,	in	some	areas,	were	inseparable	from	them	(CAJAR,	2006).	
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their	paramilitary	allies	(often	trained	by	the	military	or	commanded	by	ex-army	officials)	and	squared	well	with	the	demands	of	the	elites	who	were	bankrolling	them.	This	is	one	key	reason	most	people	who	died	in	the	Colombian	conflict	have	been	civilians	and	also	helps	explain	why	more	people	were	killed	in	massacres	and	selective	assassination	campaigns	-the	majority	of	which	were	carried	out	by	paramilitary	groups-	than	as	a	result	of	combat87.		The	paramilitaries’	contributors	and	backers	included	not	just	local/regional	elites,	but	 also	 central	 government	 functionaries	 and	 politicians,	 as	 well	 as	 national	 and	multinational	 firms.	 Hundreds	 of	 people	 have	 been	 implicated	 in	 ‘para-politics’	 related	crimes.	In	2005,	paramilitary	chief	Vicente	Castaño	boasted	that	more	than	35%	of	congress	were	“friends”	of	the	AUC	(Verdad	Abierta,	2013a).	Likewise,	dozens	of	firms	funded,	and	in	some	cases	directly	collaborated	with,	the	paramilitaries	(see	e.g.	W	Radio,	2016);	perhaps	the	most	notorious	example	is	Chiquita	Brands	(see	e.g.	“The	Chiquita	Papers”).	While	some	companies	also	paid	money	to	guerrilla	groups,	this	was	usually	under	threat	rather	than	out	of	interest;	the	paramilitaries,	in	contrast	to	the	insurgents,	acted	as	champions	of	elite-led	development.	In	an	open	letter	to	Congress,	paramilitary	leader	Carlos	Castaño	stated:	“we	are	the	defenders	of	business	freedom	[...]	Why	shouldn't	national	and	international	companies	 support	 us	 when	 they	 see	 their	 investments	 limited	 by	 the	 terrorism	 and	barbarity	of	the	guerrillas	[...?]”	(The	New	York	Times,	2000).	A	detailed	discussion	of	‘para-politics’	and	‘para-economics’	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis;	however,	relevant	aspects	of	both	are	considered	in	chapters	7	and	8.	Between	 1996	 and	 1997,	 various	 paramilitary	 groups	 joined	 together	 under	 an	umbrella	organisation	known	as	the	United	Self-Defence	Forces	of	Colombia	(Autodefensas	
Unidas	 de	 Colombia)	 or	 AUC	 -	 although	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 latter	 was	 highly	‘decentralised’	and	regional/local	differences	persisted	 (Gutiérrez	Sanín	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	p.	6;	Reyes	Posada,	2009,	pp.	101–102).	The	continued	“expansion	of	the	paramilitary	groups	was	almost	openly	sponsored	by	the	Armed	Forces	in	reaction	to	the	[new]	peace	process”	led	by	the	Pastrana	administration	(Reyes	Posada,	2009,	p.	62).		
                                                        87	Here	I	draw	on	data	provided	by	the	National	Centre	for	Historical	Memory.	They	estimate	81%	of	circa	220,000	people	killed	during	the	conflict	were	civilians.	More	than	11,700	people	were	killed	in	 massacres	 between	 1985	 and	 2012.	 Another	 23,150	 people	 were	 victims	 of	 selective	assassinations	 and	 25,000	 more	 were	 forcibly	 disappeared	 during	 a	 similar	 time	 period.	 In	comparison,	 1,344	 deaths	 were	 linked	 to	 armed	 confrontations,	 218	 due	 to	 “attacks	 on	 civilian	property”,	 223	 due	 to	 “terrorist	 attacks”	 and	 2,119	 due	 to	 landmines	 -	 between	 1988	 and	 2012	(CNMH,	2012b).	These	figures	are	indicative.	However,	it	should	be	acknowledged	that	conflict	data	is	often	inaccurate	(for	a	discussion,	see	Gutiérrez	Sanín,	2015,	pp.	35–37)	and	varies	across	sources.	
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Meanwhile,	President	Pastrana	(1998-2002)	was	negotiating	an	assistance	package	with	the	US	government,	which	was	approved	in	the	year	2000,	making	Colombia	the	third	largest	 recipient	of	US	military	aid	 (Stokes,	2003,	p.	577).	The	Colombian	Armed	Forces	were	already	receiving	support	from	the	US,	but	Plan	Colombia	-as	the	package	was	dubbed-	permitted	 a	 huge	 boost	 in	military	 operations.	 The	 conflict	 intensified	 in	 the	 years	 that	followed:	homicide	and	 forcible	disappearance	 reached	a	peak	between	2000	and	2004,	while	forced	displacement	exploded	between	2000	and	2008	(RUV,	2017).	Officially,	Plan	Colombia	was	a	centrepiece	of	the	US	War	on	Drugs	and	-later-	the	War	on	 Terror.	 However,	 it	was	much	more	 about	wresting	 power	 from	 the	 FARC	 and	 ELN	guerrillas	 and	 weakening	 “unarmed	 progressive	 social	 forces	 that	 threaten	 a	 stability	geared	 towards	 US	 interests”	 (Stokes,	 2005,	 p.	 3),	 especially	 in	 oil	 resources88.	 As	highlighted	by	Doug	Stokes,	 it	 is	difficult	to	defend	the	notion	that	the	aim	was	to	defeat	drugs	 and	 terrorism	 when	 the	 US	 was	 “actually	 sponsoring	 the	 principal	 drug-funded	terrorists	 [i.e.	 the	 paramilitaries]	 in	 Colombia”	 (p.	 3)	 through	 its	 support	 for	 the	 Army.	Declassified	documents	reveal	that	the	US	government	was	aware	of	this	situation	before	it	stepped	up	provisions	and	training	through	Plan	Colombia.	A	CIA	Report	from	1997	states,	for	 example:	 “instances	 of	 active	 coordination	 between	 military	 and	 paramilitaries	 are	likely	 to	 continue”;	 the	 same	 report	 notes	 that	 funding	 for	 these	 groups	 comes	 from	“wealthy	businessmen,	including	drug	traffickers”	and	that	“victims	of	paramilitary	violence	are	most	commonly	unarmed	civilians”	(The	National	Security	Archive,	2002).		Plan	Colombia	suited	Pastrana’s	successor	Álvaro	Uribe	Vélez	(2002-2010)	who,	in	the	wake	of	frustrations	with	the	failed	peace	process,	promised	to	defeat	the	guerrilla	by	force.	Under	Uribe’s	leadership	and	with	the	help	of	the	US,	the	State	built	up	its	military,	which	grew	from	5	divisions	with	18	brigades	in	2000	to	8	divisions	with	31	brigades	in	2012	(CNMH,	2012a,	p.	61).	This	included	the	creation	of	special	battalions	“dedicated	to	the	security	of	the	mining-energy,	hydrocarbons	and	transport	sectors”	(Mindefensa,	2015),	which	 facilitated	 the	 imposition	of	 large-scale	 investments	 and	associated	dispossession	(this	is	discussed	in	detail	in	the	report	I	wrote	on	oil	operations	in	Putumayo).	
                                                        88	 Numerous	 US	 government	 functionaries	 overtly	 affirmed	 the	 importance	 of	 Colombia’s	 oil	resources	in	their	validation	of	the	USA’s	provision	of	military	aid	to	the	country	and	oil	companies	have	 channeled	 considerable	 sums	 into	 lobbying	 for	 increased	US	military	 spending	 in	Colombia	(Stokes,	2005,	pp.	124–126	and	107;	on	the	links	between	Plan	Colombia	and	oil	interests	see	also	Gisbert	&	Pinto,	2014;	I.	Gómez,	2000;	S.	Gómez,	2002).		
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The	army	gained	control	over	densely	populated	areas.	They	established	checkpoints	on	the	country’s	arterial	highways,	which	had	once	been	the	site	of	the	FARC’s	‘miraculous	fishing’	 (kidnapping	 and	 extortion)	 operations.	 The	 guerrilla	 lost	 combatants	 through	death,	 capture	 or	 desertion	 and	were	 increasingly	 confined	 to	 relatively	 isolated	 areas.	Overall,	Uribe’s	‘Democratic	Security	Policy’	led	to	substantial	improvements	for	the	middle	and	 upper	 classes	 especially	 and	 in	 the	 ‘central’	 regions	 in	 particular,	 which	 partially	explains	his	popularity	among	the	active	electorate.		Things	were	different	 for	 those	 living	 in	 the	country’s	warzones,	who	suffered	not	only	 the	guerrilla’s	 land	mines,	but	 also	 the	government’s	bombs.	For	 them,	Democratic	Security	signified	an	intensification	of	the	armed	conflict.	Practically	the	entire	population	of	Putumayo,	for	example,	was	branded	‘subversive’.	In	this	region,	the	worst	of	the	violence	took	place	between	2000	and	2008,	as	the	army	and	the	paramilitaries	stepped	up	efforts	to	wrest	control	from	the	FARC	(CNMH,	2011,	pp.	82–85;	Personal	Interviews,	2015).	Their	stories,	especially	those	implicating	government	forces,	rarely	if	ever	made	the	news	and	are	far	removed	from	the	lives	of	many	fellow	Colombians.		One	of	the	most	important	feats	attributed	to	Uribe’s	Democratic	Security	Policy	was	the	 individual	 demobilisation	 of	 thousands	 of	 guerrilla	 and	 paramilitary	 fighters	 and	especially	 the	 collective	 formal	 demobilisation	 of	 the	 AUC.	 In	 2003,	 paramilitary	commanders	signed	the	‘Santa	Fe	de	Ralito	Agreement’,	officialising	negotiations	with	the	government,	 which	 gave	 way	 to	 the	 demobilisation	 of	 more	 than	 30,000	 combatants	(though	it	is	thought	that	around	half	of	the	demobilised	were	fakes	or	impostors)	by	2006	(Reyes	Posada,	2009,	pp.	129–134;	Semana,	2011b).	Nevertheless,	 the	paramilitaries	did	not	simply	cease	to	exist,	as	the	Uribe	government	claimed.	Some	paramilitary	groups	never	demobilized	to	begin	with,	others	rearmed	under	a	different	guise,	and	a	few	apparently	new	squads	have	formed.	The	official	discourse	calls	these	armed	groups	BACRIM	(bandas	
criminales)	or	‘criminal	gangs’,	which	essentially	depoliticises	their	actions	and	allows	the	demobilisation	to	be	presented	as	successful.	According	 to	 one	 study,	 70%	 of	 the	 territories	 that	 used	 to	 be	 controlled	 by	 the	paramilitaries	 are	 now	 ‘terrorised’	 by	 the	 BACRIM.	 More	 than	 332,000	 people	 on	 the	government	 victims	 register	 (RUV)	 identified	 these	 ‘criminal	 gangs’	 as	 their	 victimisers.	This	is	likely	to	be	an	underestimation,	given	that	many	people	were	denied	inclusion	in	the	RUV	precisely	on	the	grounds	that	the	government	does	not	deem	the	BACRIM	‘actors	in	the	armed	conflict’	(Bohórquez	Contreras,	2016).		
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The	main	 justification	 for	 refusing	 to	 call	 these	groups	paramilitaries	and	denying	their	status	as	‘actors	in	the	armed	conflict’	is	that	they	apparently	have	not	been	involved	in	combat	with	insurgents	and	-according	to	some	sources-	have	even	formed	alliances	with	them	in	certain	regions	(El	Tiempo,	2016a).	But	counterinsurgency	was	never	solely	about	combatting	 the	 guerrillas;	 since	 its	 inception	paramilitary	 violence	 has	 been	directed	 at	
unarmed	social	movements	and	individuals	considered	subversive.	As	noted	above,	civilians	were	the	main	victims	of	 ‘traditional’	AUC	warfare.	In	this	sense,	the	BACRIM	play	a	role	similar	 to	 that	 of	 their	 predecessors	 (see	 Maher	 &	 Thomson,	 2011).	 They	 assassinate	unionists,	 intimidate	 those	who	 resist	 the	 imposition	 of	mining	 and	oil	 projects	 in	 their	territories	 and	use	 violence	 to	prevent	people	 from	 reclaiming	 their	 usurped	 land	or	 to	advance	 new	 usurpations.	 Labels	 such	 as	 ‘neo’	 or	 ‘new’	 paramilitaries,	 ‘paramilitary	successor	groups’	and	‘post	demobilisation	forces’	serve	to	highlight	this	continuity,	as	well	as	the	participation	of	former	AUC	members	in	these	groups.		Those	 in	 favour	 of	 distinguishing	 the	 BACRIM	 from	 paramilitaries	 also	 point	 to	differences	in	military	capacity	and	the	scale	of	bloodshed	for	which	they	are	responsible	(El	Tiempo,	2016a).	Government	databases	do	suggest	that	indicators	of	violence	(torture,	homicide,	forced	disappearance,	displacement,	etc.)	have	declined	since	around	the	time	of	the	demobilisation	(RUV,	2017).	But	whether	or	not	this	is	reason	to	castoff	the	paramilitary	label	 is	 another	 question.	 People	 I	 interviewed	 in	 Putumayo	 insisted	 that	 BACRIM	 are	paramilitaries	even	though	the	violence	has	changed.	For	example:	an	 indigenous	 leader	from	Puerto	Caicedo	noted	 “the	 strength	 of	 the	paramilitaries	 has	diminished,	 but	 their	descendants	are	still	around	[...]	Mano	Negra	or	Los	Rastrojos,	they	changed	their	name,	but	they	are	the	same”;	another	indigenous	leader	from	Puerto	Ası́s	explained:	“in	the	past	it	didn’t	matter	if	the	paramilitaries	caught	someone	and	chopped	them	up	with	a	chainsaw	or	 cut	 off	 their	 heads.	Now	 it’s	more	 hidden,	 but	 they	 are	 still	 doing	 it	 [killing	 people]”	(Personal	Interviews,	2015).	Finally,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 BACRIM	 should	 not	 be	 called	 paramilitaries	 because,	unlike	the	AUC,	they	are	in	open	conflict	with	the	State	(El	Tiempo,	2016a).	According	to	official	sources,	authorities	captured	19,579	and	killed	1,097	BACRIM	members	between	2007	 and	 2015	 (cited	 in	 Fundación	 Paz	 y	 Reconciliación,	 2016).	 On	 the	 whole,	 the	relationship	between	the	BACRIM	and	the	State	is	different	to	that	with	the	AUC.	The	former	are	not	‘semi-legal’	like	the	latter	were.	However,	there	is	evidence	of	ties	between	these	successor	groups	and	military/police,	as	well	as	politicians	and	other	government	officials,	in	various	parts	of	the	country	(HRW,	2013,	pp.	172–173).	As	of	2014,	prosecutors	were	
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investigating	“5,749	members	of	the	public	forces	for	alleged	responsibility	in	grave	human	rights	violations	and	links	to	criminal	gangs”	(Semana,	2014).	And,	as	of	2016,	government	investigators,	council	members,	mayors,	at	least	one	governor,	among	hundreds	of	others,	were	 also	 under	 investigation	 for	 crimes	 related	 to	 these	 groups	 (El	 Universal,	 2016b).	Arguably,	then,	the	demobilisation	did	not	eliminate	paramilitarism;	it	transformed	it.		The	armed	conflict,	briefly	described	in	this	section,	enabled	a	new	phase	of	agrarian	counter-reform.	The	paramilitaries,	allied	with	regional	and	 local	elites,	used	violence	to	procure	lands	mainly	-though	not	exclusively-	from	smallholders.	Others	purchased	plots	abandoned	during	the	violence	(caused	by	the	army,	paramilitaries	and	guerrillas	alike),	often	at	fire-sale	prices	and	from	families	who	had	little	option	but	to	give	up	their	land	in	order	 to	 survive.	 State-lands	 cleared	 through	 displacement	 could	 be	 easily	 occupied,	especially	 if	 the	occupying	firm	had	government	endorsement.	Constant	violence	 limited	communities’	ability	 to	organise	and	resist	 the	take-over	of	 their	 lands.	Vocal	critics	and	opponents	of	large-investment	projects	were	threatened,	displaced,	murdered,	or	forcibly	disappeared.	All	of	this	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	subsequent	chapters.			
4)	The	1991	Constitution	and	Agrarian	Reform	Law	160	of	1994	Amidst	 macroeconomic	 reorganisation,	 a	 booming	 illicit	 drug	 economy	 and	 an	intensification	 of	 the	 armed	 conflict,	 Colombia	 adopted	 a	 new	 Constitution	 and	 the	government	 passed	 Law	 160	 of	 1994	 –	 its	 third	 gesture	 of	 agrarian	 reform	 in	 the	 20th	century.	 The	 Law,	 which	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 is	 still	 in	 force,	 albeit	 with	 substantial	modifications,	 contains	 a	 strange	 mixture	 of	 market-oriented	 policies	 (e.g.	 land	redistribution	based	on	voluntary	negotiations89)	and	the	type	of	regulations	criticised	by	neoliberal	scholars	and	policymakers.	In	part,	this	odd	combination	may	be	attributed	to	the	variety	of	actors	that	influenced	the	legislation,	including	peasant	organisations	and	the	World	Bank	(Peña	Huertas,	Parada	Hernández,	&	Zuleta	Ríos,	2014,	p.	142).	
                                                        89	Colombia’s	market-led	land	redistribution	was	a	failure.	After	7	years	just	180,211	ha	had	been	purchased	 through	 the	 program	 (Mondragón,	 2006,	 p.	 167).	 The	 properties	 were	 typically	 in	marginal	 locations	with	 poor	 infrastructure.	 And	 the	 price	 for	 land	 acquired	 through	 ‘voluntary	negotiations’	tended	to	be	higher	than	what	was	paid	for	properties	obtained	through	the	state-led	approach	(Borras,	2003,	pp.	382–389).	Furthermore,	even	though	the	loans	people	had	to	take	out	were	smaller	 than	they	would	have	been	under	a	strict	application	of	 the	model	(30%	instead	of	100%	of	the	land	costs),	the	debts	proved	unsustainable,	largely	because	“interest	rates	[were]	much	higher	than	the	actual	income	from	working	the	land”	(Mondragón,	2006,	p.	168;	see	also:	C.	Vargas	et	al.,	2016,	pp.	38–39).	High	land	prices	may	also	have	contributed	to	a	large	number	of	loan	defaults.	
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In	contrast	to	previous	efforts,	there	was	no	clear	economic	rationale	(e.g.	to	control	food	price	inflation	or	boost	internal	demand)	behind	the	most	recent	attempt	at	reform.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 domestic	 supply	 issue	 had	 been	 ‘addressed’	 through	 trade	liberalisation,	which	allowed	for	the	import	of	low-cost	food	and	raw	materials.	On	the	other	hand,	 expanding	 domestic	 demand	 was	 no	 longer	 a	 priority	 under	 export-led	 growth.	Furthermore,	the	government	continued	to	support	large-scale	agriculture.	Put	simply:	the	central	government	no	longer	explicitly	contemplates	the	‘usefulness’	of	redistributive	land	reform	for	capitalist	development,	as	 it	did	(albeit	 inconsistently)	under	 the	 ISI-model.	 It	seems	that	Law	160	was	motivated,	above	all,	by	a	desire	to	allay	rural	discontent,	which	was	fuelling	an	ever-intensifying	armed	conflict.	The	first	stated	objective	of	the	Law	is	to	“promote	and	consolidate	peace	through	mechanisms	directed	at	achieving	social	justice,	participatory	democracy	and	the	wellbeing	of	the	campesino	population”	(Article	1.1).			 Below,	I	discuss	some	specific	norms	established	through	Law	160.	This	is	preceded	by	a	simple	 introduction	 to	 the	1991	Constitution,	which	has	 important	 implications	 for	indigenous	and	Afro	land	rights	and	inspired/shaped	the	1994	agrarian	law.	Both	(the	1991	Constitution	 and	 Law	 160)	 are	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	 ‘mechanics’	 of	 dispossession,	discussed	in	the	subsequent	chapters,	which	show	that	the	legalisation	of	usurpation	and	opportunistic	 land	 accumulation	 was	 achieved	 through	 a	 careful	 management	 and	manipulation	of	Colombian	land	law,	rather	than	by	taking	advantage	of	its	collapse.			 Given	that	much	of	the	literature	on	dispossession	emphasises	the	enabling	role	of	discriminatory	and	weak	legal	protections,	contemporary	Colombian	land	law	is	not	what	some	 might	 expect.	 It	 certainly	 has	 many	 shortcomings,	 but	 in	 some	 ways	 is	 also	comparatively	 ‘progressive’,	 at	 least	 on	 paper.	 For	 example,	 Colombia	 is	 just	 one	 of	 23	countries	 to	 have	 ratified	 the	 International	 Labour	 Organisation	 (ILO)	 ‘Indigenous	 and	Tribal	Peoples’	Convention	169	(see	the	ILO	webpage),	which	contains	various	norms	that	are	supposed	to	protect	these	groups	from	dispossession.	Also,	indigenous	and	Afro	lands	under	collective	 title	are	 ‘inalienable,	 imprescriptible	and	non-seizable’.	And	while	other	countries	were	deregulating	in	ways	that	facilitated	large-scale	acquisitions	(Wily,	2012b,	p.	766),	Colombia	actually	strengthened	regulations	 that	should	have	prevented	wealthy	individuals	 and	 businesses	 in	 particular	 from	 benefitting	 from	 the	 dispossession	 and	displacement	of	campesinos	who	occupied	or	owned	‘reform	lands’.	As	suggested	below	and	in	Chapter	2,	the	failure	of	these	and	other	norms	in	preventing	or	limiting	dispossession	cannot	be	blamed	simply	on	a	weak	rule	of	law	(an	ill-defined	and	slippery	concept	in	any	case);	it	reflects	the	political	nature	of	the	legal	realm	itself.	
  
198	
	
The	1991	Constitution	and	indigenous/Afro	land	rights	In	1991	Colombia	adopted	a	new	constitution,	which	replaced	that	of	1886.	A	student-led	movement	and	peace	negotiations	with	various	guerrilla	groups	were	central	to	achieving	and	shaping	the	constitutional	change,	negotiated	through	a	National	Constituent	Assembly.	The	1991	Constitution	recognised	a	plethora	of	social,	economic	and	cultural	rights,	plus	a	variety	 of	 channels	 for	 democratic	 participation.	 It	 also	 established	 political	decentralisation	in	some	areas,	while	retaining	a	centralist	structure	in	others.	The	 third	 attempt	 at	 agrarian	 reform,	 as	 written	 into	 Law	 160	 of	 1994,	 was	formulated	 in	 response	 to	 the	 demands	 contained	 in	 the	 new	 Constitution	 (Corte	Constitucional,	2016b,	paragraphs	22-25;	see	also	Article	1	of	Law	160),	which	declared	the	State’s	 “duty	 to	 promote	 […]	 agricultural	 workers”	 access	 to	 land	 and	 to	 “improve	 the	quality	of	life	of	the	campesinos”	(Article	64).	For	the	Constitutional	Court	(2016),	Article	64	implies	that	the	peasantry	has	a	constitutional	right	to	access	rural	property	and	that	the	State	has	a	constitutional	obligation	to	adopt	measures	aimed	at	securing	this	right.		Nevertheless,	 Peña	 et	 al.	 argue	 that	 the	 1991	 Constitution	 “did	 not	 consider	 the	peasantry	 as	 subjects	 of	 special	 protection,	 included	 clauses	 that	 practically	 made	expropriation	 impossible	 and	 didn’t	 reform	 crucial	 norms	 [especially	 the	 Civil	 Code]	relating	to	the	regulation	of	property	rights	that	give	enormous	power	to	the	rich	and	local	elites”	(p.	134).	Peña	et	al.	(2014)	are	right	to	critique	the	1991	Constitution	for	‘forgetting’	the	 campesinos	 and	 for	 doing	 very	 little	 to	 challenge	 and	 change	 the	 country’s	 unequal	property	 regime.	 Still,	 the	 single	 article	 (64)	 that	 explicitly	mentions	 the	 peasantry	 has	proven	a	useful	-if	imperfect-	tool	of	resistance	(see	e.g.	Sentence	C-644	of	2012).	In	 contrast	 to	 mestizo	 peasants,	 indigenous	 communities	 did	 obtain	 special	protections	 under	 the	 new	Constitution,	which	promises	 respect	 for	 ethnic	 and	 cultural	diversity	(Article	7	and	68)	and	offers	a	foundation	for	strengthening	indigenous	autonomy	(Articles	246,	286	and	330),	political	participation	(Articles	171	and	176)	and	territorial	rights	(Articles	63,	329	and	330).	In	this	context,	Colombia	ratified	(via	Law	21	of	1991)	the	ILO	Convention	169,	which	 is	meant	 to	uphold	 these	 groups’	 “right	 to	decide	 their	 own	priorities	 for	 the	process	of	development	as	 it	affects	 their	 lives,	beliefs,	 institutions	and	spiritual	well-being	and	the	 lands	they	occupy	or	otherwise	use”	(Article	7)	and	to	prior	consultation	regarding	economic	projects	that	affect	their	territories	(Articles	6,	15,	17)	–	among	other	things.		
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Some	of	the	aforementioned	constitutional	articles	refer	to	‘ethnic	groups’	in	general	and	hence	also	apply	 to	Afro-Colombians.	Nevertheless,	Transitory	Article	55	 is	 the	only	direct	reference	to	“black	communities”.	 It	recognised	their	right	to	“collective	property”	over	 lands	 they	 traditionally	 occupy	 -specifically	 in	 the	 “Pacific	 Basin”-	 and	 ordered	Congress	to	formulate	legislation	that	would	ensure	the	“protection”	of	their	“identity”.	Two	years	 later,	 the	 government	 approved	 Law	 70	 of	 1993,	 which	 acknowledged	 Afro-Colombians’	 status	 as	 an	 ‘ethnic’	 group	with	 special	 rights	 similar	 (but	 not	 identical)	 to	those	of	indigenous	communities.	The	new	Constitution	declared	“the	communal	lands	belonging	to	ethnic	groups”	to	be	 “inalienable,	 imprescriptible	 and	 non-seizable”	 (Article	 63);	 meaning	 that	 Afro	 and	indigenous	lands	under	collective	title	cannot	be	bought	or	sold,	cannot	be	acquired	through	use	or	possession	claims,	and	cannot	be	seized	-	for	example,	by	banks	seeking	to	recover	money	on	an	unpaid	loan.	Hence,	such	lands	are	supposed	to	be,	at	least	partially,	shielded	from	the	dynamics	of	commodification.	This	norm	should	also	-hypothetically-	protect	Afro	and	 indigenous	 communities	with	 collective	 titles	 from	dispossession.	 To	 an	 extent,	 the	special	rules	that	apply	to	indigenous	resguardos	and	Afro	collective	territories	do	provide	better	 ‘land	 tenure	 security’	 than	 that	 afforded	 to	mestizo	 campesinos.	 Lands	 that	 are	‘inalienable’	 and	 ‘non-seizable’	 are	 sheltered	 from	 typical	 market-mechanisms	 of	dispossession	(e.g.	foreclosure	and	distress	sales)	and	private	agents	find	it	more	difficult	to	 legalise	 the	 usurpation	 of	 lands	 under	 collective	 ownership,	 precisely	 because	 they	cannot	be	sold	nor	acquired	through	possession.	In	spite	of	these	safeguards,	Afro	and	indigenous	communities	are	still	vulnerable	to	coercive	dispossession.	As	noted	by	the	Constitutional	Court:	“formal	titling	of	land	and	the	constitution	of	resguardos	in	practice	doesn’t	guarantee	the	material	possession	[of	these	lands]	by	the	communities;	in	fact,	their	territories	[....]	are	appropriated	by	illegal	armed	groups,	delinquents/narcotraffickers,	settlers,	and	agents	motivated	by	economic	interests”	(Auto	004	of	2009).	This	Constitutional	Court	order	focuses	specifically	on	the	indigenous	population,	but	similar	observations	apply	to	Afro-Colombian	communities.		The	occupation	of	collective	lands,	such	as	that	described	by	the	Constitutional	Court,	can	be	explained	as	arising	from	an	inability	or	unwillingness	to	enforce	the	law.	But	in	the	case	of	State-backed	dispossession,	to	borrow	from	Marx	(1867),	the	law	itself	becomes	an	instrument	of	theft.	As	discussed	below,	the	State	may	‘legally’	dispossess	indigenous	and	Afro	communities	to	make	way	for	certain	types	of	investments.	Moreover,	the	separation	between	illegal	and	legal	land	grabbing	is	not	always	clear	cut	and	private	actors	may	also	
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use	the	law	as	an	instrument	of	theft.	For	example,	under	certain	conditions,	land	can	be	excluded	 or	 detached	 from	 a	 collective	 title	 through	 legal	 demarcation;	 a	 handful	 of	individuals	and	companies	exploited	this	procedure,	albeit	with	limited	success,	to	legalise	their	occupation	of	Afro	territories	in	Chocó	(see	Chapter	7).		In	general,	law	can	be	used	to	both	legitimate	and	enforce	dispossession	but	may	also	serve	to	challenge	and	even	reverse	such	processes.	And,	notwithstanding	the	limitations	and	contradictions	of	‘rights’-based	resistance	(see	Coleman,	2013,	2015a),	Colombia’s	new	Constitution,	 and	 the	 laws	 it	 inspired,	 certainly	 shaped	 the	 terms	of	historical	 struggles.	Indeed,	opposing	groups	criticise	the	same	legal	texts	for	different	reasons.	According	to	Ballvé	 (2013),	 “the	 rural	 oligarchy	 […]	 saw	 the	 far-reaching	 reforms	 of	 the	 1991	Constitution	as	undue	concessions	to	subversive	rebels	and	their	presumed	peasant	allies”	(p.	66).	Meanwhile,	others	critique	the	Constitution	for	neglecting	the	campesino	population	and	for	preserving	the	property	regime	that	benefits	elites	(see	above).	Similarly,	Law	70	on	 Afro	 rights	 “provoked	 fierce	 opposition	 among	 the	 most	 conservative	 sectors	 of	landholders”,	but	is	also	slated	by	activists	and	scholars	for	its	inadequacies	(Grajales,	2013,	p.	 223;	 see	 also:	 Ballvé,	 2013;	 Ó	 Loingsigh,	 2013).	 Finally,	 while	 many	 point	 to	 the	shortcomings	of	Law	160,	which	failed	to	halt	-let	alone	reverse-	land	concentration;	some	complain	that	the	law	“is	an	obstacle	to	commercial	agriculture”,	precisely	because	of	the	rules	designed	to	prevent	accumulation	(Hommes,	2013;	see	also:	Portafolio,	2013a).			
The	titling	of	State	lands	under	Law	160:	a	reformed	privatisation	process	The	new	agrarian	law	of	1994	strengthened	the	rules	surrounding	baldío	privatisation	and	restrictions	on	properties	that	derive	from	titles	granted	over	these	State	lands.	In	theory	and	on	 the	whole,	 these	 rules	 favour	 the	 campesino	 population.	However,	 Law	160	also	contains	clauses	that	enable	dispossession	and	property	accumulation.	Furthermore,	even	the	 progressive	 norms	 contained	 in	 the	 legislation	 failed	 to	 prevent	 further	 land	concentration	(achieved	through	purchase	and	usurpation)	in	practice.		Article	1	(point	9)	states	explicitly	that	“peasants	with	scarce	resources”	should	have	“preferential”	access	to	titles	over	State	lands	(Congreso	de	la	República	de	Colombia,	1994).	More	specifically,	the	law	prohibits	granting	titles	to	persons	or	entities	that	already	own	or	possess	 other	 rural	 land,	 and/or	 that	 have	 a	 “net	 patrimony	 superior	 to	 one	 thousand	minimum	 monthly	 salaries”	 and	 proclaims	 that	 titling	 resolutions	 that	 violate	 these	prohibitions	should	be	considered	null	and	void	(Articles	71	and	72).		
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Law	160	also	affirms	that	property	rights	over	baldíos	can	only	be	acquired	through	a	 title	 granted	by	 the	 State.	 For	 legal	 purposes,	 occupants	 of	baldíos	are	not	 considered	‘possessors’	and	thus	have	no	lawful	claim	to	the	land	in	question,	only	a	“mere	expectation”	that	they	will	be	granted	formal	title	in	future	(Article	65).	In	other	words,	the	law	effectively	declared	baldío	 lands	 ‘imprescriptible’	 (Corte	Constitucional,	2016b,	paragraph	22).	This	rule	 is	best	understood	 in	contrast	with	 the	Civil	Code,	which	allows	private	 lands	 to	be	acquired	through	prescription;	i.e.	under	certain	conditions	a	person	may	obtain	rights	over	land	that	he	or	she	has	possessed	for	a	particular	amount	of	time	-		e.g.	Law	791	of	2002	establishes	a	period	of	more	than	5	years	(Peña	Huertas	et	al.,	2014,	p.	137).	On	the	one	hand,	this	rule	(declaring	baldío	lands	‘imprescriptible’)	is	antithetical	to	popular	 or	 common-sense	 notions	 of	 ownership.	 Consider	 the	 following	 quote	 from	Steinbeck’s	(1939)	Grapes	of	Wrath:	“it’s	our	land.	We	measured	it	and	broke	it	up.	We	were	born	on	it,	and	we	got	killed	on	it,	died	on	it.	[…]	That	makes	ownership,	not	a	paper	with	numbers	on	it”	(pp.	32-33).	People	across	Colombia	express	a	similar	view:	they	own	the	land,	even	if	they	don’t	have	a	title	to	prove	it.	But	Law	160	denies	peasant	settlers	automatic	or	implicit	legal	rights	over	the	State	lands	they	cleared	and	tilled,	lands	they	call	home.	The	government	can	reject	their	titling	applications	and	allocate	the	land	to	someone	else.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 rule	 theoretically	 also	 prevents	 elites	 from	 accumulating	property	rights	over	baldío	 lands,	as	they	have	done	historically.	According	to	Peña	et	al.	(2014),	even	in	the	contemporary	context,	“coalitions	of	usurpers	[…]	take	advantage	of	the	norm”	in	the	Civil	Code,	which	allows	for	acquisition	of	private	lands	by	prescription;	the	“dynamics	of	the	war	turned	prescription	into	[something]	that	plays	against	the	[general]	population”	 (p.	 137).	 So,	 the	 exemption	 of	 State	 lands	 from	 acquisition	 by	 prescription	creates	a	barrier	to	dispossession.	Moreover,	 Law	160	 imposed	 relatively	 strict	 land	 size	 ceilings:	 “as	 a	 general	 rule”	
baldío	titles	should	conform	to	the	Agricultural	Family	Unit	or	Unidad	Agrícola	Familiar	-	UAF	(Articles	66	and	67).	Law	135	of	1961	first	introduced	the	UAF	concept:	parcels	of	land	should	 be	 large	 enough	 to	 guarantee	 an	 adequate	 family	 income,	 but	 not	 so	 large	 that	production	 consistently	 requires	 hired	 workers,	 i.e.	 labour	 beyond	 that	 which	 can	 be	supplied	by	the	family	(Congreso	de	la	República	de	Colombia,	1961,	Article	50).	However,	this	earlier	legislation	simply	stated	that	INCORA	should	‘preferably	try’	to	ensure	that	the	lands	it	assigns	correspond	with	the	UAF	and	established	a	general	ceiling	for	titling	of	450	ha	with	 exceptions.	 Under	 Law	 160,	 in	 contrast,	 new	 titles	 should	 be	 no	 larger	 and	 no	smaller	than	the	UAF	established	for	each	zone	or	region,	which	varies	according	to	factors	
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such	as	access	to	infrastructure,	water	availability,	soil	quality,	etcetera.	This	considerably	reduced	 the	 land	 ceiling	 in	 most	 areas.	 For	 example,	 even	 in	 Putumayo,	 where	infrastructure	 and	 soil	 quality	 is	 poor,	 the	UAF	 is	 70	 to	90	ha	 (INCODER,	2008)	 -	much	smaller	than	the	previous	450	ha.		 The	UAF	rules	are	supposed	to	delimit	initial	titling	and	prevent	future	concentration	and	fragmentation.	Article	72	orders	that	“no	person	shall	acquire	property	over	terrains	originally	adjudicated	as	baldíos	if	the	extensions	exceed	the	maximum	limit	for	titling	[…	i.e.]	 the	 Agricultural	 Family	 Unit	 in	 the	 respective	municipality	 or	 region”	 (Law	 160	 of	1994).	And	that	“any	acts	or	contracts”	that	lead	a	single	entity	to	“consolidate	property”	over	more	than	one	UAF	will	be	annulled.	To	reiterate:	the	law	forbids	a	single	individual	or	company	from	accumulating	lands	that	were	originally	titled	as	baldíos	beyond	one	UAF90	(this	reinforced	and	clarified	a	norm	already	established	in	Law	30	of	1988).		Law	160	essentially	consolidated	a	different	regulatory	framework	for	lands	titled	by	the	reform	agency.	Restrictions	also	apply	to	private	lands	that	were	acquired	by	INCORA	and	 redistributed	 to	 reform	 beneficiaries	 (i.e.	 in	 addition	 to	 lands	 titled	 as	 baldíos)91.	Informally,	people	even	speak	of	‘INCORA-ised	lands’	or	tierras	incoradas.	As	Restrepo	and	Morales	(2014)	explain:	“lands	granted	by	the	State	within	the	framework	of	the	agrarian	reform	 processes	 [are	 supposed	 to]	 remain	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 those	reforms	 […]	 guaranteeing	 a	 circular	 market	 system	 that	 impedes,	 in	 theory,	 the	accumulation	[…	of	these	lands]	by	large	investors”	(p.	94).	As	discussed	below,	the	central	government	has	been	attempting	to	dismantle	UAF	regulations,	with	the	aim	of	legalising	land	concentration	that	already	occurred	and	to	facilitate	future	agroindustrial	projects.	It	should	be	said	that	Law	160	itself	contemplates	exceptions	to	the	UAF	land	ceilings.	Article	 82	 states	 that	 INCORA	 may	 create	 “Business	 Development	 Zones”	 and	 entities	“recognised	by	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	as	specialist	companies	within	the	agricultural	sector”	can	request	titles	over	baldíos	(in	extensions	determined	by	the	institute’s	Board	of	
                                                        90	 Some	 claim	 this	 prohibition	 only	 applies	 to	 lands	 titled	 after	 Law	 160	 came	 into	 force.	 But	according	to	the	Comptroller’s	Office,	this	interpretation	of	the	law	is	erroneous	(Contraloría,	2013,	pp.	93–100).	Article	40	refers	explicitly	to	parcels	granted	before	1994	and	proclaims	that	“in	no	case	may	a	single	titleholder	[…]	exercise	dominion,	possession	or	tenancy	in	any	form	over	more	than	one	Agricultural	Family	Unit”.	 In	 any	 case,	 a	 similar	prohibition	was	asserted	 in	Law	30	of	1988	(Article	13),	which	modified	the	1961	agrarian	legislation.	91	Among	other	things,	the	Law	(Articles	39	and	40)	establishes	that	-for	15	years	after	the	date	of	the	 titling	 resolution-	 land	 rights	 (property,	 possession,	 tenancy)	 over	 such	 plots	 may	 only	 be	transferred	to	“landless	or	land	poor	peasants	of	scarce	resources”	and	that	even	these	transactions	require	“express	authorisation”	from	INCORA.	
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Directors)	within	these	zones.	As	of	2013,	no	Business	Development	Zones	had	been	created	and	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge	none	have	been	established	since.	However,	certain	lobby	groups	and	individuals	have	been	pressuring	the	government	to	put	this	norm	to	use	(see	e.g.	Hommes,	2013;	Portafolio,	2013a).	And	the	Rural	Social	and	Economic	Development	Interest	Zones	(ZIDRES),	discussed	below,	are	in	essence	very	similar.			 Finally,	Law	160	permits,	 and	 in	some	cases	orders,	 the	exclusion	of	 certain	areas	from	titling.	This	allows	the	State	to	‘reserve’	areas	for	mining	and	oil	investments	and	hence	is	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 dispossessing	 campesinos	 who	 occupy	 baldíos	 coveted	 by	 these	extractive	 industries.	 Other	 exclusions	 are	 supposed	 to	 protect	 campesinos	 from	dispossession;	for	example,	the	Law	prohibits	the	enclosure	of	communal	floodplains	and	similar	 land	 areas,	 which	 may	 only	 be	 used	 for	 subsistence	 purposes	 and	 cannot	 be	privatised	(Article	69).		 Sadly,	many	of	the	pro-campesino	elements	of	Law	160	were	 ‘dead	letter’.	 INCORA	and	-later-	INCODER	officials	granted	titles	to	countless	individuals	who	were	not	peasants	of	 scarce	 resources	 and/or	who	already	owned	other	 land	–	occasionally	 for	 extensions	beyond	the	established	UAF	(i.e.	 the	 land	ceiling	rule	was	breached	 in	 the	 initial	 titling).	Many	notaries	and	land	registry	functionaries	also	allowed	for	the	continuous	violation	of	the	norms	in	Law	160,	in	particular	those	designed	to	prevent	the	accumulation	of	former	State	 lands.	 Judges	 even	 passed	 sentences	 permitting	 individuals	 to	 acquire	 baldíos	 via	prescription,	 despite	 the	 law	 declaring	 them	 ‘imprescriptible’	 (Contraloría,	 2013;	 El	Tiempo,	2013a,	2015a);	an	estimated	672,000	ha	of	State	lands	were	privatised	in	this	way	(Semana	Sostenible,	2018).	Overall,	according	to	the	then	Superintendent	of	Notaries	and	Registries,	 70%	 of	 titles	 originating	 in	 State	 land	 grants	 “are	 no	 longer	 in	 the	 hands	 of	
campesinos”	(cited	in:	El	Tiempo,	2015a).		 Peña	et	 al.	 (2014)	 argue	 that	 “legislation	 from	1991	 to	2010	 is	not	based	on	 land	distribution	[…	and	that]	it	promotes	or	allows	concentration	of	land	ownership”.	As	such,	they	 contend,	 unequal	 land	 distribution	 in	 Colombia	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 “improper	application	 of	 rural	 property	 regulations”	 (Peña	 Huertas	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 p.	 124).	 There	 is,	without	 doubt,	 truth	 to	 their	 assertions.	 Nevertheless,	 as	 the	 paragraphs	 above	demonstrate,	Colombian	law	does	include	norms	designed	to	favour	campesinos.	So,	while	‘improper	 application’	 of	 these	 rules	 alone	 cannot	 account	 for	 Colombia’s	 unequal	 land	regime,	the	failure	to	enforce	certain	laws	and/or	the	resolve	to	violate	or	circumvent	them,	is	an	important	part	of	the	story.	
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It	 is	worth	highlighting	 that	 a	 significant	portion	of	 the	 land	usurped	or	procured	opportunistically	during	and	in	the	aftermath	of	violence	were	State	lands	or	lands	granted	to	 campesinos	 by	 the	 reform	 institute	 through	 the	 titling	 or	 redistribution	 program.	 As	revealed	 in	 this	 subsection,	 on	 the	whole,	 Colombian	 law	 inhibits	 elites	 from	 acquiring	and/or	 accumulating	 these	 lands.	 So,	 the	norms	discussed	 above	 should	have	 prevented	wealthy	 individuals	 and	 businesses	 from	 benefitting	 from	 the	 dispossession	 and	displacement	of	campesinos	who	occupied	or	owned	certain	types	of	land.	That	they	failed	to	 do	 so	 should	not	 be	 attributed	 to	 institutional	 breakdown;	 rather,	 it	 reflects	 unequal	power	relations	and	a	specific	development	 ideology,	which	 influence	 the	 interpretation	and	implementation	of	the	law,	as	shown	below	and	in	the	subsequent	chapter.			
5)	The	agroindustrial	development	model	and	legislative	counter-reform	offensive	The	first	decade	of	the	new	century	brought	renewed	attention	to	agriculture,	which	after	a	period	 of	 relative	 relegation	 once	 again	 came	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 pivotal	 to	 the	 country’s	development.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 the	 Colombian	 government	 continued	 to	 provide	subsidies	 and	 support	 for	 (especially	 large-scale)	 commercial	 farming	 after	 economic	liberalisation.	However,	the	rise	in	global	commodity	prices	from	2006	invigorated	interest	in	promoting	the	sector.	This	section	focuses	on	policies	and	legislation	that	complement	the	land	grabs	executed	by	paramilitaries	and	their	backers,	as	well	as	opportunistic	and	predatory	acquisitions	that	occurred	during	and	in	the	aftermath	of	violence.		The	section	discusses,	in	particular,	how	successive	administrations	since	2007	have	attempted	to	quash	rules	 intended	to	 limit	 land	concentration	and	ensure	access	 for	 the	
campesino	population.	On	the	one	hand,	these	changes	(most	likely	will	or	already	do)	allow	past	infringements	of	the	law	to	be	forgiven	and	forgotten,	preventing	the	recovery	of	lands	acquired	or	accumulated	unlawfully	(note:	this	is	not	the	same	as	legalising	dispossession).	Recall	 that	Law	160	of	1994	expressly	 states	 that	 titling	 resolutions	 that	breach	 certain	norms	may	be	annulled,	as	well	as	contracts/transfers	that	violate	UAF	rules.	It	 is	worth	noting	 that	while	not	all	people	and	companies	who	broke	 these	 rules	were	 involved	 in	violent	 land	 grabs,	 many	 benefitted	 from	 the	 conflict	 context	 indirectly;	 conversely,	countless	 usurpers,	 I	 would	 wager	 the	 majority,	 infringed	 these	 same	 norms,	 so	 these	(counter)reforms	equate	to	removing	an	obstacle	to	the	legalisation	of	dispossession.	On	the	other	hand,	these	changes	facilitate	future	large-scale	agricultural	projects	on	what	were	supposed	to	be	‘reform	lands’.	
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So,	the	government	has	been	unable	and	unwilling	to	enforce	its	land	laws	and	is	now	seeking	 to	 ‘forgive	 and	 forget’	 historical	 legal	 violations	 by	 elite	 groups,	 as	 it	 has	 done	historically.	This	might	create	the	 impression	that	Colombia	suffers	 from	a	 ‘weak	rule	of	law’.	However,	the	fact	that	so	many	investors	and	companies	used	complex	strategies	to	evade	legal	restrictions	or	to	disguise	these	violations	provides	evidence	to	the	contrary.	If	the	rule	of	law	really	were	that	weak,	arguably	they	wouldn’t	have	expended	resources	in	strategic	 evasion	 and	 concealment.	 Furthermore,	 different	 State	 entities	 and	representatives	 disagree	 over	 how	 the	 law	 should	 be	 interpreted;	 some	 of	 these	interpretations	would	conveniently	eliminate	the	idea	that	there	was	a	legal	violation	in	the	first	place,	so	that	the	proposed	‘forgive	and	forget’	policies	appear	to	uphold	rather	than	violate	 rule	 of	 law	 principles.	 Thus,	 in	 addition	 to	 further	 contextualising	 recent	dispossession	in	the	broader	political	economy,	this	section	supports	the	idea	(discussed	in	Chapter	 2)	 that	 the	 legal	 realm	 is	 itself	 an	 arena	 of	 struggle	 and	 conflict	 (consider,	 for	example,	the	Comptroller’s	critical	position	vis-à-vis	the	Santos	administrations’	actions	and	discourse,	or	the	defeat	of	certain	initiatives	via	appeals	to	the	Constitutional	Court)	and	problematises	the	rule	of	law	concept.		
The	Uribe	administrations’	agrarian	legacy:	subsidies	for	the	elite	and	INCODER	In	 2006	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 and	 Rural	 Development	 launched	 a	 15-year	 plan	(Apuesta	Exportadora	Agropecuaria)	 to	 encourage	 ‘competitive	 specialisation’	 and	boost	agro-exports.	The	plan	focuses	on	ten	groups	of	products	deemed	to	have	‘export	potential’	(e.g.	 biofuels,	 beef,	 special	 coffees	 and	 tropical	 fruits).	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 increase	 the	 area	dedicated	to	the	production	of	exportable	goods	from	1.9	to	4.4	million	hectares	and	double	export	 volumes	 by	 2020.	 The	 document	 includes	 a	 commitment	 to	 increase	 direct	 and	indirect	subsidies	to	this	end	(MADR,	2006,	pp.	3–13;	El	Tiempo,	2006a).	The	beneficiaries	of	the	State’s	agricultural	programs	have	included	politicians,	domestic	firms	controlled	by	billionaire	 bankers,	 foreign	 investors,	 multinational	 companies,	 narcotraffickers	 and	enterprises	established	by	paramilitaries	on	stolen	lands	(Contraloría,	2013,	pp.	110–143;	Robledo,	2009;	CIJP,	2005).		A	year	after	 the	 launch	of	 this	plan,	 the	Uribe	administration	passed	 the	 infamous	Rural	Statute	(Law	1152	of	2007),	which	basically	“guaranteed	land	access	for	the	business	sector	at	the	cost	of	the	peasantry”	(L.	R.	Sánchez,	2010,	p.	4).	Among	many	other	things,	the	Statute	would	have	effectively	withdrawn	the	UAF	land	ceilings	described	above.	The	law	
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was	declared	unconstitutional	in	March	2009	on	the	grounds	that	the	government	failed	to	consult	with	 indigenous	and	Afro	communities.	But	domestic	and	foreign	 investors	alike	continued	lobbying	for	a	‘solution’	to	the	UAF	‘problem’.	Just	months	after	the	repeal	of	the	Rural	Statute,	 the	government	was	formulating	new	legislation	to	eliminate	these	rules	 -	blamed	for	deterring	international	investment	in	the	agricultural	sector	(Portafolio,	2009a).		The	 Rural	 Statute	 was	 in	 keeping	 with	 earlier	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	 Uribe	government,	including	the	liquidation	of	INCORA	in	2003.	The	stated	aim	was	to	improve	administrative	 efficiency;	 INCODER	 (the	 Colombian	 Institute	 for	 Rural	 Development)	assumed	the	responsibilities	previously	assigned	to	INCORA.	Nevertheless,	even	the	name	of	the	new	institute	(the	term	‘rural	development’	replaced	‘agrarian	reform’)	hinted	that	there	was	more	to	the	decision.	The	Attorney	General	at	the	time	noted:	“the	message	that	seems	to	underlie	the	decision	[to	eliminate	INCORA]	is	the	indefinite	postponement	of	the	primary	aim	of	 implementing	a	genuine	and	 just	agrarian	reform	in	Colombia”	(cited	 in:	Thomson,	2011,	p.	345).	This	seems	to	be	confirmed	by	redistribution	figures,	which	were	much	 lower	 during	 INCODER’s	 reign	 compared	 to	 that	 of	 its	 predecessor	 INCORA	(Contraloría,	2013,	pp.	48–49;	see	also:	C.	Vargas	et	al.,	2016).	INCODER	went	on	to	become	one	of	the	most	corrupt	entities	within	the	Colombian	government.	In	the	words	of	the	ex-Minister	 of	 Agriculture	 and	 a	 former	 employee	 of	 the	 same	 ministry:	 “for	 many	 years	[INCODER]	was	practically	co-opted	by	dark	interests	and	by	paramilitary	forces”	(Morales	&	Restrepo,	2014,	p.	76).	(A	more	accurate	rendering	of	the	‘co-optation’	of	INCODER	would	also	refer	to	the	role	of	rural	elites.)	This	was	apparently	“the	principal	factor”	behind	the	liquidation	of	INCODER	in	December	2015	(Semana	Sostenible,	2016b);	the	institute	was	replaced	by	the	National	Land	Agency	(ANT)	and	the	Rural	Development	Agency	(ADR).		
The	Santos	administrations:	the	persistent	attack	on	UAF	rules	in	favour	of	agroindustry	In	many	ways,	the	Santos	administration’s	(2010-2018)	agricultural	and	land	policies	had	much	 in	 common	 with	 those	 promoted	 during	 the	 Uribe	 presidency.	 The	 2010-2014	National	Development	Plan	referred	directly	to	the	global	rise	in	agricultural	commodity	prices	 as	 an	 important	 “opportunity”	 for	 Colombia	 and	 declared	 agriculture	 one	 of	 the	country’s	main	“engines	of	growth”,	alongside	mining	and	energy,	housing,	transport	and	infrastructure	(DNP,	2011a,	pp.	65–66).	The	Santos	government	also	attempted	to	change	legislation	(with	some	success),	in	particular	UAF	rules,	in	order	to	“promote	efficient	land	use”	and	“facilitate	private	investment	in	agroindustrial	projects”	(DNP,	2011a,	p.	240).	
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Law	1450	of	2011	(underwriting	the	2010-2014	National	Development	Plan)	added	two	new	articles	to	the	1994	agrarian	legislation.	Article	72a	allowed	the	government	to	“authorise”	transactions	that	contravene	UAF	land	ceiling	rules.	Article	72b	clarified	that	any	 project	 requiring	 a	 land	 area	 exceeding	 10	 UAFs	would	 require	 permission	 from	 a	special	 government	 commission,	while	 the	 accumulation	 of	 10	UAFs	 or	 less	would	 “not	require	authorisation	or	approval”	(Congreso	de	la	República	de	Colombia,	2011b,	pp.	21–22).	 Dissident	 politicians	 lodged	 an	 appeal	 before	 the	 Constitutional	 Court,	 which	overturned	 the	 cited	 articles	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 they	 neglected	 “the	 constitutional	mandate”	to	promote	“workers’	access	to	rural	property”	and	that	the	“regressive	measures	were	not	accompanied	by	sufficient	justification”	(Corte	Constitucional,	2012).	The	Court’s	ruling	didn’t	break	the	government’s	resolve.		The	Santos	administration	was	already	working	on	another	law	(dated	2012),	which	aimed	 to	 provide	 “juridical	 and	 economic	 security	 for	 investments	 in	 the	 Colombian	countryside”	(cited	in:	Contraloría,	2013,	p.	100).	The	proposed	law	contained	a	long	list	of	amendments	 to	 existing	 legislation,	 including	 an	 article	 that	 would	 have	 legalised	 the	accumulation	of	 State	 lands	 titled	prior	 to	1994	 (Contraloría,	2013,	p.	104).	Overall,	 the	various	changes	put	forward	amounted	to	an	“elimination	of	the	UAF	as	a	 legal	concept”	(Contraloría,	2013,	p.	101).	This	specific	proposal	was	eventually	withdrawn;	nevertheless,	much	of	its	contents	reappeared	in	later	legislation.	According	 to	a	 report	published	by	 the	Comptroller’s	Office,	Decree	1465	of	2013,	which	is	meant	to	clarify	and	regulate	the	contents	of	Law	160	of	1994,	actually	introduces	“confusions	 and	 ruptures”	 in	 Colombian	 land	 legislation.	 The	 Decree	 could	 be	 used	 to	“forgive	and	forget”	historical	 legal	violations,	such	as	titling	 in	excess	of	 the	established	ceilings	or	in	favour	of	persons	who	were	not	eligible	reform	beneficiaries,	as	well	as	the	acquisition	 of	 State	 lands	 via	 prescription.	 It	 also	 seems	 to	 pardon	 the	 accumulation	 of	former	State	lands	titled	prior	to	1994	(Contraloría,	2013,	pp.	93–100).	The	Comptroller’s	Office	 concludes	 that	 the	 Decree	 poses	 an	 obstacle	 to	 “the	 process	 of	 rural	 land	democratisation	ordered	in	the	Constitution”	(p.	99).		Meanwhile,	a	handful	of	government	functionaries	started	publicising	the	idea	that	the	accumulation	of	lands	with	baldío	origins	is	only	unlawful	if	the	title	and	land	register	for	the	property	in	question	contain	explicit	reference	to	the	UAF	restrictions	(Bermúdez	Liévano,	2013).	The	relevant	authorities	often	failed	to	make	these	annotations,	meaning	such	an	interpretation	of	the	law	would	absolve	almost	all	individuals	and	companies	that	violated	UAF	rules	(Molano	Jimeno	&	Medina,	2017),	even	if	they	knew	about	them.		
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A	 few	years	 later,	 the	Santos	administration	secured	yet	another	victory	 for	 large-scale	 agribusiness:	 Law	 1776	 of	 2016	 or	 the	 ZIDRES	 (Rural	 Social	 and	 Economic	Development	Interest	Zones)	legislation.	The	stated	objective	is	to	promote	“a	new	model	of	 economic	development”	 in	 territories	 “far	 from	urban	 centres,	with	 a	 low	population	density	and	limited	infrastructure	[…	that]	require	large	investments	to	become	productive”	(Congreso	de	 la	República	de	Colombia,	2016).	The	 law	allows	 the	government	 to	grant	investors	 use	 rights	 over	 baldíos	 in	 areas	 designated	 as	 ZIDRES	 (as	 well	 as	 special	incentives/stimulus	packages)	on	the	condition	that	the	proposed	“productive	project	[…]	integrate[s]	 small	 and	medium	 producers	 as	 associates”	 (Article	 7	 and	 Article	 13).	 The	interested	investor	may	either	enlist	campesinos	who	already	own	a	parcel	in	the	area	or	must	“guarantee”	that	associates	will	“acquire	a	certain	percentage	of	land”	(Article	7).	The	law	does	not	define	the	‘integration	of	small	and	medium	producers’;	apparently	this	may	involve	anything	from	out-grower	schemes	to	smallholders	renting	out	land	to	the	investor.		The	 idea	 behind	 the	 ZIDRES	 legislation	 is	 not	 new.	 The	 government	 has	 been	promoting	this	‘model	of	development’	since	at	least	the	1990s	(Molano	Bravo,	2013,	p.	48),	offering	 special	 incentives	 -such	as	discounted	 loans	and	grants-	 to	 investors	who	draw	smallholders	into	their	business	plans.	These	‘associative	projects’	used	to	be	referred	to	as	‘strategic	 alliances’;	 the	 government	 perhaps	 opted	 for	 a	 new	 label	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	disassociate	 the	 ZIDRES	 scheme	 from	 past	 scandals,	 of	 which	 just	 two	 examples	 are	included	 here.	 In	 the	 Urabá	 region,	 paramilitaries	 and	 their	 partners	 used	 the	 strategic	alliance	model	to	‘launder’	usurped	land	in	the	Tulapas	area	and	in	an	attempt	to	legalise	the	 violent	 occupation	of	 collective	 territories	 in	Chocó	 (Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	 2014;	Ballvé,	2013;	Verdad	Abierta,	2011c).	Opposition	 senator	 Jorge	 Enrique	 Robledo	 labelled	 the	 ZIDRES	 legislation	 the	“Urrutia-Lizarralde	Law”	after	Ruben	Darı́o	Lizarralde	-	the	Minister	of	Agriculture	between	2013	 and	 2014	 and	 Carlos	 Urrutia	 -	 Ambassador	 to	 the	 USA	 between	 2012	 and	 2013.	Urrutia’s	 legal	 firm	aided	the	evasion	of	the	UAF	rules	(see	below),	while	Lizarralde	was	party	 to	UAF	 violations	 during	 his	 time	 as	manager	 of	 the	 firm	 Indupalma92.	 Lizarralde	
                                                        92	A	report	by	the	Comptroller’s	Office	confirms	that	Indupalma	accumulated	control	over	various	properties	in	Vichada	originating	in	baldío	titles.	The	report	describes	how	the	firm	Agroindustriales	El	Palmar,	of	which	Lizarralde	was	also	manager,	acquired	a	property	in	Vichada	just	months	after	the	original	title	was	granted.	It	also	notes	that	applications	had	been	filed	for	titles	over	the	lands	surrounding	this	same	property.	In	this	context,	the	Comptroller’s	Office	reiterates	that	INCODER	has	a	duty	to	verify	that	titling	resolutions	and	any	future	transactions	 involving	these	 lands	“comply	with	the	mandate	established	in	Law	160	of	1994”	(Contraloría,	2013,	pp.	139–140).	
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himself	“invited”	friends	and	family	to	participate	in	Indupalma’s	investments	in	Vichada	by	acquiring	 lands	 (no	more	 than	one	UAF	each)	 that	 could	 then	be	used	by	 the	 company,	allegedly	without	 breaching	 the	 law	 (Semana,	 2013).	 It	 is	 conceivable	 that	 Indupalma’s	‘associates’	 in	Vichada	will	 be	 labelled	 ‘medium	producers’,	 allowing	 them	 to	 access	 the	benefits	of	the	ZIDRES	scheme.		 As	of	2017,	the	government	was	working	towards	yet	another	piece	of	legislation.	A	draft	 version	of	 the	document	 contemplates	 various	mechanisms	 that	would	 extend	 the	‘forgive	and	forget’	policy	to	all	persons	and	companies	that	accumulated	lands	originating	in	the	State	titling	program.	It	also	proposes	to	authorise	the	use	of	baldíos	for	investment	projects	(beyond	ZIDRES)	that	incorporate	reform	beneficiaries	as	‘associates’	or	so	long	as	‘land	 access’	 is	 first	 ‘guaranteed’	 for	 ‘vulnerable’	 groups.	 Some	 37	 NGOs	 and	 social	movements	 signed	 a	 declaration	 rejecting	 the	 planned	 changes	 (Medina,	 2017a,	 2017b;	Molano	Jimeno	&	Medina,	2017).			 Three	final	points	deserve	consideration.	First,	UAF	regulations	only	apply	to	lands	granted	through	the	reform	program.	There	is	no	law	to	prevent	investors	from	buying	up	other	 lands,	 most	 of	 which	 is	 already	 concentrated	 into	 large	 properties.	 The	 issue,	 as	explained	 by	Mondragón	 (2012),	 is	 that	 these	 large	 properties	 are	 expensive	 (p.	 6).	 In	contrast,	much	 of	 the	 land	 originating	 in	 the	 reform	 program	 can	 be	 acquired	 cheaply,	especially	 in	areas	desolated	by	the	armed	conflict.	So,	 it’s	“not	that	national	and	foreign	investors	can’t	buy	 land”	elsewhere,	but	rather	 that	 they	“don’t	want	 to	pay	commercial	prices”	(Mondragón,	2012,	pp.	6–7).			 Second,	the	UAF	rules	are	in	no	way	a	hindrance	to	contract	farming	or	other	types	of	‘associations’	between	investors	and	landholders	whose	properties	originate	in	State	titling	or	redistribution	programs	-	so	long	as	this	doesn’t	involve	property	concentration.	In	short:	the	‘associative	model’	the	government	claims	to	defend	does	not	require	the	elimination	of	existing	 land	 ceilings.	 Fuerte	 and	 Tacha	 (2016)	 argue	 that	 the	 emphasis	 on	 ‘associative	projects’	 is	 part	 of	 the	 government’s	 endeavour	 to	 “refine	 its	 juridical	 technique	 […]	 to	ensure	the	[ZIDRES]	law	would	pass	the	test	of	constitutionality”	(p.	25).	The	fact	that	many	so-called	 associates	 are	 not	 campesinos,	 nor	 even	 medium	 producers,	 does	 not	 inspire	confidence.	Poligrow’s	operations	in	Meta	are	illustrative	in	this	regard.	The	firm	essentially	formed	an	alliance	with	 itself:	 in	2010,	Carlo	Vigna	Taglianti,	 the	 legal	 representative	of	Poligrow	Colombia	Ltd,	signed	a	‘productive	strategic	alliance	agreement’	with	Carlo	Vigna	Taglianti,	 the	 legal	 representative	 of	 Ita	 Aceites	 Vegetales	 SAS	 -	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	‘farmer’	(CIJP,	2015a,	pp.	36–40;	additional	examples	in:	Molano	Bravo,	2013,	p.	48).		
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Finally,	even	if	the	focus	on	the	associative	model	is	more	than	just	a	smokescreen,	this	 ‘development’	strategy,	and	the	 idea	 that	 the	campesino	populations’	access	 to	State	lands	 will	 be	 dependent	 on	 joining	 such	 schemes,	 is	 itself	 extremely	 controversial.	 In	Colombia,	‘productive	alliances’	-genuinely	involving	campesinos-	often	transfer	all	business	risks	 to	 the	 smallholders	 (Molano	 Bravo,	 2013,	 p.	 54;	 CIJP,	 2015a,	 p.	 36;	 for	 additional	critique,	see:	Grupo	Semillas,	2016;	Ortiz	Soto,	2014).	The	‘associative	model’	may	refer	to	diverse	 arrangements;	 some	 of	 which	 are	 designed	 to	 lock	 smallholder	 associates	 into	extremely	 exploitative	 relations	 and	 some	 of	 which	 may	 permit	 commercially-oriented	farmers	 to	 benefit.	 This	 model	 certainly	 isn’t	 panacea;	 as	 the	 Colombian	 government	suggests.	The	outcomes	depend	on	multiple	factors,	as	shown	by	research	on	experiences	in	other	countries	(see	e.g.	Li,	2011;	Vicol,	2017).		
Agroindustrial	development	and	land	accumulation	in	the	altillanura	region			The	eastern	altillanura	-encompassing	the	department	of	Vichada,	plus	parts	of	Meta	and	Casanare-	 has	 become	 the	main	 testing	 ground	 for	 Colombia’s	 globalised	 agroindustrial	development	and	hence	is	an	illustrative	case.	The	government	aspires	to	convert	the	region	into	a	hub	of	“21st	century	agriculture”,	closely	following	the	model	applied	in	the	Brazilian	
cerrado,	which	is	said	to	have	made	the	country	an	“agricultural	power”	(Semana,	2010).	The	idea	surfaced	in	the	early	2000s	(see	e.g.	FENAVI,	2003;	El	Tiempo,	2003).	Henceforth,	the	 central	 government	 started	 concocting	 various	 development	 plans	 for	 the	 region	(OXFAM,	2016,	p.	10).	By	the	end	of	the	decade,	politicians,	businessmen	and	Colombian	newspapers	 were	 relishing	 in	 the	 idea	 that	 Colombia	 could	 soon	 have	 its	 own	 cerrado	‘miracle’	(Portafolio,	2009b;	Semana,	2010).			 These	 development	 plans	 and	 corresponding	 investor	 expectations	 spurred	 a	regional	land	rush.	Between	2004	and	2010,	the	INCODER	granted	titles	for	approximately	1	million	hectares	of	baldío	lands	in	Meta	and	Vichada	(Arias	Castillo,	2013,	p.	5);	as	of	2016,	these	titling	resolutions	were	being	revised	as	part	of	an	 investigation	into	 irregularities	committed	 by	 INCODER	 functionaries	 in	 the	 region	 (González	 Posso,	 2016,	 p.	 20).	 In	Vichada	alone,	2,953	plots	(many	of	them	newly	titled)	changed	hands	between	2008	and	2011	(El	Tiempo,	2011a).	Dozens	of	land	transactions	examined	in	a	report	by	Comptroller’s	Office	reveal	massive	price	increases,	in	some	cases	of	more	than	2000%,	in	a	few	years	or	even	months	(Contraloría,	2013;	see	e.g.	pp.	121	and	130).		
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	 The	 Fazenda	 enterprise,	 apparently	 named	 in	 honour	 of	 Brazilian	 agroindustry	(fazenda	means	plantation	in	Portuguese),	was	one	of	the	first	mega-projects	in	the	region.	It	was	established	around	2003	by	the	domestic	business	group	Aliar.	Fazenda	controls	over	10,000	hectares	of	soy	and	maize	and	combines	practically	all	components	of	pig	farming	within	 a	 single	 complex:	 from	 the	 production	 and	 processing	 of	 the	 animal	 feed,	 to	 the	rearing	and	slaughter	of	the	pigs,	and	the	processing	and	marketing	of	the	meat.	Politicians	have	praised	the	project	as	representing	a	new	‘model	of	development’	for	the	region	and	for	Colombia	(see	e.g.	Jaramillo,	2017;	Minagricultura,	2015;	Portafolio,	2008).	The	‘model’	has	 involved	 the	 violation	 or	 evasion	 of	 legislation	 designed	 to	 ensure	 campesino	 land	access,	continuing	the	scofflaw	tradition	of	elites	in	previous	eras.			 In	2013,	authorities	initiated	an	administrative	process	to	recover	16,350	hectares	controlled	by	La	Fazenda	(for	incompliance	with	UAF	norms).	These	baldío	lands	were	titled	in	the	mid-1990s	to	people	who	worked	for	the	‘emerald	tsar’	and	paramilitary	leader	Víctor	Carranza93.	They	were	then	were	acquired	by	a	company,	also	 linked	to	Carranza,	which	merged	the	plots	into	larger	estates	and	resold	to	firms	owned	by	Aliar’s	investors,	who	via	a	 complicated	 chain	 of	 transactions	 rented	 out	 the	 land	 for	 their	 Fazenda	 project	(Contraloría,	2013,	pp.	126–128;	El	Tiempo,	2013d).	It	is	unlikely	that	Fazenda	will	actually	lose	control	over	this	land;	this	is	precisely	the	type	of	case	the	legislative	changes	described	above	are	aimed	at	resolving/legalising.		 Aliar/Fazenda	 is	 one	 of	 more	 than	 a	 dozen	 companies	 listed	 in	 a	 report	 by	 the	Comptroller’s	 Office	 on	 the	 unlawful	 concentration	 of	 property	 in	 Meta,	 Vichada	 and	Casanare	 (Contraloría,	 2013).	 Most	 of	 these	 companies	 were	 clearly	 aware	 of	 the	restrictions	they	infringed;	at	least	half	created	“paper”	firms	(SAS-	‘simplified	shareholder	societies’)	in	order	to	buy	one	UAF	at	a	time;	for	example,	if	the	maximum	UAF	is	1,000	ha,	then	 25	 different	 SAS	 would	 be	 needed	 to	 accumulate	 25,000	 ha	 (Arias	 Castillo,	 2013;	Contraloría,	2013)	–	lawyers	advised	this	strategy	would	absolve	them	from	the	UAF	rules.		 In	some	cases,	the	SAS	intermediary	firms	were	sold	on	to	others	registered	outside	Colombia.	 The	 domestic	 agribusiness	 Riopaila	 SA,	 for	 example,	 created	 some	 33	 SAS	through	 which	 it	 purchased	 more	 than	 35,000	 hectares	 of	 former	 State	 lands	 in	 the	
                                                        93	 Carranza	 commanded	 his	 own	 paramilitary	 group,	 which	 was	 apparently	 responsible	 for	 the	Miraflore	massacre	 in	 1997.	 The	 ‘emerald	 tsar’	was	 famous	 for	 evading	 justice;	 he	 died	 in	 2013	without	ever	being	convicted	despite	clear	evidence	of	his	involvement	in	the	paramilitary	project	(see	the	US	National	Security	Archive	webpage	on	Carranza).	Ex-combatants	claim	the	 lands	now	controlled	by	La	Fazenda	served	as	a	paramilitary	base	and	contain	mass	graves	(El	Tiempo,	2013d).	
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altillanura.	The	shares	of	these	paper	firms	were	ceded	to	five	Spanish	holding	companies,	which	in	turn	are	owned	by	another	firm	registered	in	Luxemburg,	which	apparently	also	belongs	 to	 Riopaila.	 In	 any	 case,	 Riopaila	 officially	 acquired	 the	 SAS	 paper	 firms	 as	subsidiaries	 (Contraloría,	 2013,	 pp.	 119–122).	 As	 one	 news-article	 asks:	 why	 would	 a	Colombian	company	buy	Colombian	land	through	foreign	firms?	The	answer,	according	to	the	author,	 is	 that	by	moving	 its	capital	 in	 this	way,	Riopaila	 is	covered	by	 international	investment	treaties	that	give	access	to	dispute	settlement	mechanisms,	which	may	allow	the	company	to	sue	the	Colombian	government	in	the	instance	that	it	attempt	to	revoke	the	land	titles	(El	Espectador,	2013b).		 There	is	no	doubt	that	this	was	all	part	of	a	carefully	thought	out	strategy.	In	2013	Carlos	 Urrutia	 renounced	 his	 position	 as	 Ambassador	 of	 Colombia	 to	 the	United	 States,	following	 revelations	 that	 his	 law	 firm	 Brigard	 &	 Urrutia	 had	 provided	 legal	 advice	 to	agroindustrial	companies,	including	the	national	firm	Riopaila	(mentioned	above)	and	the	US-based	company	Cargill	(which,	according	to	the	Comptrollers’	report,	created	some	40	firms	in	order	to	acquire	39	properties	-	totalling	52,575	ha-	in	Vichada,	all	originating	in	
baldío	titling	resolutions),	helping	them	to	evade	UAF	laws	(El	Tiempo,	2013c).			 Most	of	the	companies	listed	in	the	Comptroller’s	report	seem	to	have	consolidated	control	 over	 lands	 in	 the	altillanura	 via	 voluntary	 transactions94.	Nevertheless,	 they	 are	almost	certainly	indirect	beneficiaries	of	violence	in	the	region.	Tens	of	thousands	of	people	have	been	displaced	from	or	within	the	altillanura	over	the	last	three	decades	–	in	particular	at	the	hands	of	various	paramilitary	groups.	This	displacement	facilitated	the	amassing	of	land	 (previously	 occupied	 by	 campesino	 and	 indigenous	 communities)	 by	 people	 that	controlled	or	were	allied	with	paramilitary	forces,	who	then	obtained	titles	with	the	help	of	corrupt	 officials	 (Arias	 Castillo,	 2013;	 DNP,	 2011b).	 Some	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	companies	acquired	land	from	the	paramilitaries,	their	allies	or	their	figureheads.		 Violence	 has	 been	 constant	 throughout	 the	 land	 rush.	 In	 2014,	 the	 Ombudsman’s	Office	 reiterated	 official	 “alerts”	 regarding	 the	 “forced	 displacement	 risk”	 in	 various	municipalities,	 especially	 due	 to	 homicides	 and	 threats	 attributed	 to	 The	 Liberators	 of	
                                                        94	As	far	as	I	know,	only	one	of	the	companies	listed	in	the	Comptroller’s	report	has	been	accused	of	using	violence	 to	 consolidate	 its	 land	control:	Poligrow.	According	 to	 the	 Interchurch	 Justice	and	Peace	Commission,	 the	Aljure	 family	were	“obligated”	 to	meet	with	paramilitaries	and	Poligrow’s	lawyer,	who	demanded	that	the	family	not	reclaim	the	Santa	Ana	farm	coveted	by	the	company.	A	few	days	later,	paramilitaries	forcibly	displaced	the	family	and	destroyed	their	home	(CIJP,	2015,	pp.	33–35).	The	CIJP	(2015)	report	suggests	that	occupants	of	the	Barandales	farm	were	also	displaced	by	paramilitaries	at	the	request	of	Poligrow	(p.	37).	
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Vichada.	Some	of	their	victims	reported	“facing	pressures	and/or	requests	to	sell	the	land	from	people	and	companies	interested	in	implementing	agroindustrial	and	mining	projects”	(Defensoría	del	Pueblo,	2014).	A	special	delegate	of	the	Ombudsman	notes	that	the	same	paramilitary	group	is	taking	advantage	of	disputes	over	baldíos,	“offering	its	services	with	the	 purpose	 of	 influencing	 the	 resolution	 of	 these	 controversies	 by	 promoting	 the	displacement	of	 the	 colonos	and	 consequent	 land	abandonment	via	 intimidation,	 threat,	harassment	 […	 in	 order	 to]	 appropriate	 the	 lands	 that	 have	 been	 occupied	 by	 poor	campesinos	for	years”	(cited	in:	OXFAM,	2016,	pp.	13–14).		 A	 2011	 report	 by	 the	National	 Department	 of	 Planning	 (DNP)	 describes	multiple,	historical	and	contemporary,	struggles	over	land	in	the	Altillanura.	It	comments	specifically	on	how	“extractive	activities	and	large	forestry	and	agroindustrial	projects	have	generated	disputes	over	the	territory	and	its	resources”	(DNP,	2011b,	p.	23).	Ironically,	this	report	was	expressly	written	as	“an	input	for	the	elaboration	of	the	CONPES”	(p.	3)	development	policy	underwriting	 the	corporate	 take-over	of	 the	 region.	 In	other	words,	 the	 same	document	simultaneously	promotes	exploiting	the	“productive	potential”	of	 the	Altillanura	 through	large-scale	private	investments	(DNP,	2011b,	pp.	4–14),	while	acknowledging	land	conflicts	in	the	region	and	their	links	to	such	projects.	The	situation,	according	to	the	DNP’s	report,	is	particularly	difficult	for	the	circa	40,000	indigenous	people	of	the	region.	In	addition	to	the	displacements	caused	by	armed	actors	and	clashes	with	peasant	settlers,	 it	points	to	“territorial	conflicts”	between	indigenous	groups	and			businesses	[that]	have	acquired	large	extensions	[of	land]	for	rubber	and	other	cultivations,	which	restrict	the	mobility,	given	the	nomadic	and	semi-nomadic	character	 of	 some	 groups	 [sic],	 and	 the	 development	 of	 their	 traditional	subsistence	 activities	 (fishing,	 hunting,	 collection)	 […]	 Ethnicities	 like	 the	Sikuani	 and	 Piapoco	 have	 been	 forced	 within	 a	 more	 limited	 territory	 […]	condemning	them	to	progressive	disappearance	(DNP,	2011b,	p.	26).			In	other	words,	the	government	is	actively	promoting	the	development	of	agroindustry	in	the	 Altillanura,	 in	 full	 knowledge	 that	 this	 contributes	 to	 the	 “extermination”	 of	 local	indigenous	groups.	The	final	section	of	this	chapter	focuses	on	the	oil	and	mining	sectors,	which	are	at	the	fore	of	Colombia’s	dispossession-based	development	model	and	associated	social	and	political	conflicts.	
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6)	The	oil	and	mining	industries	and	State-backed	dispossession	and	displacement	As	explained	in	section	one,	the	mining	and	energy	sectors	have	gradually	acquired	more	weight	in	the	Colombian	economy	since	the	mid-1980s	and	especially	since	the	early	2000s.	In	addition	to	oil	and	coal,	which	are	currently	the	leading	extractive	industries	in	Colombia,	extraction	and	exports	of	ferronickel	and	gold	have	also	grown.	Other	smaller	mining	sub-sectors	 include	emeralds,	 silver,	platinum	and	copper.	Coltan,	uranium	and	a	number	of	other	mineral	deposits	are	currently	under	exploration.	The	government	also	hopes	to	turn	the	 country	 into	 a	 natural	 gas	 exporter	 and	 already	 sells	 hydro-power	 to	 neighbouring	countries	 (Dinero,	 2013;	 UPME,	 2014a).	 The	 2010-2014	 National	 Development	 Plan	officially	recognised	and	declared	the	mining	and	energy	sectors	one	of	Colombia’s	main	“engines	of	growth”.	Here,	for	reasons	of	space,	I	focus	only	on	petroleum	and	mining.	Since	 the	 late	 1990s,	 successive	 governments	 have	 actively	 promoted	 mining	 in	Colombia	(see,	for	example,	the	National	Mining	Development	Plans	of	1997,	2002-2006,	2007-2010).	During	the	Uribe	administration	(2006),	the	government	launched	the	“2019	Vision”	 Mining	 Development	 Plan,	 which	 included	 aims	 such	 as	 doubling	 coal	 and	quadrupling	gold	extraction,	tripling	the	area	under	mining	contracts,	and	turning	mining	into	 one	 of	 the	 main	 sources	 of	 State	 income	 (UPME,	 2014b,	 pp.	 11–13).	 The	 Santos	administration	 reinforced	 this	 economic	 strategy:	 it	 stated	 its	 intention	 to	 “position	Colombia	as	a	mining	country	at	the	global	level”	(UPME,	2014b,	pp.	11–13)	and	is	currently	working	on	a	new	“2025	Vision”	for	the	sector.	The	government	has	also	been	promoting	investments	in	oil	exploration,	as	proven	reserves	dwindle.	It	has	campaigned	for	offshore	exploration	and	is	studying	the	possibility	of	 extending	 operations	 in	 the	 Amazon.	 It	 is	 also	 offering	 discounts	 on	 royalties,	 more	flexible	contracts,	and	other	types	of	‘stimulus’	to	attract	investment	(Celedón,	2014a;	Amat,	2015;	 Güesguan	 Serpa,	 2015;	 La	 República,	 2015);	 this	 is	 on	 top	 of	 previous	 reforms	favouring	private	investors	implemented	since	the	1990s.		It	is	worth	noting	that	the	oil	sector	accounts	for	less	than	1%	of	total	employment	in	Colombia	(UPME,	2015,	pp.	11–12)	and	the	mining	sector	another	202,000	jobs	as	of	2013	–	also	less	than	1%	(UPME,	2014b,	p.	91).	In	contrast,	agriculture	and	fishing	(put	at	risk	by	mining	and	oil	operations)	provide	for	the	livelihoods	of	at	least	7.2	million	people95.	
                                                        95	According	to	the	2014	agricultural	census,	2.7	million	producers	count	on	4.5	million	permanent	workers	(this	includes	family	labour	but	does	not	include	temporary	workers).	
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The	promotion	of	these	sectors	involves	ensuring	investors’	access	to	land	in	the	right	places	and	at	the	right	price	relative	to	the	demands	of	capital	accumulation.	Oil	and	mining	companies	 not	 only	 benefit	 from	 coercive	 land	 acquisition,	 they	 often	 require	 it.	 Many	people	 are	 unwilling	 to	 give	 up	 their	 lands	 voluntarily,	 meaning	 that	 oil	 and	 mining	companies	are	dependent	on	the	State’s	taking	powers.	In	Chapter	8,	I	discuss	actual	cases	of	dispossession	and	argue	that	‘legal’	coercive	land	acquisitions	in	Colombia	cannot	always	be	neatly	separated	from	‘illegal’	usurpations	and	displacement	in	the	conflict-context.	Here	I	 focus	 on	 the	 legal	 underpinnings	 of	 dispossession,	 which	 include:	 expropriation	 and	enforced	 easements;	 the	 eviction	 of	 people	 from	 baldíos	 and	 titling	 prohibitions	within	these	 State	 lands;	 and	 the	 imposition	 of	 oil	 and	mining	projects	 in	Afro	 and	 indigenous	territories	via	-ironically-	the	prior	consultation	process.	I	then	examine	the	government’s	attempts	to	inhibit	popular	consultations	and	municipal	regulatory	power,	which	have	been	used	to	block	oil	and	mining	operations.	This	subsection	provides	further	evidence	of	these	sectors’	 dependence	on	State	 coercion,	 but	 also	demonstrates	 that	 the	 State	 itself	 is	not	unitary.	Thus,	I	also	point	to	the	contradictions	and	conflicts	that	arise	from	the	State’s	role	as	facilitator	of	capital	accumulation.	Finally,	I	provide	a	brief	discussion	of	how	trade	and	investment	treaties	may	compel	States	to	dispossess	their	citizens	on	behalf	of	investors.		
Expropriation,	enforced	easements,	baldío	‘recovery’,	titling	prohibitions,	prior	consultation		Under	Colombian	law	(Article	332	of	the	Constitution),	the	State	owns	the	subsoil	and	non-renewable	 natural	 resources	 in	 general.	 The	 State	 grants	 companies	 or	 individuals	 the	‘right’	to	explore	and	exploit	the	subsoil	through	‘concession	contracts’.	As	shown	below,	the	legal	fiction	that	separates	the	soil	and	subsoil	has	generated	tensions	within	Colombian	law,	though,	on	the	whole,	rights	over	the	subsoil	are	given	precedence	over	title	to	the	soil.		As	of	2012,	the	Colombian	government	had	approved	over	9,400	mining	concessions	covering	some	5.6	million	ha,	while	some	19,000	applications	were	still	pending.	The	Santos	administration	also	declared	more	than	20	million	ha	“strategic	mining	reserves”,	subject	to	 a	 different	 regime	 in	which	 concessions	 are	 granted	 through	 a	 ‘competitive	 selection	process’	instead	of	on	a	‘first	come,	first	served’	basis	(Dinero,	2012b;	Negrete	Montes,	2013,	pp.	23–24).	Negrete	(2013)	estimates	that	total	mining	‘interests’	(concessions	granted	and	those	 solicited,	plus	designated	 strategic	mining	 reserves),	 extend	over	40	million	ha	or	more	than	a	third	of	Colombia’s	land	area	(p.	24).	(Note:	this	does	not	mean	the	entirety	of	this	land	will	actually	be	exploited,	much	less	‘cleared’	of	people	for	this	purpose.)	
Figures	6	&	7	–	Active	and	Offered	Oil	Blocks	in	Colombia	
  
 
 
 Images	generated	in	Google	Earth	with	.kmz	file	overlays	by	Tierra	Minada,	based	on	official	data.	
Figures	8	&	9	–	Active	and	Offered	Mining	Blocks	in	Colombia	
	
	Images	generated	in	Google	Earth	with	.kmz	file	overlays	by	Tierra	Minada,	based	on	official	data.	
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The	area	covered	by	hydrocarbon	(oil	and	gas)	interests	is	even	larger.	According	to	the	National	Hydrocarbons	Agency	(ANH),	 just	under	2.3	million	hectares	(ha)	lie	within	production	contracts,	almost	25	million	ha	are	under	exploration	concessions,	and	another	47	million	ha	are	‘available’	for	the	taking	in	future	bids	(ANH,	2014).	Put	together,	this	is	equivalent	to	more	than	half	Colombia’s	total	surface	area.		In	 terms	 of	 land	 rights,	 the	 law	 favours	 oil	 and	 mining	 companies	 under	 the	supposition	that	exploiting	the	subsoil	is	for	the	public	good.	Article	1	of	Law	1274	(2009)	and	 Article	 13	 of	 Law	 685	 (2001)	 declare	 all	 facets	 of	 the	 hydrocarbon	 and	 mining	industries	(respectively)	as	projects	of	‘public	utility	and	social	interest’.	This	is	effectively	an	expropriation	free	pass	–	with	no	consideration	of	the	particularities	of	each	project	-	i.e.	actual	public	‘costs	and	benefits’.	It	means	that	Colombian	people	have	no	enforceable	legal	right	 to	refuse	oil	or	mining	operations	on	their	 land	–	even	 if	 they	hold	a	 title.	 In	other	words,	just	as	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	property	rights	are	violated	on	the	grounds	that	these	for-profit	ventures	will	contribute	to	a	vaguely	defined	‘social	interest’.	If	a	landowner	is	unwilling	to	negotiate	a	sale,	the	oil	or	mining	company	may	request	that	 the	 State	 expropriate	 the	 terrain	on	 its	 behalf.	 They	may	 also	 acquire	use	 rights	 (a	
servidumbre	or	easement)	over	portions	of	land	required	for	the	construction	of	(e.g.)	roads	or	pipelines.	Again,	if	the	landowner	refuses	private	negotiations,	the	oil	or	mining	company	can	resort	to	legal	proceedings	to	gain	these	use	rights.	Compensation	is	required	in	both	cases	 (full	 expropriation	 or	 forcible	 acquisition	 of	 use	 rights);	 however,	 the	 payment	received	is	often	insufficient	to	cover	the	individual’s	or	family’s	loss.	Furthermore,	people	who	are	unwilling	to	sell	(and	thus	subjected	to	expropriation	or	enforced	easements)	are	often	precisely	those	who	feel	a	strong	attachment	to	their	land	that	can’t	be	represented	in	monetary	terms.		In	September	2016,	the	National	Mining	Agency	(ANM)	stated	that	it	was	“advancing	procedures	 for	 the	 administrative	 declaration	 of	 expropriation”	 for	 159	 properties	(response	 to	 freedom	 of	 information	 request:	 “Radicado	 ANM	 No.	 20165510219512”	 -	15/09/2016).	 The	Ministry	 of	Mines	 and	Energy,	 for	 its	 part,	 reported	 “attending	 to	 52	requests	 for	 administrative	 expropriation	 related	 to	mining	 projects	 during	 the	 last	 10	years”	 (response	 to	 freedom	 of	 information	 request:	 “Radicado	 No.	 2016039530”	 -	14/06/2016).	 Unfortunately,	 I	 did	 not	 get	 access	 to	 similar	material	 from	 the	 National	Hydrocarbons	Agency	(ANH).	
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In	any	case,	these	figures	are	not	representative	of	the	dispossession	associated	with	mining	and	oil	investments,	given	that	(a)	the	threat	of	legal	proceedings	is	often	enough	to	secure	a	 so-called	 ‘voluntary’	 transaction;	 (b)	 they	do	not	 include	 forcible	 acquisition	of	easements	(c)	or	the	imposition	of	mining	and	oil	projects	within	the	collective	territories	of	indigenous	and	Afro	communities;	(d)	nor	do	they	comprise	the	forcible	acquisition	of	
baldío	 lands;	 (e)	 finally,	 they	do	not	 cover	 those	plots	of	 land	 that	were	acquired	 in	 the	context	of	the	armed	conflict	and	in	the	aftermath	of	forced	displacement	(f)	nor	indirect	forms	 of	 dispossession/displacement	 that	 result	 from	 the	 ecological/social	 devastation	caused	by	mining	and	oil	operations.	The	paragraphs	that	follow	aid	clarification	of	points	a	to	d;	Chapter	8	provides	further	evidence	and	addresses	points	e	and	f.	In	many	cases	the	threat	of	legal	proceedings	is	sufficient	for	the	interested	company	to	obtain	property	or	use	 rights	over	 the	sought-after	 land,	even	 if	 this	goes	against	 the	original	owners’	will.	Smallholders,	in	particular,	are	unlikely	to	have	access	to	the	relevant	legal	advice	or	capacity	to	pay	for	a	private	lawyer	and	are	effectively	forced	to	accept	so-called	‘voluntary’	negotiations.	It	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	the	uneven	power	relations	in	 such	 negotiations	 between	 an	 oil	 or	 mining	 company	 and	 a	 single	 property	 owner,	especially	when	the	affected	titleholder	is	a	campesino	(Personal	Interviews,	2015-2016).		To	 complicate	 matters,	 over	 40%	 of	 farms	 in	 Colombia	 do	 not	 have	 legal	 titles	(Morales	&	Restrepo,	2014,	pp.	131–132).	In	some	cases,	this	is	due	to	informal	transfers	(without	official	registration	of	the	purchase-sale)	on	plots	of	land	with	a	history	of	private	ownership.	In	others,	families	occupy	land	considered	baldíos	or	without	a	record	of	formal	private	titles	that,	as	such,	technically	belong	to	the	State.		If	a	mining	or	oil	company	is	interested	in	acquiring	lands	that	are	occupied	but	that	are	technically	baldíos,	there	is	no	need	for	an	expropriation	process,	as	such	lands	already	legally	 belong	 to	 the	 State.	 The	 authorities	 would	 perhaps	 initiate	 a	 procedure	 called	“recovery	 of	 State	 lands	 wrongfully	 occupied”.	 Depending	 on	 the	 circumstances,	 the	occupant	may	or	may	not	receive	compensation	for	any	“improvements”	he	or	she	made	to	the	land,	such	as	crops	or	housing	(see	e.g.	Decree	2664	of	1994).	The	State	reserves	the	right	 to	 declare	 baldíos	 required	 for	 “projects	 of	 national	 interest”	 as	 “reserve	 zones”	(Article	75,	Law	160	of	1994),	which	excludes	them	from	titling	and	opens	the	way	for	the	‘recovery’	process	described	above.	The	law	regulating	the	negotiation	or	enforcement	of	easements	(servidumbres)	establishes	that	“equal	treatment	will	be	given	to	those	people	who	 occupy	 or	 possess	 baldío	 lands”	 (Law	 1274	 of	 2009,	 Article	 2,	 Final	 Paragraph).	
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However,	 in	practice,	 the	payment	offered	 -if	at	all-	 is	 likely	 to	be	much	 lower	when	the	person	does	not	have	a	title	(Personal	Interviews,	2015-2016).	People	living	on	lands	legally	considered	baldíos	also	find	that	the	establishment	of	oil	or	mining	operations	in	the	area	(i.e.	even	if	their	land	is	not	directly	required	for	the	project)	presents	an	obstacle	to	their	access	to	formal	titles.	The	law	prohibits	the	titling	of	
baldíos	within	a	2.5	km	radius	of	non-renewable	resource	exploitation96.	It	doesn’t	matter	if	the	community	established	years	before	the	arrival	of	the	firm;	the	interests	of	the	extractive	industry	prevail	(Personal	Interviews,	2015-2016).	The	 legal	 system	 seems	 to	 afford	 stronger	 protections	 to	 Afro-Colombians	 and	indigenous	 peoples,	 relative	 to	 their	 mestizo	 counterparts	 –	 especially	 those	 with	inalienable	collective	titles.	However,	oil	and	mining	projects	are	simply	imposed	in	their	territories	without	a	transfer	of	property	rights.	There	is	a	legal	obligation	to	consult	with	these	communities	before	initiating	the	exploration	and	exploitation	of	natural	resources	within	their	lands,	but	this	is	frequently	treated	as	a	mere	formality.	The	alleged	aim	of	these	consultations	 is	 to	 “seek	 the	 free	 and	 informed	 consent	 of	 the	 ethnic	 communities”;	especially	in	“extreme	cases”	that	involve	“resettlement	or	displacement”	of	the	community,	the	“storage	or	dumping	of	toxic	waste”	in	their	lands,	or	where	the	impacts	of	the	project	are	 so	 harsh	 that	 they	 put	 the	 “very	 existence	 of	 the	 ethnic	 community	 at	 risk”	(Constitutional	 Court	 Sentence	 C371	 of	 2014).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 authorities	 have	interpreted	 the	 law	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 consent	 is	 not	 actually	 required:	 “this	 [see	 above	quote]	does	not	mean,	 in	any	way,	 that	 the	communities	have	the	power	of	veto”	(Corte	Constitucional,	 2014).	 This	 is	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 what	 Coleman	 (2018)	 calls	 “the	contradictions	between	 the	 formal	 recognition	of	 citizenship	 rights	and	 the	crafting	of	a	legal	regime	that	undermines	those	rights”	(pp.	5	and	14).	Thus,	 the	 process	 of	 consultation	 itself	 is	 transformed	 into	 a	 mechanism	 of	dispossession	-	a	way	to	stamp	the	appropriation	of	indigenous	or	Afro	territory	with	an	official	seal	of	approval97.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	some	communities	refuse	consultation;	because	 they	 know	 that	 the	 process	 may	 be	 used	 to	 legitimate	 a	 project	 that	 they	wholeheartedly	 reject	 (Personal	 Interviews,	 2015;	 Ó	 Loingsigh,	 2013,	 pp.	 60–61).	
                                                        96	This	used	to	be	a	5	km	radius	under	article	67	of	Law	160	of	1994	and	was	recently	changed	by	Article	1	of	Law	1728	of	2014.	97	I	owe	this	observation	specifically	(as	well	as	many	other	things	I	have	learned)	to	discussions	with	my	friends	Diana	Muriel	and	Lorenza	Arango.	
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Furthermore,	the	government	does	not	carry	out	consultations	before	granting	concessions	to	oil	and	mining	companies	(ABColombia,	2012,	p.	9;	Negrete	Montes,	2013,	p.	25).	A	Nasa	leader	 from	the	Kiwnas	Çxhab	resguardo	 (Puerto	Asís,	Putumayo)	explained	 the	upshot:	“They	don’t	come	to	consult.	They	come	simply	to	tell	people	what	they	are	doing,	because	
they	already	have	the	concession.	They	are	going	to	enter	[the	territory]	at	whatever	cost	and	stepping	on	whoever	need	be”	(Personal	Interview,	2015).	Hence,	many	Afro	and	indigenous	communities	find	themselves	in	a	double-bind.	On	the	one	hand,	prior	consultation	is	the	only	official	channel	through	which	they	can	contest	the	 imposition	 of	 mining	 and	 oil	 projects	 within	 their	 territories	 and	 they	 have	 to	continually	demand	that	this	right	to	consultation	be	respected	since	companies	often	avoid	or	disavow	their	obligations	in	this	regard.	On	the	other	hand,	as	noted	above,	consultation	is	often	turned	into	an	official	endorsement	of	a	project	that	the	community	opposes.	For	that	 reason,	 some	 communities	 have	 fought	 for	 the	 consultation	 to	 take	 place,	 but	 then	attempted	to	stall	the	process	in	one	way	or	another	(Personal	Interviews,	2015).	The	State	has	 been	 quick	 to	 react	 to	 such	 forms	 of	 resistance.	 For	 example,	 rules	 regulating	 the	process	of	 prior	 consultation	 establish	 that	 if	 the	 representatives	of	 the	 communities	 in	question	“do	not	respond”	to	official	summons	or	“refuse	to	attend”	pre-consultation	and	consultation	meetings	without	justification,	after	three	and	two	attempts	respectively,	the	relevant	authorities	may	“consider	the	consultation	process	concluded”	(Presidencia	de	la	República,	 2013,	p.	 11).	 Still,	 some	government	officials	 continue	 to	 complain	 that	prior	consultation	 is	 time-consuming	 and	 costly	 and	 poses	 an	 ‘obstacle’	 to	 Colombia’s	development	(G.	A.	Rodríguez,	2013).	Given	 that	 the	 Colombian	 government	 does	 not	 offer	 its	 citizens	 (even	 ethnic	communities	who	 supposedly	 have	 special	 protections)	 genuine	 legal	 recourse	 through	which	to	defend	their	lands	and	territories,	it	is	not	surprising	that	resistance	often	takes	the	form	of	direct	actions	such	as	roadblocks	and	sabotage.	The	authorities	and	mainstream	media	habitually	berate	peasants	and	indigenous	movements	for	resorting	to	such	means,	without	recognising	that	 they	have	 few	alternatives.	 In	 the	1990s	the	brutality	of	 the	oil	industry	 and	 the	 legal	 system	 that	 sustains	 it	 gained	 national	 and	 international	 media	attention	when	the	U’wa	people	threatened	collective	suicide	after	struggling	to	prevent	the	occupation	of	their	ancestral	lands	via	official	channels	(Hill,	2014).			In	 sum,	mining	 and	oil	 companies	 are	 unable	 to	 rely	 on	 voluntary	 transactions	 to	obtain	the	land	necessary	for	their	investments.	The	extractive	development	model	requires	dispossession	 and	 displacement.	 And	 the	 Colombian	 State	 has	 satisfied	 mining	 and	 oil	
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investors’	requirements	by	giving	priority	to	these	sectors	–	allegedly,	in	the	name	of	‘public	utility	and	social	interest’.	This	reality	contrasts	with	the	dominant	discourse	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	which	claims	that	land	markets	based	on	well-defined	property	rights	provide	for	economic	growth.	While	property	rights	 in	 land	may	well	be	a	necessity	of	capitalist	development,	so	too	are	their	violation	and	restriction.		
Challenging	the	extractive	model	via	popular	consultations	and	municipal	regulatory	power	On	the	whole,	successive	central	governments	have	provided	almost	unqualified	support	for	 the	 mining	 and	 oil	 industries.	 However,	 the	 Colombian	 State	 is	 not	 monolithic.	Functionaries	 of	 the	National	 Comptroller’s	Office,	 for	 example,	 have	publicly	 expressed	concerns	 about	 the	 prioritisation	 of	 mining	 operations,	 and	 while	 Constitutional	 Court	judgements	have	served	to	enable	specific	projects,	they	have	also	blocked	others.	Recent	controversies	 surrounding	 attempts	 to	prevent	mining	 and	oil	 projects	 at	 the	municipal	level	elucidate	the	divisions	and	conflicts	between	different	government	entities	and	actors.	This	subsection	further	illustrates	mining	and	oil	companies’	dependence	on	State	coercion,	but	also	indicates	the	contradictions	that	result.	As	argued	by	Wolford	et	al.	“states	never	operate	 with	 one	 voice”;	 the	 paragraphs	 below	 respond	 to	 these	 authors’	 appeal	 for	analyses	of	“land	deals”	that	“unbundle	the	state”	and	“see	government	and	governance	as	processes,	people	and	relationships”	(Wolford	et	al.,	2013,	p.	189).		In	the	2010s,	environmental	activists	discovered	a	tool	for	opposing	mining	and	oil	projects	 that	had	been	 lying	dormant	 in	the	text	of	 the	1991	Constitution:	 the	municipal	popular	consultation	(Rubiano,	2017).	The	previous	subsection	discussed	the	denial	of	legal	recourse	to	individuals,	families	and	indigenous/Afro	communities	who	wish	to	prevent	oil	or	mining	operations	on	their	lands.	The	popular	consultation	offers	a	route	to	challenge	the	extractive	development	model	collectively	at	the	municipal	level.	On	July	28th	2013,	inhabitants	of	Piedras	(Tolima)	voted	in	a	popular	consultation,	the	first	of	its	kind	to	be	carried	out	in	Colombia:	the	question,	in	brief,	was	whether	they	agreed	with	mining	activities	being	carried	out	in	the	municipality.	2,971	people	voted	no;	24	voted	yes	(El	Nuevo	Día,	2013).	Piedras	was	one	of	various	municipalities	targeted	by	Anglogold	Ashanti’s	 gold	mining	project	La	Colosa.	The	name	 -derived	 from	colossal-	 is	 fitting;	 the	mine	would	have	been	the	 largest	gold	extraction	operation	 in	Colombia	and	perhaps	 in	South	America	(Celedón,	2014b).	‘Would	have	been’	because	in	April	2017	the	multinational	firm	announced	that	 it	was	suspending	the	project	after	another	popular	consultation	 in	
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Cajamarca	–	the	municipality	that	was	to	be	the	centre	of	the	mine’s	operations	(Portafolio,	2017).	It	is	worth	describing	briefly	the	conflicts	that	preceded	this	decision.		Following	 the	 unprecedented	 events	 in	 neighbouring	 Piedras,	 a	 group	 from	Cajamarca	started	petitioning	for	a	popular	consultation	in	their	own	municipality.	This	was	initially	denied,	after	various	government	functionaries	(from	the	Ministry	of	Mining	and	Energy,	the	Ministry	of	Interior	and	the	Attorney	General’s	Office)	threatened	investigations	against	 municipal	 councillors	 who	 backed	 the	 consultation.	 The	 citizen’s	 committee	promoting	the	vote	started	collecting	signatures	in	order	to	gain	approval	from	the	National	Registry	–	apparently	as	a	way	of	pressuring	or	circumventing	local	authorities	(Monsalve,	2017;	Rubiano,	2017).		Activists	had	to	work	amidst	constant	threats	and	intimidation	(Rubiano,	2017).	For	example:	 in	 mid-2013	 the	 (neo)paramilitary	 group,	 the	 ‘Rastrojos’,	 circulated	 threats	against	anyone	who	opposed	the	entrance	of	multinationals	in	the	area.	In	November	that	year	 unknown	 assailants	 attacked	 a	 vehicle	 carrying	 a	 government	 commission	 sent	 to	study	 the	 overlap	 between	 AngloGold	 Ashanti’s	 mining	 titles	 and	 the	 regional	 páramo	ecosystem	(mining	and	oil	operations	are	prohibited	in	the	páramos,	which	supply	70%	of	the	 country’s	drinking	water98);	 the	driver	died	 from	his	 injuries.	A	week	 later,	 gunmen	murdered	César	García	Moreno,	a	vocal	critic	of	the	Colosa	project	(Canal	1,	2013).	At	least	two	 other	 campaigners	 were	 also	 killed	 (Silva	 Numa,	 2016).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 group	pressed	on.	Meanwhile,	people	in	other	municipalities	also	started	organising.		Investor	 interests	 and	 the	 State’s	 development	 model	 were	 clearly	 under	 threat.	Representatives	 of	 the	 extractive	 industries	 and	 their	 allies	 in	 government	 and	 media	claimed	that	popular	consultations	were	not	binding	and	that	municipal	authorities	had	no	power	to	decide	the	fate	of	mining	and	oil	operations.	But	in	May	2016	the	Constitutional	Court	(in	a	close	decision:	5	to	4)	overruled	Article	37	of	the	Mining	Code,	which	barred	local	and	 regional	 authorities	 from	 rejecting	 such	 projects	 in	 the	 territories	 under	 their	jurisdiction.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 decision	 affirmed	 that	mayors	 and	 local	 councils	 could	indeed	prevent	mining	investments	(since	clearly	the	exploration	and	exploitation	of	the	
                                                        98	The	prohibition	was	introduced	in	February	2010.	The	central	government	attempted	to	skirt	the	rule	 by	 adding	 an	 article	 (No.	 173)	 to	 the	 National	 Development	 Plan,	 which	 allowed	 for	 the	continuation	of	projects	with	a	concession	contract	and	an	environmental	licence	granted	prior	to	February	2010	in	the	case	of	mining	or	June	2011	in	the	case	of	oil	projects.	The	Constitutional	Court	overruled	 this	 article	 in	 February	 2016,	 reaffirming	 the	 prohibition	 (El	 Espectador,	 2016).	 The	National	Ombudsman’s	Office	had	warned	that	“22	páramos	were	at	extreme	risk	of	disappearing	due	to	the	impacts	of	mining”	(cited	in:	ABColombia,	2012,	p.	7).		
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subsoil	affects	the	use	of	the	soil,	which	is	subject	to	regulations	decided	at	the	municipal	level	as	in	Article	313	of	the	Constitution),	against	the	will	of	the	national	government	(El	Tiempo,	2016b;	Monsalve,	2017).	In	August	2016,	the	municipal	Council	of	Cajamarca	voted	in	favour	of	carrying	out	a	popular	consultation,	but	 it	was	postponed	twice	–	 in	 the	second	 instance	due	to	a	 legal	petition	(tutela)	 that	AngloGold	Ashanti	 lodged	with	the	State	Council.	The	State	Council	claimed	 that	 popular	 consultations	 would	 impact	 future	 decisions	 but	 could	 not	 affect	
existing	concession	contracts.	Still,	the	consultation	was	carried	out	on	March	26th	2017	-	97%	of	6,296	voters	expressed	their	opposition	to	mining	operations	in	Cajamarca.	Just	a	day	 later,	 the	Minister	 of	Mines	 and	Energy	 announced	 that	 the	 project	 could	 go	 ahead	despite	 the	vote	 against	 it.	But,	 as	noted	above,	AngloGold	Ashanti	 opted	 to	 suspend	 its	operations	(El	Espectador,	2017a;	Monsalve,	2017;	Montaño,	2017).		In	 addition	 to	 Piedras	 and	 Cajamarca,	 seven	 other	 municipalities	 held	 popular	consultations	 in	which	an	overwhelming	majority	of	 inhabitants	voted	against	oil	and/or	mining	 operations99.	 As	 of	 June	 2017,	 another	 44	municipalities	were	 in	 the	 process	 of	organising	 consultations	 (El	 Tiempo,	 2017a).	 However,	 the	 organisers	 face	 numerous	obstacles.	 In	 Macarena	 and	 Granada	 (Meta)	 the	 consultations	 were	 cancelled	 after	 the	Ministry	of	Finance	refused	to	assign	the	necessary	resources	for	the	vote.	The	Governor	of	Meta	and	 the	Mayors	of	Macarena	and	Granada	were	 in	 favour	of	 the	 consultations;	 the	Mayor	of	Granada	even	presented	a	legal	demand	(tutela),	requesting	funding	for	the	voting	process	(El	Tiempo,	2017b,	2017c).	Two	municipalities	 in	Santander	were	also	forced	to	cancel	planned	consultations	for	similar	reasons	(Rey,	2017).	At	 least	 five	 other	 municipalities	 have	 placed	 prohibitions	 on	 the	 mining	 and	 oil	industries	 through	agreements	approved	directly	by	 the	municipal	 councils100	 -	perhaps	because	they	expected	a	popular	consultation	to	be	hindered	by	the	central	government.	However,	 this	 channel	 is	 also	 being	 undercut.	 The	Administrative	Tribunal	 of	Antioquia	
                                                        99	Tauramena	(Casanare),	Cumaral	(Meta),	Cabrera	(Cundinamarca),	Arbeláez	(Cudinamarca),	Pijao	(Quindío),	Jesús	María	(Santander)	and	Sucre	(Santander)	all	rejected	mining	or	oil	operations	-with	over	90%	of	the	votes-	through	popular	consultations.	Six	of	these	votes	were	held	in	2017.	100	The	Councils	of	Concordia,	Jericó,	Támesis	and	Urrao	(municipalities	of	Antioquia)	all	approved	agreements	 to	 prohibit	 mining	 in	 their	 respective	 municipalities	 (Caracol	 Radio,	 2017).	 The	Municipal	Council	of	Neiva	approved	an	agreement	to	prohibit	the	exploitation	of	hydrocarbons	and	precious	metals	around	the	River	Las	Ceibas	specifically	(El	Tiempo,	2017d).	
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declared	one	of	these	agreements	invalid	and	put	the	rest	into	question,	arguing	that	“it	is	not	possible	to	prohibit	mining	activities	via	municipal	agreements”	(Caracol	Radio,	2017).		Summing	up:	citizens’	groups	and	allied	local	authorities	are	using	tools	provided	by	the	 Constitution	 to	 prevent	 dispossession	 and	 other	 ills	 associated	with	mining	 and	 oil	operations.	Effectively,	the	economic	model	is	being	challenged	via	participatory	and	local	democracy	and	this	has	caused	conflicts	and	divisions	within	the	State.	Representatives	of	the	mining	and	oil	industries	have	pressured	for	a	particular	interpretation	of	the	law	that	would	shut	this	opposition	down.	However,	the	Constitutional	Court	ruled	that	municipal	councils’	 regulatory	 powers	 could	 affect	 the	 use	 of	 the	 subsoil.	 Still,	 a	 regional	 Tribunal	appeared	to	contradict	said	ruling	and	the	State	Council	insisted	that	municipal	decisions	could	 not	 undermine	 existing	 concessions.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 central	 government	 blocked	popular	 consultations	 using	 various	 tools	 including	 the	 denial	 of	 funding	 and	 mining	companies	 started	 lodging	 their	 own	 legal	 battles	 -	 the	 details	 of	 which	 could	 not	 be	considered	here.	As	mentioned	previously,	the	events	described	above	can	be	interpreted	as	upholding	or	threatening	the	rule	of	 law	depending	on	the	interests	and	values	of	the	observer;	this	illustrates	the	malleability	of	the	concept	and	why	blaming	dispossession	on	a	‘weak	rule	of	law’	doesn’t	provide	much	insight	into	the	issue.			
Anti-democratic	international	investment	law:	commanding	dispossession	and	displacement	Representatives	 of	 the	 oil	 and	 mining	 industries	 have	 been	 complaining	 loudly	 about	“juridical	uncertainty”	(El	Colombiano,	2017a),	putting	pressure	on	the	central	government,	which	 is	 desperate	 for	 investor	 approval.	 The	 State	 faces	 losses	more	 tangible	 than	 the	country’s	 reputation	 as	 an	 ‘investment	 destination’.	 Colombia	 is	 party	 to	 16	 free	 trade	agreements	(FTAs),	many	of	which	include	investor	protection	clauses,	giving	companies	a	right	to	sue	the	Colombian	State	for	multiple	reasons.		The	 US	 firm	 Hupecol	 has	 already	 instigated	 legal	 proceedings	 against	 Colombia,	demanding	 83,000	 million	 COP	 (around	 28	 million	 USD)	 as	 compensation	 for	 the	withdrawal	of	an	environmental	license	it	had	obtained	for	exploring	oil	in	La	Macarena.	The	majority	of	this	sum	is	composed	of	money	the	firm	hypothetically	could	have	made	if	the	project	had	gone	ahead;	just	20,881	million	COP	corresponds	to	the	loss	of	investments	already	carried	out.	Hupecol	 initiated	the	process	within	the	Colombian	legal	system	but	plans	to	bring	the	case	to	international	arbitration	on	the	grounds	of	FTA	violations.	The	environmental	licensing	agency	withdrew	permissions	after	a	public	uproar	due	to	the	risks	
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posed	to	the	legendary	Caño	Cristales	river	(El	Espectador,	2017c).	Eco	Oro	Minerals	also	announced	that	it	would	sue	the	Colombian	State	through	international	arbitration	under	the	FTA	with	Canada,	after	the	Constitutional	Court	reaffirmed	the	prohibition	of	mining	within	the	country’s	delicate	paramo	(see	earlier	footnote)	ecosystems	(W	Radio,	2017).	Cosigo	 Resources	 Ltd	 (Canada)	 and	 Tobie	 Mining	 and	 Energy	 Inc	 (USA)	 have	apparently	already	sued	the	Colombian	State	for	16,500	million	USD	on	the	grounds	that	it	‘expropriated’	 a	 mining	 title	 in	 the	 Yaigoje	 Apaporis	 National	 Park.	 Indigenous	 groups	initially	opposed	the	conversion	of	their	lands	into	a	National	Park	(some	still	do),	but	many	eventually	solicited	its	establishment	because	they	saw	it	as	the	only	way	to	prevent	mining	within	their	ancestral	territory.	Two	days	after	the	area	was	given	National	Park	status	by	one	 government	 entity,	 another	 granted	 the	 ‘Taraira	 Sur’	 mining	 concession	 currently	under	dispute	(Semana,	2017).		If	the	Colombian	State	respects	the	outcome	of	popular	consultations	and	municipal	authorities’	power	to	prohibit	mining	and	oil	exploration/exploitation,	the	number	of	legal	proceedings	 against	 it	 are	 likely	 to	 multiply.	 It	 essentially	 faces	 a	 choice	 between:	 (a)	officially	overruling	municipal	authorities	and/or	the	popular	vote	and	thus	undermining	its	democracy	and	its	own	laws	as	laid	out	in	the	Constitution;	(b)	accepting	the	law	suits	and,	 if	 the	rulings	are	unfavourable,	paying	the	ordered	compensation	–	which	given	the	sums	could	amount	to	near	bankruptcy;	or	(c)	refusing	payment	(withdrawing	from	FTAs)	and	risking	being	ostracised	by	the	global	capitalist	‘club’.	In	brief,	international	investment	law	may	effectively	compel	signatory	States	to	dispossess	and	displace	their	own	citizens	on	 behalf	 of	 investors.	 The	 outcomes	 of	 the	 interconnected	 conflicts	 described	 in	 the	previous	and	present	subsections	is	still	uncertain.	However,	the	Colombian	government	appears	to	be	leaning	towards	option	A;	demonstrating	“the	capacity	[of	economic	force]	to	shape	unconstitutional	-and	so	effectively	illegal-	legislation”	(Coleman,	2018,	p.	13).		
Summary	and	conclusion	The	2010s	in	Colombia	have	been	marked	by	massive	and	repeated	social	mobilisations.	These	mobilisations	were	hugely	diverse	but	struggles	against	dispossession	came	to	the	fore.	This	was	clear	during	the	Agrarian	Strike	of	2013,	which	united	varied	groups	and	led	to	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 national	movement:	Cumbre	 Agraria	 Campesina,	 Étnica	 y	 Popular.	Cumbre	(for	short)	developed	a	list	of	demands	including:	policies	to	strengthen	the	peasant	economy;	the	effective	restitution	of	lands	usurped	in	the	context	of	the	armed	conflict;	the	
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recognition	of	campesino	rights	to	collective	territory	and	prior	consultation;	the	exclusive	titling	of	State	lands	to	peasant,	worker,	Afro	and	indigenous	populations;	and	a	moratorium	on	mining	and	oil	concessions	until	a	new	policy	 is	 in	place	that	gives	those	affected	the	power	of	veto	–	among	many	other	things.	The	overarching	theme	is	a	call	for	an	entirely	new	development	strategy	(“la	economía	propia	contra	el	modelo	de	despojo”),	specifically	one	that	is	not	based	on	dispossession	and	displacement	(‘Pliego	de	exigencias	de	la	Cumbre	Agraria’,	2014).	The	Cumbre’s	proposals	point	to	the	multiple	enabling	factors	that	give	rise	to	dispossession	and	the	different	forms	this	can	take	–	issues	highlighted	in	this	chapter.			 I	examined	six	main	developments,	which	have	shaped	the	political	economy	of	land	and	dispossession	in	Colombia	since	the	late	20th	century:	(1)	economic	restructuring	in	the	context	 of	 neoliberal	 globalisation;	 (2)	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 illicit	 drug	 economy;	 (3)	 the	intensification	 and	 paramilitarisation	 of	 the	 armed	 conflict;	 (4)	 the	 remaking	 of	 land	legislation	in	light	of	the	1991	Constitution;	(5)	the	resurgence	of	government	and	investor	interest	 in	 agro-industry	 and	 the	 associated	 counter-reform;	 and	 (6)	 the	 growth	 of	 the	mining	and	oil	sectors,	which	have	become	central	to	the	State’s	economic	strategy.	Broadly,	I	showed	how	specific	trajectories	and	visions	of	economic	development	have	influenced	the	prevalence	and	character	of	dispossession	in	contemporary	Colombia.			 The	 shift	 towards	 export-oriented	 growth	 and	 away	 from	 ISI-style	 policies	 had	multiple	 implications	 for	 dispossession.	 These	 new	 development	 strategies	 are	 at	 least	partially	 to	 blame	 for	 the	 growing	weight	 of	 the	mining	 and	 energy	 sectors	 within	 the	Colombia	economy;	and	these	industries	don’t	just	profit	from	dispossession,	they	rely	on	it,	as	argued	in	section	6.	Economic	liberalisation	intensified	pressures	to	secure	additional	foreign	exchange,	which	exacerbates	dependence	on	mining	and	oil	extraction	since	these	account	 for	 the	majority	 of	 export	 earnings	 and	 FDI.	 The	 promotion	 and	 growth	 of	 the	extractive	 industries	not	only	 shapes	State-backed	dispossession,	but	 also	 that	 executed	‘illegally’,	 as	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 8.	 The	 lifting	 of	 trade	 barriers	 also	 set	 in	 to	 motion	widespread	market-led	dispossession,	which	in	Colombia	‘supplements’	land	accumulation	achieved	via	extra-economic	force.		 While	elite-led	dispossession	for	large-scale	agriculture	is	not	a	new	phenomenon	in	Colombia,	 economic	 restructuring	 has	moulded	 these	 processes	 and	 practices,	 as	 policy	changed	to	the	promotion	of	agro-exports.	These	types	of	policies	have	been	in	place	since	at	least	the	1990s;	however,	they	received	a	boost	following	the	rise	in	global	agricultural	commodity	 prices	 in	 the	mid-2000s.	 The	 government’s	 growing	 obsession	with	 turning	Colombia	into	an	agroindustrial	powerhouse	has	influenced	the	dynamics	of	dispossession	
  
226	
effected	by	private	agents	in	a	number	of	ways.	Subsidies	and	other	types	of	support	have	incentivised	and	facilitated	usurpation.	The	fact	that	many	of	the	land-use	changes	brought	about	 by	 dispossession	 are	 compatible	 with	 the	 State’s	 development	 strategy	 arguably	weakens	resolve	to	address	the	issue.	Put	differently:	even	if	the	central	government	doesn’t	endorse	the	means,	it	certainly	endorses	many	of	the	outcomes.	This	stands	in	contrast	to	the	 early	 20th	 century,	 when	 policymakers	 were	 concerned	 not	 only	 with	 the	 conflicts	generated	 by	 dispossession,	 but	 also	 the	 negative	 effects	 it	 was	 having	 on	 the	 broader	economy,	which	at	the	time	was	sustained	by	smallholder	agriculture.		 The	government’s	agro-industrial	development	vision	has	also	 influenced	the	 legal	context	surrounding	dispossession,	since	it	is	a	key	motivation	behind	ongoing	legislative	counter-reform.	As	explained	in	section	4,	Law	160	of	1994	introduced	a	number	of	rules	that	 should	have	prevented	elite	 groups	 from	benefitting	 from	dispossession,	 as	well	 as	predatory	and	opportunistic	land	purchases	in	the	aftermath	of	violence.	Had	the	law	been	applied,	they	wouldn’t	have	been	able	to	profit	from	the	removal	of	campesinos	from	State	lands,	 since	 these	were	declared	 imprescriptible	 and	 could	only	be	 titled	 to	peasants	 of	scarce	resources.	Likewise,	had	the	restrictions	on	parcels	granted	by	INCORA/INCODER	(via	titling	and	redistribution	programs)	been	enforced,	this	would	have	blocked	elites	from	profiting	off	 the	displacement	of	people	 from	 these	 ‘reform	 lands’.	Hence,	 the	 legislative	counter-reform	described	in	section	5,	which	aims	to	revoke	these	rules,	not	only	threatens	to	 legalise	unlawful	 land	accumulation	achieved	through	voluntary	market	transfers,	but	also	 facilitates	 the	 legalisation	 of	 land	 concentration	 accomplished	 using	 violence.	Nevertheless,	I	argue	against	attributing	dispossession,	even	that	effected	by	private	agents,	to	a	weak	rule	of	law,	for	reasons	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter	and	in	Chapter	2.			 The	confrontations	between	different	government	entities	-such	as	the	Comptroller	Office’s	public	critique	of	the	Santos	administration’s	interpretation	of	land	legislation	and	diverging	views	among	government	officials	regarding	the	extent	of	municipal	authorities’	regulatory	powers	and	whether	these	can	affect	mining	and	oil	interests-	are	noteworthy,	since	they	point	to	the	fallacies	of	the	liberal	rule	of	law	concept	by	showing	the	legal	realm	to	 be	 a	 site	 of	 struggle.	 They	 also	 serve	 as	 a	 reminder	 that	 the	 law	 can	 be	 used	 to	enforce/legitimate	dispossession	and	to	prevent	it,	depending	on	power	dynamics	between	different	groups	and	the	government,	but	also	within	the	State	itself,	which	is	not	unitary.		 	
  
227	
	 This	 chapter	 also	 suggests	 that	 the	 armed	 conflict-dispossession	 nexus	 is	 more	convoluted	 than	 is	 usually	 implied.	 Violence	 has	 certainly	 been	 a	 key	 enabler	 of	 land	grabbing	 in	 Colombia.	 However,	 in	 addition	 to	 all	 the	 other	 enabling	 factors	 described	above,	we	also	need	to	take	account	of	the	specific	dynamics	of	the	Colombian	conflict	over	the	last	three	decades,	in	particular	the	expansion	of	paramilitary	forces,	which	were	allied	with	elite	groups	and	the	army.	Arguably,	it	was	these	alliances	specifically	that	enabled	and	(especially	in	the	former	case)	encouraged	the	dispossession	carried	out	by	paramilitaries.	The	particularities	of	counter-insurgency	warfare,	which	targets	‘subversive’	civilians,	must	also	 be	 brought	 into	 the	 analysis.	 The	 demobilisation	 process	 transformed	 but	 did	 not	eliminate	paramilitarism	 in	Colombia.	Paramilitary	 successor	groups	defend	 land	 claims	acquired	 through	 force	 in	 previous	 decades	 and	 have	 orchestrated	 new	 processes	 of	dispossession.	They	also	continue	to	support	the	violent	repression	of	social	movements,	including	 organised	 resistance	 to	 large-scale	 (especially	 mining	 and	 oil)	 investments	backed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers.		 Finally,	land	pressures	in	Colombia	have	been	aggravated	by	narcotraffickers’	custom	of	 acquiring	 large	 estates	 in	 order	 launder	 their	 profits,	 store	 and	 accumulate	 wealth	(adding	to	the	historical	problem	of	speculative	acquisitions),	and	to	facilitate	their	business	operations.	 However,	 as	 explained	 above,	 the	 narco	 land	 rush	 of	 the	 1980s	 should	 be	distinguished	 from	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab	 (which	 is	 also	 connected	 to	 the	 illicit	 drug	economy	but	cannot	be	reduced	to	this)	that	escalated	in	the	decade	that	followed.		 	
-	7	-	
The	para-elite	land	grab	and	opportunistic/predatory	land	
accumulation	in	the	conflict-context		The	 previous	 chapter	 painted	 the	 context	 necessary	 for	 understanding	 and	 explaining	dispossession	 in	 contemporary	 Colombia.	 I	 placed	 special	 emphasis	 on	 the	 country’s	trajectory	of	development	and	related	policies,	 in	particular	the	promotion	of	 large-scale	agroindustry	and	the	mining	and	energy	sectors.	With	this	contextualisation	in	place,	the	present	and	subsequent	chapters	provide	a	bird’s	eye	view	of	dispossession	and	related	displacement	in	Colombia	during	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	centuries.	Here,	I	discuss	the	usurpation	imposed	by	the	para-elite,	as	well	as	grey-area	market	transactions	facilitated	by	the	conflict-context.	In	the	final	chapter,	I	examine	dispossession	for	investments	backed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers.	One	of	my	main	objectives	in	both	chapters	is	to	identify	varied	forms	and	mechanisms	of	land	dispossession,	which	I	believe	is	valuable	in	its	own	right,	but	also	helps	illustrate	how	these	processes	actually	occur	and	provides	support	for	some	broader	claims	and	arguments,	as	explained	in	the	ensuing	paragraphs.		 The	first	section	analyses	the	dispossession	imposed	by	the	paramilitaries	and	their	allies	-	what	I	call	the	para-elite	land	grab.	First,	I	argue	that	counterinsurgency	is	partially	constitutive	 of	 agrarian	 counter-reform	 and	 that	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab	 represents	 a	transformation	of	 pre-existing	processes	 and	practices,	 rather	 than	an	 aberration	of	 the	armed	conflict.	Second,	I	describe	the	network	of	actors	without	who	the	para-elite	could	not	have	operationalised	the	land	grab.	One	of	my	aims	is	to	draw	attention	away	from	the	
armed	participants	and	demonstrate	why	contemporary	dispossession	 in	Colombia	does	not	fit	well	with	stereotypical	understandings	of	wartime	plunder.	Finally,	I	show	that	the	land	use	changes	brought	about	by	this	dispossession	have	been	compatible	with	the	State’s	development	model	and	how	government	policies	incentivised	and	enabled	dispossession.	The	second	section	examines	the	different	mechanisms	of	dispossession	exploited	by	the	para-elite,	helping	to	demonstrate	how	land	grabbing	was	actually	effectuated.	I	focus	especially	 on	 the	 various	 methods	 used	 to	 legalise	 and	 legitimate	 land	 usurpation	 and	develop	a	sort-of	typology	to	this	end.	This	serves	to	bolster	the	arguments	put	forward	in	section	one	and	earlier	chapters.	It	further	illustrates	the	importance	of	non-armed	actors	in	facilitating	dispossession	and	that	the	para-elite’s	‘social	capital’	was	just	as	vital,	if	not	
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more,	 as	 brute-force	 in	 effecting	 dispossession.	 Above	 all,	 it	 shows	 how	 land	 grabbers	exploited	the	property	rights	regime,	rather	than	a	collapse	of	these	rules	and	institutions,	and	thus	serves	to	challenge	general	claims	about	dispossession	 in	conflict-contexts	that	suggest	this	is	due	to	institutional	break-down.	It	also	reveals	why	access	to	formal	titles	is	insufficient	protection	against	‘illegal’	land	grabs	and	why	certain	rules	and	policies,	which	should	have	prevented	dispossession	or	at	least	certain	groups	from	benefitting	from	such	processes,	failed	to	work	in	practice.		The	third	section	considers	opportunistic	and	predatory	land	accumulation	in	which	investors	profited	from	displacement	by	purchasing	abandoned	lands	at	clearance	prices.	Here	 I	 refer	 to	 land	 acquisitions	 that	 fall	 within	 the	middle	 of	 the	 continuum	 between	coercion	and	consent.	Distinct	from	the	para-elite	land	grab,	in	such	cases,	the	buyers	were	neither	the	material	nor	the	intellectual	authors	of	the	violence	from	which	they	benefited.	Nevertheless,	 these	were	not	 genuinely	 voluntary	 transactions	 either	 since	people	were	compelled	to	sell	their	land	precisely	as	a	result	of	their	displacement.	I	explain	how	unequal	power	relations	and	structural	inequalities	shaped	this	land	concentration	in	the	context	and	aftermath	of	violence;	this	includes	the	mutually	reinforcing	relationship	between	this	land	accumulation	and	the	State’s	vision	and	policies	of	economic	development.	
	
1)	The	para-elite	land	grab	The	 paramilitaries	 and	 their	 elite	 allies	 have	 been	 the	 most	 important	 agents	 and	beneficiaries	of	violent	land	grabs	in	Colombia	over	the	last	three	decades.	This	assertion	is	supported	by	qualitative	evidence,	from	government	reports	and	court	proceedings	to	NGO	and	academic	publications.	Although	no	one	knows	exactly	how	many	people	were	affected,	several	high-profile	cases	suggest	that	the	numbers	directly	dispossessed	by	the	para-elite	are,	 at	minimum,	 in	 the	 tens	 of	 thousands	 and	 that	 they	 have	mostly	 been	 campesinos.	Medium	 and	 large	 landowners	 have	 not	 been	 immune	 from	 dispossession,	 but	 there	 is	clearly	 a	 class	 dimension	 to	 the	 phenomenon.	 As	 indicated	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	quantitative	studies	suggest	land	concentration	in	Colombia	has	increased	since	the	1980s;	this	 is	at	 least	partially	an	upshot	of	the	bloody	counter-reform	imposed	by	paramilitary	groups	and	their	associates.	Land	grabbing	in	Colombia	is	often	treated	as	a	problem	reducible	to	the	actions	of	illegal	armed	groups.	Certainly,	paramilitaries	often	acted	of	their	own	accord,	stealing	land	for	use	by	their	squadron	and	for	personal	enrichment	or	that	of	their	friends	and	families.	
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However,	they	also	acted	on	behalf	of	wider	economic	interests.	Some	commanders	were	themselves	businessmen	or	large	landowners;	in	other	cases,	elites	actively	participated	as	unarmed	members	of	regional	paramilitary	organisations;	and	finally,	a	significant	number	of	 companies	 and	 individual	 profiteers	 made	 agreements	 with	 the	 paramilitaries	 (see	Quinche,	2016;	Vargas	Reina,	2016b,	2016a;	CNMH,	2012c;	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010).	Hence,	the	term	‘para-elite’	highlights	the	links	between	the	dispossession	imposed	by	paramilitaries	and	the	economic/political	interests	and	power	of	a	particular	social	class.	Indeed,	Gutiérrez	and	Vargas	found	that	paramilitary	groups	“organically	articulated”	with	“rural	elites”101	consistently	used	violence	or	threats	to	appropriate	land	and	that	land	grabbing	was	much	 less	common	among	units	 lacking	 this	characteristic.	Recall	 that	 the	AUC	was	an	umbrella	organisation	that	encompassed	various	regional	groups	with	different	origins	 and	 characteristics.	 Gutiérrez	 and	 Vargas	 determined	 that	 differences	 between	paramilitary	units	account	for	significant	variations	in	the	intensity	of	land	dispossession.	Their	qualitative	comparative	analysis	uncovered	three	“rules”	that	explain	this	variation.	The	first	rule,	put	simply:	all	paramilitary	units	that	included	or	made	pacts	with	individual	elites	or	economic	interest	groups	frequently	committed	acts	of	usurpation.	Rule	two	can	be	 expressed	 as	 follows:	 large	 paramilitary	 units	 involved	 in	 narcotrafficking	 and	 other	illegal	ventures	also	used	coercion	to	acquire	land.	Third	and	finally,	the	first	two	rules	are	contingent	on	favourable	military	conditions.	Specifically,	paramilitary	units	operating	“in	territories	disputed	with	the	guerrilla”	did	not	usurp	land	in	those	areas	or	did	so	on	a	much	smaller	scale	(Gutiérrez	Sanín	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	pp.	8–11).		
Violent	agrarian	counter-reform	and	the	continuation	of	dispossession	by	other	means	As	 shown	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 and	 fraud	 to	 impose,	 defend	 and	challenge	land	claims	has	an	extensive	history	in	Colombia.	In	the	words	of	Gutiérrez	and	Vargas	 (2016):	 “in	wide	sectors	of	 rural	 society	 […	 there	 is]	a	 long-standing	 tradition	of	manipulating	property	rights	 through	coercion,	contacts	and	 juridical	chicanery”	(p.	22).	
                                                        101	The	authors	are	right	to	emphasise	the	role	of	rural	elites	specifically;	however,	it	is	worth	noting	that	some	of	the	businessmen	and	other	civilians	that	collaborated	with	the	paramilitaries	were	from	or	lived	in	large	cities.	Examples	are	provided	in	a	recent	court	ruling	against	those	involved	in	the	usurpation	 of	 land	 in	 Curvaradó	 and	 Jiguamiandó.	 According	 to	 the	 document,	 Javier	 José	 Daza	Pretelt,	of	the	para-enterprise	Urapalma,	is	a	graduate	in	business	from	Barranquilla;	Hernán	Iñigo	de	Jesus	Gómez	Hernández,	who	was	involved	with	the	same	company,	lived	in	Montería	and	worked	as	a	university	teacher;	businessman,	Gabriel	Jaime	Sierra	Moreno,	was	born	in	Medellín	and	lived	there	at	the	time	of	the	trial;	and	so	on	and	so	forth	(Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014).	
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And	 elites	 have	 historically	 relied	 on	 hired	 gunmen	 and	militia	 groups	 to	 defend	 their	economic	and	political	projects	more	broadly.	While	the	paramilitary	phenomenon	clearly	has	 particular	 characteristics	 due	 to	 these	 groups’	 links	 to	 the	 illicit	 drug	 economy	 and	State-backed	 counterinsurgency	 warfare,	 it	 also	 reflects	 this	 tradition	 –	 albeit	 in	 some	regions	more	 than	others.	 Furthermore,	 the	 origins	 and	 execution	of	 counterinsurgency	warfare	itself	must	be	partially	understood	as	constitutive	of	agrarian	counter-reform,	as	argued	in	the	rest	of	this	subsection.	The	insurgency-counterinsurgency	dynamic	in	Colombia	is	intimately	linked	to	land	struggles.	As	discussed	earlier	 in	this	thesis,	 the	FARC	were	born	of	peasant	self-defence	forces	 and	 took	 root	 in	 areas	 settled	 by	 people	 dispossessed	 and	 displaced	 during	 La	
Violencia.	The	histories	of	the	ELN	and	the	EPL	are	also	intertwined	with	conflicts	over	land.	Even	before	 the	guerrilla	 take-off,	unarmed	 peasant	movements	demanding	 land	reform	were	targeted	in	the	State’s	anti-subversive	operations	(consider	the	history	of	the	ANUC,	mentioned	in	Chapter	5).	Repression	at	the	hands	of	government	forces	intensified	in	the	1970s	 and	 gradually	 merged	 with	 paramilitary	 violence	 against	 the	 same	 groups.	 This	contributed	to	the	strengthening	and	expansion	of	armed	resistance.	Nevertheless,	it	should	be	emphasised	that	the	relationship	between	the	guerrilla	and	campesino	communities	or	organisations	has	been	varied	and	complex	-	ranging	from	cooperation,	to	coexistence	and	outright	conflict.	Irrespective	of	their	links	to	the	guerrilla,	peasants	-especially	leaders	and	organised	communities-	were	(and	are)	routinely	attacked	by	the	(neo-)paramilitaries.		In	some	regions,	land	occupations	were	among	the	list	of	factors	that	prompted	elites	to	summon	or	organise	paramilitary	groups	(see	e.g.	Semana,	1989a).	In	others,	escalating	violence	provided	an	opportunity	for	landowners	to	retaliate	against	campesinos	for	past	occupations.	 Gutiérrez	 and	 Vargas	 (2016)	 include	 this	 “reprisal”	 factor	 as	 one	 of	 five	possible	 explanations	 as	 to	why	 paramilitary	 units	with	 close	 links	 to	 rural	 elites	were	systematically	more	likely	to	usurp	land,	alongside	“knowledge,	tradition	and	institutions”	briefly	mentioned	above,	“incentives”	and	“possibility”	discussed	below,	and	“opportunist	violence”	enabled	by	“organizational	laxity”	(pp.	18-24).		Land	reform	beneficiaries	in	general	(regardless	of	whether	they	had	participated	in	occupations)	 were	 among	 the	 main	 victims	 of	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab,	 especially	 in	northern	 Colombia	 (Grupo	 de	 Memoria	 Histórica,	 2010,	 pp.	 129–144	 and	 269–271;	Quinche,	2016,	pp.	100–108;	Vargas	Reina,	2016b,	pp.	70–75).	One	member	of	the	Metro	Block,	which	mostly	operated	in	east	and	northeast	Antioquia,	avowed	outright	that	they	were	undertaking	“a	great	agrarian	counterreform”	(Mingorance,	2006,	p.	43).		
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	(Ex-)paramilitaries	 have	 openly	 justified	 the	 usurpation	 of	 redistributed	 lands,	arguing	that	the	guerrilla	and	their	support	base,	in	partnership	with	the	agrarian	reform	agency,	were	responsible	for	the	“second	great	dispossession	of	the	modern	era”,	following	that	which	occurred	during	La	Violencia.	Demobilised	paramilitary	commander	Salvatore	Mancuso	affirmed	that	the	AUC	worked	to	“combat”	this	“second	dispossession”	with	the	“support	of	the	State”	and	that	their	fight	against	subversives	“allowed	cattle	ranchers	and	
hacendados	 […]	 to	 return	 and	 recover	 properties	 they	 had	 abandoned	 because	 of	 the	guerrillas’	actions	and	their	infiltration	in	the	INCORA”	(Mancuso	cited	in	CNMH,	2012c,	pp.	85–86).	 This	 discourse,	 which	 portrays	 the	 dispossessed	 as	 usurpers,	 continues	 to	 be	reproduced	in	an	attempt	to	delegitimise	the	restitution	process	initiated	in	2011.	Paramilitaries	sometimes	played	an	auxiliary	role,	backing	elites	in	long-running	land	conflicts.	 Take	 the	 case	 of	 the	 marshland	 (ciénagas)	 enclosures	 in	 Sucre	 and	 Córdoba.	
Campesinos	have	lived	from	these	marshlands	for	decades:	combining	fishing	with	-mostly	transient-	 agriculture	 during	 the	 dry	 season.	 Since	 at	 least	 the	 1960s,	 they	 have	 been	struggling	against	 large	 landowners	who	assert	private	ownership	or	control	over	 these	public	 lands102.	 ‘Traditional’	elites	and	-later-	narcotraffickers	have	continually	expanded	their	property	claims,	converting	communal	wetlands	 into	private	drylands	by	 installing	pumps	and	other	drainage	systems	and	erecting	electric	fences.	They	deliberately	flooded	or	let	cattle	loose	on	the	campesinos’	crops,	hired	gunmen	to	intimidate	residents	and	got	local	authorities	to	carry	out	evictions	on	their	behalf.	From	the	late	1980s	onwards,	these	tactics	 were	 increasingly	 combined	 with	 paramilitary	 violence.	 Many	 campesinos	 fled,	facilitating	the	ongoing	enclosures	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	pp.	144–155).		The	 above	 example,	 and	 many	 others,	 illustrate	 the	 transformation	 of	 previous	processes	and	practices	of	dispossession	and	the	importance	of	locating	the	para-elite	land	grab	in	the	context	of	historical	struggles	over	land.	It	also	reveals	that	the	armed	conflict-dispossession	 nexus	 is	 more	 convoluted	 than	 is	 often	 implied.	 Arguably,	 it	 was	 the	particularities	 of	 counter-insurgency	 warfare	 in	 Colombia,	 rather	 than	 some	 general	phenomena	that	are	presumed	to	occur	with	conflict-contexts	(such	as	the	breakdown	of	law	 and	 order	 or	 a	 generic	 increase	 in	 criminal	 behaviour),	 that	 shaped	 dispossession.	Further	evidence	for	this	point	is	provided	in	the	subsequent	subsection.		
                                                        102	Law	160	of	1994	prohibits	the	privatisation	of	communal	floodplains	and	similar	areas;	however,	elites	have	managed	to	circumvent	these	rules	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	pp.	146–148).	
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Beyond	‘illegal’	armed	actors:	the	para-elite	land	grabbing	network	The	paramilitaries	and	their	elite	allies	were	absolutely	dependent	on	wider	contacts	and	alliances	 to	 operationalise	 the	 land	 grab	 (Gutiérrez	 Sanín	&	Vargas	Reina,	 2016;	 Ballvé,	2013;	Grajales,	2013,	2011;	CNMH,	2012c).	As	argued	by	Grajales	(2011),	the	paramilitary’s	“role	 in	 securing	 some	people’s	property	 rights	 and	denying	others	 is	not	merely	extra-institutional.	 It	 is	 supported	by	 large	bureaucratic	 and	political	 networks	 that	 allow	 the	legalization	of	profits	from	violence”	(p.	771).	Local	and	regional	elites	were	able	to	legalise	the	theft	and	then	physically	defend	these	land	claims	with	the	help	of	varied	government	functionaries;	this	is	what	Gutiérrez	and	Vargas	refer	to	as	the	“possibility”	factor	(pp.	18-21).	 This	 subsection	helps	demonstrates	why	 simplistic	 notions	 of	wartime	plunder	 are	inadequate	for	explaining	and	understanding	violent	land	dispossession	in	Colombia.		Ex-paramilitary	commanders	themselves	have	claimed	that	the	“armed	structures”	were	 simply	 “the	 tip	 of	 the	 iceberg	 of	 the	 paramilitary	 phenomenon”.	 In	 order	 to	 truly	understand	 “land	 accumulation,	 usurpation	 and	 concentration	 of	 agrarian	 property,	violence	and	displacement	in	the	countryside,	and	the	resulting	social	injustice	against	the	peasant”,	they	explain,	it	is	necessary	to	look	below	the	surface	and	examine	the	role	of	other	actors,	 including:	 “politicians,	businesspeople,	high-level	 functionaries,	 large	contractors,	foreign	 investors	 and	 members	 of	 the	 Armed	 Forces”	 (communication	 with	 President	Santos	 from	2011,	 signed	by	Freddy	Rendón	Herrera	and	seven	other	ex-paramilitaries,	cited	 in	CNMH,	 2012c,	 pp.	 88–89).	 Four	 broad	 groups	were	 central	 to	 the	network	 that	facilitated	the	para-elite	land	grab;	in	what	follows	I	provide	an	overview	of	each,	explaining	their	specific	roles.		(i)	An	unknown	number	of	politicians	were	complicit,	whether	directly	or	indirectly,	in	the	para-elite	land	grab.	As	of	2012,	more	than	450	regional	and	local	politicians,	plus	200	congress	men	and	women,	were	under	investigation	or	had	been	charged	for	crimes	relating	 to	 ‘para-politics’	 (Verdad	 Abierta,	 2012c).	 The	 alliance	 between	 politicians	 and	paramilitaries	was	a	significant	enabler	of	land	dispossession	in	the	basic	sense	that	it	was	one	 among	 various	 factors	 that	 allowed	 the	 latter	 to	 continue	 operating.	 For	 example:	mayors	 (whether	 under	 threat	 or	 of	 their	 own	 volition)	 promised	 not	 to	 expose	 the	paramilitaries,	 ensured	 combatants	 could	 be	 treated	 at	 local	 hospitals,	 guaranteed	 the	cooperation	 of	 local	 police	 forces,	 and	 helped	 channel	 public	money	 to	 the	 unit	 and/or	commanders	(Gutiérrez	Sanín,	2015a,	pp.	137–144).	
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The	alliance	between	politicians,	paramilitaries	and	their	elite	sponsors	deterred	the	dispossessed	from	making	formal	complaints,	as	exemplified	in	this	excerpt	from	a	news	article:	“In	El	Dorado	[Meta]	nobody	dared	to	denounce	[what	was	happening]	since	the	paramilitaries	themselves	confessed	that	they	relied	on	the	complicity	of	the	-then-	Mayor	Euser	Rondón	[…]	some	of	the	meetings	between	politicians	and	paramilitaries	took	place	in	the	Casa	Roja	and	Azul	farms,	which	kept	growing	in	size	with	[the	addition	of	adjacent]	lands	usurped	by	the	Centauros”	Block	(cited	in	Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	p.	166).	There	are	similar	accounts	from	elsewhere	in	the	country	(Personal	Interviews,	2015;	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010).	Para-politicians	 also	 intervened	 more	 directly	 in	 the	 dispossession	 process.	 For	example,	they	helped	secure	funding	and	other	types	of	support	for	projects	operating	on	stolen	land,	organised	meetings	with	other	actors	involved	in	legalising	dispossession,	and	even	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 displaced	 to	 sell	 their	 lands.	 In	 a	 number	 of	 cases,	 politicians	and/or	 their	 family	 members	 were	 the	 direct	 beneficiaries	 of	 dispossession	 and	 more	generally	part	of	the	para-elite	that	enacted	the	land	grab	(CNMH,	2012c;	Verdad	Abierta,	2013b;	Quinche,	2016;	Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016;	Vargas	Reina,	2016b;	Gutiérrez	Sanín,	2015a,	 p.	 145	 and	 150;	 see	 also	 news	 reports	 on	 investigations	 against	 politicians	 for	involvement	in	land	dispossession	-	for	example:	Caracol	Radio,	2011a;	El	Tiempo,	2013b;	El	Meridiano,	2017;	Dinero,	2017).	Mayors	 and	 functionaries	 of	 the	 Mayor’s	 offices	 have	 been	 able	 to	 support	 the	usurpers	in	very	specific	ways,	given	their	responsibility	for	ordering	evictions.	There	are	multiple	cases	in	which	displaced	communities	or	families	obtained	judicial	sentences	in	their	 favour,	 but	 local	 authorities	 refused	 to	 implement	 orders	 to	 evict	 the	 current	occupants;	and/or	they	accepted	the	usurper’s	petitions	and	authorised	evictions	against	displaced	persons	who	had	returned	to	their	lands	(CIJP,	2008,	2012a,	pp.	5–8,	2016,	p.	25	and	47;	Ayola,	2015;	Vargas	Reina,	2016a,	p.	141;	El	Colombiano,	2017b).	There	are	suggestions	that	members	of	congress	also	used	their	specific	powers	as	legislators	to	facilitate	the	para-elite	land	grab,	by	putting	forward	and	voting	for	policies	that	favoured	the	beneficiaries	of	dispossession.	Examples	include:	a	law	to	bolster	the	bio-fuels	sector	and	other	subsidies	for	large-scale	agriculture,	the	defunct	Rural	Development	Statute,	the	Forestry	Law	(also	declared	unconstitutional)	and	the	elimination	of	UAF	land	ceiling	rules.	However,	at	present	research	on	this	topic	is	insufficient	to	make	categorical	claims	(CNMH,	2012c,	pp.	136–137).	In	general,	knowledge	of	the	role	politicians	played	in	paramilitary-backed	dispossession	is	still	relatively	limited.		
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Here	I	briefly	describe	just	one	case	of	politicians’	involvement	in	the	para-elite	land	grab.	In	2011	Óscar	de	Jesús	López	Cadavid,	ex-	congressman	and	Governor	of	Guaviare,	was	sentenced	to	seven	years	in	prison	for	‘conspiring’	with	the	paramilitaries.	In	addition	to	 other	 crimes,	 judges	 found	 that	 López	 acquired	 a	 farm	 that	 paramilitaries	 had	commandeered	from	the	original	owner	using	violence	and	threats.	A	 few	years	 later,	 in	2014,	the	authorities	seized	491	assets	belonging	to	the	ex-politician	and	his	cousin	Nebio	de	Jesús	Echeverry	Cadavid,	also	ex-Governor	of	Guaviare.	The	two	ex-governors	are	said	to	have	“amassed	this	fortune	thanks	to	their	alliance	with	the	paramilitaries	and	with	criminal	gangs	following	the	demobilisation	of	the	AUC”	(El	Tiempo,	2014a).	Among	the	seized	assets	were	dozens	of	rural	properties	“occupying	thousands	of	hectares	of	the	most	productive	land	 in	 Guaviare,	 Meta,	 Arauca	 and	 Guanía”,	 some	 of	 which	 are	 said	 to	 have	 been	“appropriated	[…]	from	peasants	displaced	by	the	paramilitaries	and	the	‘Erpac’	gang”	(ibid;	see	also	Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	pp.	167–168).	(ii)	Members	of	the	Armed	Forces	and	police	had	their	own	role	in	the	para-elite	land	grab.	Not	only	did	 they	 fail	 to	protect	people	 from	being	uprooted	and	 from	losing	 their	lands;	the	Armed	Forces	often	permitted	by	omission,	collaborated	with,	or	even	directly	participated	 in	 operations	 that	 caused	 displacement	 and	 enabled	 dispossession.	Furthermore,	 as	 with	 para-politics,	 the	 links	 between	 government	 forces	 and	 the	paramilitaries	 have	 also	 hindered	 denunciation;	 consider	 the	 implications	 of	 filing	 a	complaint	with	the	police	if	you	know	they	are	in	the	pocket	of	your	victimisers	(Personal	Interviews,	2015;	see	also	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	p.	186).	Quinche	(2016),	for	example,	documents	how	in	some	areas	of	Magdalena	“the	public	forces	were	in	favour	of	the	figureheads	and	demobilised”	paramilitaries	involved	in	usurpation	(pp.	96-97).		In	 some	 cases,	 government	 forces	 intervened	more	 directly	 in	 land	 grabbing.	 The	dispossession	of	the	Curvaradó	and	Jiguamiandó	communities	is	a	clear	example:	the	army	(1)	 participated	 alongside	 the	 paramilitaries	 in	 various	 operations	 that	 led	 to	 the	displacement	of	inhabitants	from	their	collective	territories	(2)	provided	security	for	the	usurpers	and	their	palm	crops/logging	operations,	(3)	actively	prevented	the	return	of	the	displaced	to	their	lands,	and	(4)	were	involved	in	pressuring	community	members	to	sell	their	land	or	generally	accept	the	occupation	(CIJP,	2005;	Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014).		(iii)	Notaries	 and	 registrars	 and	 other	 functionaries	 of	 Notary	 and	 Public	 Records	Offices	 have	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 legalising	 dispossession,	 due	 to	 negligence	 and/or	collusion.	 Notary	 Offices	 are	 in	 charge	 of	 drawing	 up	 public	 deeds;	 the	 legal	 document	through	 which	 property	 rights	 are	 transferred.	 They	 are	 responsible	 for	 verifying	 the	
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authenticity	of	the	documents	from	which	a	new	deed	is	derived.	Notaries	also	authorise	power	of	attorney	(POA)	documents,	which	allow	lands	to	be	transferred	without	the	seller	or	buyer	being	present.	Public	Records	Offices,	in	particular	the	registrars,	are	responsible	for	 the	national	 land	 register	 (without	 registration	 a	 deed	or	 titling	 resolution	does	not	confer	 property	 rights):	 updating	 existing	 property	 folios	 with	 ownership	 transfers,	restrictions,	 or	 clarification	 of	 boundaries,	 and	 creating	 new	 folios	when	 properties	 are	subdivided,	merged,	or	if	the	land	in	question	does	not	yet	exist	on	the	register.	So,	notaries	and	registrars	are	central	actors	within	the	Colombian	property	system	and	their	actions	(e.g.	creation	of	false	deeds	or	bogus	POA	documents,	registration	of	fake	titling	resolutions)	or	inactions	(e.g.	failure	to	double-check	the	authenticity	of	relevant	documents)	were	vital	to	the	para-elite	land	grab.	Registrars	also	contributed	(knowingly	or	not)	to	dispossession	by	failing	to	enforce	laws	designed	to	prevent	it.	It	is	worth	explaining	the	land	protection	system	briefly.	Law	387	 of	 1997	 ordered	 the	 INCORA	 to	 establish	 and	 administer	 a	 register	 of	 forcibly	abandoned	 lands	 (RUPTA);	 among	 other	 purposes,	 the	 register	 is	 supposed	 prevent	transactions	not	authorised	by	the	original	landholder	-	whether	he	or	she	is	legally	deemed	an	occupant,	possessor	or	proprietor	of	the	land	in	question103.	In	practice,	this	system	of	land	 protection	 has	 not	 always	 shielded	 against	 dispossession	partly	 because	 registrars	either	failed	to	make	the	required	annotations	in	the	folios	in	the	first	place	or	registered	public	 deeds	 or	 titling	 resolutions	 affecting	 lands	 that	 were	 supposed	 to	 be	 protected	
without	the	required	authorisation	(SNR,	2011e,	2011c,	2011a,	2011b).	
As	of	2011,	70	to	80	notaries	from	across	the	country	were	under	investigation	for	facilitating	dispossession	(El	Tiempo,	2011c).	And	the	ex-Superintendent	of	Notaries	and	Registries	 recounted	 deposing	 90	 functionaries,	 including	 registrars,	 for	 corruption	
between	2011	and	2017,	15	of	who	have	been	detained	(cited	in	H.	M.	Cárdenas,	2017).	I	have	not	found	any	comprehensive	data	on	how	many	such	functionaries	have	been	found	guilty	or	are	still	under	investigation	for	their	involvement	in	the	para-elite	land	grab,	but	media	and	government	reports	from	different	years	suggest	it	is	at	least	a	couple	dozen	(El	
                                                        103	 Land	 abandonment	 can	 cause	 loss	 of	 legal	 rights.	 Gaining	 title	 over	 private	 lands	 through	prescription,	for	example,	demands	uninterrupted	possession.	Though	the	rules	pertaining	to	baldíos	differ	(State	lands	are	imprescriptible),	proof	of	 long-term	occupation	is	a	requirement	for	titling.	Similarly,	 titling	 resolutions	 for	 State	 lands	may	be	 revoked	 if	 the	beneficiary	abandons	 the	plot.	Technically,	these	rules	should	not	apply	if	the	landholder	was	displaced	and	thus	forced	to	abandon	the	land.	Inclusion	in	the	official	register	(RUPTA)	is	a	form	of	proof	that	abandonment	was	due	to	force	majeure.	
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Tiempo,	2015b,	2012a,	2006c;	El	Espectador,	2012;	SNR,	2011a,	2011c;	Fiscalía	General	de	la	Nación,	2014,	pp.	9–11;	Canal	1,	2017).		It	should	be	said,	some	functionaries	may	have	assisted	the	para-elite	under	threat;	indeed,	a	number	of	registrars	have	been	murdered	or	forcibly	displaced	after	refusing	to	cooperate	with	the	paramilitaries	(El	Tiempo,	2006b).				 (iv)	 INCORA	 and	 INCODER	 functionaries	 also	 abetted	 the	 legalisation	 of	dispossession	in	a	number	of	ways.	They	pushed	through	irregular	titling	resolutions	for	State	 lands	 or	 helped	 forge	 bogus	 ones.	 They	 also	 revoked	 genuine	 titling	 resolutions	belonging	to	the	displaced	and	reallocated	the	land	in	question	to	paramilitaries	and	their	allies.	 Such	 practices	 have	 been	 documented	 in	 diverse	 locations,	 including:	 Meta,	Antioquia,	Chocó,	Sucre	and	Magdalena	(SNR,	2011b,	2011a,	2011c).	There	are	indications	that	 a	 few	 dozen	 INCORA/INCODER	 functionaries	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 racket.	 A	 news	report	from	2010,	titled	“the	para[military]	take-over	of	INCODER”,	affirms	that	the	institute	deposed	 26	 functionaries	 and	 suspended	 11	 in	 the	 space	 of	 just	 three	 years,	 and	 was	investigating	another	53	(El	Tiempo,	2010).	At	least	18	functionaries	and	ex-functionaries	of	INCORA	and	INCODER	have	been	captured	under	orders	of	the	Public	Prosecutors	since	
2011	(El	Espectador,	2011,	2014b;	El	Universal,	2016a).			 (v)	Other	 actors	 that	 facilitated	 or	 are	 accused	 of	 collusion	 in	 land	 dispossession	include:	 employees	 of	 the	 Colombian	 Agricultural	 Institute	 (ICA)	 and	 the	 state-backed	agricultural	 fund	 (FINAGRO);	 functionaries	 of	 the	 regional	 environmental	 corporations	(CorMagdalena,	 CodeChocó	 and	 CorpoUrabá)	 in	 charge	 of	 evaluating,	 controlling	 and	monitoring	the	ecological	impacts	of	economic	activities	within	their	jurisdiction;	bankers	and	lawyers;	and	-of	course-	individual	investors	and	businesses	(Caracol	Radio,	2011a;	El	Tiempo,	2012a;	CNMH,	2012c;	Quinche,	2016,	p.	102).	Examples	of	involvement	of	the	latter	group,	 as	 members	 of	 the	 para-elite	 or	 as	 secondary	 participants	 in	 the	 land	 grab,	 are	provided	below	and	in	the	subsequent	chapter.	Here	I	want	to	highlight	the	enabling	role	played	by	different	functionaries	-	in	this	case	from	the	environmental	authority	of	Chocó.	Paramilitary-backed	palm	oil	businesses	started	clearing	thousands	of	hectares	of	protected	forests	and	constructing	drainage	channels	in	the	territories	of	Curvaradó	and	Jiguamiandó	(lands	 they	 had	 taken	 over	 by	 force)	 without	 the	 required	 permissions,	 but	 instead	 of	launching	an	investigation	and	taking	actions	to	halt	the	ecological	destruction,	Codechocó	proceeded	to	legitimate	the	usurpation	by	approving	an	‘Environmental	Management	Plan’.	This	was	in	2004,	after	the	Inter-American	Court	of	Human	Rights	and	the	Ombudsman’s	Office	 had	 condemned	 the	 displacement	 and	 dispossession	 of	 the	 communities	 who	collectively	own	the	affected	lands	(CIJP,	2005,	pp.	108–110	and	134–138).	
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Economic	‘development’	policies	and	violent	land	grabs:	a	symbiotic	relationship		Much	of	the	land	usurped	by	paramilitaries	was/is	used	for	illicit	business	operations:	to	form/control	trafficking	routes	for	drugs	and	weapons,	plant	coca	crops,	establish	cocaine	laboratories,	 build	 private	 airplane	 landing	 strips	 and	 for	 unofficial	 mining	 operations.	Many	 commandeered	 farms	 were	 also	 converted	 into	 paramilitary	 bases	 and	 training	camps	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	p.	124;	Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	pp.	165–166;	Quinche,	2016,	p.	105;	Vargas	Reina,	2016b,	p.	51).	However,	the	interests	implicated	in	the	land	grabs	go	beyond	the	shadow	economy	and	the	armed	groups’	military	objectives.		On	the	one	hand,	the	usurpers	commonly	sold	the	land	on	to	‘reputable’	businesses	and	investors	for	a	profit.	This	usually	involved	a	complex	chain	of	transactions,	designed	to	disguise	the	history	of	the	plot.	Some	buyers	were	unaware	of	the	bloody	saga	behind	the	land	they	purchased,	some	knew	and	actively	tried	to	distance	themselves	from	that	history,	and	others	were	part	of	the	racket.	On	the	other	hand,	the	paramilitaries	and	their	allies	were	often	directly	 involved	 in	establishing	economic	projects	on	 land	usurped	 from	the	displaced.	Elites	had	a	 lot	 to	gain	 from	usurpation,	as	preferential	access	 to	government	subsidies	and	special	credit	schemes	allowed	them	to	put	the	stolen	land	to	productive	use	relatively	easily.	The	paramilitaries,	 for	 their	part,	 either	stood	 to	gain	directly	 from	the	business	venture	or	benefitted	indirectly	by	nurturing	relations	with	powerful	individuals	or	groups.	Gutiérrez	and	Vargas	(2016)	call	this	the	“incentives”	explanation.	In	general,	the	State’s	economic	model	has	incentivised,	facilitated	and	been	served	by	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab	 (see	 also	 Ballvé,	 2013;	 Grajales,	 2013,	 2011).	 Demobilised	commanders	themselves	affirmed	that	one	of	their	objectives	was	to	rebuild	the	economy	and	to	bring	investors	to	regions	that,	according	to	them,	were	un-	or	under-	developed	as	a	 result	 of	 the	 insurgency	 (see	 e.g.	 CNMH,	 2012c,	 pp.	 86,	 90).	 A	 year	 before	 his	disappearance	 in	 2006,	 the	 notorious	 paramilitary	 commander	 Vicente	 Castaño	 told	reporters:	“In	Urabá	we	have	palm	cultivations.	I	myself	found	the	businessmen	to	invest	in	those	projects,	which	are	durable	and	productive.	The	idea	is	to	bring	the	rich	to	different	zones	of	the	country	to	invest	in	this	type	of	project.	Once	you	bring	the	rich	to	these	zones,	the	State	institutions	arrive.	Unfortunately,	State	institutions	only	move	these	things	along	when	the	rich	are	there”	(cited	in	Semana,	2005).	Ironically,	this	quote	signals	clearly	the	State’s	bias	in	favour	of	elite-led	development,	which	the	paramilitaries	helped	advance.	
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Here	I	focus	on	agriculture	and	forestry;	the	subsequent	chapter	discusses	mining,	oil	and	 infrastructure	 projects.	 Dispossession	 often	 resulted	 in	 visible	 land	 use	 changes,	 as	natural	forests	and	 ‘traditional’	peasant	cultivations	were	replaced	by	pasture,	 industrial	monocrops	 and	 tree	 farms	 (CNMH,	 2012c,	 p.	 65).	 Documented	 cases	 have	 involved,	 for	example:	cacao,	rubber,	banana	and	plantain	cultivations		(see	e.g.	CNMH,	2012c;	Defensoría	del	Pueblo,	2007;	Vargas	Reina,	2016b,	2016a)	and	above	all	cattle	ranching104,	oil	palm105	and	timber	plantations106.	These	are	precisely	the	types	of	land	use	that	the	government	has	been	promoting	in	discourse	and	in	practice.	They	match	the	list	of	“prioritised	products”	targeted	 in	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Rural	Development’s	2006	15-year	plan.	The	declared	goals	include,	among	other	things:	to	extend	timber	plantations	from	220,703	to	1,429,613	hectares	between	2006	and	2020,	to	triple	the	area	planted	with	oil	palm,	nearly	double	the	number	of	hectares	used	for	cacao	and	export	plantain	and	quadruple	the	rubber	cultivation	area	–	over	 the	 same	period.	The	document	also	 states	an	aim	 to	double	 the	number	of	cattle	 from	just	over	25.6	million	to	51.4	million	 ‘heads’,	while	 increasing	the	average	 ‘stocking	 rate’	 from	0.65	 to	1.3	animals	per	hectare	 (MADR,	2006,	pp.	20–100).	Based	on	the	above	figures,	it	can	be	deduced	that	the	plan	supposes	a	very	slight	increase	(taking	into	account	the	new	‘stocking	rate’)	in	the	area	used	for	cattle	ranching,	from	39.4	to	just	over	39.5	million	hectares	–	this	is	particularly	remarkable,	as	explained	below.		In	order	to	encourage	these	land	use	changes,	the	2006	plan	established	new	targeted	support	measures	and	the	maintenance	and/or	expansion	of	existing	incentives,	including	access	 to	 favourable	 government-backed	 loans	 (via	 FINAGRO)	 and	 subsidised	 insurance	policies;	investment	grants	and	tax	exemptions;	specially-designed	public-funded	research;	plus	 assistance	 with	 meeting	 phytosanitary	 standards,	 marketing,	 and	 other	 activities	aimed	at	gaining	a	foothold	in	international	markets	(MADR,	2006,	pp.	5–18).			
                                                        104	 Examples	 of	 cattle-ranching	 on	 usurped	 land	 in:	 Antioquia	 (Vargas	 Reina,	 2016b,	 p.	 77),	Magdalena	(Quinche,	2016,	p.	88	and	105),	Chocó	(Vargas	Reina,	2016a,	pp.	138–139),	Meta	(Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	p.	164)	and	Casanare	(Verdad	Abierta,	2011b).	105	Examples	of	oil	palm	cultivations	on	usurped	land	in:	Becerril,	César	(I.	Rodríguez	&	Navarrete,	2017);	Mapiripán,	Meta	(El	Tiempo,	2014d;	Verdad	Abierta,	2012b);	Maní,	Casanare	(Verdad	Abierta,	2011b;	 El	 Tiempo,	 2014d);	 El	 Peñón,	 Bolívar	 (Ayola,	 2015;	 Verdad	Abierta,	 2017b);	 Tibú,	 North	Santander	(Uribe	Kaffure,	2014,	pp.	260–267);	Pedeguita-Mancilla,	Chocó	(Vargas	Reina,	2016b,	p.	139)	and	Jigumiandó	and	Curvaradó	(CIJP,	2005),	also	in	Chocó.	106	Examples	of	timber	plantations	on	usurped	land	in:	Chivolo,	Magdalena	(Quinche,	2016,	p.	88);	Riosucio,	Chocó	(Vargas	Reina,	2016a,	p.	138)	and	Turbo,	Antioquia	(Vargas	Reina,	2016b,	p.	73).	
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Oil	palm,	cacao	and	rubber	are	explicitly	targeted	by	the	ICR	subsidy	scheme	(pre-dating	this	policy	document),	which	offers	grants	for	between	20%	and	40%	of	investment	costs,	to	be	discounted	from	the	amount	owed	on	FINAGRO	loans.	These	same	crops	are	also	exempt	from	income	tax	(renta	liquida)	for	ten	years	after	production	begins.	The	biofuels	sector	benefits	from	additional	tax	exemptions	and	funds	for	the	construction	of	processing	plants.	Companies/individuals	engaged	in	the	cultivation	of	export	banana	and	plantain,	as	well	as	cattle	raising	for	beef	and	dairy	production	are	also	eligible	for	special	credits	and	certain	 types	 of	 ICR	 grants	 (MADR,	 2006,	 pp.	 7–100).	 In	 addition	 to	 ICR	 grants,	 tree	plantations	 may	 also	 benefit	 from	 the	 Forestry	 Incentive	 Certificate	 (CIF)	 initiative,	launched	in	1994,	which	includes:	subsidies	for	50%	to	75%	of	initial	investment	costs,	as	well	 as	 50%	 of	maintenance	 costs	 between	 year	 2-5	 of	 production,	 a	 30%	 discount	 on	income	tax	for	firms	and	individuals	who	make	direct	investments	in	new	plantations	and	tax	 exemptions	 for	 incomes	 derived	 from	 “the	 exploitation	 of	 new	 forestry	 plantations,	including	 the	 sawmills	 linked	 to	 these	 plantations	 and	 the	 sale	 of	 carbon	 capture	certificates”	(MADR,	2006,	p.	13).	There	 is	no	comprehensive	data	on	how	many	projects	established	on	stolen	 land	received	State	support;	however,	a	quick	overview	of	a	few	high-profile	cases	provides	an	indication	of	the	problem.	It	is	worth	noting	that	different	forms	of	State	support	not	only	incentivised	and	facilitated	the	implementation	of	projects	established	on	usurped	land;	it	also	provided	a	veneer	of	legitimacy	to	these	investments.		Three	of	the	paramilitary-backed	palm	oil	businesses	that	operated	on	land	usurped	from	 the	 Jiguamiandó	 and	 Curvaradó	 communities	 secured	 FINAGRO-backed	 loans	(between	2001-2005)	totalling	around	5.2	million	USD.	One	of	these	firms	also	obtained	ICR	subsidies	to	the	tune	of	an	estimated	1.16	million	USD	(Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014,	pp.	172,	 195,	 205,	 209,	 335–336).	 Government-backed	 funding	 continued	 for	 several	 years	
after	public	denunciations	against	these	firms	appeared	in	reports	by	the	Inter-American	Court	of	Human	Rights	and	the	National	Ombudsman’s	Office	(CIJP,	2005,	pp.	115–117).		Similarly,	 para-businessman	 Tuto	 Castro	 received	 an	 estimated	 127,000	 USD	 in	government	 subsidies	between	2004	and	2006,	before	and	after	his	demobilisation	as	a	member	of	the	AUC	North	Block,	in	particular	via	the	Forestry	Incentive	Certificate	(CIF)	initiative,	allowing	him	to	establish	tree	plantations	on	lands	taken	from	the	displaced	(El	Tiempo,	2012b;	see	also	Quinche,	2016).		
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Likewise,	 the	 Córdoba	 Cattle	 Ranching	 Fund,	 a	 company	 part	 owned	 (20%)	 by	government	 entities,	was	 granted	 approximately	419,000	USD	 in	CIF	 subsidies	between	2007	 and	2009	 for	 tree	plantations	 (Contraloría,	 2012,	 pp.	 23–25)	 established	on	 lands	acquired	 through	 force	and	 fraud	(Fiscalía	General	de	 la	Nación,	2014,	2015).	There	are	indications	 that	 another	 four	 tree	plantation	 companies	 -Procaucho	del	Norte	de	Urabá,	Caucho	San	Pedro,	La	Gironda	de	Urabá	and	El	Indio	de	Urabá-	entangled	with	the	para-elite,	two	of	which	leased	stolen	land	from	above-mentioned	Fund,	also	received	subsidies	(this	is	implied	in	a	Ministry	of	Agriculture	document	and	report).	In	any	case,	government	money	is	implicated	since	CorpoUrabá	(a	public	entity)	is	a	shareholder	in	three	of	these	firms,	while	 INCUAGRO	 (a	public-private	 venture	 established	with	 loans	 from	 the	 Inter-American	Development	Bank	as	part	of	the	Presidency’s	program	to	combat	illicit	crops),	is	the	majority	shareholder	in	all	four	(Dinero,	2003;	Unidad	de	Restitución	de	Tierras,	2014,	pp.	20–24).	The	four	firms	led	strategic	alliance	projects	(backed	by	USAID)	organised	by	the	paramilitary	NGO	Asocomún107	(Unidad	de	Restitución	de	Tierras,	2014;	Ballvé,	2013).	In	sum,	the	para-elite	land	grab	served	and	was	served	by	the	government’s	economic	development	programs.	Interestingly,	a	lawyer	defending	someone	implicated	in	the	para-elite	 land	 grab	 tried	 to	 absolve	 his	 client	 (among	 other	ways)	 by	 arguing	 that	 the	 “the	government	 impulsed	 and	 stimulated	 the	 planting	 of	 oil	 palm	 in	 Curvaradó	 and	Jiguamiandó,	since	this	would	bring	progress	to	the	zone”	(Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014,	p.	84).	He	noted	 that	 INCODER	 functionaries	advised	 the	communities	 to	 form	 ‘strategic	alliances’	 with	 the	 companies	 (ibid)	 –	 this	 after	 the	 usurpers	 had	 failed	 to	 legalise	 the	occupation	 by	 other	means.	 As	 highlighted	 above,	 the	 para-elite	 had	 a	 vast	 network	 of	support;	 arguably,	 in	 addition	 to	 possible	 personal	 interests,	 some	 favoured	 the	 land	grabbers	because	they	saw	the	resulting	land	use	changes	as	positive.	
                                                        107	Asocomún	was	one	of	a	number	of	paramilitary-backed	NGOs	that	helped	advance	the	para-elite’s	agenda.	Asocomún	maintained	a	veneer	of	legitimacy	and	was	able	to	secure	contracts,	funds	and	support	 from	diverse	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	Mayor’s	Offices	 of	Necoclí	 and	Turbo,	 the	 national	government’s	 Social	 Action	 program,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	 the	 National	 Learning	 Service	(SENA),	 among	 others.	 The	 congressman	 César	 Andrade,	 found	 guilty	 of	 para-politics,	 awarded	Asocomún	the	“Simón	Bolívar	Democratic	Order”	 in	“recognition	of	 its	social	development	work”.	Asocomún	 also	 managed	 to	 get	 one	 of	 its	 projects	 included	 in	 the	 government’s	 Familias	
Guardabosques	program	(with	the	help	of	another	ex-congressman	Ramón	Antonio	Valencia	Duque,	also	 found	 guilty	 of	 para-politics),	 which	 is	 endorsed	 by	 the	 UNODC	 (Unidad	 de	 Restitución	 de	Tierras,	2014,	p.	19;	Verdad	Abierta,	2011c).	Ironically,	Asocomún	was	founded	and	run	by	John	Jairo	Rendón	Herrera,	ex-paramilitary	commander	Freddy	Rendón’s	brother	and,	according	to	journalists,	himself	an	“AUC	chief”.	He	was	wanted	in	the	USA	for	narcotrafficking	and	terrorism	charges	and	handed	himself	over	to	the	Panamanian	authorities	in	2009	but	was	repatriated	to	Colombia	after	serving	just	two	years.	As	of	2014,	Rendón	was	said	to	be	‘on	the	run’	(El	Tiempo,	2014c,	2011b).	
  
242	
One	qualification	deserves	discussion	before	proceeding.	There	are	indications	that	many	coercive	acquisitions	were	primarily	speculative,	especially	given	that	a	significant	proportion	of	usurped	land	was	turned	into	pasture	(given	the	paucity	of	reliable	data,	this	is	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	quantify).	As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	extensive	cattle	grazing	is	a	comparatively	low-value	land	use,	which	in	many	regards	presents	an	obstacle	to	capital	accumulation	and	capitalist	development	in	Colombia.	Indeed,	Gutiérrez	and	Vargas	(2016)	suggest	this	is	one	reason	that	economic	policy	should	not	be	treated	as	a	key	explanatory	factor	 behind	 violent	 land	 grabbing	 in	 Colombia:	 “dispossession	 can	 be	 associated	with	macro-projects	and	the	dynamics	of	export	economies,	but	also	with	other	very	backward	[dynamics…]	like	extensive	cattle	grazing”	(p.	3).		Nevertheless,	I	see	this	as	a	qualification	and	not	an	objection	to	my	overall	argument	for	three	main	reasons.	First,	speculative	land	accumulation,	despite	posing	an	obstacle	to	economic	 growth,	 is	 a	 feature	 of	 many	 capitalist	 economies	 (hence	 the	 contradictions	emphasised	in	Chapter	2),	which	arguably	is	accentuated	by	financialisation	and	neoliberal	land	 regimes.	 Second,	 as	 discussed	 earlier,	 the	 Colombian	 government	 continues	 to	subsidise	and	encourage	cattle-ranching	and	sees	beef	and	dairy	as	key	potential	areas	of	export	growth	(see	also	El	Tiempo,	2001b).	State	officials	have	been	pushing	to	open	further	foreign	markets	(e.g.	seeking	authorisation	from	Israeli	and	Chinese	sanitary	officials)	for	beef	producers	(El	Espectador,	2018b).	So,	despite	being	comparatively	‘inefficient’,	cattle	ranching	is	part	of	the	State’s	export-driven	growth	strategy.	Third,	arguably,	it	is	partially	because	the	government	has	been	unwilling	to	tackle	inefficient	land	use	and	speculative	hoarding	by	 elites	 that	 land	pressures	 from	other	 sectors	 get	passed	onto	 smallholders.	Consider	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture’s	plan	cited	above:	it	might	have	proposed	incentives	to	convert	huge	cattle	haciendas	into	tree	plantations	or	agribusiness	estates,	but	it	actually	suggests	that	total	pastureland	should	increase	very	slightly,	albeit	used	more	intensively.	On	the	whole,	then,	the	fact	that	a	significant	proportion	of	usurped	land	is/was	used	for	cattle	grazing	does	not	undermine	my	claim	that	 the	Colombian	governments’	economic	policies	have	incentivised,	facilitated	and	been	served	by	violent	land	grabs.		
2)	Mechanisms	of	dispossession:	displacement,	legalisation	and	land	laundering	This	 section	describes	 and	disaggregates	 various	mechanisms	 of	 dispossession.	 It	 starts	with	a	brief	explanation	of	the	role	of	forced	displacement	and	then	focuses	on	the	various	methods	used	for	legalising	or	otherwise	legitimising	land	theft.	The	then	Superintendent	
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of	Notaries	and	Registries,	Jorge	Enrique	Vélez,	discovered	more	than	“65	juridical	tricks”	used	 in	 the	 land	racket	(cited	 in	H.	M.	Cárdenas,	2017).	This	section	 includes	 -but	 is	not	limited	to-	some	of	these	‘juridical	tricks’.	The	categories	used	for	convenience	below	are	not	mutually	exclusive	and	cannot	always	be	neatly	separated.	A	single	case	may	involve	multiple	 strategies.	 Furthermore,	 some	 of	 these	 strategies	 have	 also	 been	 used	 by	individuals	 and	 companies	 not	 involved	 with	 paramilitaries	 and	 thus	 are	 not	 always	combined	with	violence	–	i.e.	not	all	of	them	are	exclusive	to	the	para-elite	land	grab.		The	goal	of	providing	a	detailed	account	of	these	mechanisms	is	to	facilitate	a	clear	explanation	of	how	coercive	dispossession	actually	occurs	and	its	relation	to	displacement.	This	 section	 also	 provides	 evidence	 for	 various	 broader	 arguments.	 First,	 it	 elucidates	further	why	the	para-elite	land	grab	does	not	fit	standard	notions	of	wartime	plunder	and	the	importance	of	wider	networks	in	operationalising	dispossession.	Second,	it	shows	that	the	land	grabbers	skilfully	exploited	property	rights	rules	and	institutions,	rather	than	their	collapse.	 Third,	 it	 demonstrates	 why	 land	 titles	 are	 insufficient	 protection	 against	dispossession,	while	also	indicating	how	property	rights	(especially	but	not	only	inalienable	collective	titles)	can	act	as	a	barrier	to	land	grabbing	under	certain	conditions.	Finally,	 it	indicates	why	‘technical	fixes’	(specific	laws	and	procedures)	are	insufficient	on	their	own	to	prevent	dispossession.			(i)	Forced	displacement	as	a	mechanism	of	land	dispossession	The	dispossession	process	often	began	with	mass	forced	displacements,	in	which	hundreds	or	even	thousands	of	people	fled	from	a	paramilitary	incursion	-	sometimes	carried	out	in	conjunction	with	or	just	after	a	State-led	military	operation.	In	some	cases,	evidence	clearly	suggests	the	violence	was	motivated	by	economic	interests	in	the	land.	For	example,	in	the	case	 of	 the	 recurring	 forcible	 displacements	 in	 Jiguamiandó	 and	Curvaradó,	 even	Public	Prosecutors	 concluded	 these	 “were	 aimed	 at	 acquiring,	 through	 irregular	 methods,	 the	lands	belonging	to	the	members	of	the	Afro-Colombian	communities”	(cited	in	Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	 2014,	 pp.	 20–21,	 emphasis	 added).	However,	 it	 is	 usually	 difficult	 to	 know	whether	the	land	occupation	was	the	original	purpose	of	the	violence	or	whether	the	para-elites	decided	to	take	over	the	land	after	the	displacement	had	occurred.	Either	way,	they	frequently	employed	violence	and	intimidation	to	prevent	the	displaced	from	returning	and	to	pressure	them	into	selling	their	abandoned	lands	(see	e.g.	Quinche,	2016;	Vargas	Reina,	2016b,	2016a;	Uribe	Kaffure,	2014).		
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Aside	 from	 the	 role	 of	mass	 forced	 displacements	 in	 facilitating	 land	 grabs,	 some	communities	 were	 drained	 ‘drop	 by	 drop’.	 Also,	 the	 paramilitaries	 often	 used	 targeted	violence	 to	 selectively	 displace	 particular	 families.	 Individuals	 considered	 subversive	 or	accused	 of	 collaborating	 with	 the	 guerrilla	 were	 usually	 the	 victims	 of	 these	 targeted	displacements,	as	well	as	families	who	lived	on	particularly	sought-after	land	(see	e.g.	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010;	CNMH,	2012c;	Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016).	The	sequence	is	similar	 to	 that	 already	 described:	 threats	 or	 violence	 lead	 to	 forced	 displacement,	paramilitaries	or	their	allies	occupy	the	abandoned	land,	and	then	attempt	to	legalise	this	occupation	ex	post	facto.	As	 depicted	 above,	 physical	 and	 legal	 usurpation	 followed	 a	 process	 of	 mass	 or	selective	 forced	 displacement.	 However,	 occasionally	 this	 was	 imposed	 almost	simultaneously;	the	paramilitaries	would	give	the	order	to	‘sell’	and	vacate	at	the	same	time.	In	such	 instances,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 interest	 in	 the	 land	was	the	main	reason	 for	 the	 forced	displacement,	as	exemplified	by	the	following	testimony	from	Caldas:		[A	 friend	 of	mine]	 had	 an	 enormous	 farm	 […	 but]	 they	 [the	 paramilitaries]	called	the	man	and	they	told	him:	“Ok,	you	know	who	we	are,	right?	So,	have	this	Toyota	and	these	2	million	pesos	[equivalent	to	1,000	USD	at	the	time],	and	get	out	of	here”.	About	two	months	after	giving	him	the	Toyota,	they	told	him	to	hand	the	car	over.	They	took	it	from	him.	It	was	an	old	Toyota.	That	farm	was	immense;	it	had	crops	and	cattle.	[Me:	and	they	only	gave	him	2	million	pesos?]	Yep:	“here	have	this”.	 […]	They	called	him,	and	they	said:	 “The	 farm	is	ours,	have	this”.	And	he	knew	who	he	was	dealing	with.	[…]	He’s	not	going	to	claim	[his	land	via	the	restitution	process].	I	have	sought	him	out	and	he	says:	“I’m	not	 going	 to	 get	 myself	 killed,	 I	 know	 who	 those	 people	 are”	 (Personal	Interview,	2015).			Javier*	who	told	me	this	story	wasn’t	sure	if	his	friend	had	transferred	the	land	title	to	the	paramilitaries	or	what	happened	to	the	property	rights	over	this	farm.	But	in	other	cases,	the	paramilitaries	forced	victims	to	sign	over	their	land	rights	before	or	at	the	time	of	their	displacement	and	thus	achieved	the	first	step	in	 legalising	the	theft	almost	 immediately.	Javier’s*	father,	who	owned	land	in	the	Valle	department,	experienced	this	first	hand.	The	Calima	Block	of	the	AUC	began	to	harass	him	in	order	to	pressure	a	sale.	The	first	purchase	
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offer	came	after	they	broke	into	his	home.	A	second	and	third	offer	followed	the	theft	of	his	cattle.	 The	 man	 would	 not	 give	 in.	 Eventually,	 he	 was	 summoned	 to	 a	 meeting.	 The	paramilitaries	had	abducted	one	of	his	sons;	he	signed	the	papers	transferring	the	land.				(ii)	 De-facto	 land	 occupations:	 As	 noted	 above,	 physical	 takeover	 is	 often	 followed	 or	accompanied	 by	 efforts	 to	 legalise	 the	 occupation.	 However,	 sometimes	 dispossession	doesn’t	 get	 past	 this	 stage	 (see	 e.g.	Uribe	Kaffure,	 2014,	 p.	 269;	Quinche,	 2016,	 p.	 100).	Usurpers	may	be	less	likely	to	make	their	possession	official	if	the	land	in	question	is	used	for	coca	production	and	other	illicit	ventures.	Evidence	suggests	that	de-facto	occupations	have	 been	 especially	 common	 in	 indigenous	 and	 Afro	 territories.	 As	 explained	 earlier,	collective	 titles	 are	 officially	 inalienable,	 making	 it	 particularly	 difficult	 (though	 not	impossible)	for	the	usurpers	to	secure	property	rights	over	such	lands.	In	Putumayo,	 for	example,	armed	gangs	imposed	unofficial	gold	mining	operations	within	resguardo	land.	A	Nasa	leader	of	one	community	asked	workers	to	leave	the	area,	but	he	was	told	“not	to	insist	because	they	[presumably,	their	bosses]	are	very	dangerous	people”	(Personal	Interviews,	2015).	 Black	market	 timber	 operations	 function	 in	 a	 similar	way;	 however,	 these	 often	overlap	 with	 (and	 are	 sometimes	 indistinguishable	 from)	 apparently	 legal	 tree	 felling.	Technically,	 logging	 firms	 require	 formal	 authorisation	 from	 the	 communities	 who	collectively	own	the	affected	lands,	as	well	as	environmental	permits	from	the	State,	but	the	former	 requirement	 is	 often	 ignored.	 For	 example,	Maderas	 del	 Darién	 S.A.	 -a	 firm	 that	formed	alliances	with	the	paramilitaries-	has	engaged	in	industrial	logging	ventures	on	Afro	and	 indigenous	 lands	 in	 Chocó,	 without	 authorisation	 from	 the	 relevant	 community	authorities	(CIJP,	2012b;	see	also	Mejia,	2009).			(iii)	 Forced	 transfers	 of	 ownership	 or	 coerced	 sales:	 Many	 private	 property	 titles	 were	transferred	 under	 coercion	 following	 direct	 threats,	 the	 murder	 of	 family	 members,	 or	literally	at	gunpoint.	This	type	of	forced	transaction	-at	extremely	low	prices108	or	without	payment	at	all-	is	epitomised	by	the	paramilitary	maxim	‘sell	or	we	will	negotiate	with	your	widow’.	 In	some	cases,	 the	 forced	sale	was	 imposed	at	 the	same	time	as,	or	prior	to,	 the	displacement;	 in	 others,	 the	 usurpers	 contacted	 the	 titleholder	 after	 they	 had	 been	
                                                        108	 For	 example,	 the	 SNR	 reports	 that	 at	 least	 40	 of	 the	 plots	 purchased	 by	 the	 Córdoba	 Cattle	Ranching	Fund	were	acquired	for	less	than	$50,000	per	hectare	and	for	as	low	as	$10,000	per	ha;	this	is	between	$4	and	$50	USD	depending	on	the	year	(not	indicated)	and	hence	the	exchange	rate.	
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uprooted.	In	Chocó	and	the	Urabá	region	of	Antioquia,	for	example,	the	paramilitaries	and	their	business	allies	employed	land	brokers	to	seek	out	the	displaced	and	pressure	them	to	sell.	 Often	 the	 usurpers	 offered	 to	 buy	 lands	 they	 had	 already	 occupied	 (El	 Espectador,	2014a;	El	Heraldo,	2014;	Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014;	Unidad	de	Restitución	de	Tierras,	2014).	 Coerced	 land	 transfers	 have	 been	 documented	 across	 Colombia:	 from	 Caldas,	Putumayo	 and	 Valle	 to	 Magdalena,	 Antioquia,	 Chocó,	 Casanare,	 Meta	 and	 Santander	(Personal	Interviews	2014-2015;	Quinche,	2016,	p.	104;	Vargas	Reina,	2016b,	pp.	71–74	;	Verdad	Abierta,	2011b;	El	Tiempo,	2014d;	Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	pp.	164–169;	Uribe	Kaffure,	2014,	p.	269).	It	is	worth	emphasising	that	forced	(discussed	here)	and	fraudulent	(discussed	below)	 	 transfer	strategies	often	overlap,	since	 the	para-elite	 frequently	used	fabricated	POA	documents109	to	finalise	the	legalisation	process	in	cases	where	people	had	been	 forced	 to	 sign	 papers	 ceding	 property	 or	 possession	 rights	 (Fiscalía	 General	 de	 la	Nación,	 2014,	 p.	 9;	 Vargas	 Reina,	 2016b,	 pp.	 71–72).	 However,	 in	 a	 few	 cases,	 the	paramilitaries	 actually	 obligated	 their	 victims	 to	 go	 personally	 to	 the	Notary	Office	 and	hence	legalise	the	transfer	themselves	(Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	pp.	163,	168).		(iv)	Fraudulent	transfers	of	ownership:	Some	displaced	families	who	never	sold	their	land	later	 discovered	 (e.g.	 upon	 soliciting	 protection	 for	 their	 property)	 that	 their	 title	 was	registered	in	someone	else’s	name	(see	e.g.	Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014).	This	was	usually	achieved	using	forged	power	of	attorney	(POA)	documents	and	deeds.	In	a	number	of	cases,	the	legitimate	landholders,	who	allegedly	signed	documents	transferring	their	properties,	were	actually	deceased	at	the	time	of	the	transfer110.	For	example:	Porfilde	Galván	Guerra	died	in	June	1993,	but	supposedly	signed	a	power	of	attorney	document	in	May	2005,	which	allowed	paramilitary	agents	to	sell	his	farm	(Verdad	Abierta,	2012a).	Similarly,	Hernando	Cardona	Higuita	was	murdered	in	December	1997;	nevertheless,	he	supposedly	travelled	
                                                        109	 In	 some	 cases,	 people	 were	 obligated	 to	 sign	 POAs	 or	 blank	 documents,	 meaning	 that	 the	signatures	 themselves	were	 not	 always	 forged.	 However,	 unless	 the	 victim	 actually	 went	 to	 the	Notary	Office	 to	 validate	 the	POA,	 then	 the	 required	 authentication	was	 faked,	 achieved	 through	impersonation,	or	provided	by	a	dishonest	notary.	For	example:	69	of	the	105	properties	acquired	by	the	Córdoba	Cattle	Ranching	Fund	were	transferred	using	POA	documents	allegedly	granted	to	Sor	Teresa	Gómez	Álvarez	-	jailed	since	2013.	Many	of	these	documents	contained	clear	irregularities	(SNR,	2011a,	p.	5,	2011d,	p.	51).	Public	Prosecutors	allege	that	the	Notary,	Miguel	Francisco	Puche,	authenticated	the	illegitimate	POA	documents	and	elaborated	the	public	deeds	(Fiscalía	General	de	la	Nación,	2014,	p.	9).	110	In	addition	to	the	two	cases	mentioned	in	the	main	text	from	the	Urabá	region	of	Antioquia,	four	further	 cases	 like	 this	 have	been	documented	 in	 Jiguamiandó	 and	Curvaradó	 -	 Chocó	 (INCODER,	2012;	Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014).	It	is	likely	this	‘method’	was	also	used	in	other	regions.	
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to	a	Notary	in	Carepa	in	the	year	2000	to	transfer	his	property,	which	now	form	part	of	the	thousands	of	hectares	owned	by	the	firm	Palmas	y	Ganados	S.A.	(Yhobán	Camilo,	2016).	The	assistance	of	corrupt	notaries	was	essential	to	this	method	of	dispossession.	Consider,	for	example,	that	a	POA	document	is	only	valid	if	it	has	been	authorised	by	a	Notary	and	that	the	person	granting	the	‘power’	must	solicit	this	authorisation	in	person.		
	(v)	‘Administrative	dispossession’	or	revocation/reallocation	of	titles:	INCORA	or	INCODER	officials	revoked	titles	that	had	been	granted	to	reform	beneficiaries,	on	the	grounds	that	title-holders	had	abandoned	the	land	or	had	fallen	behind	with	loan	payments,	despite	the	fact	that	they	had	been	forcibly	displaced	and,	as	such,	should	have	been	exempted	-by	law-	from	the	usual	conditions	attached	to	government	land	grants.	They	often	reallocated	these	titles	 to	 individuals	 implicated	 in	 this	 forced	 displacement,	 including	 paramilitaries	 and	their	allies.	In	2003,	in	the	department	of	Magdalena,	INCORA	revoked	134	titles,	amidst	a	regional	forced	displacement	crisis,	and	without	notifying	the	affected	landowners.	Quinche	(2016)	provides	multiple	examples	which	suggest	that	the	administrative	procedures	were	part	of	a	well-planned	land	grabbing	strategy	(p.	107-111;	see	also	Verdad	Abierta,	2011a).	In	a	handful	of	cases,	the	original	reform	beneficiaries	were	forced	to	sell	or	rent	informally	and	 the	 transfer	 was	 later	 completed	 through	 the	 revocation	 and	 reallocation	 process	(Quinche,	 2016,	 p.	 107;	 SNR,	 2012);	 in	 other	 words,	 coerced	 sales	 and	 administrative	dispossession	 were	 combined.	 Similar	 tactics	 have	 been	 documented	 elsewhere	 in	 the	country	(SNR,	2011d,	p.	15	and	29–30;	see	also	Vargas	Reina,	2016b).		(vi)	Formal	titling	of	usurped	baldíos	or	lands	acquired	by	INCORA/INCODER:	Many	of	the	displaced	were	not	 legal	owners	of	 the	 land	they	had	 formerly	 farmed,	but	occupants	of	
baldíos,	 abandoned	 private	 lands,	 or	 properties	 that	 had	 been	 acquired	 by	INCORA/INCODER	 for	 redistribution.	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 act	 of	 displacement	 and	 re-occupation	was	in	itself	an	important	step	in	legalising	the	theft	since	continuous	use	and	occupancy	 of	 a	 plot	 is	 usually	 a	 prerequisite	 in	 titling	 applications111.	 As	 suggested	 by	
                                                        111	Article	69	of	Law	160	states	that	applicants	must	be	able	to	prove	occupation	and	exploitation	of	the	baldío	land	solicited	for	titling	for	a	period	of	no	less	than	5	years.	Law	387	of	1997	and	posterior	legislation	makes	allowances	for	people	who	were	forced	to	abandon	their	lands	so	that	the	time	they	were	displaced	 should	not	 count	 against	 them	as	 an	 ‘interruption’	 of	 ‘possession’	 or	 ‘occupancy’.	These	 laws	should	also	have	protected	displaced	reform	beneficiaries	 from	revocation.	However,	many	were	unaware	of	this	law	and	did	not	inform	authorities	of	the	forced	abandonment	in	time.	In	other	cases,	officials	did	not	take	their	reports	into	consideration	or	directly	flouted	the	laws.	
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Gutiérrez	and	Vargas	(2016),	it	was	much	easier	for	paramilitary	groups	to	take	lands	that	were	 informally	owned	 (p.	25;	 see	also	Grajales,	2011).	Nevertheless,	 in	 some	cases	 the	paramilitaries	and	their	allies	still	obligated	the	displaced	to	sign	documents	in	which	they	agreed	 to	 ‘sell’	 the	 lands	 they	 had	 occupied.	 The	 para-elite	 regularly	 finalised	 the	dispossession	by	gaining	a	property	title	over	the	usurped	land	for	themselves	or	their	allies	(examples	from	Casanare	and	Meta	in	Barrios	&	Vargas	Reina,	2016,	pp.	164–165;	Verdad	Abierta,	 2011b).	 In	 Chivolo	 (Magdalena),	 for	 example,	 multiple	 properties	 acquired	 by	INCORA	were	 allocated	 to	 demobilised	paramilitaries	 and	 their	 associates	 following	 the	displacement	of	the	intended	beneficiaries.	In	such	cases,	the	officials	who	granted	the	titles	to	the	new	occupants/usurpers	were	usually	themselves	involved	in	the	swindle	(Quinche,	2016,	pp.	101–102	and	104–106;	see	also	the	case	of	Hacienda	el	Toco	in	César	department	in	Verdad	Abierta,	2013c).	It	is	worth	recalling	that	only	landless	or	land-poor	farmers	with	low	incomes	are	eligible	for	titles	over	State	lands	or	properties	acquired	for	redistribution;	nevertheless,	these	rules	were	regularly	broken	(see	the	various	SNR	reports).		(vii)	Fraudulent	titling	of	usurped	lands:	The	para-elite	also	forged	titles	for	baldío	or	other	lands	taken	from	the	original	occupants	by	force.	Presumably,	this	strategy	was	preferred	when	 the	 land	 grabbers	 believed	 a	 formal	 titling	 application	 would	 be	 denied.	INCODER/INCORA	 officials	 often	 helped	 the	 usurpers	 create	 the	 fake	 titles.	 This	 is	well	documented	 in	 the	 case	of	 Jiguamiandó	and	Curvaradó	 (Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	 2014)	False	INCORA/INCODER	resolutions	were	also	detected	by	the	SNR	in	Meta	and	Antioquia.	In	some	cases,	 it	 is	unclear	whether	the	titling	resolutions	were	forged	or	 ‘authentic’	but	unlawfully	procured,	as	described	in	the	previous	sub-section.	For	example,	at	least	49	of	the	100	plus	properties	acquired	by	the	Córdoba	Cattle	Ranching	Fund	had	dubious	titling	resolutions,	some	of	which	were	transferred	to	the	Fund	just	8	days	after	being	originated.	The	 SNR	 report	 implies	 that	 these	were	 bogus	 documents	 (SNR,	 2011a,	 p.	 5).	 However,	Public	Prosecutors	claim	the	dispossessed	were	forced	to	fill	in	titling	applications,	which	were	put	through	with	the	help	of	an	INCORA	employee	(Fiscalía	General	de	la	Nación,	2014,	p.	9);	and	thus	imply	instead	that	the	titling	resolutions	were	genuine,	albeit	illegitimate.		(viii)	Fraudulent	extension	of	existing	titles:	‘Moving	the	fence’	is	perhaps	one	of	the	oldest	dispossession	tricks,	usually	associated	with	disputes	between	neighbours	or	the	enclosure	of	common	land.	Many	para-elite	not	only	‘moved	the	fence’	but	also	ensured	that	the	new	
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property	boundaries	would	be	officialised	in	the	 land	registry.	For	example,	 the	palm	oil	para-enterprises	operating	in	Chocó	increased	their	titled	property	holdings	from	129	to	17,737	 hectares	 via	 the	 registration	 of	 fictitious	 natural	 accessions112	 (Juzgado	 5to	 de	Medellín,	 2014,	 pp.	 179,	 214–216).	 The	 SNR	 has	 documented	 dozens	 of	 irregular	 or	suspicious	area	changes	(many	of	which	enlarged	the	property	by	100%	or	more),	achieved	through	different	means,	including	notarised	out-of-court	statements	(declaraciones	extra	
juicio)	and	questionable	certificates	or	resolutions,	allegedly	supplied	by	INCORA/INCODER	or	the	IGAC	(the	Instituto	Geográfico	Agustín	Codazzi	 is	the	official	cartography	agency	in	Colombia	 and	 is	 also	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 national	 cadastre).	 In	 other	 cases	 a	 property	was	enlarged	little	by	little	through	various	transactions;	with	each	transfer,	new	boundaries	or	land	areas	were	written	into	the	public	deed	(SNR,	2012,	2011b,	pp.	8–9,	2011a,	p.	10).	Such	tactics	have	not	been	exclusive	to	those	involved	in	violent	land	grabbing,	but	they	were/are	clearly	part	of	the	para-elite	arsenal.		(ix)	 ‘Legal	 detachment’	 of	 usurped	 lands	 under	 collective	 title:	 Different	 legalisation	strategies	 were	 used	 when	 the	 usurped	 land	 was	 under	 collective	 ownership,	 since	 as	already	reiterated	such	titles	are	inalienable.	In	the	case	of	the	Afro	territories	of	Curvaradó	and	Jiguamiandó,	this	involved	securing	-genuine	or	bogus-	individual	property	titles	that	were	granted	prior	 to	1993	 (before	 the	 law	protecting	Afro	 territories	 came	 into	 force),	fraudulently	extending	the	area	covered	by	these	titles,	and	then	applying	for	the	exclusion	or	legal	detachment	of	these	lands	from	the	collective	title,	through	a	demarcation	(deslinde	or	delimitación)	process113.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	para-elite	had	only	limited	success	with	this	strategy	in	Curvaradó	and	Jiguamiandó.	INCODER	passed	two	resolutions	in	2007	detaching	6,393	ha	from	the	collective	titles	(INCODER,	2012,	p.	6)114.	At	least	23	of	the	156	
                                                        112	The	‘natural	accession’	or	‘alluvion’	rule	allows	a	landowner	to	augment	their	title	with	land	that	is	 formed	 due	 to	 gradual	 soil	 deposits	 along	 a	 riverbank	 or	 that	 is	 no	 longer	 submerged	 due	 to	changes	in	the	river’s	course.	Generally,	this	rule	is	not	applicable	under	Colombian	law	(Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014,	p.	302)	but	some	have	managed	to	exploit	it	nonetheless.	113	Apparently,	INCODER	functionaries	advised	the	businessmen	that	the	only	way	for	them	to	secure	rights	over	the	land	they	had	occupied	was	to	gain	titles	granted	before	the	passing	of	Law	70	in	1993	(Juzgado	 5to	 de	 Medellín,	 2014,	 pp.	 265,	 274).	 The	 investors	 had	 to	 overcome	 a	 considerable	obstacle:	the	dearth	of	such	titles.	So,	they	brought	the	deceased	back	to	life,	reinvented	Colombian	geography,	and	acquired	farms	that	never	existed.	114	This	contradicts	information	provided	in	the	2014	court	sentence,	which	suggests	that	more	than	20,000	hawere	excluded.	According	to	this	document,	under	the	new	demarcation,	the	territories	of	Curvaradó	were	reduced	from	46,084	to	34,209.91	ha,	while	those	of	Jiguamiandó	fell	from	54,973	to	46,459.08	hectares	(Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	2014,	p.	161).		
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properties	that	were	excluded	from	the	collective	territories	-covering	more	than	1,100	ha-	belonged	to	the	paramilitary-backed	investors	and	firms115.	Keep	in	mind,	however,	that	by	2004	the	palm	oil	companies	occupied	more	than	22,000	hectares	and	by	2008	they	had	planted	almost	10,000	hectares	with	oil	palms	(INCODER,	2012,	p.	92).	Hence,	the	vast	bulk	of	lands	they	occupied	remained	part	of	the	collective	titles.		(x)	Legitimating	the	occupation	of	collective	territories	through	association	agreements:	In	August	2005	INCODER	passed	a	resolution	that	explicitly	authorised116	the	establishment	of	 alliances	 or	 associations	 between	 Afro	 communities	 (via	 their	 Councils)	 and	 outside	companies	 or	 investors	 that	 allow	 for	 “the	 development	 of	 productive	 projects	 within	collective	territories”	(INCODER	cited	in	CIJP,	2005,	p.	102),	so	long	as	this	does	not	imply	the	 transfer	of	property	 rights	–	 recall	 that	 collective	 titles	are	 inalienable.	A	number	of	observers	agree	that	this	resolution	was	a	reaction	to	the	land	grabs	in	Chocó	-	an	attempt	to	legalise	the	violent	occupation	of	various	collective	territories	(CIJP,	2005,	p.	103)	or	to	resolve	the	land	conflicts	by	presenting	“the	interests	of	community	councils	and	those	of	agribusiness	firms	[as]	compatible”	(Grajales,	2013,	p.	224).	In	the	collective	territories	of	Cacarica,	 Curvaradó	 and	 Jiguamiandó,	 various	 companies	 and	 individuals	 attempted	 to	establish	association	agreements	with	the	communities	after	they	had	occupied	the	lands.	In	all	three	cases,	the	majority	of	inhabitants	were	displaced	and	returned	to	find	their	lands	being	used	for	logging,	oil	palm	cultivation	and	other	commercial	activities,	protected	by	the	army	and	paramilitaries.	The	companies	attempted	to	 legitimise	their	operations	ex-post	 facto	by	establishing	 ‘agreements’	with	co-opted	 leaders	without	 the	consent	of	 the	wider	 communities	and/or	with	 small	 groups	 (including	new	arrivals	–	 see	below)	who	organised	exclusionary	votes		(CIJP,	2005,	2007;	Defensoría	del	Pueblo,	2007;	Juzgado	5to	de	Medellín,	 2014).	A	 similar	 process	 occurred	 in	 the	nearby	 collective	 territories	 of	 La	Larga	Tumaradó	and	Pedeguita	Mancilla	(Vargas	Reina,	2016a,	pp.	138–143).		
                                                        115	 This	 is	 potentially	 an	 underestimation	 since	many	 private	 titles	 that	were	 excluded	 from	 the	collective	territories	have	individual	owners,	who	may	or	may	not	act	as	figureheads	for	the	usurpers.	116	A	number	of	companies	and	individuals	attempted	to	gain	use	rights	over	collective	territories	through	various	bogus	agreements	and	contracts	before	the	‘association’	modality	was	authorised	by	 the	 government.	 For	 example,	 one	document	 (dated	March	2004)	 feigned	 that	 the	Curvaradó	Council	gave	usufruct	rights	-apparently	over	the	entirety	of	the	collective	territories	(46,000	ha)	-	to	five	companies.	Its	signatories	were	not	authorised	to	act	as	legal	representatives	of	the	people	of	Curvaradó	and	no	General	Assembly	was	held	to	consult	with	the	communities.	The	document	was	endorsed	by	an	entity	that	posed	as	the	official	Communal	Council;	this	parallel	entity	was	registered	with	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	(CIJP,	2005,	pp.	15,	96–102).	
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	(xi)	Controlled	repopulation	and	repartition	of	usurped	land:	In	order	to	build	a	local	support	base,	the	paramilitaries	and/or	associated	businesses	often	encouraged	others	to	establish	on	the	lands	-whether	baldíos,	private	property	or	collective	territories-	abandoned	by	the	people	they	had	displaced	(see	e.g.	Uribe	Kaffure,	2014,	p.	269;	Quinche,	2016,	pp.	103,	105–106	and	110;	Vargas	Reina,	2016a,	pp.	140–143).	In	a	number	of	cases,	they	even	conducted	semi-formal	repartitions	of	small	plots	to	the	newcomers,	ensuring	the	settlers’	allegiance.	Usually	called	‘repopulation’,	the	strategy	has	actually	been	used	by	both	the	guerrilla	and	paramilitaries	to	assert	territorial	control.	However,	for	the	paramilitaries,	this	often	served	economic	ends	also.	Settlers	usually	became	the	para-elites’	employees,	contract	farmers	or	figureheads	(testaferros).	Repopulation	also	enabled	the	para-elite	to	distance	themselves	from	 the	 resulting	 land	 conflicts.	 For	 example,	 in	 Jiguamiandó	 and	 Curvaradó,	 clashes	between	the	original	inhabitants	and	the	newcomers	allowed	the	palm	oil	firms	to	portray	the	situation	as	a	conflict	within	and	between	communities	in	which	they	were	peripheral	actors	 (CIJP,	 2012a,	 2016;	 INCODER,	 2012).	 And,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 collective	 territories,	newcomers	may	also	help	the	companies	or	individuals	gain	influence	over	the	Communal	Councils,	which	may	sign	the	association	agreements	mentioned	above117.		(xii)	Legitimising	land	grabs	via	producer	cooperatives	or	associations:	The	former	strategy	was	often	combined	with	the	creation	of	producer	cooperatives	or	associations,	controlled	or	influenced	by	the	paramilitaries	and/or	associated	business	and	usurpers,	which	could	serve	 multiple	 purposes.	 (a)	 The	 cooperatives	 helped	 organise	 allied	 individuals	 and	opponents	of	the	original	land	holders.	(b)	They	provided	ostensible	legitimacy	to	the	land	occupation,	which	could	be	represented	as	an	 inclusive	development	project,	benefitting	
                                                        117	In	2010	the	Constitutional	Court	reiterated	instructions	(to	the	Ministry	of	Interior)	to	carry	out	a	census	within	Curvaradó	and	Jiguamiandó,	with	the	goal	of	identifying	the	original	and	legitimate	inhabitants	of	the	zone.	This	came	after	repeated	complaints	that	the	area	was	being	repopulated	with	outsiders	loyal	to	the	palm	project	and	against	the	Curvaradó	Council	recognised	by	the	Ministry	of	Interior	in	2010.	This	Council	was	elected	during	an	exclusionary	assembly	(held	in	2009)	in	which	just	4	of	22	communities	participated.	Furthermore,	the	Assembly	Act,	which	is	meant	to	substantiate	the	vote,	did	not	include	the	last	names,	signatures	and	identification	numbers	of	many	participants.	The	 relevant	 authorities	 failed	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 complaints	 and	 requests	 to	 register	 a	 different	Council	that	was	voted	in	by	12	different	communities.	For	this	reason,	the	Court	reiterated	a	freeze	on	all	 transactions	affecting	 the	 collective	 territories	until	 after	 the	 census	and	posterior	Council	elections	with	institutional	oversight	(Corte	Constitucional,	2010,	pp.	21–31;	Osorio,	2011).	
  
252	
smallholders118.	(c)	They	could	be	used	as	institutional	figureheads	to	conceal	the	identity	of	the	true	landowner.	(d)	And,	in	some	cases,	the	cooperatives	or	associations	served	as	a	channel	 through	 which	 the	 para-elite	 secured	 government-backed	 loans	 and	 subsidies	specially	designated	for	‘strategic	alliance’	projects.	(e)	Finally,	a	handful	of	cooperatives	or	associations	were	made	up	of	active	or	demobilised	paramilitaries	and	 thus	allowed	the	commanders	to	compensate	their	combatants,	while	maintaining	control	over	the	land.	In	some	cases,	this	also	enabled	access	to	funds	earmarked	for	peace	building,	which	added	another	 layer	 of	 ‘legitimacy’	 to	 dispossession.	 The	 para-elite	 established	 at	 least	 five	producer	 associations	 and	 cooperatives	 as	 part	 of	 their	 land	 grabbing	 strategy	 in	Jiguamiandó	 and	 Curvaradó	 alone	 (Juzgado	 5to	 de	 Medellín,	 2014).	 Smallholder	associations	or	cooperatives	created	and/or	controlled	by	the	paramilitaries	and	related	businesses	 have	 been	 documented	 in	 regions	 across	 the	 country,	 including:	 Tulapas	 –	Antioquia	 (Ballvé,	 2013),	 Parapeto	 -	Magdalena	 (Quinche,	 2016,	 p.	 103),	 Córdoba,	Meta,	Guaviare	and	Bolívar	(CNMH,	2012c,	p.	109	and	150).		(xiii)	Land	laundering	and	figureheads:	Common	to	many	cases	of	dispossession	are	complex	processes	of	dividing	and	merging	properties	(leading	to	the	creation	of	a	new	folio	in	the	land	register)	and	multiple	transfers,	which	obscure	the	origins	of	the	final	title.	Teo	Ballvé	(2013)	labels	this	and	other	strategies	(including	some	of	those	described	above119)	“land	laundering	[…]	the	process	by	which	the	illegal	origins	of	a	land	acquisition	are	concealed”	(p.	63).	Furthermore,	testaferrato	or	the	use	of	figureheads	(testaferros)	to	hide	the	identity	of	the	true	owner	of	an	asset,	“commonly	employed	by	the	economic	elites	with	the	aim	of	evading	 taxes”,	 has	 also	 been	 used	 to	 conceal	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	dispossession	(CNMH,	2012c,	pp.	87–88;	see	also	pp.	77-80).	The	same	tactics	are	also	used	to	conceal	the	illicit	accumulation	of	reform	lands	and	the	violation	of	UAF	land	ceiling	rules	(see	Chapter	6	and	below).			
                                                        118	Ballvé	(2013)	argues	that	“grassroots	development	became	the	basis	of	[…]	land	laundering	[…]	Grassroots	discourses	gave	paramilitary-supported	projects	an	air	of	symbolic	legitimacy.	But	more	than	legitimation	[…]	made	possible	a	series	of	material	practices	and	institutional	formations	that	helped	further	obfuscate	the	illicit	origins	of	the	lands”	(p.	63,	emphasis	in	original).	This	includes,	but	is	not	limited	to,	the	use	of	producer	cooperatives	mentioned	above.	119	Following	Ballvé	(2013),	“land	laundering	is	not	the	one-off	conversion	of	the	illegal	into	the	legal,	but	rather	an	on-going,	everyday	process	of	blurring	any	distinction	between	the	two”	(p.	63).	
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3)	Opportunistic	and	predatory	land	accumulation	and	unequal	power	relations	“The	bombings	are	 terrible.	People	 just	 start	 running.	There	are	 families	who	sell	 [their	land]	 cheap	 in	 order	 to	 get	 out”	 (Inhabitant	 of	 the	 Amazon	 Pearl	 -	 Putumayo,	 Personal	Interview,	 2015).	 As	 the	 quotation	 suggests,	 armed	 conflict	 provokes	 distress	 sales.	 In	Colombia,	a	huge	amount	of	land	changed	hands	during	and	in	the	aftermath	of	violence.	A	few	individual	investors	and	companies	bought	up	thousands	of	hectares	from	campesinos	who	had	been	forced	to	abandon	their	farms.	In	some	cases,	predatory	buyers	sought	out	families	who	had	been	forcibly	displaced.	In	others,	the	displaced	themselves	went	in	search	of	someone	who	would	purchase	their	property.	These	plots	of	land	were	usually	sold	at	very	low	prices	(see	e.g.	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010;	García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014;	 Uribe	 Kaffure,	 2014).	 For	 example,	 one	 media	 report	 indicates	 intermediaries	purchased	for	as	 low	as	$100,000	pesos	(circa	$35	USD)	per	ha	and	resold	at	around	$3	million	per	ha	(Semana	Sostenible,	2018).	This	section	focuses	on	land	acquisitions	that	fall	 into	a	grey	area;	those	that	were	neither	directly	 and	openly	 forced,	 nor	 truly	 voluntary.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	Colombian	conflict	 specifically,	 these	 are	 purchases	 in	 which	 the	 buyer	 was	 unrelated	 to	 those	responsible	for	displacement	and	did	not	use	physical	violence	or	death	threats	to	procure	the	land.	Such	acquisitions	are	clearly	distinct	from	the	overtly	coerced	sales	or	fraudulent	transfers	described	in	the	previous	section.	However,	these	were	not	genuinely	voluntary	transactions	either,	as	it	was	the	violent	context	and	resulting	displacement	that	compelled	people	 to	 sell.	 The	 relationship	 between	 coerced	 and	 voluntary	 land	 transfers	 can	 be	fruitfully	described	as	a	continuum	(García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014,	p.	43;	Hall,	2013,	p.	1594);	here	I	am	interested	in	those	acquisitions	that	lie	somewhere	in	the	middle.	While	some	buyers	simply	took	advantage	of	an	opportunity	to	buy	land	cheap	from	desperate	sellers,	others	acted	as	‘predators’,	exerting	diverse	forms	of	pressure	on	the	displaced.	The	latter	are	closer	to	coercion	than	the	former;	I	provide	a	couple	examples	to	clarify.	In	the	municipality	of	Pensilvania	(Caldas),	for	example,	a	number	of	people	reported	selling	 their	 farms	during	 the	worst	years	of	violence.	Those	 I	 spoke	 to	did	not	say	who	purchased	their	land,	but	implied	that	the	buyers	were	mostly	absentee	landowners	from	the	regional	elite.	One	man	fled	because	he	was	declared	a	military	objective	of	the	FARC.	He	sold	his	farm	shortly	after.	He	said	he	didn’t	want	to	give	up	the	land	but	desperately	needed	the	money	during	the	time	his	family	was	displaced.	He	did	not	express	resentment	towards	the	buyer	and	stated	outright	that	he	had	not	been	‘dispossessed’.	Once	the	conflict	subsided,	he	returned	to	his	village	as	a	landless	labourer	(Personal	Interviews,	2015).			
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Many	 testimonies	 included	 in	 the	 Historical	 Memory	 Group’s	 description	 of	 land	concentration	 in	 the	 Montes	 de	 María	 region,	 in	 contrast,	 illustrate	 more	 predatory	practices	 among	 buyers	 (though	 one	 or	 two	 accounts	 also	 present	 the	 investors	 in	 a	favourable	or	neutral	way).	One	campesino	told	researchers	that	land	had	not	been	“taken”,	but	noted	that	interested	investors	often	“harass”	smallholders,	and	that	the	“struggle”	was	to	 convince	 people	 not	 to	 give-in	 and	 sell	 (Grupo	 de	Memoria	 Histórica,	 2010,	 p.	 166).	Another	interviewee	suggested	that	the	buyers	were	in	fact	“grabbing”	(arrebatando)	the	land,	given	the	“miserable”	sums	they	offered	in	return	(ibid,	p.	173).	Opportunistic	 and	 predatory	 land	 accumulation	 is	 best	 documented	 in	Montes	 de	María,	a	topographically	defined	region	of	northern	Colombia	that	was	severely	affected	by	the	armed	conflict.	In	addition	to	the	Historical	Memory	Group’s	study	cited	above,	the	SNR	conducted	an	investigation	which	included	close	scrutiny	of	the	local	land	registers.	They	found	that	tens	of	thousands	of	hectares	had	been	purchased	by	a	dozen	or	so	individual	investors	and	firms	(just	five	acquired	more	than	18,000	ha)	between	2006	and	2010.	Some	120,000	people	were	forcibly	displaced	from	or	within	Montes	de	María	that	same	decade.	According	 to	 the	 SNR,	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 properties	 acquired	 were	 previously	smallholdings	allocated	 through	 INCORA’s	 reform	program.	Most	 land	was	purchased	at	below-market	prices,	merged	into	large	properties,	and	then	re-sold	at	commercial	rates	to	well-known	 national	 companies.	 All	 of	 this	 was	 achieved	 through	 a	 complex	 chain	 of	transactions,	 often	 with	 clear	 ‘irregularities’	 such	 as	 registration	 of	 questionable	 titling	resolutions,	 violations	 of	 restrictions	 applicable	 to	 lands	 acquired	 through	 the	 reform	program	or	the	legalisation	of	transfers	affecting	properties	subject	to	protection	measures	without	 the	 relevant	 authorisation	 (Semana,	 2011a;	 SNR,	 2011c;	 Grupo	 de	 Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	pp.	166–184).	A	 few	 clarifications	 are	 in	 order	 before	 proceeding.	 First	 and	 most	 importantly,	without	 detailed	 research	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 know	 whether	 a	 single	 case	 involved	 overt	coercion	and	hence	fits	into	the	para-elite	land	grab	phenomenon	described	above	or	did	not	 and	 hence	 belongs	 in	 the	 category	 presently	 discussed.	 For	 example,	 the	 macro	information	 about	 land	 concentration	 provided	 by	 the	 SNR	 is	 insufficient	 to	 answer	questions	such	as:	were	the	original	landholders	threatened	by	those	interested	in	acquiring	the	 land	 or	 are	 these	 farms	 occupied	 by	 the	 same	 people	 that	 orchestrated	 forced	displacement?	The	Historical	Memory	Group’s	analysis	of	 land	accumulation	in	the	same	region	(Montes	de	María),	suggests	that	it	was	affected	by	both	overtly	violent	land	seizures	and	the	grey	area	transactions	focused	on	here	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	p.	181).	
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The	second	point	of	clarification	is	more	conceptual	than	empirical.	Just	as	there	is	a	grey	area	between	coerced	and	voluntary	land	transfers,	there	is	a	grey	area	between	the	para-elite	 land	grab	and	opportunistic	 land	accumulation.	Suppose,	 for	example,	 that	the	shareholders	of	a	 land-accumulating	company	financed	paramilitary	groups	but	that	this	same	company	acquired	its	properties	from	the	hundreds	of	displaced	persons	who	sold	their	farms	not	because	they	received	death	threats	or	were	directly	forced	in	some	other	way,	but	because	they	desperately	needed	the	money.	Such	a	company	would	be	complicit	in	 the	displacement	 in	so	 far	as	 its	shareholders	 funded	the	group	that	was	responsible.	However,	it	would	be	a	leap	to	claim	that	the	company	stole	the	land,	the	way	other	firms	involved	 in	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab	 did.	 Though	 my	 example	 is	 hypothetical,	 evidence	indicates	this	sort	of	situation	exists.	García	and	Vargas	provide	information	about	a	few	of	the	 companies	 and	 individuals	 who	 accumulated	 land	 in	 Montes	 de	 María.	 The	 major	shareholders	of	one	of	the	companies	and	the	legal	representative	of	another	are	accused	of	financing	or	otherwise	associating	with	the	paramilitaries;	however,	 the	authors	suggest	that	these	firms	were	involved	in	opportunistic	“mass	acquisitions”,	not	violent	land	grabs	(García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014,	pp.	36–38).		Third,	it	is	important	to	emphasise	that	the	displacement	that	enables	opportunistic	and	 predatory	 land	 acquisitions	may	 have	 been	 caused	 by	 the	 paramilitaries,	 the	 army,	guerrillas,	or	a	mixture	of	these	groups.	It	may	have	been	an	inadvertent	consequence	of	armed	conflict	or	motivated	by	reasons	other	than	land	dispossession.	For	example:	intense	battles	 often	 caused	people	 to	 flee	 (inadvertent	 displacement),	while	 the	 guerrilla	 often	ordered	individuals	or	families	they	accused	of	collaborating	with	the	enemy	to	leave	the	area	 (deliberate	 displacement	 not	 motivated	 by	 land	 dispossession)	 -	 both	 provided	opportunities	for	third-parties	to	purchase	abandoned	land	cheaply.		Fourth,	 I	 am	 concerned	 with	 land	 accumulation.	 Violence	 can	 and	 has	 led	 to	transactions	between	smallholders.	Furthermore,	some	large	landowners	affected	by	the	armed	conflict	 transferred	their	 farms	to	other	elites.	However,	as	argued	by	García	and	Vargas	(2014),	these	“transactions	between	peers”	or	people	of	relatively	equal	status	and	power	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 “symmetric”;	 they	 typically	 do	 not	 “involve	 the	 use	 of	 force	 or	differences	 of	 information	 between	 the	 parties”120	 (p.	 40).	 Finally,	 in	 a	 few	 specific	geographical	and	temporal	contexts,	the	conflict	favoured	land	redistribution,	as	guerrilla	
                                                        120	 The	 authors	 refer	 specifically	 to	 informal	 transactions	 between	 campesinos.	 However,	 similar	observations	may	apply	 to	 transactions	between	elites.	 I	 emphasise	qualifying	words	with	 italics	because	I	do	not	want	to	suggest	that	asymmetries	were	always	or	wholly	absent	from	such	transfers.	
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threats	and	violence	against	large	landowners	compelled	them	to	sell	to	the	agrarian	reform	institute.	But	macro	data	shows	that	land	concentration	in	Colombia	increased	over	the	last	few	decades,	suggesting	the	predominance	of	transactions	from	‘labouring	classes’	to	elite	groups.	 These	 transactions	 deserve	 separate	 analysis	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 unequal	power	relations	involved.	In	order	to	highlight	unequal	power	relations	and	enabling	structural	conditions,	the	remainder	of	this	section	is	organised	into	two	parts	focusing	on	the	general	conditions	of	the	sellers	and	then	the	buyers.	The	examples	and	details	offered	below	are	mostly	drawn	from	research	and	documents	focused	on	Montes	de	María,	which	means	some	observations	may	 reflect	 regional	 particularities.	 Nevertheless,	 opportunist	 and	 predatory	 land	accumulation	is	not	exclusive	to	this	region.	This	section	also	draws	on	Sonia	Uribe’s	(2014)	study	of	Tibú	-	North	Santander	and	is	informed	by	accounts	from	eastern	Caldas	and	lower	Putumayo	(Personal	Interviews,	2015).			
The	socially	disadvantaged	sellers		Many	campesinos	were	pushed	into	extreme	poverty	as	a	result	of	their	displacement.		What	little	economic	wealth	these	families	had	was	typically	tied	up	in	physical	assets	(e.g.	farm	infrastructure,	 objects	 such	 as	 furniture	 and	 tools,	 and	 the	 crop	 itself)	 that	 were	 lost	precisely	as	a	result	of	their	displacement.	Many	were	forced	to	leave	behind	all	but	what	they	could	carry,	and	often	had	little	or	no	savings.	Some	went	to	stay	with	family	or	friends,	others	ended	up	living	in	make-shift	camps	or	slums	in	Colombia’s	towns	and	cities.	So,	for	many	selling	their	land	was	a	question	of	survival,	a	means	of	withstanding	conditions	of	displacement	(see	e.g.	IDMC,	2007;	also	Personal	Interviews,	2014-2015).		(i)	Violence-induced	distress	sales	-	These	transactions	fall	into	the	category	of	what	are	typically	called	‘distress	sales’	in	which	a	person	or	company	is	forced	to	sell	their	assets,	usually	at	very	low	prices	or	even	at	a	loss,	due	to	adverse	circumstances.	However,	business	and	economics	discourse	usually	refers	to	situations	such	as	job	loss,	unforeseen	legal	or	medical	 expenses,	 or	 unmanageable	 debts.	 Mass	 forced	 displacement	 forms	 a	 systemic	
condition	for	distress	sales.	Furthermore,	unlike	natural	disasters	or	financial	crises,	these	systemic	conditions	are	generated	by	direct	actions	involving	extra-economic	force.	For	this	reason,	 it	 is	pertinent	 to	distinguish	 sales	 that	 are	violence-induced	 from	other	 types	of	distress	sales.		
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(ii)	Barriers	to	return	-	The	term	‘distress	sale’	typically	refers	to	transactions	carried	out	with	urgency.	But	some	displaced	families	took	years	to	sell	their	land.	In	such	cases,	impediments	to	people’s	return	often	plays	a	role.	As	explained	by	the	Historical	Memory	Group	 (2010),	 “the	 persistence	 of	 violence	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 capital	 to	 impulse	 anew	productive	processes	has	led	many	displaced	peasants	to	‘voluntarily’	sell	their	properties”	(p.	 170).	 Some	 farms	 were	 deliberately	 destroyed	 by	 armed	 actors;	 in	 other	 cases,	abandoned	homes	became	derelict	and	neglected	crops	perished	overtime	(see	e.g.	IDMC,	2007).	There	are	people	who	simply	cannot	afford	to	reconstruct	and	replant.	Others	did	or	do	not	wish	to	return	for	multiple	reasons	and	genuinely	want(ed)	to	sell	their	land	(León,	2009;	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010;	García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014).		(iii)	Debt	stress	and	pressured	sales	-	Hundreds	of	displaced	persons	have	had	their	farms	seized	by	the	banks	(Bolivar	Jaime,	2012);	many	more	have	sold	to	cover	debts.	In	addition	 to	 loans	 taken	 out	 for	 productive	 projects,	 many	 still	 owe(d)	 money	 for	 land	acquired	through	the	reform	program121.	Between	2006	and	2008,	amidst	a	nation-wide	rural	displacement	crisis,	the	government	passed	on	some	of	its	loan	portfolio	to	CISA	and	COVINOC,	 companies	 specialised	 in	 debt	 collection.	 These	 firms	 started	 aggressively	pursuing	 indebted	 campesinos,	 including	 those	 who	 were	 in	 arrears	 because	 of	 their	displacement.	Some	received	ultimatums	that	they	should	sell	immediately	to	avoid	seizure	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	pp.	178–179).	In	2008	the	Constitutional	Court	ordered	banks	to	refinance	debts	of	IDPs.	However,	many	were	unaware	of	the	ruling	and/or	were	not	equipped	to	negotiate.	One	farmer	from	Montes	de	María	explained:	“we	let	ourselves	be	influenced	by	COVINOC’s	threats	[…]	But	now	we	have	been	given	advice	that	displaced	persons	can’t	be	obligated	[to	sell	because	of	their	debts…]	we	didn’t	know	that	then”	(cited	in	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	p.	175;	see	also	García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014,	p.	40;	on	North	Santander,	see	Uribe	Kaffure,	2014,	p.	275).				
                                                        121	Prior	to	1994,	reform	beneficiaries	were	saddled	with	debts	equivalent	to	100%	of	the	land	cost;	this	was	reduced	to	30%	following	the	passing	of	Law	160,	which	introduced	a	70%	subsidy.	Later	reforms	 increased	 the	subsidy	 to	100%,	but	by	 then	redistributive	efforts	had	been	reduced	 to	a	minimum.	Note:	this	additional	debt	pressure	is	more	prevalent	in	regions	like	the	Atlantic	Coast,	where	much	of	 the	redistributive	reform	efforts	were	historically	carried	out;	 in	 the	south	of	 the	country,	and	other	areas	of	recent	‘colonisation’,	campesinos	were	more	likely	to	occupy	State	land	and	baldío	titling	-unlike	adjudications	of	redistributed	land-	only	involves	administrative	costs.	
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The	well-connected	buyers	The	buyers	were/are	typically	absentee	landowners,	who	did	not	and	would	not	constantly	endure	the	violence	in	the	area,	unlike	the	original	landholders.	In	some	cases,	the	investors	were	from	outside	the	region	entirely.	In	Montes	de	María,	for	example,	most	abandoned	properties	were	acquired	by	people	from	Medellín	and	surrounding	areas.	These	are	often	investors	who	could/can	obtain	personalised	security	from	public	or	private	forces	when	visiting	their	properties	or	who	could	afford	to	leave	the	land	idle	until	the	armed	conflict	subsided	(see	e.g.	García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014,	pp.	32–38;	Uribe	Kaffure,	2014,	pp.	271–273;	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	pp.	168–170,	189).		 (i)	Buyer’s	networks	-	Just	like	the	para-elite	described	in	the	previous	sections,	many	of	 these	 investors	 relied	 on	 existing	 or	 developing	 networks	 (e.g.	 links	 with	 notaries,	functionaries	 and	 politicians,	 other	 investors),	 which	 enabled	 them	 to	 achieve	 the	 land	accumulation.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 a	 number	 of	 buyers	 gained	 “access	 to	 privileged	information	from	State	entities	like	INCODER	and	[by	establishing]	alliances	with	the	debt-collection	agencies	or	their	operators”	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	pp.	133,		178–179).	So,	many	knew	of	the	potential	sellers’	adverse	situation	in	advance;	that	they	had	abandoned	their	 lands	and/or	had	unmanageable	debts.	According	 to	García	and	Vargas	(2014),	 these	 “circles	 of	 information”	 and	 “circles	 of	 power”	 not	 only	 facilitated	 actual	acquisitions	(see	below)	but	were	linked	also	to	the	origins	of	the	land	rush	in	some	regions.	A	businessman	 from	Antioquia,	 for	 example,	 started	buying	 lands	 in	Tetón	 -	Córdoba	 in	2001	and	later	“became	a	spearhead	of	a	surge	of	property	buyers	in	the	municipality”	(p.	32).	The	same	man	also	shepherded	other	 investors	 into	neighbouring	Montes	de	María,	convincing	them	that	the	security	situation	would	soon	improve	(contacts	 in	high	places	advised	that	the	defeat/expulsion	of	the	FARC	in	the	region	was	imminent)	and	that	it	was	a	perfect	time	to	buy	(García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014,	p.	38).			 (ii)	Government	backing	-	These	investors	are	often	seen	as	bringing	‘development’	to	the	Colombian	‘backwaters’;	many	set	up	precisely	the	type	of	project	that	the	Colombian	State	 is	 trying	 to	 promote.	 In	 Tibú	 -	 North	 Santander	 land	 was	 acquired	 for	 oil	 palm	cultivations	and	mining/energy	projects	(Uribe	Kaffure,	2014).	Buyers	in	the	Altillanura	and	Montes	de	Maria	planted	feed	crops	and	established	(e.g.)	teak,	rubber	and	palm	plantations	(Contraloría,	2013;	León,	2009).	The	Comptroller’s	report	on	unlawful	land	accumulation	in	 the	 Altillanura	 contains	 details	 of	 the	 different	 government	 benefits	 granted	 to	 the	implicated	 companies	 and	 individuals,	 including	FINAGRO	 loans,	 interest	 rate	 subsidies,	grants	 and	 tax	 exemptions	 (Contraloría,	 2013,	 pp.	 110–150).	 Various	 companies	 that	
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accumulated	lands	in	Montes	de	María	are	also	said	to	have	received	ICR	and	CIF	subsidies	(Cepeda,	2013).	In	other	words,	 like	with	the	para-elite	 land	grab,	grey	area	acquisitions	during	 and	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 violence,	 served	 and	 were	 served	 by	 the	 government’s	economic	development	model.			 In	 Montes	 de	 Maria,	 “functionaries	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 [actually]	accompanied	 the	 buyers	 and	 encouraged	 the	 ‘mass	 sales’,	 as	 happened	 in	 2009	 in	 the	municipalities	of	María	La	Baja	and	El	Carmen	de	Bolívar”	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	p.	179;	see	also	García	and	Vargas,	2014,	p.	38).	Representatives	of	Argos,	a	large	well-known	national	company	that	has	received	a	lot	of	attention	in	the	disputes	surrounding	opportunistic	 land	 accumulation	 in	 Montes	 de	 María	 and	 related	 restitution	 processes,	reiterated	that	“the	State	invited	the	private	sector	to	invest	so	as	to	impulse	the	economic	and	social	development	of	the	region”	(cited	in	Verdad	Abierta,	2016).		 There	 is	 actually	 a	 video	of	 the	 then	 (2009-2010)	Minister	 of	Agriculture	 -Andrés	Fernández	Acosta-	publicly	asking	INCODER	functionaries	to	eliminate	restrictions	on	land	transactions	in	the	area	(presumably,	he	is	referring	to	the	protection	measures	discussed	above)	and	promising	that	the	government	is	working	towards	eliminating	the	UAF	rules	designed	 to	prevent	 land	concentration.	 In	 this	 intervention	 in	a	public	meeting,	held	 in	Montes	de	María,	the	then	Minister	makes	it	very	clear	that	he	supports	the	mass	purchases	that	have	been	occurring	in	the	region,	noting	without	embarrassment	that	the	many	of	the	businesspeople	behind	this	land	accumulation	(also	present	at	the	meeting)	are	his	long-time	personal	“friends”	(Contravía	TV,	2011,	9:30-14:00).	(iii)	Predatory	acquisitions	–	As	hinted	at	above,	some	companies	and	individuals	went	to	great	lengths	to	plan	and	execute	mass	acquisitions,	consciously	taking	advantage	of	the	adverse	situation	of	the	original	landholders.	Some	purchase	offers	were	accompanied	by	threats	that	if	they	didn’t	sell	they	might	lose	everything	through	bank	seizure	anyway.	The	buyers’	lawyers	even	sent	letters	to	indebted	displaced	farmers,	which	were	confused	with	notifications	 of	 foreclosure	 (Grupo	 de	Memoria	Histórica,	 2010,	 p.	 175).	 One	 campesino	explained:	“the	debt,	the	misters	buying	up	land,	they	use	it	[se	agarran	de	ahí],	trying	to	fill	us	with	fear	so	that	we	give	our	land	away”	for	pennies	(cited	in	ibid,	p.	176).			 In	Montes	de	María,	many	buyers	hired	agents	or	relied	on	brokers	(comisionistas)	to	seek	out	the	displaced.	According	to	one	interviewee,	they	said	things	like:	“you	are	going	to	end	up	alone	because	your	neighbours	already	sold	[…]	and	how	will	you	get	out?	where	will	 you	 get	 in?	because	 either	way	 they	 are	 going	 to	put	up	 fences”	 (cited	 in	Grupo	de	
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Memoria	 Histórica,	 2010,	 p.	 180).	 The	 Historical	 Memory	 Group	 suggests	 this	 tactic	 of	refusing	right	of	way	to	pressure	sales	was/is	relatively	common	in	the	coastal	regions.	The	book	even	includes	a	photo	of	a	bridge	blocked	off	with	a	concrete	wall,	apparently	designed	to	prevent	campesinos	 from	accessing	 their	plots	 (Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	p.	187).	In	general,	campesinos	that	stayed	on	their	lands	or	decided	to	return	found/find	it	difficult	 to	 survive	 surrounded	 by	 large	 farms	 and	 in	 a	 context	 “that	 privileges	 an	agroindustrial	production	model”	(ibid,	p.	188).			 (iv)	Streamlined	legal	transfers	-	In	Montes	de	María,	buyers	and	intermediaries	set	up	specially	designated	offices	with	teams	of	 lawyers.	Interviewees	told	researchers	that	people	formed	lines	at	these	offices	in	order	to	sell	their	abandoned	lands	(García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014,	p.	33).	Intermediaries	provided	advice	on	sales	and	purchases,	acting	like	 real	 estate	 agents	with	 lists	 of	 available	 land.	 Both	 types	 of	 offices	 streamlined	 the	different	procedures	required	for	legalising	the	land	transfers.	Employees	took	charge	of	doing	the	different	tasks	that	the	campesinos	needed	to	complete	in	order	to	sell,	such	as	soliciting	the	lifting	of	any	protection	measures	or	any	permissions	required	from	INCODER	and	dealing	with	Notary	Office	errands	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	pp.	181–182).			 The	 legalisation	of	 the	transactions	was	particularly	complex	 in	the	case	of	reform	and	State	lands.	As	explained	previously,	baldío	lands	titled	by	INCORA/INCODER	and	plots	acquired	 through	 the	 redistribution	 program	 are	 subject	 to	 multiple	 rules.	 In	 terms	 of	redistributed	parcels	specifically,	for	the	first	12-15	years	after	being	granted,	these	may	only	be	 transferred	 to	peasants	of	 scarce	 resources	and	even	 these	 transactions	 require	“express	 authorisation”	 from	 INCODER.	 The	 violation	 of	 such	 norms	 was	 particularly	predominant	in	northern	Colombia.	In	contrast,	in	the	Altillanura	and	other	regions,	land	accumulation	involved	the	violation	of	UAF	rules	pertaining	to	lands	originating	in	baldío	titles	-	these	restrictions,	unlike	those	pertaining	to	reform	parcels,	do	not	expire.	Buyers	and	 agents	 used	 all	 sorts	 of	methods	 and	 relied	 upon	 their	 networks	 to	 get	 around	 the	various	rules.	In	general,	they	had	the	knowledge	and	means	to	“manage	the	very	complex	laws	related	to	 the	assignment	of	rural	property	rights”;	 they	were	able	 to	 ‘use	the	 law’,	while	sellers	generally	‘suffered	the	law’	(García	Reyes	&	Vargas	Reina,	2014,	pp.	39–40;	see	also	Uribe	Kaffure,	2014;	SNR,	2011c;	Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010;	León,	2009).	This	section	has	laid	out	what	I	call	opportunistic	or	predatory	land	accumulation,	as	it	occurred	in	many	parts	of	Colombia.	I	do	not	use	the	term	“land	grabbing”	here,	as	neither	the	buyers,	nor	the	government	acting	on	their	behalf,	seized	the	land.	Nevertheless,	from	many	of	the	sellers’	perspective,	the	transactions	were	not	purely	voluntary	either.	These	
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grey	area	land	transfers	have	been	a	very	important	form	of	dispossession	in	Colombia	in	recent	 decades.	 Various	 scholars	 have	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 unequal	 power	relations	 in	 land	 transactions	 more	 generally	 (Borras,	 2003;	 Akram-Lodhi,	 2007;	 Hall,	2013).	Neoclassical	economists	tend	to	assume	that	“people	meet	as	equals	to	mutually	and	voluntarily	agree	a	price	upon	which	to	exchange	a	commodity,	an	exchange	that	is	equally	beneficial	to	both”	(Akram-Lodhi,	2007,	p.	1440).	However,	as	explained	by	Akram	Lodhi,	often	“the	identity	of	those	conducting	an	exchange	is	essential	to	its	terms	and	conditions,	including	the	price”	(p.	1440).	This	section	has	shown	that	the	particular	dynamics	of	the	Colombian	conflict	over	the	last	three	decades	magnified	unequal	power	relations,	which	facilitated	land	accumulation.		
Summary	and	conclusion	This	chapter	has	highlighted	the	various	forms	and	mechanisms	of	dispossession	that	exist	in	contemporary	Colombia,	revealing	the	diverse	actors	and	intersecting	interests	at	play.	It	has	argued	that	(1)	counterinsurgency	warfare	is	partly	constitutive	of	agrarian	counter-reform	and	the	para-elite	land	grab	represents	a	transformation	of	pre-existing	processes	and	practices;	(2)	violent	dispossession	relied	on	a	network	of	unarmed	actors	and	thus	does	not	 fit	well	with	stereotypical	understandings	of	wartime	plunder;	 (3)	 ‘illegal’	 land	grabs	 served	 and	were	 served	 by	 the	 State’s	 economic	 policies;	 (4)	 the	 para-elite	 used	multiple	methods	 to	 legalise	 and	 legitimate	 land	 usurpation	 and	 exploited	 the	 property	rights	regime,	rather	than	a	collapse	of	these	rules	and	institution	–	again	illustrating	the	deficiencies	of	conventional	accounts	of	dispossession	in	conflict	contexts;	(5)	investors	and	businesses	 (not	 involved	 in	 violent	 usurpation)	 profited	 from	 forced	 displacement	 by	purchasing	abandoned	 lands	at	clearance	prices	–	 this	opportunistic	and	predatory	 land	accumulation	was	enabled	by	unequal	power	relations	and	has	also	 facilitated	and	been	facilitated	by	the	State’s	development	model.		 A	couple	issues	deserve	mention	before	proceeding	to	the	final	chapter,	which	focuses	on	dispossession	associated	with	oil,	mining	and	infrastructural	projects.	Dispossession	has	certainly	propelled	more	people	onto	the	labour	market	(though	it	should	be	said	that	this	is	not	always	 the	case),	which	combined	with	 forced	displacement	more	generally,	most	likely	 exacerbated	 high	 levels	 of	 unemployment,	 especially	 in	 the	 country’s	 cities122.	
                                                        122	Between	1990	and	2000	Colombia’s	average	unemployment	rate	in	its	7	most	important	cities	was	12.2%,	with	a	high	of	20.5%.	The	figures	for	2000	to	2006	(different	method	of	calculation	to	
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According	to	one	study,	the	displacement	crisis	in	Colombia	contributed	to	an	18%	decline	in	 real	 salaries	 in	 the	 informal	sectors,	which	account	 for	around	half	of	 employment	 in	Colombia’s	urban	areas	(study	by	Ibáñez	cited	in	Kalmanovitz,	2008).	However,	unlike	in	previous	 eras,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 recent	 dispossession	 has	 been	
motivated	 by	 an	 interest	 in	 labour	 acquisition/retention;	 these	 processes	 have	 been	characteristically	‘expulsive’,	aimed	at	securing	control	over	the	land	and	related	resources.	The	2014	national	agrarian	census,	the	first	to	be	conducted	since	1970,	confirmed	what	many	observers	already	believed:	 that	a	small	group	of	people	control	most	of	 the	country’s	land	and	that	a	large	proportion	of	this	remains	un-	or	under-	used.	The	census	classified	some	43	million	hectares	-38%	of	the	total	land	area-	as	under	‘agricultural	use’.	However,	80%	of	this	area	(34	million	ha)	is	covered	by	grasslands	or	rastrojo123.	Less	than	20%	of	agricultural	lands	were	actually	cultivated	as	of	2013	(DANE,	2016,	p.	51).	At	the	same	time,	69.5%	of	agricultural	producers	have	plots	of	less	than	5	hectares	and	occupy	just	5.2%	of	the	land	area;	and	0.2%	of	producers,	with	‘agricultural	production	units’	or	UPA	of	over	1,000	hectares,	occupy	32.8%	of	 the	 total	area	 (DANE,	2016,	pp.	502–503).	Note:	these	figures	do	not	represent	concentration	of	ownership,	as	an	UPA	is	not	the	same	as	a	property	or	titled	plot124.		As	noted	above,	because	of	a	lack	of	comprehensive	data,	we	simply	do	not	know	to	what	extent	dispossession	has	 contributed	 to	 the	un-	or	under-	use	of	 agricultural	 land.	However,	qualitative	research	suggests	that	(1)	much	-probably	most-	of	the	land	usurped	or	 acquired	opportunistically	 in	 the	 conflict-context	 belonged	 to	 campesinos;	 (2)	 for	 the	most	 part,	 was	 previously	 either	 used	 for	 subsistence	 cultivations	 and	 small-scale	commercial	agriculture	or	(especially	in	the	case	of	Afro/indigenous	territories)	covered	in	natural	 forests;	 (3)	and,	 in	a	considerable	number	of	cases,	 following	dispossession,	was	planted	 with	 industrial	 monocrops	 and	 tree	 plantations.	 This	 indicates	 that,	 instead	 of	provoking	the	replacement	of	extensive-cattle	grazing	with	higher-value	land	uses	or	the	
                                                        above)	are	an	average	of	16.2%,	with	a	high	of	20.1%	(DANE,	2007).	It	must	be	stressed	that	the	method	used	by	the	national	statistics	agency	DANE	counts	a	person	who	(e.g.)	sells	sweets	on	a	bus	two	hours	a	week	as	employed	(Dinero,	2014)	and	hence	the	figures	are	misleadingly	positive.	123	Under	the	census	definition,	this	is	land	that	hasn’t	been	cultivated	for	three	years	or	more	and	has	‘bushy’	or	‘shrub’	vegetation	growing	on	it	(DANE,	2016,	p.	45).	124	 For	 example:	 an	 agroindustrial	 farm	 -considered	 one	 UPA-	 may	 be	 spread	 across	 several	properties,	 while	 resguardos	 covered	 by	 a	 single	 collective	 title	 contain	 multiple	 UPAs.	 The	distinguishing	characteristic	of	an	UPA	 is	 that	an	 individual	or	entity	 is	responsible	 for	economic	activities	within	the	corresponding	area	(DANE,	2016,	p.	20).	
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establishment	 of	 new	 crops	 on	 unused	 but	 cleared	 lands	 (i.e.	 already	 deforested),	commercial	 land	 pressures	 have	 been	 transferred	 to	 campesinos	 and	 indigenous/Afro	communities	via	usurpation	and	opportunistic/predatory	acquisitions.	Ironically,	while	the	government	is	reluctant	to	expropriate	or	confiscate	large	idle	properties	for	redistribution	purposes	 (or	 even	discourage	 speculative	property	 accumulation	 via	 taxation	 and	other	‘softer’	measures),	it	has	been	more	than	willing	to	use	its’	taking	powers	to	sustain	the	oil	and	mining	industries,	as	shown	in	the	subsequent	chapter.			 	
-	8	-	
Dispossession	and	displacement	for	State-backed	investments		The	 previous	 chapter	 discussed	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab,	 as	 well	 as	 opportunistic	 and	predatory	 property	 accumulation	 in	 the	 conflict-context.	 In	 this	 final	 chapter,	 I	 analyse	dispossession	and	displacement	associated	with	investments	directly	backed	by	the	State,	which	includes	both	the	above	categories,	as	well	as	‘legal’	coercive	land	acquisitions	and	other	types	of	involuntary	land	loss.	As	explained	earlier,	this	and	the	preceding	chapter	are	dedicated	 to	 examining	 diverse	 forms	 and	 mechanisms	 of	 dispossession,	 which	 is	 a	worthwhile	 endeavour	 in	 itself,	 but	 also	 permits	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 how	 these	processes	unfold	and	bolsters	some	wider	propositions,	as	explained	in	ensuing	paragraphs.	Here	I	use	the	term	‘State-backed	project’	in	a	specific	way,	referring	to	investments	that	 are	 underwritten	 by	 government	 taking	 powers.	 While	 industrial	 agriculture	 and	commercial	forestry	have	received	significant	State	support,	there	is	currently	no	explicit	law	 in	 Colombia	 that	 allows	 government	 entities	 to	 directly	 dispossess	 and	 displace	inhabitants	to	make	way	for	such	projects.	In	contrast,	the	government	may	‘legally’	uproot	people	to	make	way	for	infrastructure	and	oil/mining	operations.	It	is	worth	mentioning	that	while	the	latter	sectors	have	effectively	been	granted	an	‘expropriation	free	pass’,	other	kinds	of	investments	(e.g.	dams	or	urban	renewal)	require	a	specific	‘declaration	of	public	utility	and	social	interest’125.	In	theory,	such	a	system	(in	contrast	to	the	blanket	declaration	covering	 the	 oil	 and	 mining	 industries)	 permits	 an	 analysis	 of	 whether	 the	 project	 in	question	 actually	 serves	 the	 ‘social	 interest’	 or	 at	 least	 the	 weighing	 up	 of	 certain	 and	potential	 losses	 against	 projected	 benefits.	 However,	 the	 decision	 is	 often	 biased	 by	 a	generalised	obsession	with	profits	and	growth.	There	 is	 no	 register	 of	 people	 ‘legally’	 dispossessed	 and/or	 displaced	 by	 the	Colombian	government	and	associated	 companies.	And	even	 if	 there	were,	 the	numbers	would	probably	be	misleadingly	small	for	reasons	explained	in	Chapter	6	and	elaborated	on	below.	However,	 it	 is	plausible	that	cases	of	 ‘legal’	dispossession	outnumber	instances	of	‘illegal’	usurpation	by	the	para-elite	-	the	issue	simply	hasn’t	received	the	same	attention.		
                                                        125	For	example,	 the	 Ituango	Dam	was	declared	a	project	of	 ‘public	utility	and	social	 interest’	 via	Resolution	 317	 of	 2008,	 conferred	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Mines	 and	 Energy;	 this	 guarantees	 that	Hidroituango	can	procure	the	land	required	for	its	operations	within	an	area	totalling	24,596	ha.	
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The	first	section	examines	diverse	mechanisms	and	forms	of	dispossession	that,	at	least	in	the	abstract,	exist	independently	of	the	armed	conflict.	It	illustrates	the	importance	of	property	rights	violations	and	restrictions	in	mobilising	land	for	capitalist	development	-	thus	bolstering	the	propositions	put	forward	in	Chapter	2.	I	stress	how	many	transfers	and	use	agreements	that	appear	voluntary	on	paper	are	in	fact	forced	under	the	threat	of	legal	proceedings.	This	allows	investors	to	secure	land	at	below	market	prices,	without	the	need	for	direct	intervention	by	the	State.	In	the	case	of	coerced	sales,	the	upshot	is	that	payment	is	often	insufficient	for	the	dispossessed	to	purchase	land	elsewhere.	In	the	case	of	coerced	easements,	 this	may	lead	to	 indirect	or	environmental	dispossession	and	displacement	–	these	losses	are	rarely	reflected	in	the	small	sums	people	receive	in	exchange	for	use	rights	over	their	land.	People	who	lack	formal	titles	tend	to	fare	even	worse.	Ironically,	many	of	those	denied	compensation	for	their	land	because	they	lack	legal	titles	were/are	unable	to	access	 a	 title	 precisely	 because	 the	 law	 prohibits	 titling	 in	 areas	 with	 oil	 and	 mining	operations	or	because	the	land	has	been	‘reserved’	for	such	investments.	The	remaining	sections	of	the	chapter	survey	the	multiple	ways	in	which	the	conflict-context,	especially	counterinsurgency	warfare,	has	facilitated	the	imposition	of	mining,	oil	and	 infrastructural	 projects	 backed	 by	 the	 State’s	 taking	 powers.	 I	 point	 out	 that	counterinsurgency	(CI)	warfare	is	partly	motivated	by	a	desire	to	secure	space	for	capitalist	development	-the	Colombian	and	US	governments	have	explicitly	stated	that	one	of	their	main	 aims	 is	 defend	 investors	 against	 guerrilla	 attacks-	 and	 that	 CI	 doctrine	 openly	contemplates	 the	 deliberate	 displacement	 of	 civilians	 as	 strategy	 for	 weakening	 the	insurgency.	 I	also	emphasise	how	the	 funding	of	 the	Colombian	armed	 forces	by	private	firms	entrenched	the	relationship	between	violence	and	economic	interests,	further	eroding	State	legitimacy	in	affected	regions.				Section	two	focuses	on	how	displacements	in	the	conflict-context	have	served	State-backed	 investments.	 Sometimes,	 so-called	 ‘conflict-induced	 displacement’	 was	 actually	aimed	 at	 clearing	 the	 land	 to	 make	 way	 for	 these	 projects.	 In	 other	 instances,	 mass	displacements	 inadvertently	 facilitated	 the	corporate	 take-over.	Policymakers	across	 the	world	insist	that	conflict-	and	development	-induced	displacement	are	separate	and	distinct	phenomena.	In	reality,	however,	this	distinction	is	often	untenable	(for	a	full	critique	of	the	conventional	categories	of	forced	displacement	see	my	article:	Thomson,	2014).	This	has	become	a	point	of	contention	in	Colombia	(see	e.g.	El	Espectador,	2014c;	Verdad	Abierta,	2015;	Wahlin,	2015).	On	the	one	hand,	many	people	displaced	for	mega-projects	demand	to	be	 recognised	 as	 IDPs,	 but	 government	 functionaries	 and	 business	 representatives	
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emphatically	reject	the	use	of	this	label	for	those	uprooted	by	‘development’126.	On	the	other	hand,	even	those	registered	as	IDPs	demand	recognition	that	their	displacement	was	not	‘caused’	by	the	armed	conflict	but	because	of	investment	interests	in	the	region127.	In	brief,	this	section	not	only	serves	to	further	elucidate	how	dispossession	and	displacement	unfold	in	 Colombia,	 but	 also	 to	 challenge	 established	 concepts	 that	 allow	 policymakers	 to	discriminate	 between	processes	 that	 violate	 human	 rights	 and	 those	 that	 are	 alleged	 to	uphold	them	(see	e.g.	footnote	below).	Section	 three	 provides	 a	 couple	 examples	 of	 how	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab	 aided	investments	 guaranteed	by	eminent	domain	powers,	while	 section	 four	provides	 a	brief	discussion	of	the	broader	ways	(i.e.	beyond	displacement	and	violent	land	grabs)	in	which	counter-insurgency	warfare	has	facilitated	the	imposition	of	State-backed	projects,	focusing	specifically	 on	 the	 intimidation	 and	 silencing	 of	 critics	 and	 opponents.	 In	 addition	 to	shedding	light	on	the	diverse	‘mechanics’	of	dispossession,	I	aim	to	highlight	how	‘legal’	and	‘illegal’	practices	and	processes	intertwine.		
1)	The	varied	forms	and	mechanisms	of	dispossession	for	State-backed	projects		This	 section	 discusses	 varied	 forms	 and	 mechanisms	 of	 dispossession,	 associated	 with	investments	 underwritten	 by	 the	 State’s	 taking	 powers,	 most	 of	 which	 are	 ‘legal’.	 The	categories	 used	 below	 are	 for	 analytical	 convenience	 and	 do	 not	 imply	 real-world	separation.	For	example,	at	least	16	communities	in	La	Guajira	-a	department	in	northeast	Colombia-	were	displaced	by	the	coal	mining	firm	Cerrejón	between	1985	and	2015	(CINEP,	2016,	 p.	 18	 and	 25);	 these	 processes	 were	 diverse,	 involving	 coerced	 land	 sales,	expropriations,	the	‘reserve’	and	‘recovery’	of	State	land,	evictions,	indirect	dispossession	
                                                        126	For	example:	in	March	2013,	some	370	people	occupied	a	gymnasium	in	Medellín,	proclaiming	themselves	displaced	by	the	Ituango	Dam.	They	reported	that	“threats	against	them	from	different	
armed	actors	and	from	State	and	[the	firm’s]	private	security	personnel	[…	combined	with]	the	lack	of	 subsistence	 for	 those	who	had	depended	 on	 traditional	mining”	 obligated	 them	 to	 leave	 their	homes	(Wahlin,	2015,	p.	31,	emphasis	added).	Perhaps	 if	 they	had	 limited	 their	denunciations	 to	intimidation	by	illegal	armed	groups,	the	State	would	have	recognised	them	as	IDPs,	but	Colombian	law	 does	 not	 recognise	 people	 uprooted	 by	 ‘development’	 projects	 as	 ‘displaced’	 and	 hence	 the	government	refused	to	include	them	in	the	register,	barring	them	from	accessing	humanitarian	aid	during	the	6	months	they	lived	in	the	gymnasium	(ibid,	pp.	31-33).	127	One	woman	told	the	Inter-American	Commission	on	Human	Rights:	“the	dozens	of	mining	and	energy	mega-projects	planned	for	 the	zone	were	the	real	causes	of	my	displacement”.	She	asked:	“how	many	of	us	are	really	expelled	by	the	armed	conflict?”	(cited	in	El	Espectador,	2014c).	A	State	representative	responded:	“there	haven’t	been	any	displacements	[for	these	projects]	but	 instead	protection	of	rights	[…]	via	the	imposition	of	certain	obligations	on	the	companies”	(ibid).	
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due	to	ecological	devastation	(favouring	further	property	transfers	to	the	company)	and	in	some	 cases	 -but	 not	 all-	 organised	 involuntary	 resettlement.	 For	 lack	 of	 space,	 I	 have	excluded	or	limited	the	discussion	of	certain	strategies	used	by	companies	and	the	State	to	counteract	 resistance	 to	 such	 projects,	 such	 as:	 ‘divide	 and	 conquer’	 tactics	 and	 the	propagation	of	conflicts	within	communities,	withdrawal	or	relocation	of	public	services,	militarisation	 of	 the	 area	 by	 government	 forces	 and	 private	 security	 firms,	 sabotage	 or	surveillance	of	community	meetings,	misuse	of	attendance	and	other	lists	with	participant	signatures	as	evidence	of	consent,	and	so	on	and	so	forth	(Personal	Interviews	2014-2015,	see	also	Contravía	TV,	2017;	CINEP,	2016;	Ó	Loingsigh,	2013).			(i)	Sales	coerced	under	threat	of	expropriation:	Most	 land	acquisitions	 for	mining,	oil	and	infrastructure	 projects	 are	 achieved	 through	 private	 transfer.	 Under	 Colombian	 law,	companies	are	expected	 to	attempt	negotiations	with	 landowners	before	 soliciting	State	intervention.	However,	the	fact	that	a	company	does	not	rely	directly	on	the	State’s	taking	powers,	does	not	mean	these	are	voluntary	transactions,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	the	legal	discourse	explicitly	labels	them	so.	An	inhabitant	of	Marmato,	a	town	slated	for	destruction	for	an	open-pit	gold	mine,	explained:			 It’s	like	a	forced	displacement	because	we	don’t	want	to	leave.	[…]	They	would	say	that	if	we	didn’t	sell	our	house,	then	later	the	machines	would	come,	there	would	be	slopes	 [taludes	 -	prone	 to	 landslide],	 the	 lands	would	devalue	and	then	who	would	buy?	And	if	we	didn’t	sell,	then	they	would	expropriate	us,	the	government	 would	 expropriate.	 People	 were	 scared.	 That	 psychological	terrorism	made	many	people	sick	(Personal	Interview,	2014).			There	 are	 similar	 stories	 from	 across	 the	 country.	 According	 to	 CINEP	 (2016),	 people	affected	 by	 the	 Cerrejón	 mine	 faced	 multiple	 pressures,	 including	 the	 threat	 of	expropriation,	and	as	a	consequence	accepted	payments	“below	the	prices	of	the	parcels	and	what	 the	 families	 needed	 to	 establish	 a	 new	 home”	 (p.	 18).	 Inhabitants	 of	 Albania,	neighbouring	Cerrejón,	told	journalists	they	had	been	forced	to	sell	 for	between	$15,000	
  
268	
and	$25,000	pesos	per	ha;	or	between	$5	and	$50	USD,	depending	on	the	date	of	the	sale128.	In	addition	to	the	expropriation	ultimatum,	unequal	power	relations	clearly	affect	people’s	ability	to	negotiate,	so	that	low-income	farm/home	owners	are	more	likely	to	be	exploited.	Occasionally,	 companies	 decide	 standard	 compensation	 amounts	 in	 advance129,	indicating	that	land	prices	are	non-negotiable.	A	report	on	the	Hidroituango	dam	project	in	Antioquia	 (which	used	 a	 standardised	 compensation	 scheme)	notes:	 “Some	 say	 that	 the	payment	they	received	for	their	land	was	too	low	and	that	[the	firm]	EPM	didn’t	give	them	the	chance	to	negotiate	a	better	price.	Given	that	the	construction	is	considered	in	the	public	interest,	landowners	are	obligated	to	sell”	(Wahlin,	2015,	p.	22).		An	 article	 on	 the	 Quimbo	 dam	 in	 Huila	 suggests	 that	 the	 amount	 offered	 to	landowners	was	based	on	values	in	the	cadastre	(Verdad	Abierta,	2015),	which	in	Colombia	are	typically	much	lower	-some	times	as	much	as	15	times	lower-	than	commercial	prices	(Sarmiento,	2018).	So,	again,	payments	may	be	insufficient	for	the	dispossessed	to	acquire	replacement	land130	(this	is	a	common	problem	across	the	world,	see	Cernea,	1995,	p.	253).	Sometimes	 landowners	 are	 offered	 a	 choice	 between	 monetary	 compensation	 and	relocation;	 in	 the	 latter	case,	 it	 is	 the	company	that	has	to	ensure	the	dispossessed	have	access	to	new	farm	or	house;	however,	as	discussed	below,	involuntary	resettlement	brings	its	own	set	of	problems.				I	do	not	wish	to	imply	that	all	property	transfers	linked	to	State-backed	investments	are	coerced.	But	those	who	sell	willingly	usually	have	little	attachment	to	the	land	and	tend	to	have	the	power,	knowledge	and	resources	to	y	negotiate	a	‘fair’	price.	To	reiterate:	many,	perhaps	most,	land	transfers	achieved	under	the	threat	of	expropriation	are	not	voluntary	transactions,	 though	they	have	a	 legal	appearance	as	such.	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	 these	coerced	 sales	 also	 affect	people	who	do	not	have	 formal	property	 rights;	 often,	 in	 these	cases,	the	firm	offers	to	pay	for	constructions	and	crops,	but	not	the	land	itself.		
                                                        128	The	article	does	not	state	the	year	of	these	sales	but	suggests	they	were	some	time	ago;	from	1990	to	2010	the	exchange	rate	fluctuated	between	500	and	2,877	COP	per	USD	(see	OECD	wepage).		129	See,	for	example,	Hidroituango’s	Manual	(Resolution	18	0557	–	09/04/2010),	which	establishes	a	complex,	but	standardised,	method	for	land	valuations.		130	The	Quimbo	dam	project	had	initially	been	denied	an	environmental	license	on	the	grounds	that	it	would	affect	thousands	of	hectares	of	productive	lands	and	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	‘restitute’	displaced	farmers.	When	the	licence	was	finally	granted	in	2009,	the	Environmental	Attorney	General	objected,	arguing	that	Huila	has	insufficient	productive	lands	(Semana	Sostenible,	2016a).	
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(ii)	Forced	 transfers	of	use	 rights	or	easements:	 In	 the	case	of	pipelines,	 roads,	and	other	constructions	that	occupy	relatively	small	areas,	a	company	may	opt	for	the	acquisition	of	use	rights	(an	easement	or	servidumbre)	over	portions	of	land.	The	interested	company	is	expected	 to	 negotiate	 privately	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 but	 if	 the	 landowner	 refuses,	 the	company	 can	 resort	 to	 legal	 proceedings	 to	 gain	 these	 rights.	 Evidence	 suggests	 such	litigation	is	unusual;	many	easements	are	secured	via	agreements	that	appear	voluntary	on	paper	but	-like	coerced	sales	-	are	in	fact	governed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers.	In	 Putumayo,	 oil	 companies	 sometimes	 simply	 use	 land	 without	 acquiring	 an	easement	and	even	without	giving	notice	(CIJP,	2014).	The	denial	of	use	rights	payments	to	people	who	don’t	have	formal	land	titles	is	seemingly	common,	despite	the	fact	that	the	law	regulating	 servidumbres	 requires	 equal	 treatment	 of	 owners,	 possessors	 and	 occupiers.	Even	if	compensation	is	offered,	this	is	often	very	low,	especially	in	the	case	of	landholders	or	 owners	 with	 little	 negotiating	 power.	 For	 example,	 one	 farmer	 received	 a	 one-off	payment	of	about	300	USD	for	the	installation	of	a	hosepipe	that	would	dump	wastewater	on	his	farm	for	the	duration	of	an	oil	project	(CIJP,	2015b).	Media	reports	reveal	that	this	sort	 of	 thing	 occurs	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 country	 also	 (Almario	 Chávez,	 2010;	 Corcho	Tróchez,	2013).	However,	the	dynamics	surrounding	easements	are,	on	the	whole,	poorly	documented.	 Those	 cases	 that	make	 the	news	usually	 do	 so	 because	 the	 land	holder	 or	owner	has	made	a	legal	complaint,	which	is	beyond	the	reach	of	many	campesinos.	Some	may	object	 that	 easements	 should	not	be	 categorised	as	dispossession.	This	objection	may	be	valid	 in	some	 instances	(e.g.	 the	 installation	of	a	 telephone	wires),	but	certain	 types	 of	 infrastructure	 (especially,	 but	 not	 only,	 oil	 pipelines)	 can	 partially	 or	completely	inhibit	farming	activities,	or	more	generally	make	living	on	the	land	unbearable	and,	in	some	cases,	may	force	the	affected	person	to	abandon	their	home	entirely.	This	is	discussed	below	under	‘indirect	or	environmental	dispossession	and	displacement’.		(iii)	 Expropriation:	 As	 already	 noted,	 if	 a	 landowner	 refuses	 to	 sell	 land	 required	 for	 a	project	 of	 ‘public	 utility	 or	 social	 interest’,	 then	 the	 interested	 company	 can	 solicit	expropriation	 proceedings	 on	 its	 behalf.	 The	 type	 of	 expropriation	 (administrative	 or	judicial)	 and	 the	 entity	 in	 charge	of	 the	process	depends,	 among	other	 things,	 upon	 the	project	itself.	In	the	case	of	mining,	oil	and	dam	investments,	for	example,	expropriation	is	usually	handled	by	the	Ministry	of	Mines	and	Energy.	For	urban	regeneration,	the	Mayor’s	Office	may	be	 in	 charge.	 Governors	 can	 also	 exercise	 ‘eminent	 domain’	 powers.	 The	 list	
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could	go	on.	This	is	one	reason	it	is	difficult	to	get	comprehensive	data	about	expropriation	in	 Colombia;	 it	would	 require	 sending	 Freedom	of	 Information	 requests	 to	 hundreds	 of	different	entities.		Based	on	just	two	FOI	responses,	it	is	clear	that	the	majority	of	recent	expropriations	for	mining	have	taken	place	in	César	and	Guajira,	the	country’s	main	coal	producing	regions.	Of	the	52	expropriation	cases	listed	by	the	Ministry	of	Mines	and	Energy,	37	were	in	César	and	the	majority	were	initiated	between	2006	and	2009.	The	information	supplied	by	the	National	 Mining	 Agency	 indicates	 that	 147	 of	 the	 159	 properties	 subject	 to	 recent	expropriation	proceedings	(114	of	these	were	initiated	in	2015)	were	advanced	on	behalf	of	Carbones	de	Cerrejón,	which	operates	Colombia’s	largest	coal	mine	and	is	owned	by	the	multinationals	BHP	Billington,	Anglo	American	and	Xtrata.		According	to	CINEP	(2016),	multiple	properties	 in	Manantial,	Caracolí,	Espinal	and	Tabaco	(La	Guajira)	were	also	expropriated	in	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	to	make	way	for	 Cerrejón’s	 operations	 (p.	 17).	 A	 news	 article	 on	 the	 eviction	 carried	 out	 in	 Tabaco	indicates	that	some	lands	were	legally	transferred	to	the	company	prior	to	the	completion	of	the	expropriation	proceedings	(entrega	anticipada),	meaning	that	people	were	evicted	before	receiving	compensation.	One	inhabitant	commented:	how	will	they	do	the	valuation	if	our	houses	have	been	torn	down?	(El	Tiempo,	2001a;	see	also	CINEP,	2016,	p.	17).			(iv)	 Dispossession	 via	 the	 ‘reserve’	 and	 ‘recovery’	 of	 State	 lands:	 Expropriation,	 in	 the	technical	 sense,	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 State	 lands;	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 any	 official	 procedure	accompanies	the	dispossession	of	people	living	on	these	lands,	it	involves	the	declaration	of	the	 lands	as	 ‘reserved’,	 sometimes	 followed	by	a	process	called	 ‘baldío	 recovery’.	People	subject	 to	such	 forms	of	dispossession	do	not	usually	receive	compensation	 for	 the	 land	itself,	but	only	 for	the	value	of	 their	crops	and	homes	and	in	some	cases	not	even	those.	Again,	this	means	payment	is	often	insufficient	for	people	to	acquire	land	and	re-establish	elsewhere.	An	example	of	the	use	of	this	juridical	figure	is	the	displacement	of	farmers	in	Arauca	to	make	way	for	oil	operations.		In	1993	the	government	declared	the	baldío	 lands	surrounding	the	Caño	Limón	oil	field	as	a	‘reserve’	of	the	State.	In	1995,	hundreds	of	people	were	displaced	to	make	way	for	the	oil	complex.	Decades	later	-and	despite	a	2011	court	order-	the	government	had	failed	to	 resettle	 the	 community	 as	promised.	 In	2013-2014,	 following	almost	 twenty	years	of	
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‘protracted	displacement’131,	some	families	decided	to	return	to	their	lands.	Responding	to	the	demands	of	Occidental	Petroleum,	police	have	tried	to	forcibly	evict	these	families	at	least	six	times	since	their	return	(Colombia	Informa,	2014,	2015).			 Similarly,	in	La	Guajira,	large	portions	of	State	lands,	ancestral	territory	of	the	Wayuu,	were	declared	as	‘reserves’;	at	least	four	of	these	areas	were	conceded	to	Carbocol	for	the	Cerrejón	mine,	preventing	the	lands	from	being	titled	to	inhabitants	(CINEP,	2016,	p.	20).	It	is	worth	recalling	that	even	without	a	‘reserve’	declaration,	Colombian	law	bars	the	titling	
baldíos	within	a	2.5	km	radius	(prior	 to	2014,	 this	was	a	5	km	radius)	of	oil	and	mining	operations.	All	 across	 the	country,	 farmers,	 indigenous	and	afro	communities	have	been	denied	individual	and	collective	(respectively)	titles	over	their	lands	for	this	reason.			 A	leader	from	Yu’	Çxihme	cabildo	in	Puerto	Caicedo,	Putumayo	explained:	“We	have	been	asking	for	the	resguardo	for	15	years.	Because	there	are	oil	wells	in	the	territory,	they	don’t	want	 to	 recognise	 it	 as	 ours.	 It’s	 been	 a	 struggle	 and	 a	 fight.	We’ve	 had	 very	 few	answers”	(Personal	Interview,	2015).	In	the	Putumayo	department	alone,	there	are	some	9,744	 individual	 land	 title	 applications	 pending,	 plus	 106	 for	 collective	 titles	 and	 43	applications	 for	 the	expansion	of	existing	resguardos	without	resolution.	The	majority	of	unresolved	applications	are	for	lands	within	oil	producing	municipalities	(CIJP,	2015b).			(v)	Occupation	of	collective	territories	and	prior	consultation:	As	explained	in	Chapter	6,	Afro	and	 indigenous	communities	whose	 territories	are	under	collective	 title	are	 subject	 to	a	different	 type	 of	 State-sanctioned	 dispossession.	 This	 does	 not	 involve	 the	 transfer	 of	property	rights;	the	land	is	simply	occupied	by	the	company.	In	order	to	be	recognised	as	a	‘legal’	occupation,	the	firm	has	a	duty	to	conduct	a	prior	consultation.		It	is	worth	noting	that	the	law	recognises	areas	used	and	inhabited	by	indigenous	and	Afro	 groups	 as	 their	 territory	 and	 demands	 prior	 consultation	 for	 intervention	 in	 these	lands	even	when	they	don’t	have	a	formal	title.	However,	this	rule	is	regularly	ignored	and	State	lands,	which	are	in	fact	indigenous	or	Afro	territories,	are	often	conceded	to	oil	and	mining	 companies	 (see	 above).	 Qualitative	 research	 suggests	 those	 groups	 without	
                                                        131	 The	 forced	migration	 literature	 usually	 defines	 displacement	 as	 “protracted”	 if	 the	 displaced	person	 lacks	 a	 “durable	 solution”	 for	 a	 prolonged	 period	 of	 time.	 The	 person	 is	 neither	permanently/adequately	settled	elsewhere,	nor	is	able	to	return	home.	The	most	obvious	example	is	when	people	spend	years	living	in	a	refugee	camp	(see:	this	2009	issue	of	Forced	Migration	Review,).	In	 the	 case	described	above,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	many	of	 the	displaced	 families	were	unable	 to	 find	a	‘durable	solution’	or	they	wouldn’t	have	returned	almost	two	decades	later,	despite	the	risks.	
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collective	titles	are	particularly	vulnerable	to	 involuntary	resettlement	and	evictions;	 for	example,	the	communities	uprooted	to	make	way	for	the	Cerrejón	mine	were	indigenous,	Afro	or	a	mixture	of	the	two	–	it	seems	none	of	them	had	collective	titles	(CINEP,	2016).	Even	 in	 areas	 protected	 by	 a	 collective	 title,	 companies	 habitually	 evade	 their	obligation	to	carry	out	prior	consultation.	When	consultations	are	carried	out,	these	tend	to	be	conflictual	and/or	superficial	(Personal	Interviews,	2014-2015;	ABColombia,	2012,	pp.	15–17;	Molano	Bravo,	2009).	Finally,	as	argued	previously,	because	affected	communities	are	denied	the	power	of	veto,	the	consultation	process	itself	can	become	a	mechanism	of	dispossession.	 In	2010	alone,	121	prior	consultation	processes	were	 implemented,	60	of	which	 were	 for	 oil	 operations,	 11	 for	 mining	 and	 energy	 investments,	 and	 34	 for	infrastructural	projects	(Comisión	Colombiana	de	Juristas,	2011,	p.	47).	Land	occupations	‘legalised’	through	prior	consultation	often	lead	to	indirect	-environmental-	dispossession	and	displacement	(see	e.g.	CINEP,	2016).		(vi)	 Enclosure	 and	 loss	 of	 public	 space:	 Mining,	 oil	 and	 large-scale	 infrastructural	investments	often	involve	the	enclosure	of	public	space.	Riverbanks	and	surrounding	areas	are	 particularly	 susceptible.	 People	 affected	 by	 hydroelectric	 and	 extractive	 projects	commonly	proclaim	that	the	river	was	‘taken’	from	them	(see	e.g.	Caracol	Radio,	2011b).	Often,	this	is	quite	literally	the	case.	Those	whose	livelihoods	depend	on	fishing	and	gold	panning	are	especially	affected	by	the	enclosure	of	surrounding	land,	prohibitions	on	river	use	 and/or	 alterations	 to	 the	watercourse	 itself	 (see	 e.g.	Wahlin,	 2015;	 Verdad	Abierta,	2015).	Of	course,	they	are	not	the	only	groups	affected	by	‘water	grabbing’.	In	many	parts	of	Colombia,	daily	life	is	constructed	around	the	river;	especially,	but	not	only,	in	areas	with	no	commercial	water	services.	Forests	used	for	hunting,	the	gathering	of	medicinal	plants	and	 firewood,	 traditional	 ceremonies	 and	 transit	 by	 foot	 may	 also	 be	 cordoned	 off,	destroyed	 or	 converted	 into	 privately	 owned	 nature	 reserves	 that	 are	 supposed	 to	compensate	for	the	negative	ecological	impacts	of	the	project	(Personal	Interviews	2015;	CINEP,	2016;	Semana	Sostenible,	2016a).				(vii)	Indirect	or	environmental	displacement	and	dispossession:	Often	people	who	were	not	immediately	or	directly	uprooted	to	make	way	for	a	project	end	up	losing	their	livelihoods	or	having	to	leave	their	homes	due	to	the	environmental	impacts.	Such	cases	are	similar	to	what	the	US	property	law	scholars	call	‘indirect	takings’.	The	following	is	a	commonly	used	
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example:	a	government	constructs	a	dam,	which	floods	an	adjacent	farm,	making	agriculture	on	 that	 land	unviable.	 The	 land	has	 effectively	 been	 ‘taken’	 from	 the	 farmer	without	 an	official	 process.	 However,	 the	 literature	 on	 indirect	 takings	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 land	 use	restrictions	and	how	government	regulations	impact	upon	property	values	(US	Department	of	Justice,	2015;	Chayes	et	al.,	2008).	Here,	the	focus	is	on	what	some	observers	refer	to	as	‘environmental	displacement’	(Roa	Avendaño,	2016).	I	provide	just	a	few	examples	in	order	to	illustrate	my	point.	In	2006	British	Petroleum	(BP)	agreed	to	pay	compensation	to	a	group	of	Colombian	farmers	who	were	 left	destitute	due	 to	 the	 construction	of	 the	Ocensa	oil	pipeline.	 (The	company	was	 also	 accused	 of	 profiting	 from	 a	 reign	 of	 terror	 imposed	 by	 paramilitary	groups,	which	 violently	 repressed	 any	 attempts	 to	 challenge	 the	 project).	 The	 case	was	brought	to	a	UK	court	in	2005,	in	part	due	to	death	threats	against	the	Colombian	lawyers	representing	 the	 farmers.	 In	 the	 end,	 BP	 chose	 to	 negotiate	 an	 out-of-court	 settlement,	presumably	 to	 avoid	 “admissions	 of	 liability”	 (Verkaik,	 2006;	 Business	&	Human	Rights	Resource	Centre,	2015a).	In	2008	another	group	of	farmers	affected	by	the	same	pipeline	filed	 a	 separate	 claim	 against	 BP	 in	 a	 UK	 High	 Court.	 They	 accused	 the	 company	 of	negligence	and	demanded	compensation	for	lost	income	due	to	impacts	on	water	sources	and	 soil	 erosion	 (Lee,	 2014;	 Vidal,	 2015).	 The	 installation	 of	 the	 pipeline	 “drastically	reduce[d]	production	and	cause[d]	some	farmers	to	leave	the	land”	(Leigh	Day	&	Co,	2008,	p.	21,	emphasis	added).		In	 César,	 inhabitants	 of	 El	 Hatillo	 have	 been	 demanding	 official	 resettlement	 and	resisting	 indirect	 dispossession	 and	 displacement.	 They	 started	 denouncing	 problems	caused	by	the	neighbouring	coal	mines	in	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s:	respiratory,	skin	and	other	 illnesses,	 the	failure	of	 their	subsistence	crops,	 the	contamination	of	 the	River	Calenturitas	and	its	diversion	to	suit	the	needs	of	the	coal	operations.	In	2010,	the	Ministry	of	 Environment,	 Housing	 and	 Territorial	 Development	 ordered	 a	 number	 of	 firms	 to	coordinate	the	resettlement	of	El	Hatillo,	in	addition	to	two	other	communities	(Plan	Bonito	and	 Boquerón)	 –	 the	 resolution	 (No.	 0970,	 20/05/2010)	 stresses	 that	 relocation	 is	necessary	due	to	the	risks	posed	by	air	pollution	caused	by	the	mine.	As	of	2017,	the	people	of	El	Hatillo	had	still	not	been	resettled.	Unidentified	armed	actors	(most	likely	paramilitary	successor	groups)	regularly	threaten	and	intimidate	inhabitants.	A	community	leader	from	El	 Hatillo,	 Aldemar	 Parra,	 was	murdered	 in	 January	 2017	 (Contravía	 TV,	 2017;	 Verdad	Abierta,	2017a).	
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Similar	stories	exist	across	Colombia,	many	of	which	never	reach	the	stage	of	 legal	proceedings	and	do	not	end	with	any	form	of	reparations	for	the	communities	affected.	The	
intermediate	 causes	 (the	underlying	 cause	 is,	 of	 course,	 the	 investment	project	 itself)	 of	indirect	 dispossession	 and	 displacement	 are	 diverse	 and	 may	 combine,	 for	 example:	significant	declines	in	production	or	total	loss	of	crops	due	to	a	rise	in	‘pests’	or	the	loss	of	wild	 pollinators	 following	 deforestation,	 soil	 contamination,	 depletion/contamination	 of	hydric	sources	used	for	agriculture;	a	decline	in	fish	catches	due	to	pollution;	intolerable	living	conditions	due	to	noise	and	light	pollution	and	health	problems	caused	by	the	project	(further	examples	of	indirect	dispossession	and	displacement	caused	by	the	oil	industry	in	Avellaneda	Cusaría,	2004,	pp.	472–478;	Moreno	&	Ussa,	2008;	caused	by	mining	operations	in	 CINEP,	 2016;	 caused	 by	 hydroelectric	 projects	 in	 Roa	 Avendaño,	 2016;	 Semana	Sostenible,	2016a;	Wahlin,	2015).	As	noted	by	researchers	from	CINEP	(2016),	such	adverse	conditions	often	pressure	people	into	selling	their	land	or	homes	at	low	cost	(p.	15).		(viii)	Involuntary	resettlement:	With	this	category	I	refer	to	official	relocations,	carried	out	by	a	company	or	the	government,	usually	to	new	settlements	constructed	for	the	purpose132.	It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 detail	 the	 harms	 (e.g.	 mental	 health	 issues,	deterioration	 in	 living	 standards,	 loss	 of	 incomes,	 cultural	 and	 social	 disintegration)	typically	caused	by	forced	displacement	(for	a	succinct,	but	still	incomplete,	summary,	see	Cernea,	1995,	pp.	251–252)	-many	of	which	are	shared	by	people	forced	to	flee	by	the	armed	conflict	and	those	uprooted	by	economic	projects,	including	under	official	relocations.	The	specific	impacts	on	indigenous	and	Afro	communities,	with	a	strong	spiritual	attachment	to	their	land,	would	add	another	layer	of	complexity	to	such	an	analysis	(see	e.g.	CINEP,	2016).	Here	I	give	just	a	few	specific	examples.		As	of	2015,	two	of	the	four	the	settlements	built	for	those	displaced	by	the	Quimbo	dam	in	Huila	lacked	access	to	running	water,	while	none	had	the	promised	irrigation	system	(Verdad	 Abierta,	 2015).	 People	 relocated	 to	 make	 way	 for	 the	 Sogamoso	 hydroelectric	
                                                        132	In	some	ways,	those	subject	to	involuntary	resettlement	are	‘fortunate’	compared	to	the	unknown	numbers	of	people	 affected	by	 investment	projects	who	have	been	excluded	 from	such	 schemes.	According	to	CINEP	(2016),	Cerrejón	and	its	contractors	would	divide	communities	by	categorising	families	 into	 ‘eligible’	 and	 ‘not	 eligible’	 for	 resettlement	 (pp.	 22-23).	 Complaints	 of	 exclusionary	censuses	used	to	decide	who	should	be	included	in	compensation	and/or	resettlement	schemes	are	common.	In	the	case	of	El	Quimbo	dam,	the	Constitutional	Court	intervened	in	2013,	ordering	the	company	to	conduct	another	census.	The	original	census	had	included	3,000	people.	In	the	second	round,	28,000	applied	but	13,000	applications	were	rejected	(Verdad	Abierta,	2015;	see	also	Semana	Sostenible,	2016a;	Roa	Avendaño,	2016;	Wahlin,	2015;	CINEP,	2016).		
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project	in	Santander	also	reported	lack	of	access	to	water	in	the	resettlement	locations,	in	addition	 to	other	problems	with	 the	productive	 schemes	 that	were	 supposed	 to	 replace	their	lost	livelihoods	(Roa	Avendaño,	2016).	In	the	case	of	El	Hatillo	in	César	(see	above),	which	as	of	2017	was	still	awaiting	resettlement,	inhabitants	were	offered	just	1.5	hectares	per	family.	The	companies	argue	that	the	land	the	community	currently	lives	on	is	owned	by	 the	 State	 (which	 refused	 to	 grant	 them	 property	 rights	 precisely	 because	 of	 laws	preventing	titling	in	areas	affected	by	mining)	and,	as	such,	that	they	have	no	obligation	to	compensate	 for	 the	 terrain	 itself,	 which	 the	 people	 of	 El	 Hatillo	 have	 cultivated	 for	generations	(Contravía	TV,	2017).		 	(ix)	Evictions:	The	forms	and	mechanisms	of	dispossession	described	above	may	or	may	not	be	accompanied	by	eviction	or	the	forcible	physical	removal	of	people	from	their	homes	and	places	of	work.	Often,	evictions	are	simply	the	most	visibly	violent	facet	of	a	more	complex	and	 longer	 process.	 Consider	 the	 case	 of	 Tabaco.	According	 to	 the	 José	Alvear	Restrepo	Lawyer’s	Collective,	the	firm	Carbocol-Intercor	(now	Cerrejón)	“had	offered	the	inhabitants	of	Tabaco	derisory	sums	of	money”	for	their	farms	and	homes.	The	company	and	the	State	started	 pressuring	 those	who	 refused	 the	 offers:	 they	 cut	 off	 public	 services,	 withdrew	teachers,	 closed	 the	 health	 centre	 and	 church,	 and	 prevented	 transit	 in	 the	 area.	 CINEP	researchers	note:	“all	these	pressures	led	many	families	to	sell	their	land	at	any	price”	(p.	17).	In	1999,	the	Ministry	of	Mines	and	Energy	ordered	the	expropriation	of	lands	that	the	company	was	unable	to	acquire	through	private	transactions.	And,	in	2001,	the	remaining	inhabitants	 of	 Tabaco	were	 evicted.	 In	 2002,	 the	 Supreme	Court	 instructed	 the	Mayor’s	Office	to	resettle	the	Tabaco	community	within	48	hours;	as	of	2017,	this	instruction	had	not	been	fulfilled,	and	15	years	on	many	were	still	“waiting	for	resettlement”	(Colectivo	de	Abogados	José	Alvear	Restrepo,	2017;	CINEP,	2016,	p.	17).		Nevertheless,	in	other	cases,	eviction	is	the	sole	mechanism	of	dispossession;	there	are	no	prior	 attempts	at	 coerced	 sales,	no	 resettlement	negotiations	–	 the	police	 simply	remove	people	from	their	land.	This	seems	to	be	what	happened	to	a	group	of	farmers	in	Puerto	Gaitán,	Meta.	In	2011,	excavators	were	brought	in	to	tear	down	their	homes.	Some	150	families	settled	on	the	disputed	terrain	in	the	mid-1990s.	Almost	15	years	later,	in	2009,	a	woman	who	asserts	ownership	over	the	 land	signed	land	use	contracts	(servidumbres)	with	the	oil	company	Hocol	and	sought	permissions	to	evict	the	families	living	on	the	land.	Journalists	note	that	inhabitants	questioned	the	validity	of	the	land	title	used	to	justify	their	eviction;	one	of	their	leaders,	Enoc	Hernández,	was	murdered	in	2010	(Noticias	UNO,	2011).	
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Gold	panners	in	Antioquia	have	been	subjected	to	a	similarly	crude	process.	These	artisanal	miners,	many	of	whom	are	itinerant	and	live	in	temporary	shelters	on	the	banks	of	the	River	Cauca,	represent	the	majority	of	the	estimated	900	people	evicted	between	2011	and	2015	to	 make	 way	 for	 the	 Ituango	 Dam;	 most	 were	 deemed	 ineligible	 for	 compensation	 or	resettlement	(Wahlin,	2015).		
2)	Armed	conflict	and	land	clearance	in	zones	slated	for	State-backed	investments	Across	 Colombia,	 mass	 displacements,	 apparently	 ‘caused’	 by	 the	 armed	 conflict,	 have	occurred	just	before	and/or	amidst	the	imposition	of	State-backed	investments.	According	to	 one	 estimate,	 87%	 of	 forced	 displacements	 and	 80%	 of	 human	 rights	 violations	 in	Colombia	occur	in	mining-petroleum	municipalities	(Ramírez	Cuellar,	2011,	cited	in	Vargas	Valencia,	2013,	p.	63).	There	is	evidence	indicating	that,	in	some	cases,	so-called	‘conflict-induced	displacement’	may	have	 in	 fact	 been	 a	deliberate	 strategy	of	 land	 clearance	 for	these	State-backed	projects;	however,	this	is	very	difficult	to	prove.	Regardless	of	whether	violent	 displacement	 was	 intended	 to	 do	 so,	 it	 has	 certainly	 facilitated	 corporate	 land	occupations.	Fewer	inhabitants	within	an	investment	zone	means	fewer	people	to	consult	and	negotiate	with,	fewer	to	compensate	or	resettle	and	less	opposition	to	the	project	(Ó	Loingsigh,	2013,	p.	86).	Before	proceeding	with	some	illustrative	examples,	several	points	deserve	consideration.	(1)	Guerrilla	groups	are	notorious	for	attacks	on	oil,	mining	and	other	infrastructure,	extorting	 ‘war	 rents’	 from	 companies,	 and	kidnapping	or	 assassinating	 their	 employees.	This	 posed	 serious	 difficulties	 for	 State-backed	 investments	 in	 some	 areas.	 The	 exact	opposite	 could	be	 said	of	 paramilitary	 groups,	which	 -historically	 at	 least-	 have	worked	alongside	 the	 army	 to	 defend	 national	 and	 international	 investors	 against	 the	 armed	insurgency,	 as	well	 as	unarmed	social	movements.	 In	 this	 sense,	 counterinsurgency	 (CI)	warfare	closely	intertwines	with	investment	interests	(see	also	Grajales,	2013).	The	latter	claim	is	easily	substantiated.	For	example,	US	government	functionaries	overtly	affirmed	the	 importance	 of	 Colombia’s	 oil	 resources	 in	 their	 validation	 of	 the	USA’s	 provision	 of	military	 aid	 to	 the	 country	 (Stokes,	 2005,	pp.	 124–126).	Mass	displacements	 are	 almost	always	the	outcome	of	paramilitary	and	military	incursions;	CI	operations	clear	areas	not	only	of	guerrilla	combatants,	but	also	segments	of	the	civilian	population,	and	this	clearance	benefits	State-backed	projects.	
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(2)	 Official	 narratives	may	 advise	 that	 the	 objective	 is	 to	 clear	 the	 area	 of	 armed	insurgents,	not	civilians.	However,	as	explained	in	Chapter	6,	CI	doctrine	defines	the	enemy	widely	so	as	 to	 include	civilians	deemed	 ‘subversive’.	Entire	communities	 living	 in	areas	traditionally	occupied	by	 the	guerrilla	may	 fall	 into	 this	category.	Wresting	control	 from	insurgents	is	often	thought	to	require	the	displacement	or	even	assassination	of	presumed	‘collaborators’.	 CI	 discourse	 calls	 this	 ‘draining’	 the	 ‘water’:	 in	 uprooting	 the	 civilian	population	 (the	 water),	 the	 rebels	 (fish)	 are	 exposed	 (see	 e.g.	 Downes,	 2007).	 So,	counterinsurgency	operations,	which	are	at	least	partially	motivated	by	a	desire	to	secure	space	for	capitalist	development,	often	comprise	the	forcible	displacement	of	civilians	who,	in	addition	to	armed	subversives,	are	themselves	deemed	obstacles	to	this	development	(i.e.	civilian	displacement	is	not	‘collateral	damage’).	It	is	worth	emphasising	that	the	treatment	of	 people	 as	 obstacles	 is	 not	 just	 inferred,	 it	 is	 often	 stated	 rather	 openly.	 For	 example,	various	 news	 reports	 discuss	 the	 “issue	 of	 the	 communities”	 as	 “a	 stone	 in	 the	 shoe”,	hindering	the	oil	and	mining	sectors	and	Colombia’s	development	(see	e.g.	El	Colombiano,	2017a;	Portafolio,	2013b;	Semana,	2015).	(3)	 Close	 cooperation	 between	 extractive	 industry	 firms	 and	 government	 armed	forces	and	the	private	financing	of	public	defence	further	complicate	this	issue.	For	at	least	20	years,	oil	and	mining	companies	have	been	signing	‘collaboration	agreements’	with	the	Colombian	 army,	 in	 which	 the	 former	 contributes	 resources	 (in	 money	 or	 in	 kind)	 in	exchange	for	special	protection.	Company	facilities	often	double	as	military	bases	and	their	private	 security	 firms	 frequently	 work	 with	 local	 army	 units133.	 This	 contributes	 to	 a	situation	in	which	government	forces	prioritise	the	demands	of	private	firms	over	their	duty	to	protect	 civilians.	 It	 is	 relatively	 common	 for	 inhabitants	 to	observe	a	deterioration	 in	security	conditions	following	the	arrival	of	an	oil,	mining	or	hydroelectric	company	(CINEP,	2016;	Wahlin,	 2015).	 Consider	 the	 following	 fragments	 of	 testimonies	 from	 Putumayo,	which	provide	a	mere	taste	of	a	recurring	theme:		
                                                        133	Perhaps	the	most	cited	case	involves	Occidental	Petroleum	and	the	private	military	contractor	AirScan,	accused	of	complicity	in	the	1998	Santo	Domingo	massacre	in	which	a	Colombian	air	force	helicopter	dropped	a	cluster	bomb	on	the	village	(near	the	Caño	Limón	oilfield),	killing	17	civilians	-among	them	6	children-	and	injuring	a	further	27.	The	plane	that	accompanied	the	bombardment	was	provisioned	by	AirScan.	Airscan	is	said	to	have	managed	aerial	surveillance	and	to	have	defined	the	targets.	It	is	also	alleged	that	Occidental	provided	space	in	its	facilities	for	planning	and	other	resources	such	as	fuel	and	logistical	support.	The	event	led	to	the	displacement	of	the	entire	village	(Inter-American	Court	of	Human	Rights,	2012;	US	Court	of	Appeals,	2014).		
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“They	say	 that	you	provide	 security	 for	us,	but	 that	 is	 a	 lie”,	 I	 told	him	 [the	solider].	“You	are	only	working	to	protect	the	multinationals.	What	do	they	pay	you?”	He	said:	“yes,	that	is	true,	but	if	those	are	the	orders,	we	have	to	do	it”.	[...]	I	have	told	them:	“you	are	protecting	something	that	isn’t	even	yours”.	“You	say	that	you	are	protecting	a	community,	a	population,	but	in	reality	you	are	not.	When	you	arrive	in	this	territory	I	feel	unsafe.	Your	presence	doesn’t	make	me	 feel	 secure”,	 I	 told	 him	 (Inhabitant	 of	 Jerusalén-San	 Luis,	 Personal	Interview,	2015).		 The	army	started	to	hassle	us	when	the	oil	company	arrived	[...]	Six	months	after	 the	oil	 company	was	established,	 the	soldiers	 tortured	people	 to	make	them	‘sing’	 [provide	 information].	There	was	one	man	they	shot	 in	the	ears;	they	burnt	him	with	cigarettes	on	his	testicles.	I	remember	one	of	the	young	men	they	got;	he	was	a	noble	worker.	[...]	They	had	been	trying	to	build	the	oil	platform	since	the	year	2000,	but	the	guerrillas	kept	knocking	it	down.	Then	they	 stopped	 knocking	 it	 down	 and	 started	 imposing	 a	 tax	 of	 50%.	 The	company	 didn’t	 accept	 and	 that’s	when	 the	military	 strengthened	 and	 then	came	the	repression.	[...]	They	built	the	military	base	in	2002	to	protect	the	oil	company.	Since	then	there	is	no	peace	(Inhabitant	of	the	Amazon	Pearl	PRZ,	Personal	Interview,	2015).		 The	armed	forces	have	not	only	defended	companies	from	insurgent	attacks,	but	also	(whether	directly	or	indirectly)	from	civilian	strikes	and	protests.	This	‘special	relationship’	is	particularly	problematic	given	the	long	history	of	human	rights	abuses	committed	by	the	Colombian	armed	forces,	as	well	as	their	close	collaboration	with	and/or	participation	in	paramilitary	groups.	Despite	reiterated	allegations,	oil	and	mining	firms	operating	across	Colombia	continue(d)	to	enter	into	official	and	unofficial	collaboration	agreements	with	the	armed	forces	(Business	&	Human	Rights	Resource	Centre,	2015b;	Moor	&	Van	de	Sandt,	2014;	Dunning	&	Wirpsa,	2004;	Gillard,	Gomez,	&	Jones,	1998;	HRW,	1998).	(4)	 In	 addition	 to	 being	 connected	 with	 paramilitary	 violence	 through	 security	contracts	with	 the	Colombian	army,	many	mining	and	oil	 companies	maintained	a	more	direct	relationship	with	the	paramilitaries.	(Note:	dozens	of	firms	from	other	sectors	also	collaborated	with	paramilitary	 forces,	 but	my	 focus	here	 is	 on	 the	 traditional	 extractive	
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industries.)	Representatives	of	the	Texas	Petroleum	Company,	for	example,	are	said	to	have	been	present	at	the	1982	meeting	responsible	for	founding	the	death	squad	MAS	or	‘Death	to	 the	 Kidnappers’	 	 (HRW,	 1996).	 More	 recently,	 legal	 proceedings	 against	 various	demobilised	paramilitaries	revealed	details	of	their	alliance	with	the	French	multinational	Parenco.	 The	 company	 is	 said	 to	 have	 provided	 funds	 to	 the	 paramilitaries,	 as	 well	 as	vehicles	 and	 oil.	 One	 ex-combatant	 proclaimed:	 “We	 collaborated,	 and	 those	 people	financed	 the	 organization	 and	 had	 voice	 and	 vote”	 (cited	 in	 Quevedo,	 2012).	 British	Petroleum	 has	 also	 been	 implicated	 in	 paramilitary	 violence	 (see	 e.g.	 Coleman,	 2015a,	2015b).	 Ex-paramilitary,	 Salvatore	 Mancuso	 declared	 that	 “all	 those	 oil	 companies	[operating	in	the	eastern	plains]	paid”	money	to	the	AUC	(Versión	Libre	Salvatore	Mancuso,	2007,	pp.	27–28,	2009,	p.	92).	The	NGO	PAX’s	 investigation	into	the	links	between	paramilitary	violence	and	coal	mining	 in	 César	 is	 particularly	 revealing.	 Demobilised	 combatants	 claim	 that	 the	paramilitary	expansion	in	César,	between	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	was	requested,	encouraged	 and	 funded	 by	 the	 two	 major	 coal	 mining	 firms	 operating	 in	 the	 region:	Drummond	 Colombia	 (a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 US	 multinational	 with	 the	 same	 name)	 and	Prodeco	(acquired	by	the	Swiss	company	Glencore	in	1995).	In	addition	to	protecting	the	companies	and	their	personnel	 from	guerrilla	attacks,	 the	paramilitaries	also	threatened	and	murdered	labour	union	members	 	and	displaced	inhabitants	from	lands	required	by	coal	businesses	(Moor	&	Van	de	Sandt,	2014,	pp.	48–73;	see	also	CNMH,	2012c,	pp.	135–136).	Ex-paramilitary	alias	Bam	Bam	affirmed	that	fellow	fighter	alias	Jhon	was	“the	main	person	in	charge	of	expelling	people	from	the	land	that	Drummond	wanted	for	its	railway	line	 or	 for	 other	 operations.	 This	 included	 assassinating	 or	 displacing	 the	 people	 who	refused	 to	 abandon	or	 sell	 their	 land”	 (cited	 in	Moor	&	Van	de	 Sandt,	 2014,	 p.	 70).	The	paramilitaries	killed	more	than	3,000	people	in	the	César	mining	zone	between	1996	and	2006	and	displaced	more	than	59,000	(ibid,	pp.	28-32).		(5)	 Whatever	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	 government	 and	 the	 paramilitaries,	 many	inhabitants	 believe	 that	 the	 true	 purpose	 of	 counterinsurgency	 and	 related	counternarcotics	 operations	 is	 land	 clearance.	 Most	 of	 the	 people	 I	 interviewed	 in	Putumayo,	for	example,	expressed	the	view	that	the	army’s	objective	is	to	secure	land	for	the	oil	companies.	The	narratives	of	people	from	North	Santander	are	similar:	“The	army	burned	the	Barí	with	planes.	[…]	to	make	them	flee	from	their	territory	so	they	could	explore	for	oil”	 (cited	 in	 IDMC,	2007,	p.	61).	As	noted	 in	a	Constitutional	Writ:	a	 combination	of	factors	 “has	 reasonably	 led	 multiple	 indigenous	 groups	 to	 perceive	 the	 situation	 as	 a	
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generalized	strategy	of	de-territorialisation	or	appropriation	of	their	territories,	with	the	approval	of	the	State”	(Corte	Constitucional,	2009,	p.	18).	This	perception	is	by	no	means	limited	to	 indigenous	groups.	A	peasant	 farmer	 from	Magdalena	explained:	“We	say	that	displacement	is	a	policy	constructed	by	the	state	[…]	displacement	happens	where	there	are	riches,	like	gold;	where	there	are	coal	mines;	where	there	is	good,	fertile	land	where	they	plan	to	create	palm	plantations”	(cited	in	IDMC,	2007,	p.	128).	The	ubiquity	of	this	view	has	multiple	and	complex	implications,	not	least	for	the	legitimacy	the	State,	its	development	model	and	‘peace	building’.	(6)	 As	 noted	 above,	 guerrilla	 presence	within	 a	 given	 territory	would	 often	 deter	State-backed	 investments.	 However,	 paradoxically,	 the	 armed	 insurgency	 has	 also	inadvertently	 enabled	 oil,	 mining	 and	 large-scale	 infrastructural	 projects.	 Though	 the	militarisation	of	investment	zones	is	not	exclusively	a	result	of	guerrilla	activity	(as	noted	in	Chapter	5,	the	oil	industry	in	Colombia	was	militarised	before	the	FARC	and	ELN	existed),	guerrilla	 attacks	 on	 oil	 pipelines	 and	 other	 infrastructure	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 retaliatory	attacks	by	the	armed	forces.	The	resulting	intensification	of	conflict	weakens	communities’	ability	to	organise	and	resist.	It	may	also	lead	to	forced	displacements	that	further	facilitate	the	entrance	of	the	company.		In	what	remains	of	this	subsection,	I	provide	just	two	examples	of	how	‘legal’	state-led	displacement	in	the	name	of	development	intertwines	with	displacement	in	the	context	of	 the	armed	conflict.	Subsequent	sections	examine	cases	where	evidence	 is	sufficient	 to	assert	a	direct	connection	between	paramilitary-imposed	dispossession	and	State-backed	investment	projects	and,	finally,	the	multiple	ways	in	which	counterinsurgency	warfare	has	debilitated	civilians’	ability	to	organise	resistance	to	government-sanctioned	land	grabs.		Between	2011-2014,	the	municipality	of	Buenaventura,	on	Colombia’s	pacific	coast,	had	the	highest	 levels	of	displacement	in	the	country.	While	the	media	tends	to	focus	on	gangs	 (aka	 paramilitary	 successor	 groups)	 involved	 in	 drugs	 and	 arms	 trafficking,	researchers	and	inhabitants	claim	the	violence	is	also	connected	to	a	grand	scheme,	backed	by	multiple	international	investors,	aimed	at	converting	the	town	and	surrounding	area	into	a	 global	 trading	 hub.	 Buenaventura,	 it	 should	 be	 said,	 already	 accommodates	 the	most	important	port	in	the	country	but,	nevertheless,	remains	one	of	the	poorest	municipalities	in	 Colombia.	 Future	 projects	 and	 those	 underway	 include:	 the	 expansion	 of	 port	infrastructure,	tourism	complexes,	a	new	airport,	railway	connections,	and	the	widening	of	the	road	connecting	Buenaventura	to	the	rest	of	the	country.	The	areas	targeted	for	tourist	and	port	infrastructure	are	inhabited	by	circa	100,000	people.	Local	authorities	argue	that	
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these	 communities	 are	 at	 risk	 from	 natural	 disasters	 and	 must	 be	 resettled	 for	 safety	reasons.	 The	 official	 relocation	 program	 (itself	 involving	 violent	 evictions)	 is	 being	implemented	amidst	a	 regime	of	paramilitary	 terror,	which	has	 caused	at	 least	10	mass	displacements	 from	 precisely	 the	 neighbourhoods	 the	 government	 wants	 to	 demolish.	Dozens	 of	 local	 activists	 in	 Buenaventura	 have	 been	 murdered	 over	 the	 years	 (CIJP	 &	Mundubat,	2015;	Ó	Loingsigh,	2013,	pp.	107–117;	Molano	Jimeno,	2013).	In	January	2018,	hitmen	gunned	down	Temístocles	Machado,	a	well-known	community	leader.	In	the	case	of	Temístocles,	even	mainstream	press	insinuated	that	the	murder	was	a	response	to	his	work	defending	the	poorest	neighbourhoods	against	land	grabs	motivated	by	the	expansion	of	town’s	port	infrastructure	(El	Espectador,	2018a).			 Another	example	is	the	Ituango	Dam	mentioned	earlier.	In	2011,	a	Magistrate	of	the	Justice	and	Peace	Tribunal	requested	an	investigation	into	whether	paramilitary	operations	had	 favoured	 the	 Hidroituango	 project.	 One	 Public	 Prosecutor	 affirmed:	 “the	 principle	obstacle	to	the	project	was	the	presence	of	the	guerrilla.	In	1996	the	Mineros	Block	[of	the	AUC]	entered	 Ituango	and	 just	 two	years	 later	 the	 [company]	Sociedad	Promotora	de	 la	Hidroeléctrica	Pescadero	SA	was	formed”	(cited	in	Verdad	Abierta,	2011d).	Between	1996	and	 1998	 the	 paramilitaries	 committed	 more	 than	 15	 massacres	 in	 the	 area	 (Verdad	Abierta,	2011d).	Following	the	demobilisation	of	the	AUC	and	more	recently	the	FARC,	this	area	of	Antioquia	is	disputed	between	paramilitary	successor	groups,	FARC	dissidents	and	the	ELN	(El	Tiempo,	2018).	Examining	figures	for	Ituango	alone	(the	project	spans	various	municipalities),	 the	government	register	 indicates	there	were	more	than	22,000	cases	of	displacement	in	the	municipality	during	the	decade	prior	(2000-2009)	and	more	than	9,000	cases	in	the	eight	years	since	(RUV,	2017)	the	construction	of	Hidroituango	began	in	2010.	It	 is	 likely	 that	 this	 displacement	 has	 favoured	 the	 project,	 indirectly	 at	minimum.	 Two	members	of	the	Ríos	Vivos	movement,	which	opposes	the	Ituango	Dam,	were	murdered	in	2013	and	at	least	19	have	received	death	threats.	In	2014,	two	masked	armed	men	told	a	group	 of	 people	 they	would	 be	 killed	 if	 they	 continued	 protesting	 against	Hidroituango	(Wahlin,	2015,	pp.	29–30,	33–34,	80–81).		
	
3)	State-backed	investments	and	the	para-elite	land	grab	While	 in	 the	 above	 examples	 the	 information	 presently	 available	 is	 insufficient	 to	categorically	assert	that	the	displacements	caused	by	the	paramilitaries	were/are	aimed	at	clearing	the	land	for	investors	(this	doesn’t	mean	it	isn’t	the	case),	in	other	instances	the	
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connections	 are	 well-documented,	 in	 particular	 thanks	 to	 court	 proceedings	 and	 the	testimonies	of	demobilised	paramilitaries.	This	section	examines	para-elite	land	grabs	that	specifically	served	investments	underwritten	by	the	State’s	taking	powers	(i.e.	that	might	otherwise	 have	 relied	 on	 expropriation	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 ‘legal’	 government-backed	dispossession).	Examples	focus	on	coal	mining	in	César,	but	the	phenomenon	is	not	limited	to	this	sector	or	region.	In	1997	INCORA	acquired	1,300	hectares	in	the	sub-district	of	El	Prado	(César)	and	assigned	the	land	to	51	families	who	inhabited	the	former	hacienda.	The	landholders	were	initially	 given	 usufruct	 rights	 and	 were	 promised	 titles	 at	 a	 later	 date.	 However,	paramilitaries	 prevented	 this	 from	 happening.	 In	 May	 2002,	 they	 assassinated	 and	disappeared	five	people.	In	the	months	that	followed	paramilitary	forces	killed	another	7	people	from	El	Prado.	As	a	result,	48	of	the	51	families	fled.	INCODER	functionaries	claimed	that	 they	had	 abandoned	 the	plots	 (ignoring	 that	 they	were	 registered	 as	 IDPs)	 and	 re-assigned	rights	over	the	land	to	the	new	occupants,	who	were	paramilitary	figureheads.	In	2009,	 INCODER	began	negotiations	with	Prodeco:	 in	exchange	 for	 the	hacienda,	 the	coal	company	would	provide	replacement	land	for	the	occupants	(i.e.	paramilitary	figureheads)	and	 compensate	 them	 for	 their	 homes	 and	 crops.	 The	 original	 landholders	 initiated	 a	lawsuit	and	have	received	repeated	death	threats	in	response	(Moor	&	Van	de	Sandt,	2014,	p.	77	and	79–80;	see	also	CNMH,	2012c,	p.	165).		One	ex-paramilitary,	Alias	El	Mecánico,	testified:	“they	ordered	our	presence	there	to	pressure	the	greatest	number	of	people	possible	to	sell	their	land	[…]	It	was	a	place	where	they	knew	there	was	a	lot	of	coal	in	the	ground	and	where	in	the	future	Drummond	or	some	other	company,	like	Prodeco,	would	buy	those	parcels”	(cited	in	Moor	&	Van	de	Sandt,	2014,	pp.	77–78;	see	also	CNMH,	2012c,	p.	92).	The	coal	mining	firms	evidently	benefitted	from	this	dispossession	(they	weren’t	going	to	face	opposition	from	people	who	acquired	the	land	to	sell	it),	but	these	particular	testimonies	suggest	those	directly	interested	in	the	land	grab	were	the	paramilitaries	and	their	allies.	In	other	instances,	however,	State-backed	investors	are	accused	of	authoring	the	dispossession.	The	case	of	Santa	Fé	exemplifies	the	latter.	INCORA	acquired	the	Santa	Fé	hacienda	(in	Becerril,	César)	in	1989.	Two	years	later,	the	reform	institute	divided	and	titled	the	land	to	30	families.	In	the	early	1990s,	two	of	the	Santa	Fé	parceleros	were	murdered	by	the	army	and	the	FARC.	In	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s	paramilitaries	committed	four	massacres	and	countless	individual	assassinations	in	the	area	(four	of	 the	victims	were	 inhabitants	of	Santa	Fé),	 resulting	 in	another	wave	of	forced	 displacement.	 The	 firm	 Carbones	 de	 Caribe	 started	 buying	 up	 land	 amidst	 the	
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violence.	 Over	 the	 years	 that	 followed,	 employees	 of	 La	 Jagua	 mine	 and	 paramilitaries	pressured	various	Santa	Fé	residents	into	selling.	Note	that	in	at	least	three	cases	they	used	the	threat	of	expropriation	to	achieve	their	goal	(I.	Rodríguez	&	Navarrete,	2017;	Verdad	Abierta,	2017c),	exemplifying	the	intertwining	of	different	forms	of	dispossession.		Various	 demobilised	 paramilitaries	 have	 testified	 that	 the	 Santa	 Fé	 displacements	were	motivated	by	interest	in	the	land,	that	they	held	multiple	meetings	with	functionaries	of	Carbones	de	Caribe,	and	that	the	firm	paid	them	to	prevent	the	return	of	the	campesinos.	Alias	Samario	explained:	“we	would	displace	the	people	and	whoever	didn’t	want	to	leave	we	would	kill	them,	as	occurred	in	various	cases	[…]	we	got	the	land	in	Santa	Fé	for	what	they	needed,	the	dump	site	and	the	[land]	surrounding	the	mine”	(cited	in	I.	Rodríguez	&	Navarrete,	2017).	23	of	the	original	parceleros	applied	for	restitution	under	the	2011	law.	This	 led	 to	 further	 threats	 against	 the	 claimants	 and	 even	 functionaries	 of	 the	 Land	Restitution	Unit	(I.	Rodríguez	&	Navarrete,	2017;	Verdad	Abierta,	2017c,	2018).	In	another	case,	in	the	rural	subdistrict	of	Mechoacán,	abandoned	lands	were	taken	over	by	local	elites	and	later	transferred	to	the	mining	firm	Drummond.	Associated	property	rights	required	‘cleaning’	first.	So,	INCODER	functionaries	(the	ex-director	of	the	regional	INCODER	office	was	found	guilty	of	falsifying	documents),	with	the	help	of	a	local	notary,	set	 about	 ‘laundering’	 the	 land.	 According	 to	 Public	 Prosecutors,	 at	 least	 32	 transfers	pertaining	to	land	in	Mechoacán	were	achieved	using	forged	signatures;	in	three	cases	the	alleged	signatories	were	in	fact	deceased.	By	the	time	the	Public	Prosecutors’	investigations	had	advanced	(in	2010	they	froze	48	sales	agreements	and	in	2012	declared	21	of	these	transactions	 invalid),	 the	 area	 had	 already	 been	 occupied	 by	 Drummond,	 and	 “was	 no	longer	apt	for	agriculture”,	making	material	restitution	to	the	original	owners	impossible	(Moor	&	Van	de	Sandt,	2014,	pp.	74–76	and	78;	see	also	CNMH,	2012c,	p.	166).			
4)	The	intimidation	and	silencing	of	critics	and	opponents	In	Colombia,	it	is	surprising	to	find	examples	of	infrastructural,	mining	and	oil	investments	
not	tainted	by	assassinations,	death	threats	and	other	forms	of	intimidation.	This	facilitates	land	sales,	weakens	communities’	during	negotiations	surrounding	compensation	and/or	resettlement,	and	more	generally	undermines	resistance	to	such	projects.	 I	have	already	mentioned	some	instances,	such	as	the	murder	of	community	organisers	in	Buenaventura	and	members	of	the	Ríos	Vivos	movement	who	oppose	the	Hidroituango	project.	Even	the	documented	cases	-let	alone	unreported	ones	-	are	too	numerous	to	list.		
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It	is	worth	emphasising	the	role	of	violence	and	intimidation	in	the	occupation	of	Afro	and	indigenous	territories	specifically.	As	indicated	previously,	the	dispossession	of	lands	under	 collective	 title	 is	 officialised	 through	 prior	 consultation.	 The	 conflict-context	 has	
further	skewed	these	‘negotiations’	(on	top	of	legal	trammels)	so	that	rather	than	being	an	opportunity	for	Afro	and	indigenous	groups	to	exercise	their	‘rights’,	they	have	become	yet	another	scenario	of	abuse	(Personal	Interviews,	2015;	ABColombia,	2012,	p.	17).	Consider	the	 example	 of	 consultations	 with	 Embera	 communities	 in	 Córdoba	 prior	 to	 the	construction	of	 the	Urrá	Dam:	 the	 “process	was	accompanied	by	 threats	 from	 the	ACCU	[paramilitaries].	 Displacements	 and	 killings	 of	 leaders	 who	 asserted	 their	 territoriality	against	the	construction	of	the	dam	were	characteristic	during	the	late	1990s”	(Grupo	de	Memoria	Histórica,	2010,	p.	163).	Persecution	 is	 often	 linked	 to	 large	mobilisations,	 such	 as	 those	 organised	 by	 the	inhabitants	of	Puerto	Vega-Teteyé	in	Putumayo.	Communities	in	the	area	started	to	mobilise	around	2005,	denouncing	 the	 impacts	of	oil	activities	 in	a	context	of	 relentless	violence.	Thousands	 of	 people	 participated	 in	 eight	 rallies	 between	 2006	 and	 2014,	 as	 well	 as	countless	smaller	actions.	These	movements	have	been	under	siege	since	their	inception.	A	leader	from	the	Kiwnas	Çxhab	resguardo	recounted:			When	the	[oil]	company	arrived,	they	arrived	with	paramilitaries.	They	always	portrayed	the	people	that	live	in	the	zone	as	pure	insurgency,	but	it	was	never	like	that.	[...]	There	was	no	law	that	protected	the	campesinos.	So,	the	community	decided	to	occupy	the	road	and	protest.	The	conflict	we	were	living	was	intense.	Day	after	day	people	were	killed	or	disappeared	(Personal	Interview,	2015).		There	 is	 a	 marked	 tendency	 in	 Colombia	 to	 stigmatise	 activists,	 including	 those	fighting	dispossession,	as	‘terrorists’.	In	some	cases,	this	has	led	to	arbitrary	detentions	and	legal	persecution.	More	generally,	large	protests	are	often	alleged	to	have	been	organised	or	promoted	by	the	guerrillas.	This	is	not	only	a	way	of	delegitimising	resistance,	but	also	turns	participants	into	(para-)military	targets,	putting	their	lives	at	risk	(see	e.g.	CIJP	Digital	Archives,	2017;	Wahlin,	2015,	p.	29;	El	Espectador,	2008;	Movice,	2010).	In	2017	circa	1,000	members	 of	 different	 organisations	 gathered	 outside	 the	 Public	 Prosecutors’	 Office	 in	Bogotá	 to	 denounce	 “the	 criminalization	 of	 social	 leaders”,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 enduring	paramilitary	threat	and	aggressions	against	them	more	generally	(El	Espectador,	2017b).	
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Summary	and	conclusion		The	main	ideas	in	this	chapter	can	be	summed	up	as	follows:	(1)	State-backed	investments	are	 associated	with	multiple	 forms	 and	mechanisms	of	 dispossession	 and	displacement,	most	of	which	are	technically	‘legal’.	(2)	These	involve	enclosure	and	privatisation,	but	also	the	violation	and	restriction	of	property	rights.	As	suggested	in	Chapter	2,	the	latter	are	just	as	 important	 to	 growth	 and	 capital	 accumulation	 as	 the	 former.	 (3)	 The	 State’s	 taking	powers	 act	 as	 a	 guarantee,	 which	 enables	 companies	 to	 force	 land	 sales	 and	 easement	contracts	at	below	market	prices,	without	direct	intervention	by	the	government.	Official	discourse	defines	such	private	negotiations	as	voluntary,	disguising	the	use	of	coercion	and	the	 ubiquity	 of	 property	 rights	 violations.	 (4)	 These	 coerced	 transfers	 and	 agreements,	backed	by	eminent	domain	powers	in	the	name	of	‘public	utility	and	social	interest’,	often	entail	a	redistribution	of	wealth	from	labouring	classes	to	capitalist	enterprise.	(5)	People	without	 formally	 recognised	 rights	 over	 their	 land	 tend	 to	 fare	 even	 worse	 than	 their	counterparts	 with	 legal	 title.	 (6)	 In	 many	 cases,	 they	 were/are	 denied	 titles	 precisely	because	of	restrictions	that	reserve	lands	for	oil,	mining	and	infrastructural	investments.		 While	the	forms	and	mechanisms	of	dispossession	discussed	in	the	first	section	of	this	chapter	exist	independently	of	the	armed	conflict,	(7)	in	practice,	they	often	connect	with	counterinsurgency	warfare,	(8)	which	is	partially	aimed	at	establishing	a	secure	space	for	capitalist	 development.	 (9)	 Military	 and	 paramilitary	 incursions	 directed	 at	 wresting	territorial	control	from	guerrilla	groups	cause	mass	displacements	that	aid	corporate	land	occupations.	(10)	In	some	instances,	the	expulsions	were	in	fact	aimed	at	clearing	the	land	to	make	way	 for	projects	endorsed	by	 the	State,	 (11)	 revealing	 the	 tenuousness	of	 rigid	conceptual	 distinctions	 between	 conflict-	 and	 development-	 induced	 displacement.	 (12)	This	 is	most	 obvious	 in	 those	 cases	where	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab	 served	 State-backed	investments,	which	otherwise	would	have	relied	on	‘legal’	mechanisms	of	dispossession	and	displacement.	(13)	Mass	displacements	and	violent	land	usurpations	are	not	the	only	ways	in	which	the	conflict-context	has	facilitated	the	imposition	of	mining,	oil	and	infrastructural	projects;	 counterinsurgency	 warfare	 has	 provided	 a	 pretext	 for	 the	 assassination,	intimidation	 and	 criminalisation	 of	 people	 who	 oppose	 these	 investments,	 weakening	communities’	 position	 during	 negotiations	 and	 resistance	 more	 generally.	 Overall,	 (14)	understanding	how	dispossession	and	associated	displacement	unfold	in	Colombia	requires	a	 comprehensive	 approach	 that	 considers	 diverse	 forms	 and	 mechanisms,	 ‘legal’	 and	‘illegal’,	and	how	they	overlap.	 	
Conclusion		This	 thesis	 analysed	 land	 dispossession	 in	 Colombia	 from	 a	 critical	 historical	 political	economy	 perspective.	 I	 began	 by	 laying	 the	 conceptual	 groundwork	 and	 constructing	 a	framework	 for	 the	 subsequent	analyses.	Using	my	 research	on	Colombia	and	 studies	on	other	 countries,	 I	 argued	 that	 conventional	 accounts	 of	 dispossession,	 as	 defined	 by	orthodox	 economic	 and	 liberal	 political/legal	 paradigms,	 are	 inadequate.	 I	 presented	critical	 political	 economy	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 approaches	 that	 downplay	 history,	 power	relations,	 social	 struggles,	 ideology	and	 the	wider	 context.	Nevertheless,	 I	 also	 indicated	why	Marx’s	notion	of	primitive	accumulation	and	Harvey’s	accumulation	by	dispossession,	the	concepts	most	commonly	used	in	critical	scholarship	on	land	grabbing,	are	insufficient	for	approaching	the	issue.	Building	on	these	and	other	authors,	I	advanced	some	of	my	own	arguments,	 in	particular	regarding	the	relationship	between	dispossession	and	capitalist	development	(chapters	1-2).			 I	suggested	that	the	‘the	capitalist	growth	imperative’	creates	systemic	land	pressures	and	considered	why	these	pressures	sometimes	translate	into	dispossession	or	why	land	is	acquired	via	coercive	mechanisms	rather	than	via	voluntary	transactions.	I	argued	that	the	capitalist	 land	 regime	 is	 laden	 with	 internal	 contradictions	 and	 that,	 consequently,	violations	and	restrictions	of	property	rights	are	commonly	used	to	secure	land	for	capital	accumulation	 and	growth.	Thus,	 extra-economic	 force	 (dispossession	 and	displacement)	continues	 to	 be	 integral	 to	 capitalist	 development	 even	 after	 private	 property	 and	 free	markets	 in	 land	 are	 established.	 Overall,	 however,	 I	 argued	 that	 understanding	 land	dispossession	 requires	 context-specific	 political	 economy	 analysis	 and	 that	 the	character/prevalence	of	dispossession	is	contingent	upon	multiple	factors	(Chapter	2).		 The	 remaining	 chapters	 of	 the	 thesis	 focused	 on	 the	 political	 economy	 of	dispossession	in	Colombia,	 from	the	colonial	era	up	to	present	day.	Though	this	thesis	is	clearly	defined	by	its	historical	perspective,	my	main	concern	was	to	explore	contemporary	land	issues.	I	surveyed	different	forms	and	mechanisms	of	dispossession,	in	order	to	shine	light	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 processes	 and	 how	 they	 actually	 unfold	 (chapters	 7-8).	 This	comprehensive	 approach	 -including	 land	 grabs	 effected	 by	 private	 agents	 and	 coercive	State-backed	acquisitions-	differentiates	my	research	from	other	investigations	on	the	issue	and	offered	new	 insights	 into	what	has	happened	 in	Colombia,	where	different	 forms	of	dispossession	overlap.	
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	 I	explained	how	violence,	specifically	counterinsurgency	warfare,	has	facilitated	the	imposition	 of	 investments	 underwritten	 by	 the	 State’s	 taking	 powers	 and	 how	 these	projects	intertwine	with	‘illegal’	land	grabs	and	expulsions	(Chapter	8).	I	also	showed	how	violent	land	usurpation	and	opportunistic/predatory	acquisitions	-forms	of	dispossession	that	are	not	endorsed	by	the	State’s	taking	powers-	have	served	and	been	served	by	the	government’s	economic	development	agenda	(Chapter	7).		 As	explained	in	the	introduction,	recent	dispossession	in	Colombia	is	often	implicitly	treated	as	an	aberration	of	armed	conflict.	My	research	suggests,	to	the	contrary,	that	the	violent	 context	 has	 been	 just	 one	 among	 several	 enabling	 conditions.	 I	 paid	 particular	attention	to	how	the	country’s	trajectory	and	policies	of	economic	development,	which	were	bolstered	 by	 counterinsurgency	warfare	 (itself	 as	much	 a	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	undertaking	as	a	military	mission),	fundamentally	shaped	dispossession.			 Furthermore,	I	 indicated	why	what	has	happened	in	Colombia	doesn’t	fit	well	with	stereotypical	 notions	 of	 wartime	 plunder	 or	 even	 more	 specialised	 theories	 of	 land	dispossession	in	conflict	contexts.	Overall,	government	functionaries	continued	to	perform	their	‘functions’.	Notaries	drew	up	public	deeds	for	stolen	lands,	the	reform	agency	granted	titles	to	usurpers,	registrars	updated	the	land	registry	with	these	spurious	deeds	and	titling	resolutions,	environment	officials	 issued	the	 land	grabbers	with	relevant	permits,	others	approved	State-backed	loans	and	subsidies	for	investments	in	the	usurped	lands,	Mayor’s	offices	signed	eviction	orders	against	the	original	 landholders	when	they	tried	to	return,	and	police	enforced	 the	evictions	 (Chapter	7).	 So,	 there	 is	 little	evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	dispossession	was	enabled	by	a	 collapse	of	 institutions;	 to	 the	 contrary,	 their	 continued	functioning	was,	in	many	ways,	expedient	for	plunder	and	gave	it	an	air	of	legitimacy.		 Reflecting	 the	 exploratory	nature	of	my	 research,	 this	 thesis	put	 forward	multiple	empirical	claims	and	related	theoretical	propositions.	In	the	pages	that	follow,	I	provide	a	summary	of	some	key	ideas	and	arguments,	organised	around	four	themes:	(1)	interest	in	labour	control	versus	the	profit	potential	of	new	land	uses	in	motivating	dispossession;	(2)	the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	 dispossession	 and	 how	 this	 is	 shaped	 by	 specific	trajectories	and	visions	of	economic	development	and	related	pressures,	power	dynamics	and	 social	 struggles;	 (3)	how	 landed	property	 rights	may	 impede	 economic	 growth	 and	capital	 accumulation;	 and	 (4)	 the	 variable	 relationship	 between	 growth,	 capitalist	development	and	dispossession.	
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	 (1)	Between	the	16th	and	early	20th	centuries,	labour	acquisition	and	control	was	a	key	 motivation	 behind	 varied	 policies	 and	 practices	 of	 dispossession/displacement	 in	Colombia.	In	contrast,	contemporary	processes	are	primarily	driven	by	an	interest	in	the	land	itself	and	related	resources;	there	is	simply	no	clear	evidence	to	suggest	that	either	the	State	(in	the	case	of	legal	coercive	land	acquisitions)	or	elite	groups	and	their	paramilitary	allies	(in	the	case	of	private	land	grabs)	have	forcibly	dispossessed	people	in	order	to	secure	their	labour	power.	Here	I	provide	a	brief	recap	of	this	gradual	transformation.	The	colonial	government	imposed	a	policy	of	forced	relocation,	which	served	its	land	
and	 labour	 demands,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 objectives	 of	 Catholic	 conversion.	 Put	 simply:	 the	colonial	economy	depended	upon	the	usurpation	of	strategic	territories	(arable	flatlands,	mineral	rich	areas,	trading	routes,	etc.),	but	also	upon	the	controlled	displacement	of	the	dispossessed.	The	creation	of	indigenous	resguardos,	from	the	1590s	onwards,	was	central	to	this	involuntary	resettlement	policy.	However,	around	the	mid	1700s	-as	the	indigenous	tribute	 system	 entered	 into	 decline-	 many	 resguardos	 were	 reduced	 or	 dissolved,	constituting	yet	another	process	of	dispossession/displacement.	In	this	context,	the	landed	elite	 further	expanded	their	property	claims	 in	order	to	prevent	 the	establishment	of	an	independent	peasantry	(Chapter	3).	The	latter	practice	continued	post-independence	and	was	especially	prominent	during	a	period	of	successive	resource	booms	and	accelerated	frontier	migration	from	the	mid	to	late	1800s.	So,	even	in	a	context	of	land	valorisation,	the	dispossession	 of	 peasant	 settlers	 was	 largely	 (though	 not	 solely)	 driven	 by	 traditional	landowners’	interest	in	acquiring	and	maintaining	a	dependent	workforce	for	the	haciendas	(Chapter	4).	Dispossession	 aimed	 at	 labour	 acquisition	 began	 to	 diminish	 from	 the	 1930s	onwards.	On	the	one	hand,	as	organised	peasant	movements	grew,	the	landed	elite	became	more	preoccupied	with	defending	 their	existing	property	claims	 than	extending	 them	 in	order	to	acquire	additional	tenants	and	workers.	Land	conflicts	and	the	threat	of	reform	actually	led	to	an	inversion	of	the	historical	tendency:	landowners	started	to	evict	peasants	rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 retain	 them	within	 the	 large	 estates.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	advance	 of	 capitalist	 agriculture	 (including	 the	 introduction	 of	 mechanised	 farming),	combined	 with	 population	 growth,	 gradually	 dimmed	 the	 ‘problem’	 of	 labour	 scarcity,	which	had	defined	the	Colombian	political	economy	since	the	Spanish	invasion.	Meanwhile,	land	 grabs	 driven	 by	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 productive	 potential	 of	 the	 land	 itself	 and	 its	resources,	 turned	more	 frequent	with	 the	advent	and	expansion	of	modern	agribusiness	and	the	oil	industry	(Chapter	5).		
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This	type	of	dispossession,	stirred	by	the	profit	potential	of	new	land	uses,	escalated	in	the	1990s-2000s.	With	the	intensification	and	paramilitarisation	of	the	armed	conflict,	forced	 displacement	 became	 a	 strategy	 and	 opportunity	 for	 usurpation	 and	 property	accumulation.	The	inherently	expulsive	nature	of	contemporary	dispossession,	it	should	be	reiterated,	 diverges	 from	 historical	 patterns.	 The	 colonial	 government	 sought	 to	 stop	indigenous	 communities	 -whose	 labour	was	 required	 by	 the	 colonisers-	 from	 fleeing	 to	remote	 areas.	 Migration,	 though	 certainly	 not	 voluntary,	 was	 a	 form	 of	 resistance,	 of	escaping	Spanish	rule.	Similarly,	during	the	19th	century,	land	grabs	frequently	led	to	the	displacement	of	the	dispossessed;	however,	this	was	largely	contrary	to	the	objectives	of	the	land	grabbers	who	aimed	to	forcibly	transform	settlers	into	tenants	and	day	labourers.	Again,	 the	direct	producers	 resisted	subjugation	by	displacing	 further	afield.	Finally,	 the	mass	evictions	of	the	mid-20th	century	involved	the	deliberate	expulsion	of	the	peasantry,	but	these	were	largely	reactionary,	an	attempt	to	defend	established	land	claims.	In	the	late	20th	 and	 early	 21st	 centuries,	 in	 contrast,	 dispossession	 (both	 ‘legal’	 and	 ‘illegal’)	 has	characteristically	 been	 focused	 on	 clearing	 people	 off	 the	 land	 to	 make	 way	 for	 more	profitable	ventures.	Those	behind	these	processes	have	shown	little	interest	in	the	labour	power	of	the	dispossessed	(chapters	3-8).		 Though	the	above	history	is	specific	to	Colombia,	there	are	indications	that	this	is	a	wider	 trend.	 Thus,	 I	 tentatively	 proposed	 that	 dispossession	 motivated	 by	 labour	acquisition	 tends	 to	 decline	 as	 capitalism	 develops,	 while	 dispossession	 driven	 by	 an	interest	 in	 the	 land	 and	 its	 resources	 tends	 to	 increase.	 Arguably,	 the	 capitalist	 growth	imperative	creates	systemic	land	pressures	that,	combined	with	labour-saving	production	methods	and	population	growth,	has	transformed	the	political	economy	of	dispossession	across	 the	globe.	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	 suggested	 that	analyses	 centred	upon	Marxist	 concepts	often	overemphasise	proletarianisation,	to	the	detriment	of	other	important	issues,	when	discussing	 the	 relationship	 between	 dispossession	 and	 capitalism.	 In	many	 parts	 of	 the	world,	the	forcible	conversion	of	self-sufficient	producers	into	dependent	wage	labourers,	or	one	of	the	many	unemployed	that	make	up	‘the	reserve	army’,	continues.	However,	this	observation	does	not	necessarily	tell	us	why	dispossession	happens	or	about	the	different	roles	such	processes	play	in	capital	accumulation	(Chapter	2).	
(2)	While	conventional	explanations	of	dispossession	typically	pin	the	issue	to	a	weak	rule	of	law,	critical	theorists	tend	to	emphasise	how	the	law	is	used	to	effect	and	legitimise	these	 processes	 (Chapter	 2).	 The	 analyses	 in	 this	 thesis	 suggest	 that	 the	 contents,	interpretation	and	application	of	the	law	are	shaped	by	specific	trajectories	and	visions	of	
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economic	 development,	 as	 well	 as	 changing	 power	 dynamics,	 social	 struggles	 and	 the	pressures/constraints	faced	by	the	government.	This	controverts	mainstream	liberal	views	that	represent	the	legal	realm	as	neutral	or	a-political.	It	also	challenges	overly-simplistic	critical	 views	 that	 portray	 the	 law	 as	 a	 mere	 tool	 of	 an	 undifferentiated	 ruling	 class;	arguably,	the	law	does	tend	to	favour	elites	but	this	is	not	inevitable.	The	implication	is	that,	depending	upon	multiple	and	varied	factors,	the	legal	system	can	be	used	as	‘an	instrument	of	theft’	but	also	to	prevent	or	reverse	dispossession.	Below	I	offer	a	brief	summary	of	the	complex	 interaction	 between	 these	 diverse	 factors,	 legislation	 and	 dispossession	 in	Colombia	–	historically	and	to	date.		During	 the	 early	 colonial	 era	 the	 Spanish	 Crown	 granted	 its	 conquistadors	 and	settlers	rights	over	the	lands	of	what	is	now	Colombia.	Nevertheless,	it	also	ordered	them	to	respect	the	‘property’	of	the	‘indians’	–	understood	in	conveniently	narrow	terms	as	those	lands	 they	 ‘effectively	 occupied’.	 In	 any	 case,	 usurpation	 continued	 irrespective	 of	 the	indigenous	peoples’	ability	to	prove	‘effective	occupation’	of	their	ancestral	territories.	And	though	the	Crown	denounced	unofficial	land	appropriations	(i.e.	those	not	sanctioned	by	its	authorities),	it	simultaneously	endorsed	the	practice	via	the	policy	of	composición,	through	which	those	with	economic	means	could	pay	a	fee	for	legalisation	ex-post	facto	(Chapter	3).	Early	 resguardo	 policy	 was	 partially	 formulated	 in	 response	 to	 uncontrolled	 land	grabbing,	 which	 was	 contributing	 to	 the	 extermination	 and	 exodus	 of	 the	 indigenous	peoples	on	whose	labour	the	colonial	economy	depended.	While	some	observers	suggest	the	motivations	behind	the	decision	to	assign	lands	to	these	groups	were	benevolent,	the	policy	 is	 better	 understood	 as	 the	 Crown’s	 attempt	 to	 order	 (not	 halt)	 processes	 of	dispossession	 and	 displacement.	 Still,	 some	 indigenous	 leaders	 saw	 the	 policy	 as	 an	opportunity	to	regain	cohesive	territories	for	their	communities;	they	actively	solicited	the	establishment	or	enlargement	of	resguardo	titles.	These	titles	posed	an	obstacle	to	private	land	grabs	(albeit	an	imperfect	one)	but	were	insufficient	protection	against	State-backed	dispossession.	From	the	mid-18th	century,	the	colonial	government	made	increasing	use	of	its	legislative	powers	to	‘dissolve’	and	‘reduce’	the	resguardos.	By	this	point	the	indigenous	tribute	system	was	no	 longer	vital	 to	 the	colonial	economy	and	the	government	saw	the	dissolution	and	reduction	of	the	resguardos	as	a	fiscal	opportunity,	as	well	as	a	means	of	promoting	agricultural	development.	These	rationales	combined	with	pressure	from	elites	and	non-indigenous	labouring	classes,	who	encouraged	the	authorities	to	‘release’	allegedly	‘under-utilised’	 lands	 from	 the	 collective	 titles.	 Ultimately,	 however,	 the	 latter	 group	benefitted	little	from	the	new	policy	of	dispossession	and	displacement	(Chapter	3).	
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After	independence,	the	Liberal	government	passed	a	Decree	ordering	the	restitution	of	usurped	resguardo	land.	Nevertheless,	it	also	reiterated	orders	to	partition	the	collective	titles	into	individual	plots.	This	was	presented	as	a	recognition	of	indigenous	peoples’	rights	to	private	property,	but	a	number	of	historians	believe	the	policy	was	purposefully	designed	to	‘free	up’	land	and	labour.	The	Conservatives	later	reinstated	the	resguardo	and	the	cabildo	via	Law	89	of	1890;	in	the	decades	that	followed,	indigenous	movements	and	leaders	found	ways	to	use	this	overtly	racist	law	to	resist	and	reverse	dispossession	(chapters	4	and	5).	Ever	 since	 colonial	 times,	 traditional	 landowners	 attempted	 to	 prevent	 the	establishment	of	an	independent	peasantry	by	asserting	property	rights	over	large	areas.	This	practice	gained	increasing	significance	in	the	mid	to	late	19th	century	in	the	context	of	accelerated	frontier	migration	and	rising	global	demand	for	raw	materials.	In	an	effort	to	encourage	agricultural	 growth,	 the	government	began	 to	offer	 land	grants	 to	 those	who	established	crops	in	previously	uncultivated	zones.	New	laws	introduced	in	the	1870s	and	1880s	included	norms	to	prevent	the	dispossession	of	colonos	who	cultivated	State	lands.	These	 legislations	emboldened	peasant	settlers	 to	resist	usurpation;	hundreds	of	groups	joined	forces	to	formally	petition	the	government’s	 intervention	on	their	behalf.	 In	some	cases,	the	colonos	were	victorious.	However,	many	others	were	forced	to	become	tenants	or	labourers	on	land	that	was	once	their	own	or	were	displaced	further	afield	(Chapter	4).	In	the	early	20th	century,	the	government	introduced	additional	legislation	aimed	at	tackling	 elite-led	 dispossession.	 A	 number	 of	 policymakers	 (both	 Conservatives	 and	Liberals)	believed	that	ensuring	peasant’s	access	to	land	was	necessary	in	order	to	promote	agricultural	 expansion	 and	 satisfy	 rising	 demand	 linked	 to	 urbanisation	 and	industrialisation.	Supported	by	a	1926	Supreme	Court	ruling	that	introduced	the	so-called	‘diabolical	 property	 test’,	 Congress	 ordered	 all	 alleged	 proprietors	 of	 farms	 larger	 than	2,500	ha	to	present	their	titles	for	revision.	The	landed	elite	stalled	the	investigations	and	organised	a	legal	challenge.	Still,	the	ruling	is	said	to	have	empowered	peasant	movements,	which	 mobilised	 around	 the	 spuriousness	 of	 the	 elites’	 land	 ownership	 claims.	 The	introduction	 of	 other	 laws	 endorsing	 the	 establishment	 of	 ‘agricultural	 colonies’,	 which	were	 partially	 aimed	 at	 curtailing	 the	 dispossession	 of	 productive	 smallholders,	 further	galvanised	campesino	organisations	in	some	regions	(Chapter	5).		The	first	agrarian	reform	act	(Law	36	of	1936)	of	the	20th	century	was	supposed	to	strengthen	existing	norms	favouring	the	peasantry	and	‘economic	exploitation’	of	the	soil.	But	 the	 landed	elite	and	 their	allies	 in	government	managed	 to	water	down	the	original	proposal	 and	 the	 resulting	 legislation	ended	up	 rescinding	 the	 ‘diabolical	property	 test’,	
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permitting	usurped	State	lands	to	become	legal	private	property.	In	other	words,	the	reform	validated	the	outcome	of	decades	of	dispossession.	On	top	of	this,	a	limited	redistribution	program	allowed	some	usurpers	to	be	compensated	for	lands	acquired	illicitly	(Chapter	5).	The	relationship	between	government	policy	and	the	eviction	of	tenants	and	peasant	settlers	was	equally	convoluted.	The	hacienda	clearances	intensified	after	the	first	agrarian	reform	 law	 was	 passed	 in	 1936,	 continued	 into	 the	 1940s	 despite	 the	 government’s	attempts	to	restore	tenant	farming,	and	were	revived	in	the	1960s	following	the	passing	of	new	reformist	 legislation.	On	 the	one	hand,	 these	were	often	aided	by	 local	officials	and	were	broadly	‘legal’	precisely	because	the	government	had	recognised	the	property	rights	of	large	landowners,	including	over	State	lands	they	had	accumulated	illicitly.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	 evictions	 went	 against	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 agrarian	 legislations	 that	encouraged/enabled	them	(Chapter	5).		The	 political	 will	 to	 address	 previous	 and	 ongoing	 dispossession	 weakened	 as	government	policy	shifted	towards	the	promotion	of	industrial	agriculture	circa	the	1940s.	However,	 this	 development	model	 contributed	 to	 various	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	problems,	which	combined	with	continued	pressure	from	the	campesino	population	and	an	ideologically	favourable	context	(the	structuralist	school’s	arguments	had	become	popular	and	the	US	government	promoted	reform	as	part	of	its	communist	containment	strategy),	led	to	a	renewed	attempt	at	redistributive	land	reform	in	the	1960s.	This	reformist	period	didn’t	last	long.	Following	yet	another	elite	pact,	‘the	landowner	path’	became	the	official	chosen	 route	 of	 agrarian	 development	 and	 the	 government	 relaunched	 its	 historical	campaign	of	repression	against	peasant	organisations	and	movements	(Chapter	5).	In	the	wake	of	economic	liberalisation	and	the	abandonment	of	ISI-style	development	(a	process	started	in	the	mid-1970s	and	consolidated	in	the	1990s),	the	economic	rationales	for	attempting	to	prevent	and	revese	the	dispossession	of	the	peasantry	all	but	disappeared	from	government	discourse.	Nevertheless,	in	1991,	after	years	of	popular	demand	for	legal	and	political	reform,	Colombia	adopted	a	new	Constitution,	which	led	to	the	strengthening	of	indigenous	and	Afro	land	rights	and	to	the	passing	of	a	new	agrarian	legislation.	The	latter	(Law	 160	 of	 1994)	 fortified	 rules	 surrounding	 baldío	 privatisation	 and	 restrictions	 on	properties	that	derive	from	titles	granted	over	these	State	lands.	These	rules,	in	theory	and	on	the	whole,	 favoured	the	rural	masses	and	should	have	prevented	wealthy	 individuals	and	businesses	from	benefitting	from	the	dispossession/displacement	of	campesinos	who	occupied	or	owned	‘reform	lands’.	The	fact	that	they	failed	to	do	so	cannot	be	blamed	simply	on	a	weak	rule	of	law;	it	reflects	the	political	nature	of	the	legal	realm	(Chapter	6).		
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Diverse	officials	have	tolerated,	facilitated,	or	even	encouraged	recent	processes	of	dispossession.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 enabling	 role	 of	 specific	 actions	 and	 inactions,	 this	 is	reflected	in	the	legislative	counter-reform	offensive,	initiated	around	2007,	which	seeks	to	annul	rules	that	pose	an	obstacle	to	dispossession	and	land	concentration,	past	and	present.	This	includes	proposals	to	validate	unlawful	land	acquisitions	such	as	those	accomplished	via	irregular	titling	resolutions	(e.g.	the	granting	of	State	lands	to	individuals	that	were	not	landless	peasants	and	hence	were	ineligible,	sometimes	for	areas	above	the	legal	limits)	or	via	prescription	-	despite	 the	 law	declaring	baldíos	 imprescriptible,	as	well	as	 those	 that	violated	norms	prohibiting	the	accumulation	of	former	State	lands.	(Not	all	unlawful	land	acquisitions	involved	dispossession,	but	most	cases	of	dispossession	involved	the	violation	of	these	same	norms.)	Some	officials	have	put	forward	interpretations	of	the	law	that	would	conveniently	eliminate	the	idea	that	there	was	a	legal	violation	in	the	first	place.	In	essence,	however,	 the	 proposed	 reforms	 absolve	 elite	 groups	 from	 their	 offences	 and	 legalise	unlawful	acquisitions	–	echoing	the	actions	of	the	colonial	administration	and	the	Liberal	government	of	the	1930s.	Still,	the	outcomes	of	this	most	recent	struggle	are	not	written	in	stone.	Social	movements	and	organisations	have	been	challenging	the	regressive	reforms,	alongside	 opposition	 politicians.	 Their	 efforts	 have	 been	 complemented	 by	 certain	functionaries	and	entities,	such	as	the	Comptroller’s	Office,	which	has	openly	criticised	the	ongoing	legal	changes,	labelling	them	unconstitutional	(Chapter	6).	The	mounting	 importance	 of	 the	 mining	 and	 oil	 industries	 within	 the	 Colombian	economy	had	profound	legal	implications.	In	an	effort	to	promote	the	further	expansion	of	these	sectors,	the	government	introduced	laws	declaring	related	investments	as	projects	of	‘public	utility	and	social	interest’,	meaning	that	Colombians	have	no	enforceable	legal	right	to	 reject	 oil	 and	mining	 operations	 on	 their	 lands.	 The	 legal	 arsenal	 used	 to	 effect	 and	legitimate	dispossession	includes,	ironically,	the	prior	consultation	process	that	is	supposed	to	 protect	 indigenous	 and	Afro	 communities,	 their	way	 of	 life	 and	 their	 territories.	 The	Constitutional	 Court	 itself,	 which	 in	 many	 other	 instances	 has	 acted	 as	 an	 important	defender	of	 indigenous	and	Afro	 rights,	 ratified	an	 interpretation	of	Colombian	 law	 that	effectively	obliterated	the	notion	of	‘free	prior	and	informed	consent’	(Chapter	6).		Meanwhile,	allies	of	 the	oil	and	mining	sectors	have	been	working	hard	 to	restrict	other	Constitutional	norms	that	have	been	used	to	challenge	the	extractive	economic	model:	municipal	popular	consultations	and	regulatory	power.	In	2016,	the	Constitutional	Court	rejected	the	legal	argument	that	municipal	authorities	cannot	influence	the	use	of	subsoil.	However,	representatives	of	these	industries	haven’t	given	in	and	it	is	likely	that	they	will	
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invent	new	interpretations	of	the	law	in	order	to	supress	participatory	and	local	democracy,	which	has	been	threatening	capital	accumulation	and	the	elite-led	development	espoused	by	the	central	government.	Mining	and	oil	companies	not	only	enjoy	the	support	of	many	politicians,	they	are	also	favoured	by	Colombia’s	commitment	to	various	international	trade	and	investment	treaties,	which	may	sway	the	outcome	of	ongoing	disputes	(Chapter	6).		Thus,	 the	empirical	 chapters	of	 this	 thesis	 illustrated	how	specific	 trajectories	and	visions	 of	 economic	 development	 influence	 domestic	 legislation,	 which	may	 be	 used	 to	advance	and	legitimate	dispossession	as	well	as	to	prevent	and	reverse	such	processes.	At	the	same	time,	they	also	indicated	how	the	contents,	interpretation	and	application	of	the	law	are	shaped	by	changing	power	dynamics,	social	struggles	and	the	pressures/constraints	faced	by	the	government.	The	implication	is	that	even	in	epochs,	such	as	the	late	19th	and	early	 20th	 centuries,	 when	 dispossession	 was	 largely	 inimical	 to	 growth	 and	 capital	accumulation,	 laws	 introduced	 to	 limit	or	 reverse	 such	processes	were	often	 ineffective,	especially	due	to	the	political	clout	of	 the	 landed	elite.	Conversely,	 labouring	classes	and	allied	groups	have	used	the	law	in	their	struggles	and	have	occasionally	had	successes	even	during	periods	 (such	 as	 the	present)	 in	which	 government	policy	has	 favoured	 elite-led	development	founded	on	dispossession.	So,	the	law	is	clearly	not	‘above	politics’,	as	some	theorists	and	policymakers	proclaim	or	insinuate,	but	neither	is	it	simply	an	apparatus	of	a	homogenous	ruling	class.	
(3)	The	role	of	property	institutions	in	propelling	-especially	capitalist-	development	is	widely	accepted	as	conventional	wisdom	(Chapter	2);	however,	the	possible	inversion	of	this	relationship	is	rarely	acknowledged.	This	thesis	has	shown	that	landed	property	rights	can	impede	economic	growth	and	capital	accumulation.	During	the	colonial	era	elite	groups	started	amassing	property	rights	over	huge	areas	of	land,	which	they	left	un-	or	under-	used.	Colonial	 officials	 and	 politicians	 post-independence	 repeatedly	 commented	 on	 the	problems	 caused	 by	 a	 property	 system	 that	 facilitates	 land	 hoarding.	 Nevertheless,	speculative	 accumulation	 continued	 unabated	 and	 remains	 a	 problem	 in	 the	 early	 21st	century.	 This	 has	 contributed	 to	 an	 offloading	 of	 land	 pressures	 onto	 smallholders	 and	indigenous/Afro	communities,	who	are	more	vulnerable	to	State-backed	dispossession	and	that	enacted	by	private	actors.	The	former	involves	legislation	authorising	the	violation	and	restriction	of	property	rights	–	itself	a	manifestation	of	the	contradictions	intrinsic	to	the	capitalist	land	regime.	It	is	worth	briefly	summarising	some	of	the	evidence	that	led	me	to	these	conclusions.	
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The	colonial	government	denounced	the	expansion	of	unproductive	latifundia	as	far	back	as	the	late	16th	century.	However,	fiscal	interests	eclipsed	concerns	for	ensuring	lands	were	used	productively	and	property	titles	were	granted	to	those	who	could	pay.	The	issue	gained	 increasing	 attention	 in	 the	 18th	 century.	 The	 Crown	 sought	 ways	 to	 promote	agricultural	growth	in	‘its	colony’	and	many	officials	identified	land	concentration	as	a	key	barrier	to	this	expansion.	Royal	Orders	from	this	period	(mid	to	late	1700s)	asserted	the	State’s	 right	 to	 confiscate	 lands	 that	were	not	 put	 to	productive	use,	 but	 also	 contained	contradictory	reassurances	that	property	rights	would	be	respected	(Chapter	3).	Like	its	colonial	predecessor,	the	newly	independent	State	prioritised	fiscal	objectives	for	much	of	the	19th	century.	It	auctioned	confiscated	Church	property,	sold	off	State	lands	and	 issued	 bonds	 redeemable	 for	 these	baldíos	 -	 all	 in	 order	 to	 service	 its	 debts.	 These	Liberal	 policies	 only	 contributed	 to	 further	 speculative	 accumulation.	 Land	 laws	 were	modified	 in	 the	 1870s	 as	 interest	 in	 promoting	 production	 came	 to	 the	 fore.	 The	government	offered	land	grants	to	peasant	settlers	and	made	newly	granted	property	rights	conditional	upon	economic	use	of	the	land	by	declaring	its	right	to	confiscate	estates	left	unexploited	for	a	certain	period	of	time.	Nevertheless,	the	threat	of	confiscation	was	seldom	acted	upon	and	the	problem	of	idle	landownership	persisted	(Chapter	4).	By	 the	 1920s	 the	 land	 question	 had	 become	 a	matter	 of	 urgent	 national	 interest.	Members	of	both	dominant	political	parties	 (Conservative	and	Liberal)	 agreed	 that	 land	hoarding	 and	 the	 property	 system	 that	 sustained	 it	 posed	 obstacles	 to	 the	 country’s	economic	development.	The	Liberals	had	promised	a	land	to	the	tiller	reform.	However,	the	landed	 elite	 and	 their	 allies	 launched	 an	 anti-reform	 campaign,	 presenting	 plans	 to	confiscate	idle	lands	as	a	communist	attack	on	private	property.	They	managed	to	get	the	original	proposal	watered	down	and	the	resulting	legislation	(Law	200	of	1936)	ended	up	reinforcing	 the	problem.	 It	wasn’t	until	decades	 later,	 following	 the	passing	of	new	 land	legislation	 in	 the	 1960s,	 that	 the	 government	 finally	 put	 its	 taking	 powers	 to	 use.	 The	agrarian	reform	 institute	 INCORA	began	 to	acquire	 (mostly)	 idle	 land	 through	 forfeiture	proceedings	and	to	a	lesser	extent	expropriation.	However,	a	pact	between	the	government	and	the	landed	elite	put	an	end	to	this	brief	redistributive	phase	(Chapter	5)	and	speculative	land	accumulation,	often	under	the	guise	of	extensive	cattle	grazing,	exists	to	this	day.	Government	 officials	 and	 mainstream	 media	 have	 been	 very	 adept	 at	 shifting	attention	 away	 from	 speculative	 land	 accumulation	 by	 elite	 groups	 towards	 other	hindrances	 to	 growth-based	 development.	 Rules	 that	 were	 supposed	 to	 ensure	 the	
campesino	 population’s	 access	 to	 land	 and	 prevent	 further	 property	 concentration,	 for	
  
296	
example,	are	attacked	for	deterring	investment.	Similarly,	prior	consultations	with	Afro	and	indigenous	communities	have	been	labelled	an	‘obstacle’	to	Colombia’s	development	-	given	that	 the	 ‘right’	 to	 free	 prior	 and	 informed	 consent	 has	 already	 been	 overridden	(communities	are	not	allowed	to	veto	projects	declared	of	‘public	utility	and	social	interest’),	the	remaining	‘obstacles’	are	the	costs	and	delays	involved	in	the	process	(Chapter	6).	The	 contemporary	 political	 establishment	 in	 Colombia	 baulks	 at	 the	 idea	 of	redistributive	land	reform,	arguing	that	it	has	to	defend	property	rights.	But	the	reality	is	that	the	market	principle	of	voluntary	exchange	is	regularly	infringed	to	make	way	for	State-backed	projects,	 including	oil	and	mining	operations,	dams,	ports	and	urban	renewal.	 In	other	words,	recent	governments	have	been	more	than	willing	to	violate	property	rights	(especially	 those	 of	 low-income	 homeowners,	 smallholders	 and	 Afro/indigenous	communities)	when	these	impede	the	favoured	economic	model.	In	addition,	Colombian	law	prohibits	titling	within	a	2.5	km	radius	of	non-renewable	resource	exploitation	and	allows	the	 State	 to	 ‘reserve’	baldíos	 for	 -among	 other	 things-	mining	 and	 oil	 investments,	 thus	barring	significant	numbers	of	people	from	accessing	titles	to	their	 lands	and	territories,	which	 in	 turn	 facilitates	 dispossession.	 Put	 simply:	 the	 Colombian	 State	 implicitly	recognises	that	property	rights	can	sometimes	impede	growth	and	capital	accumulation;	this	 is	 embodied	 in	 laws	 that	 permit	 their	 violation	 and	 restriction.	 But	 while	 past	governments	openly	decried	the	problems	caused	by	the	property	regime,	in	particular	its	role	in	sustaining	speculative	accumulation,	recent	administrations	have	been	reluctant	to	acknowledge	the	issue,	especially	when	it	concerns	elite	land	claims.	
(4)	 Broadly	 speaking,	 there	 are	 three	 main	 views	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	dispossession	and	capitalist	development	(Chapter	2).	(i)	Conventional	narratives	advise	that	a	high	prevalence	and/or	risk	of	dispossession	has	negative	 impacts	on	growth	and	investment.	Nevertheless,	policymakers	and	academics,	working	from	the	same	paradigm,	also	 argue	 that	 (ii)	 growth-based	 development	 sometimes	 requires	 dispossession	 and	displacement.	They	justify	State-backed	coercive	land	acquisitions	specifically,	presenting	them	as	a	necessary	cost	of	‘progress’	or	as	a	means	of	overcoming	market	‘failures’.	Finally,	(iii)	critical	scholars,	especially	those	that	draw	on	Marxist	concepts,	tend	to	emphasise	the	role	of	dispossession	in	the	formation	and	expansion	of	capitalist	social	relations	and	capital	accumulation,	historically	and	to	date,	while	also	highlighting	the	regressive	redistribution	such	processes	often	entail.	In	other	words,	they	recognise	the	potential	synergies	between	dispossession	and	capitalist	development	but	don’t	normatively	endorse	these	processes	or	presume	they	benefit	the	public	(i.e.	they	simultaneously	challenge	view	i	and	ii).		
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Though	 this	 thesis	 was	 built	 upon	 view	 iii,	 it	 also	 showed	 that	 the	 relationship	between	 dispossession	 and	 capitalist	 development	 varies	 across	 space	 and	 time.	 More	specifically,	 I	suggested	that	 the	history	of	dispossession	and	associated	displacement	 in	Colombia	is	utterly	different	from	Marx’s	account	of	primitive	accumulation	in	England	and	Scotland.	All	 three	of	 the	above	views	are	 ill-equipped	 to	explain	historical	processes	 in	Colombia.	Recall	that	between	the	16th	and	early	20th	centuries,	on	the	whole,	land	grabs	by	
elite	groups	favoured	neither	economic	expansion	nor	the	development	of	capitalism	and	in	some	 ways	 obstructed	 both	 -	 though	 not	 for	 the	 reasons	 expounded	 by	 mainstream	theorists134.	Recent	processes	of	dispossession,	in	contrast,	have	played	a	much	clearer	role	in	facilitating	growth	driven	by	capital	accumulation.	There	are	a	few	important	examples	of	investment-driven	land	grabs	from	the	late	1800s	and	early	1900s	but	the	important	shift	started	 to	 occur	 mid-century,	 as	 the	 long-established	 elite	 practice	 of	 dispossessing	peasants	in	order	to	subjugate	them	to	the	hacienda	was	gradually	replaced	by	new	forms	of	dispossession	compelled	by	an	interest	in	establishing	or	extending	capitalist	enterprise.	Below,	I	provide	a	recap	of	this	shift,	which	was	consolidated	towards	the	end	of	the	century.	The	Spanish	and	the	elites	in	New	Granada	clearly	profited	from	the	dispossession	of	Colombia’s	 indigenous	 peoples,	 in	 particular	 the	 usurpation	 of	 gold	 rich	 territories.	However,	the	amassing	of	huge	swathes	of	land	by	powerful	settlers,	and	the	uncontrolled	displacement	of	indigenous	people	that	this	elicited,	caused	various	problems.	The	forcible	resettlement	of	the	indigenous	population	to	designated	resguardos	(1600s),	which	served	both	the	land	and	labour	demands	of	the	regime,	played	a	much	clearer	role	in	upholding	the	colonial	economy.	However,	the	tribute	system	that	this	policy	had	supported	entered	into	 decline	 in	 the	 century	 that	 followed,	 and	 the	 government	 started	 to	 dissolve	 the	
resguardos.	 The	 impact	 of	 this	 new	 policy	 (yet	 another	 form	 of	 dispossession	 and	displacement)	 on	 agricultural	 output	 is	 unclear;	 however,	 it	 contributed	 to	 the	consolidation	 of	 the	 hacienda	 system,	 which	 many	 historians	 agree	 was	 comparatively	inefficient.	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 colonial	 era,	 land	 is	 said	 to	 have	 acquired	 more	importance	 ‘as	 a	 factor	 of	 production’	 and	 ‘object	 of	 commerce’;	 still,	 evidence	 suggests	elite-led	dispossession	was	mainly	motivated	by	speculative	interests	and	labour	control,	rather	than	transforming	land	use	and	production	methods	(Chapter	3).	
                                                        134	Conventionally,	a	high	risk	or	prevalence	of	dispossession	is	assumed	to	discourage	investment	by	existing	landholders,	while	also	deterring	potential	investors	from	acquiring	land	(Chapter	2).	But	the	reasons	elite-led	dispossession	hindered	growth-led	development	in	Colombia,	especially	during	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	centuries,	are	different,	as	presented	in	the	main	text	below.	
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Speculative	land	accumulation	and	the	use	of	property	claims	to	acquire	a	dependent	workforce	 (which	 were	 complementary	 and	 sometimes	 indistinguishable)	 continued	 to	define	 dispossession	 throughout	 the	 19th	 century	 and	 intensified	 in	 the	 context	 of	 early	globalisation	and	rising	frontier	migration.	In	order	to	exploit	the	opportunities	afforded	by	rising	global	demand,	the	traditional	landowning	class,	which	already	controlled	large	areas	of	land,	had	to	increase	the	labour	force	under	their	control.	In	this	context,	the	landed	elite	chased	peasant	settlers	across	the	agrarian	frontier,	asserting	property	rights	over	the	lands	they	cultivated	in	order	to	convert	them	into	tenants	and	labourers.	Those	peasants	who	were	unable	to	resist	dispossession	and	did	not	displace	further	afield	were	incorporated	into	a	non-capitalist	regime	of	production	and	labour	exploitation	(Chapter	4).		Similarly,	 in	 the	 early	 20th	 century,	 overall,	 Colombia’s	 economic	 development	proceeded	despite	 -rather	 than	because	of-	dispossession	and	displacement.	During	 this	period,	small	and	medium	coffee	farms	began	to	overtake	the	haciendas.	Foreign	exchange	earnings	 from	 coffee	 exports	 allowed	 for	 the	 importation	 of	 machinery	 to	 support	industrialisation	efforts,	while	incomes	from	coffee	sales	contributed	to	domestic	demand	(unlike	the	centralised	hacienda	system,	which	is	said	to	have	limited	the	expansion	of	the	home	market).	 Furthermore,	 most	 	 food	 consumed	 internally	 was	 supplied	 by	 peasant	producers,	 not	 by	 the	 large	 estates.	 Put	 simply:	 the	 smallholder	 economy,	 which	 the	traditional	landed	elite	sought	to	undermine,	was	financing,	stimulating	and	sustaining	the	country’s	 industrial	 development.	 Finally,	 many	 hacendados	 attempted	 to	 stop	 by	 the	outflow	of	workers	from	the	haciendas	to	construction	and	other	urban	sectors;	suggesting	that	 initial	 industrialisation	 in	 Colombia	 was	 at	 least	 partially	 supported	 by	 voluntary	migration,	rather	than	forcible	displacement	(Chapter	5).		As	noted	above,	the	elite	practice	of	asserting	property	rights	over	lands	cultivated	by	peasant	settlers	in	order	to	convert	them	into	tenants	and	labourers	continued	into	the	early	20th	century	but	gradually	waned	and	was	superseded	by	mass	evictions	in	the	1930s	and	1940s.	These	hacienda	clearances	were	reactionary	(they	were	aimed	at	guarding	against	peasant	land	claims	and,	in	some	cases,	destabilising	the	smallholder	coffee	economy)	and	were	detrimental	to	production	–	at	least	in	the	short	term	(Chapter	5).	State	support	for	a	‘landowner	path’	of	agrarian	development,	the	growth	of	domestic	agribusiness	and	changes	 in	production	 techniques,	 from	 the	1940s	onwards,	 started	 to	alter	the	political	economy	of	dispossession	in	Colombia.	With	government	assistance,	many	landowners	established	mechanised	crops	on	 flatlands	 formerly	used	 for	cattle	ranching	and	usurped	from	peasant	settlers	or	cleared	of	tenants	in	earlier	epochs.	In	other	words,	
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elite	groups	started	to	use	lands	accumulated	through	decades	of	dispossession	in	ways	that	contributed	to	an	expansion	of	exchange	value.	Agribusiness	growth	also	stimulated	new	processes	of	dispossession	–	stirred	by	a	drive	to	expand	profits	within	a	capitalist	system	of	production,	rather	than	an	interest	in	subjugating	peasants	to	the	hacienda	(Chapter	5).	This	type	of	dispossession	became	even	more	ubiquitous	towards	the	end	of	the	century.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 government	 constructed	 a	 legal	 regime	 of	 coercive	 land	acquisition	to	safeguard	the	continued	growth	of	the	mining	and	oil	industries,	 justifying	the	 use	 of	 extra-economic	 force	 on	 the	 dubious	 grounds	 that	 these	 private	 investments	serve	 a	 broader	 ‘social	 interest’.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 para-elite	 land	 grab,	 as	well	 as	opportunistic	and	predatory	property	acquisitions	during	and	in	the	aftermath	of	violence,	served	and	were	served	by	the	government’s	economic	development	model,	in	particular	policies	 aimed	 at	 promoting	 industrial	 agriculture	 and	 commercial	 forestry	 and	mining/energy	projects.	All	 in	 all,	 the	 relationship	 between	 dispossession	 and	 capitalist	 development	 in	Colombia	does	not	fit	neatly	with	any	of	the	views	described	above.	During	the	late	19th	and	early	 20th	 centuries,	 elite-led	 dispossession	 largely	 hindered	 economic	 expansion	(controverting	views	ii	and	iii),	but	not	because	landholders	or	potential	investors	were	put-off	by	insecure	tenure.	Peasant	settlers	continued	to	clear	land	and	plant	new	crops	despite	the	fact	that	their	work	was	likely	to	be	appropriated	by	the	landed	elite;	while	international	investors	that	established	in	Colombia	during	this	period	(e.g.	 the	United	Fruit	Company	and	petroleum	firms)	actually	profited	from	the	tenure	insecurity	endured	by	the	masses	(contrary	to	view	i).	While	there	are	examples	of	investment-driven	land	grabs	during	this	early	 phase	 of	 globalisation,	 the	 traditional	 landowning	 class	 mostly	 usurped	 the	 land	cultivated	by	peasant	settlers	in	order	to	subjugate	them	to	the	hacienda;	such	processes	clearly	 did	 not	 contribute	 to	 the	 formation	 and	 expansion	 of	 capitalist	 social	 relations	(challenging	view	iii).	Recent	and	contemporary	dispossession	in	Colombia,	both	‘legal’	and	‘illegal’,	has	played	a	much	clearer	role	in	profit-driven	capital	accumulation	and	growth-based	 development	 (favouring	 view	 iii	 and	 destabilising	 view	 i).	 But	 this	 dispossession	cannot,	 in	 my	 view,	 be	 justified	 in	 the	 name	 of	 some	 normatively-defined	 notion	 of	‘progress’	(in	contrast	to	view	ii).		 Summing	 up,	 this	 thesis	 has	 offered	 original	 insights	 into	 the	 issue	 of	 land	dispossession	broadly	and	in	the	Colombian	context	specifically.	The	originality	stems	from	the	emphasis,	perspective	and	approach	of	the	research.	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	dispossession	has	typically	been	treated	as	an	appendage	to	other	issues.	In	contrast,	I	put	
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dispossession	at	the	centre	of	analysis.	This	provided	for	a	unique	narration	of	Colombian	history	 and	 a	 distinctive	 account	 of	 recent	 land	 grabs	 in	 the	 country.	 It	 required	 the	construction	of	a	conceptual	framework	focused	on	dispossession,	which	may	be	of	use	to	others.	Meanwhile,	a	critical	political	economy	perspective	allowed	me	to	highlight	how	and	why	dispossession	unfolds	and	the	diverse	factors	that	shape	these	processes,	challenging	mainstream	explanations	of	the	phenomenon.	This	perspective	also	helped	me	to	identify	the	 limitations	 of	 concepts	 such	 as	 primitive	 accumulation	 and	 accumulation	 by	dispossession,	which	predominate	 in	 critical	 scholarship	on	 land	 grabbing.	Much	of	 this	would	not	have	been	possible	without	an	exploratory	research	approach.	I	did	not	set	out	to	 test	 a	 specific	 set	 of	 hypotheses	 and	 hence	 was	 able	 to	 continually	 reformulate	 my	questions	and	ideas.	The	broader	arguments	put	forward	in	this	thesis	open	up	multiple	avenues	for	future	research,	including	projects	focused	on	evaluating	the	validity	of	specific	claims	 (e.g.	 regarding	 the	 role	 of	 property	 rights	 violations	 and	 restrictions	 in	 capitalist	development),	which	 are	 relevant	 to	 scholarship	 concerned	with	 dispossession	 but	 also	wider	 debates	 (e.g.	 regarding	 the	 nature	 of	 capitalist	 market	 economies	 and	 liberal	democracies)	within	diverse	fields	of	social	inquiry.	I	end	this	thesis	how	I	began,	with	the	words	of	people	who	have	been	struggling	against	dispossession	in	their	everyday	lives	-	a	final	 brief	 descent	 from	 abstract	 academic	 discussions	 and	 reminder	 of	 the	 violence	(structural,	symbolic	and	physical)	on	which	capitalist	development	in	Colombia	is	based.		Once	in	2013	we	had	a	meeting	with	a	functionary	from	[the	oil	firm]	Vetra.	She	said:	 “you	 haven’t	 understood,	 the	 government	 sold	 us	 this	 little	 house”	 and	“there	are	some	obstacles	that	we	are	going	to	remove”.	She	said	this	after	we	had	made	a	single	request:	that	she	show	us	just	one	place	where	we	can	see	the	‘golden	birds’	she	talks	about,	a	place	where	oil	[exploitation]	has	had	positive	impacts,	where	the	community	was	better	off	after	the	arrival	of	the	oil	company.	She	replied:	“that	is	impossible”.	[…]	That	same	year	mortar	grenades	were	fired	from	the	military	base	into	the	Reserve	Zone	territory	where	the	company	plans	to	work.	[...	But]	Vetra	hasn’t	been	able	to	enter	[this	part	of	the	PRZ].	We	haven’t	let	 them	(Inhabitants	of	 the	Amazon	Pearl	Peasant	Reserve	Zone	-	Putumayo,	personal	interview,	2015).			
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Two	of	our	friends	are	dead.	They	killed	Aà ngela	Muncué	in	April	and	they	killed	her	husband	in	October.	[...]	When	the	oil	companies	weren’t	here,	we	lived	well.	[...	Now]	there	are	people	wondering	around	at	night	[in	our	lands]	and	we	don’t	know	who	they	are.	So,	when	there	is	opposition,	when	there	is	a	person	who	defends	the	territory,	they	are	disappeared	[or	murdered...]	That	is	the	situation	in	 which	 we	 live	 (Inhabitant	 of	 Jerusalén-San	 Luis	 -	 Putumayo,	 personal	interview,	2015).			The	 government	 has	made	 big	 deals	with	 the	multinationals	 claiming	 that	 in	Putumayo	there	are	no	people,	that	no	one	lives	here.	But	we	live	here!	There	are	people	 in	all	corners.	There	are	no	empty	territories.	The	baldı́os	that	the	government	talks	about,	they	aren’t	baldı́os,	because	our	ancestors	live	there	and	there	are	footprints.	We	are	the	owners	of	our	land	(Inhabitant	of	Floresta	or	Alpes	Orientales	-	Putumayo,	personal	interview,	2015).			 [One	of	the	mining	company’s	functionaries,]	he	told	me:	“we’re	going	to	knock-down	your	town	in	five	years.	The	politicians	of	your	country	legislate	for	us”.	This	struggle	has	been	going	on	since	2005.	[…	For	them]	our	houses	are	worth	nothing,	we	as	humans	are	worth	nothing.	I	fight	for	dignity	[…]	The	only	thing	that	matters	 to	 the	 government	 is	 the	 gold	 (Inhabitant	 of	Marmato	 -	 Caldas,	personal	interview,	2014).		They	 created	 development	 projects	 [palm	 oil	 cultivations]	 with	 blood,	 with	impunity,	with	pain.	That	is	the	cause	of	the	war,	why	war	was	forced	on	us.	[…]	They	 think	about	 the	development	of	 the	 rich.	And	 they	want	 to	 turn	us	 into	business	people,	but	we	are	not	business	people	and	we	don’t	want	to	be.	Our	development	is	not	that	of	destructive	consumption,	it’s	production	for	our	own	survival	and	that	of	humanity	(Inhabitant	of	Curvaradó	or	Jiguamiandó	-	Chocó	cited	in	CIJP,	2005,	p.	61).		
	 	
Epilogue:	land	restitution	and	the	2016	peace	agreement	
	This	 thesis	 would	 be	 incomplete	 without	 a	 concluding	 reference	 to	 two	 ongoing	processes135:	 land	 restitution	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 2016	 peace	 agreement	between	the	Colombian	government	and	the	FARC.	I	start	with	the	former.	The	2011	Victims	and	Land	Restitution	Law	(Victims	Law	or	Law	1448)	established	a	new	route	for	people	to	reclaim	 land	 that	 was	 usurped	 or	 abandoned	 in	 the	 conflict-context.	 The	 Law	 includes	safeguards	not	found	in	ordinary	legal	processes	(e.g.	inversion	of	the	burden	of	proof)	that	favour	claimants	and	hence	is	not	tailor-made	to	suit	the	beneficiaries	of	dispossession,	as	some	observers	insinuate.	Representatives	of	the	landed	elite	would	not	be	working	so	hard	to	reform	Law	1448	if	it	already	served	their	interests	well136.	Nevertheless,	as	reiterated	throughout	 this	 thesis,	 the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	 dispossession	 is	 never	straightforward.	A	few	brief	points	deserve	mention	here.		(1)	Significant	numbers	of	people	who	may	be	eligible	for	restitution	have	not	even	applied	(see	my	article:	Thomson,	2017);	among	other	reasons,	due	to	ongoing	violence	and	threats	against	 the	dispossessed.	At	 least	72	 land	restitution	 leaders	and	claimants	 from	across	Colombia	have	been	murdered137	(Valencia,	2016).	As	one	human	rights	defender	explained:	“In	all	of	Caldas	there	is	dispossession	but	there	is	more	fear	than	dispossession.	There	are	many	that	have	told	me	[in	response	to	suggestions	that	they	should	apply	for	restitution]:	 ‘definitely	 not,	 because	my	mother	 doesn’t	 want	 any	more	 problems	 –	 we	already	had	so	many	problems	when	they	took	us	from	the	 land’…”	(Personal	Interview,	2015).	Thus,	dispossession	may	go	unchallenged,	not	because	of	the	way	the	law	is	written,	but	 simply	because	 the	victim	 is	 too	scared	 to	claim.	Law	1448	expires	 in	2021	and	 the	government	recently	decreed	a	deadline,	after	which	no	more	restitution	applications	can	be	received	(CCJ,	2018)	-	so	for	those	who	haven’t	applied,	it	will	soon	be	too	late.		
                                                        135	 This	 epilogue	 was	 originally	 going	 to	 be	 a	 full	 chapter.	 However,	 I	 faced	 the	 difficult	 choice	between	including	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	restitution	program	and	the	2016	peace	agreement	and	other	chapters,	which	I	ultimately	decided	were	more	important	to	this	thesis.	136	There	have	been	multiple	attempts	to	reform	Law	1448.	The	Centre	Democratic	Party	just	put	forward	(September	2018)	yet	another	proposal	to	reform	restitution,	which	experts	suggest	would	turn	the	Law	into	a	tool	for	legalising	dispossession	(Observatorio	de	Restitución,	2018).	137	The	total	number	of	leaders	and	claimants	killed	is	likely	to	be	higher,	especially	when	those	who	applied	under	previous	 restitution	processes	 are	 included:	 for	 example,	 the	Ombudsman’s	Office	documented	the	murder	of	71	land	restitution	leaders	between	2006	and	2011	(HRW,	2013,	p.	30)	–	i.e.	prior	to	the	passing	of	the	Victims	Law.	
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(2)		The	restitution	process	under	Law	1448	includes	an	administrative	and	a	judicial	phase.	While	judicial	sentences	tend	to	favour	restitution	–	e.g.	a	sample	of	1,500	sentences	revealed	94%	of	cases	were	resolved	in	favour	of	the	claimant	(Forjando	Futuros,	2016),	a	recent	 investigation	 by	 the	 Colombian	 Commission	 of	 Jurists	 (CCJ)	 points	 to	 the	 high	numbers	of	applications	-more	than	40,200	cases	or	circa	63%	of	those	reviewed-	rejected	during	 the	 administrative	 phase,	 especially	 during	 the	 period	 2015-2017.	 The	 Land	Restitution	 Unit	 does	 not	 have	 a	 detailed	 record	 indicating	 why	 each	 application	 was	rejected.	The	CCJ	notes	that	the	rate	of	rejection	increased	significantly	in	recent	years	and	suggests	that	the	criteria	used	by	the	Unit’s	functionaries	must	have	changed.	It	is	likely	that	at	least	some	of	these	more	than	40,000	applications	were	rejected	prematurely	on	unfair	grounds	(CCJ,	2018).	So,	other	cases	of	dispossession	may	go	unchallenged	due	to	careless	administrative	decisions	or,	as	suggested	by	CCJ,	the	drive	to	meet	targets	and	deadlines.	(3)	Having	reached	the	judicial	phase,	the	dispossessed	may	face	pressure	to	sign	land	use	 contracts	 with	 the	 current	 occupant.	 Article	 99	 of	 Law	 1448	 insinuates	 that	 the	displaced	will	be	obligated	 to	accept	existing	agroindustrial	projects	on	 their	 ‘restituted’	land	through	the	signing	of	such	contracts.	In	cases	where	the	occupant	is	deemed	to	have	acted	in	‘bad	faith’,	control	of	the	project	is	passed	onto	the	Land	Restitution	Unit	(which	may	contract	 third	parties	 to	manage	and	operate	 it)	and	any	profits	should	be	used	for	‘reparations’	 of	 the	 restituted	 parties	 and	 other	 victims	 from	 the	 area	 (Congreso	 de	 la	República	de	Colombia,	2011a).	Concerns	were	 taken	 to	 the	Constitutional	Court,	which	resolved	that	Article	99	is	‘conditionally	constitutional’	-	upon	the	understanding	that	the	continuation	of	a	project	would	depend	on	 the	victim’s	consent	 (Sentence	C-820	 -	Corte	Constitucional,	2012).	Some	observers	rightly	suggest	that	the	consent	proviso	could	prove	meaningless	 “given	 the	 asymmetry	 of	 power	 between	 the	 claimant	 and	 the	 occupant”	(Amnesty	International,	2014,	p.	41).	However,	I	have	not	found	sufficient	information	to	assess	whether	or	not	 this	has	become	an	 important	 tool	 for	 securing	 land	use	 changes	achieved	through	dispossession.	(4)	Many	oil	and	mining	concessions	overlap	with	land	usurped	or	abandoned	in	the	conflict-context	and	with	corresponding	restitution	claims	(Peña,	2013).	In	some	instances,	the	 overlap	 may	 be	 incidental,	 but	 in	 others	 there	 are	 clear	 links	 between	 forced	displacement	 and	 the	 extractive	 industries,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 8.	 The	 2014-2018	National	Development	Plan	affirmed	that	it	should	be	considered	‘judicially	impossible’	to	restitute	 land	 in	 areas	 required	 for	 PINES	 or	 Projects	 of	 National	 Strategic	 Interest,	including	 oil	 and	 mining	 investments.	 The	 associated	 legislation	 basically	 tried	 to	
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rationalise	 the	 double-dispossession	 imposed	 on	 people	 in	 such	 cases,	 by	 incorporating	expropriation	into	the	restitution	process.	The	Constitutional	Court	declared	Article	50	of	the	Development	Plan	Law	(1753	of	2015)	unconstitutional,	but	not	 for	 the	reasons	one	might	hope.	The	Court	sentence	guarantees	victims’	‘right’	to	be	dispossessed	through	the	same	procedures	that	apply	to	other	citizens	-	rather	than	through	the	restitution	process	(Sentence	C-035	-	Corte	Constitucional,	2016a).	Hence,	the	ruling	reiterates	that	restituted	land	is	not	excluded	from	the	forcible	 imposition	of	mining	and	oil	operations	and	other	investments	considered	of	‘public	utility’	-	the	interested	company	simply	must	wait	until	restitution	is	complete	and	then	initiate	standard	procedures.		The	legal	norms	are	vague	about	what	should	happen	to	displaced	people	whose	land	is	already	occupied	by	mining	or	oil	operations.	A	judge	would	probably	offer	relocation	or	monetary	compensation	instead	of	restitution,	as	described	under	articles	72	and	97	of	the	Victims	Law.	The	latter	notes	a	list	of	reasons	the	judge	may	consider	restitution	impossible,	such	as	(a)	if	the	land	is	in	a	‘high	risk	area’;	(b)	if	the	land	has	already	been	restituted	to	another	victim	who	was	usurped	of	the	same	plot;	(c)	if	there	is	evidence	that	restitution	would	compromise	the	life	or	personal	integrity	of	the	victim	and/or	his	or	her	family;	or	(d)	if	the	land	has	been	totally	or	partially	destroyed	to	a	point	that	would	prevent	the	victim	from	rebuilding	his	or	her	life	there	(Congreso	de	la	República	de	Colombia,	2011a).	Mining	and	oil	operations	could	constitute	a	risk	to	 the	returning	 farmer	or	community	or	have	caused	total	or	partial	destruction	of	the	land	and	hence	fall	under	this	list	of	‘exceptions’.	In	sum,	active	mining	and	hydrocarbon	projects	may	prevent	restitution	from	taking	place,	while	returnees	can	be	forcibly	displaced	and	dispossessed	a	second	(or	third!)	time	to	make	way	for	future	investments.	For	many,	this	renders	meaningless	the	‘guarantees	of	non	 repetition’	 promised	by	 the	Victims	Law.	Recall	 the	 examples	 from	César:	 evidence	suggests	paramilitary	forces	in	the	region	were	funded	by	coal	companies	and	that	many	assassinations,	displacements	and	land	grabs	were	aimed	at	benefitting	this	industry.	So,	contrary	to	what	the	Constitutional	Court	claims	(Sentence	C-035	of	2016),	dispossessing	or	displacing	someone	a	second	or	third	time	to	make	way	for	projects	that	are	intimately	tied	with	the	history	of	violence	they	already	suffered	can	indeed	be	called	‘re-victimisation’.		(5)	 Even	 if	 a	 person	 plucks	 up	 the	 courage	 to	 apply	 for	 restitution,	 successfully	overcomes	 any	 barriers	 in	 the	 application	 process,	 gets	 past	 the	 administrative	 phase,	obtains	a	 restitution	 sentence	 to	 their	 favour,	 are	not	pressured	 into	accepting	 land	use	agreements,	and	are	not	affected	by	oil	and	mining	concessions	-	this	does	not	guarantee	a	successful	return.	There	are	multiple	impediments,	here	I	mention	just	two.	In	a	few	cases,	
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the	 current	 owners/occupants	 of	 the	 restituted	 land	 have	 refused	 to	 leave	 and	 even	attacked	returnees.	More	generally,	it	may	not	be	safe	for	the	dispossessed	to	re-establish	on	their	lands.	Many	more	families	may	not	be	able	to	afford	to	return	and	rebuild;	limits	on	compensation	written	into	Law	1448	and	related	decrees	mean	that	the	support	offered	is	often	insufficient.	The	program	doesn’t	even	absolve	victims	of	debts	that	they	were	unable	to	pay	as	a	 result	of	 the	conflict	 (e.g.	 investments	 tied	up	 in	crops	and	homes	 that	were	destroyed)	 and	 returnees	 are	 expected	 to	 take	 on	 new	 loans	 to	 finance	 replacement	cultivations	and	homes.	The	upshot	is	that	some	could	be	obligated	to	sell	their	restituted	land	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 associated	 transaction	 freeze	 period	 is	 over	 or	 could	 even	 end	 up	foreclosed	on	by	the	bank	(see	e.g.	Amnesty	International,	2014).	Put	simply:	the	restituted	may	be	dispossessed	yet	again	through	market	mechanisms,	intimately	tied	to	the	violent-context	and	underfinancing	of	Law	1448.	Overall,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 restitution	 policy	 exemplifies	 the	 government’s	endeavour	 to	 simultaneously	 project	 a	 strong	 rule	 of	 law	 without	 destabilising	 the	established	 economic	 model.	 This	 means	 challenging	 the	 means	 or	 methods	 without	challenging	 the	 wider	 outcomes	 of	 dispossession.	 Arguably,	 the	 Santos	 administrations	(2010-2018)	were	particularly	keen	to	strengthen	the	legitimacy	of	the	government,	both	internal	 and	 external.	 Legislations	 such	 as	 the	 Victims	 Law	 surely	 contributed	 to	 the	country’s	admission	into	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	and	its	 improving	 reputation	 as	 an	 ‘investment	 destination’.	 I	 do	 not	 mean	 to	 imply	 that	restitution	is	merely	a	tool	for	getting	in	the	international	community’s	good	books.	I	believe	many	 of	 the	 people	 who	wrote	 Law	 1448	 and	work	 hard	 to	 implement	 the	 restitution	program,	despite	the	difficulties,	genuinely	want	to	see	the	dispossessed	regain	their	lands.	However,	 it	 is	 clear	 that,	 overall,	 the	 government	 does	 not	 aim	 to	 reverse	 the	 violent	transformation	of	the	Colombian	countryside.		Similar	 arguments	 can	 be	 made	 about	 the	 2016	 peace	 accords.	 The	 Santos	administration	repeatedly	promised	that	neither	property	rights	nor	the	economic	model	would	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 negotiations	 with	 the	 FARC	 (see	 e.g.	 El	 Espectador,	 2015;	 El	Tiempo,	2014b).	This	leaves	a	question	mark	hanging	over	celebratory	declarations	that	the	agreement	will	help	“solve	the	historical	causes	of	the	conflict”	(Acuerdo	Final,	2016,	p.	10).	The	first	point	of	the	agreement,	on	Integral	Rural	Reform,	promises	to	create	a	Land	Fund	with	3	million	hectares	for	distribution.	Where	will	this	land	come	from?	Forfeiture	proceedings	 against	 (e.g.)	 narcotraffickers	 and	proprietors	who	 left	 their	 lands	 idle;	 the	recovery	of	State	lands	acquired	unlawfully;	purchases	and	donations;	and	expropriation	
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(Acuerdo	Final,	2016,	p.	14)	–	all	mechanisms,	it	should	be	said,	that	already	existed	in	law.	It	is	unlikely	the	government	will	make	significant	use	of	expropriation	and	confiscation	of	idle	lands	belonging	to	elites.	Indeed,	official	discourse	focuses	on	furnishing	the	Fund	with	State	lands.	However,	this	clashes	with	the	legislative	counter-reform	described	in	Chapter	6,	which	includes	efforts	to	legalise	ex-post-facto	the	unlawful	acquisition	of	State	lands	and	to	 facilitate	 the	 leasing	 of	 remaining	 baldíos	 to	 large-scale	 investors.	 Hence,	 while	negotiating	 with	 the	 FARC,	 the	 Santos	 administration	 was	 simultaneously	 promoting	polices	that	undermine	what	is	supposed	to	be	the	basis	of	the	Land	Fund	at	the	centre	of	the	 first	 point	 in	 the	 accords.	More	 generally,	 it	 has	 sustained	 a	 bias	 towards	 industrial	agriculture,	which	sits	uneasily	with	its	‘peace	vow’	to	support	the	‘campesino	economy’.		So,	the	government	has	been	pushing	forward	with	the	established	economic	model,	as	 promised	 to	 national	 and	 international	 investors.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	mining	 and	 energy	sectors,	 representatives	were	 already	 assessing	 the	profitability	 of	 the	peace	 agreement	before	the	deal	was	signed:	“the	conflict	is	happening	to	a	great	extent	where	there	is	oil,	and	above	all	 the	oil	of	the	future.	Peace	liberates	the	oil...”	(President	of	Ecopetrol,	 Juan	Carlos	 Echeverry,	 in	 an	 interview	 published	 with	 Dinero,	 9/16/2015).	 Thus,	 the	disarmament	of	the	FARC	may	enable	new	processes	of	dispossession	and	displacement	by	opening	up	areas	where	investments	had	been	limited	because	of	their	presence.		To	reiterate	a	point	made	in	the	introduction	of	this	thesis:	a	de-escalation	of	armed	conflict,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 is	 likely	 to	 transform,	 rather	 than	 resolve,	 dispossession	 and	associated	displacement138.	The	lived	experiences	of	people	displaced	for	‘development’	and	those	displaced	in	the	context-conflict	are	not	dissimilar.	The	historical	overlap	between	‘legal’	and	‘illegal’	forms	of	dispossession	and	displacement	in	Colombia	only	intensifies	this	lived	similarity.	Millions	of	rural	Colombians	are	unlikely	to	swiftly	forget	the	links	(proven	and	suspected)	between	the	extractivist	economy	and	the	war	waged	against	them.	Nor	are	they	likely	to	quickly	forgive	the	State’s	role	in	this	dynamic.	For	many,	without	a	change	in	the	economic	model,	the	transition	to	‘peace’	is	emptied	of	substance.	
                                                        138	In	any	case,	not	all	regions	in	Colombia	can	celebrate	the	‘de-escalation	of	armed	conflict’.	Some	were	already	controlled	by	ELN	rebels	or	neo-paramilitaries,	while	many	other	regions	-previously	strongholds	of	 the	FARC-	are	now	disputed	between	different	groups,	 including	dissidents	of	 the	latter	who	 refused	 to	disarm	and,	of	 course,	 State	 forces.	Meanwhile,	 targeted	assassinations	are	reported	to	have	increased.	According	to	one	source,	between	the	signing	of	the	peace	agreement	in	November	 2016	 and	 May	 2018	 -i.e.	 in	 less	 than	 2	 years-	 some	 385	 community	 leaders,	 land	restitution	 claimants,	 environmental	 activists,	 human	 rights	 defenders	 and	 ex-combatants	 were	murdered	-	161	of	them	belonged	to	the	movement	Marcha	Patriótica	(Contagio	Radio,	2018).		
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